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ABSTRACT
The written aspect of this practice-based thesis ‘collates’ a one-day event exploring the question, 
‘What is dialogic art?’ into a textual account. The practical aspect threads through this account, with 
reference to its dissemination elsewhere made frequently.
The event ‘documented’ here is a ‘barcamp’, a kind of ‘unconference’ that combines presentations 
with responsive discussion. This barcamp brings together practitioners of art, activism, education, 
philosophy, sociology, sociolinguistics, literary theory and criticism, and others to explore dialogic art 
through a dialogue that moves amongst their respective points of view.
The barcamp’s collation tracks the contributors’ discursive struggle to co-author dialogic art as a 
dialogue-based approach to contemporary art practice. ‘The dialogic’ that qualifies this art accretes 
through the barcamp as an artistic disposition preoccupied with the constitutive agency of dialogue, 
understood here in an expanded sense. This disposition explores the myriad relations that preoccupy 
authorship qua authorship. These include the material and conceptual thresholds organising creative 
agents and their cultural production: participation and collaboration, process and outcome, the 
author and the authored.
The epistemological foundation of this barcamp can be defined as dialogic because it understands 
knowledge as arising from social relations and enacted through intersubjective exchange. Similarly, 
the ontological basis for this project issues from a post-structuralist sense of subjectivity as 
simultaneously dispersed and multiple, distributed amongst authors. These philosophical perspectives 
underpin the theory of subjectivity evolved through dialogic art. This theory recommends the art’s 
authors as ‘responsive subjects’—artist-agents who are themselves reciprocally authored through 
their artistic practice. This reciprocal authorship explodes the twin myths of the independent artist-
author and the discrete artwork without abandoning the facticity of their historical existence. Always 
contingent, dialogic artworks and their artist-agents are presented in this project as polyphonic 
portraits of heterogeneous becoming achieved through dialogic exchange.
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COLLATOR’S NOTES
Barcamps are a type of unconference that combines dynamic discussion with prepared 
contributions, such as demonstrations, presentations and short workshops. Barcamps are often 
documented impressionistically, coming together after the fact as fragments in a range of media. 
Tweets are favoured over transcripts and snapshots over video.  The dynamic nature of this mode 
of assembly and its forms of address makes it resistant to easy representation. It is not uncommon 
to hear ‘barcampers’ say that, when it comes to this kind of experience, ‘You really had to be 
there to understand’.  And, for sure, the vast majority of events like the one pictured in this thesis 
do resist capture. The general recollections, occasional-but-sharp impressions and embodied 
experience distributed amongst all those involved remains largely ‘off the page’ of documentary 
accounts.
Nevertheless, researching dialogic art through a barcamp seemed apt, with the interplay of 
voices and perspectives distinguishing this form as explicitly dialogic. Exploring the question, ‘What 
is dialogic art?’, this barcamp aims to enact what it seeks to explore with a homologous coupling of 
content and form across the transcript and the other aspects composing the barcamp’s collation.
 I took up the challenge of collating this barcamp as an enthusiastic ‘barcamper’, but a novice 
in authoring such a comprehensive account. I have tried, wherever possible, to present this event 
in fidelity with the barcamp’s form, its organizational protocols and discursive tendencies, including 
wide-ranging conversations and use of props, such as PowerPoint slides. Yet, when it comes to the 
transcription proper, several considerations are worthy of mention.  At times, the contributors’ 
dialogue becomes heated, with them speaking over each other. To maintain the flow of discussion 
on the printed page, editing was required. Choosing which interjections to include and exclude was 
by no means easy.  And I would like to thank my supervisors, Neil Cummings, Stephen Scrivener 
and Mary Anne Francis for their editorial suggestions. With their encouragement, I approached 
collating this barcamp as something akin to a production. Honouring the contributors’ respective 
perspectives, embodied in their contributions, on the one hand, I have sought to make their 
discursive exchange accessible and significant to those encountering the barcamp ‘after-the-fact’ 
on the other. For sure, this balance proved challenging to strike, with the perceived needs of one 
constituency sometimes taking priority over the other.
There was also the contributors’ nonverbal communication to consider: their sighs, coughs, 
guffaws and all the rest. How to include or exclude these utterances? After several experiments, 
I settled on a sparse approach to avoid cluttering the transcript. Only nonverbal utterances or 
ambient noises that notably impact the discussion are included, as in the case of the barcamp 
clapping after the contributions, transitioning from one to the next.  Another consideration 
was how to reference sources in the contributions and discussion. Deciding these worked 
best as endnotes, I have sometimes included direct quotations here of ones paraphrased in the 
contributors’ dialogic exchange. From time to time, it seemed necessary to expand some of the 
contributors’ ideas expressed in passing. In doing so, I aim to clarify lines of thought or draw 
out their significance. I have indicated these supplementary notes with an * to differentiate them 
from the others. Finally, the ‘documentary’ photographs, the presentation slides, select tweets 
and handouts are all integrated into the main body of the text. Other materials distributed in the 
barcamp are included as appendices at the end.
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Marsha Bradfield: It’s recording?
Allison Jones: The red light is on.
Marsha Bradfield: Hello, everyone. If you could take your seats, we’ll get started. My name is 
Marsha Bradfield and it’s my very great pleasure to welcome you all with a 
few opening comments. Though to be honest, I’m sorry to be interrupting the 
discussion that was brewing over coffee on dialogue as labour. I’d like to keep 
this going, so feel free to interject.
Now, at the beginning of events like this one, there is usually a reminder 
to turn off your mobile phones. But instead I suggest you leave them on and 
I invite you to contribute to our Twitter feed. We’ll see how well it works for 
sharing your thoughts and observations about our discussion as it unfolds. 
Think of this as ‘live feedback’. Presenters may choose to respond to the 
tweets directly or not. Either way, the feed will be projected alongside our 
discussion. You can use your own handle or remain anonymous by posting 
as ‘DialogicArt’; the info on how to do this is included in your barcamp pack. 
(See A.1)
Now, according to convention, a welcome address begins with a greeting, 
after which the host acknowledges notable guests. But as you’re all notable 
and this is an intimate gathering, I’ll ask you to briefly introduce yourselves at 
the end of this welcome. I’ll say more about barcamps, which is the name of 
today’s discursive format, a little later on. For now, let me acknowledge that, 
in keeping with barcamp practice, introductions are done quickly by stating 
Fig. 1.1
Fig. 1.0  
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your name, along with two or three keywords related to your contribution. 
In this way, we’ll get a sense of the day’s lineup. This is also indicated by the 
sticky-note schedule, which is another barcamp practice. (Fig. 1.0)
So, as you know from the barcamp announcement—and I’m referring 
here to the open call, which I’ve also included in your barcamp packs—we’re 
here today to explore the question, ‘What is dialogic art?’.  I will, in due 
course, offer a response, but on the condition that it’s only one response—a 
departure point for our discussion, something to kick against and evolve. And 
Allison and I have very good reason for prioritising this discussion of dialogic 
art. Now—
David Rooksby: Excuse me, Marsha, but Allison is—?
Marsha Bradfield: Well, as some of you know, I’m pursuing a collaborative, practice-based PhD 
with Allison Jones, but we’re writing separate theses. Allison is a critic, curator 
and art historian and she is researching an evaluative framework for dialogic 
art.
Now, there is significant overlap in our practice-based projects but, as 
an artist, my research is preoccupied with dialogic forms—forms that are 
predisposed to representing a range of authorial relations. I came to the 
barcamp’s own dialogic form through working with Critical Practice,1 which is 
the group featured barcamping in my slides. (Figs. 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, 
1.10, 1.11 )
So Critical Practice is a research cluster supported by Chelsea College 
of Art and Design, where Allison and I are doing our PhDs. I’ve been a 
member of CP for more than five years now and—by organising, facilitating 
and contributing to the cluster’s many barcamps—I’ve developed a deep 
appreciation for this dialogic form. Barcamps are good at bringing voices, 
knowledges, sensibilities and other dynamics into relation through combining 
prepared presentations with responsive discussion. In my experience, this 
dialogic form is especially well suited—tailor made, in fact—for co-producing 
knowledge and understanding through a kind of immersive experience. And 
I had this in mind for today’s gathering: that by inhabiting the barcamp with 
our bodies, our thinking, our attention, our enthusiasm and our expertise, we 
might gain a richer sense of what distinguishes a dialogic form from other 
types.
Ella Stone: Other types? What other types might those be?
Marsha Bradfield: Well, think of academic conferences in comparison to barcamps, where 
experts read their papers at an audience.
Ella Stone: Is this not still a dialogic form? Because there is dialogue involved, oui? The 
papers address the audience? And what about the post-paper questions? 
They would be dialogic, would they not?
Shadworth Dyson: If I may come in on this, Marsha. Your question—forgive me, but you are—
Ella Stone: It’s Ella. Ella Stone. Et vous, monsieur?
Fig. 1.2  
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Shadworth Dyson: Shadworth Dyson. Very pleased to make your acquaintance. Your question, 
Ella, is a sharp one in that it cuts into dialogic forms as constitutive of dialogic 
art. I shall take this up in my presentation later this morning, when I discuss 
how it is that some forms are more dialogic than others and consider what 
consequences this has for dialogic art.
David Rooksby: More dialogic. I feel like I’ve stumbled into a conversation that’s already in full 
swing and everyone seems to know what ‘dialogic’ means except me. I’m not 
complaining. I just want to join the party.
Clark Chris: Well then, you can count on my contribution—coming up next. I’ll take up 
‘the dialogic’ in relation to dialogue, among other things.
Marsha Bradfield: And hopefully we’ll surface some of the tacit understanding that our 
discussion is already taking for granted. It may be a useful foundation, but it 
will need to be unpacked.
David Rooksby: The sooner you define ‘dialogic’ the better. I mean, we can’t very well talk 
about dialogic art without clear agreement about what ‘dialogic’ means.
Marsha Bradfield: It’s a good comment because it’s a practical one. I’ve said the barcamp’s 
form differs from an academic conference. This is especially the case when 
pre-scripted papers marked by dialectical argumentation are the norm. 
By contrast, the logic of the barcamp as a dialogic form is more dynamic, 
responsive—provocative, even. Think of the barcamp presentations as 
primers for discussion, in contrast to self-contained arguments that are fully 
worked up and worked out.
Allison Jones: It’s absolutely crucial to our research that we orient ourselves in this barcamp 
and come to terms with how, in particular, this dialogic form facilitates our 
interaction. With this in mind, a word or two about questions and comments.
I would like to remind you that questions that aim to clarify something 
and comments intent on extending our discussion’s remit will propel our 
dialogue. However, from time to time it will be necessary to defer their 
consideration, so that additional insights and information that are not 
directly relevant to the immediate presentation can be brought to bear. This 
is central to our research, which is, of course, our primary reason for being 
here today. So, for example, when Marsha or I—or another interlocutor, for 
that matter—flags a question for future consideration, it’s because discussing 
all the questions, comments and concerns raised in this welcome address 
goes beyond what we can hope to accomplish—at least, in the immediate 
contribution. But to be sure, David, defining ‘dialogic’ and ‘dialogue’ is vital 
if we are to evolve our understanding of dialogic art, and I look forward to 
hearing what Clark has to say about this.
Marsha Bradfield: In this same spirit of deferral, I’ll resist saying more about dialogic forms and 
hold off discussing Critical Practice, as I know from a recent conversation with 
Phil that he’ll consider one of the cluster’s projects in his contribution this 
afternoon.
But I hope that, in light of what has been said so far about the logic of 
dialogic forms, you can see more clearly—or at least a little more clearly—
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why your contributions, anchored in a range of distinct and specialised 
perspectives, are so key to evolving an understanding—or understandings—of 
dialogic art. We need your response—responses.
Phil Hind: So you’ve smuggled in a definition of dialogue through the back door, 
Marsha! Granted, I’m listening with the ears of a sociologist, but I think 
you’ve said there is more to dialogue than interaction between human actors. 
Dialogue also describes the interplay of their different positions, their distinct 
points of view—their perspectival diversity.
Krista Wiseman: Human actors? As in theatre? A dialogue in a play or film?
Phil Hind: No, though it makes good sense that one would hear it that way. I’m using 
the term ‘actor’ here in a sociological sense, as opposed to a dramatic one, 
to describe someone or something with sufficient volition to associate and 
dissociate with other actors.2
David Rooksby: So you’re saying that dialogue is more than just people talking.
Marsha Bradfield: Yes.
David Rooksby: Dialogue is also about different points of view being in dialogue with each 
other.
Marsha Bradfield: In a manner of speaking, yes. The idea being that interlocutors tend to hold 
different perspectives, with these finding expression through their interaction. 
So—
David Rooksby: But who or what is doing the interacting here? The points of view? The 
people? What? Or, I guess, who—whom—who? You know what I mean.
Marsha Bradfield: Well, both are interacting. Dialogue is a multiplex basis for dialogic art, which 
is why we need your help.
Allison Jones: What Marsha is trying to say is that, by addressing the question, ‘What 
is dialogic art?’ from a range of perspectives, we aim to generate, for our 
research, a richer understanding or understandings of dialogic art composed 
of distinct points of view—including yours—than we could do on our own. So 
a stronger sense of dialogic art as both theory and practice. 
John Johnson: Okay, so more is better? Look, not necessarily—not as far as I’m concerned.
Ella Stone: Oui, mais is it an issue of more perspectives? Or is it closer to different 
and more nuanced perspectives? Perspectives that might feed into an 
understanding—or understandings, as you say of dialogic art—that we reach 
through dialogue.
Shadworth Dyson: Well, when you put it that way, there’s no pressure!
Marsha Bradfield: Actually, you’re quite right to flag this, Professor Dyson.
Shadworth Dyson: Do call me Shadworth.
Allison Jones: As Marsha says, you’re right to flag this, Shadworth. There is pressure. Or 
more specifically, through our work together, Marsha and I perceive that 
evolving a theory and practice of dialogic art is pressing. And this perceived 
importance—this urgency—pertains to the constitutive role of dialogue 
in contemporary art practice. What are the so-called ‘dialogues’ that have 
assumed centre stage in cultural production, and which are often celebrated 
as liberating and progressive? And how do they compose cultural forms, 
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including dialogue-based art practice? What are their methods and ambitions, 
their socio-political conditions? Who are their interlocutors?3 These are some 
of the questions behind the central one that brings us here today: ‘What is 
dialogic art?’
Cassy Appadurai: Excuse me, Allison, but has dialogue really ‘assumed centre stage in cultural 
production’, to use your turn of phrase?
Clark Chris: You want evidence? That wouldn’t be my question because, for my sins, 
I spend most of my time in dialogue. As I was saying to Phil over coffee, 
‘dialogue’, in my experience, is a turnstile for funding bodies bound by 
well-intentioned but misguided policies that are hell bent on making art 
accountable.4 I’m a jobbing artist and, you know, it’s all about dialogues, 
because dialogues are the so-called impact indicators—like the contact 
days we’re expected to have, shaking hands and chatting with the public or, 
worse yet, doing workshops.5* It’s just too much, really. Anyone here a public 
programmer or arts policy person? Nope? None of you looks the type.
Ella Stone: If it is curators you are looking for, Brian and I fit into that category.
Marsha Bradfield: Allison and John do, too.
Krista Wiseman: I also curate.
Marsha Bradfield: At the risk of sounding glib, arts policy impacts us all.
Clark Chris: Then you’ll know that all this dialogue in art, around art—as art—is really the 
downside of the dematerialization of the art object. Could be that dialogue 
is just too familiar—we do it all the time, it’s the stuff of life, really. For 
whatever reason, it’s easily instrumentalised by the powers that be. I mean, 
conceptualism happened nearly half a century ago. And look at art now! 
Today, it’s a case of ‘dialogue, dialogue everywhere and not a drop of art to 
drink’.
John Johnson: Okay, you’re saying there’s not enough art in the world? Not enough objects? 
Is that what you mean? But the majority of museum collections are in 
storage! I once heard that, in the case of Tate, it’s like 70%.6 Listen, dialogue 
as sheer intersubjective exchange could be a sustainable development in art, 
which, as we all know, is a field given to fetishising material culture.
Phil Hind: ‘Sheer intersubjective exchange?’ I’m not sure what’s more question-begging: 
the ‘sheer’ part of this suggestion or what you mean by ‘intersubjective 
exchange’. I have some reservations—
Clark Chris: And what about ‘sustainability’? My own sustainability? I’m so busy 
dialoguing with the public and with art administrators that there’s very little 
time or energy to have a decent conversation with my own art. That’s why I’m 
here today—to figure out ways to do a better job of managing and extracting 
value from all the dialogues that cinch together my art practice.
Maeve Cutty: Well, ah what you’re saying sounds a lot like ‘a theory of the work’,7 as Michel 
Foucault puts it. He gives the example of Nietzsche’s laundry list. Is this a 
work or isn’t it? How do we take up, ah, the empirical task of editing and 
grouping—evaluating—cultural production without a theory of the work?8 
Simply put, this remains very much up for grabs. There’s a real need for 
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theories concerned with organising cultural production into multifarious 
outcomes that critically consider their own complexity and contingency, as 
such.
Clark Chris: A theory of the work as in an artwork? How about a theory of artistic practice 
that both includes and goes beyond the artwork? Yes, it’s a good point, 
because it gets at all the work that’s carried out to bring an artwork into 
being—all the labour that makes art happen.
Maeve Cutty: But, if I may come in on this, there’s something else. It goes back to David’s 
questions about how we’re defining ‘dialogic’ here. When it comes to the 
practice of dialogic art, I think we need to ask what counts as a dialogue, and 
why certain dialogues count as dialogic art and not others, right?
Clark Chris: There is also the question of how to include these other dialogues in dialogic 
works of art, as well as what we gain from doing so.
Cassy Appadurai: Could you clarify what you mean by ‘other’ dialogues?
Clark Chris: You know—all the planning, the preparation, the emails, the phone calls, 
the meetings and the decision-making. They all tend to be othered—to be 
disappeared, actually—in the artwork as an outcome.
Marsha Bradfield: But do we want to include them, and what benefit results from doing so?
Maeve Cutty: That’s a good point, Marsha. I see yours and raise it with another one: that 
we might also think about these other dialogues as Foucault might have, by 
which I mean we would encompass all the discursive modes—the valorisation, 
attribution, circulation and appropriation—that actually go into creating 
works of art and other forms of cultural production, right?9
Clark Chris: Yes, those too. It’s like what you were saying about storage, John. When 
it comes to art practice, what gets recognised as ‘artworks’ is only ever a 
fraction of what’s involved, what’s been produced—the energy that’s been 
expended. Yeah, a 30/70 split sounds about right, actually.
KK Lin: But, if I can interject, I’m, um, thinking that it’s not just about making all this 
labour available in the case of dialogic art. It’s about making it accessible in a 
meaningful way, isn’t it? I think this comes onto questions of documentation 
and dissemination, doesn’t it? Under the broader umbrella of representation?
Marsha Bradfield: Yes. And this distinction between making these dialogues—this labour—
accessible in contrast to merely available is something we should hold onto, 
KK. The same goes for your concerns about bounding dialogic artworks, Clark 
and Maeve.
Allison Jones: Of course, this discussion of differentiation calls to mind another distinction 
that’s important to our research. What makes dialogic art different from other 
dialogue-based practices of contemporary art?
Clark Chris: Well, I’m repeating myself, but I think this art could expand our sense of art 
practice to include and go beyond the artwork through the simple act of 
accounting for all the work that goes into it—a theory of art practice based on 
dialogue as labour, really. You look surprised, Marsha.
 29    28
Marsha Bradfield: Not at all, and I’m fascinated by your labour-based concern, as this isn’t 
something that Allison and I have really explored in our preliminary research. 
But by now it should be clear that we organised today’s event as a barcamp 
to bring a range of perspectives to bear on dialogic art, so you’re right on task 
with your particular interest, Clark.
David Rooksby: Look, I really don’t mean to be difficult, but an artwork has to have limits—
it has to have some kind of shape or form, and an artistic one to boot. 
Otherwise, it’s just all work and no art.
Phil Hind: So on one hand there’s growing consensus here that dialogic art could 
expand our established notions of ‘the artwork’, and I don’t disagree. Yet, 
on the other hand, David’s point is well taken, as expansion introduces a risk 
of infinite regress, if you see what I mean. So the question begged is, ‘What 
determines the boundaries of a dialogic work of art?’ That’s something I’d like 
to know.
Allison Jones: I have another caution to add. Clark’s comments pertain to the broader 
context of dialogic art and how dialogue is ‘impacting’ contemporary art more 
generally, and I’ll place that word in air quotes for your sake, Clark. However, 
audit culture is only one instance of this impact.
Clark Chris: Your point being?
Allison Jones: That listening to the way you’re describing dialogue seems to indicate a 
number of presuppositions that have the potential to take on a prescriptive 
hue. For example, you appear to be conflating the rise of dialogue, or its 
increased visibility in contemporary art, with audit culture. But it behooves us 
not to invest dialogue with too much particular significance too soon, making 
it value-laden so it’s already encumbered by ideological baggage.10
Clark Chris: Who said anything about dialogue being value-laden? All I said is that I’ve 
come to accept that much of my art practice is spent in dialogue and, as this 
seems unlikely to change, I’m looking for ways to make the most of it, really. 
You know, twenty years ago I spent a lot of time building stretchers, pulling 
canvas and spreading gesso. Today, I dialogue.
Marsha Bradfield: Hold on to that thought, Clark, as I move this welcome address in a slightly 
different direction. I hope we can sustain this level of discussion. But Allison 
and I would also like to use this contribution to introduce several outcomes of 
our preliminary research on dialogic art that might inform today’s exchange. 
So perhaps a little sign posting would help to anticipate what we aim to cover 
in the next half hour, as well as focus our broader discussion.
I want to say something about the influence of popular culture on 
dialogic art, after which Allison will engage it from the angle of dialogue-
based contemporary art practice. She’ll also take stock of some of the 
rationales for our research and then I’ll offer a few more words about the 
barcamp format. After this, we’ll introduce ourselves and then crack on with 
the other contributions.
Fig. 1.3  
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Alright, so what influence might popular culture have on dialogic art, 
with this art understood in a very general sense as a dialogue-based approach 
to contemporary art practice? Allison is going to supplement the broad 
strokes of my thinking by tweeting evidence to—
Allison Jones: Support some of Marsha’s  generalisations. We’ve never co-delivered in this 
fashion before. It’s an experiment; bear with us.
Clark Chris: A tag team, a division of labour—what have I been telling you?
Marsha Bradfield: To consider the influence of popular culture on dialogic art, I want to connect 
this to our barcamp’s dialogic form. Both the discursive format and the Twitter 
feed (Fig. 1.3) can be described as social media, come under the banner of 
Web 2.0. We might think of the barcamp as a kind of analogue version of a 
chat-room exchange or a Skype interface. Added to this, the Twitter feed will 
supplement our discussion with citizen journalism. We have microbloggers 
hard at work, demonstrating the potential of this technology by annotating 
our barcamp with a layer of meta-discussion—live.
All this points to what I would like to dub ‘the dialogic turn’ in culture 
at large. But I googled it—someone else has already coined this expression, 
and it resonates with quite specific significance. Of course, in and of itself, 
dialogue through forms like peer-to-peer exchange is nothing new. My cattle-
ranching grandfather got his barns built on the prairies of Alberta, Canada 
by helping other cattle ranchers to build theirs, or by trading equivalent 
skills. And this peer-to-peer exchange is also how we’re going to expand our 
sense of dialogic art through this barcamp as a multi-threaded platform—by 
drawing on each other’s expertise and enthusiasm through our discussions, 
both on and offline.
So when it comes to dialogue being new, it’s less a question of what 
than how. Yes, dialogue has been technologically mobilised and intensified, 
with the Internet resulting in mass connectivity. And, yes, this technology 
has encouraged patterns of use, with people dialoguing through high-profile 
platforms like Facebook and YouTube and also emerging ones, such as 
N.E.W.S. and aaaaarg.org (Fig. 1.4), which are becoming key organs for a range 
of cultural production. It’s also true that many of us spend a good part of our 
lives online, or with these Internet platforms running in the background, on 
the fringes of our attention. All this is to acknowledge that, as an approach to 
contemporary art practice concerned with intersubjective exchange, dialogic 
art is developing both in response to as well as through social media, peer-
to-peer networking and other forms of enhanced connectivity. Dialogic art, 
in our working understanding, explores intersubjective exchange as people 
interact with objects, networks, information and/or each other to produce 
dialogic works of art.
David Rooksby: Hang on. Earlier we talked about dialogue as ‘an exchange between people 
and/or distinct perspectives’. You’ve also said that you’ve been thinking 
about dialogic art as a particular approach to dialogue-based practice in 
contemporary art. And now you’ve said that it explores ‘intersubjective Fig. 1.4
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exchange as people interact with objects, networks, information and/or each 
other to produce dialogic works of art’. It seems like you already know what 
dialogue is and what dialogic art is. So I’m not sure what the pressing need is 
for a barcamp.
John Johnson: Okay, but to me the point is—look, can you name an artwork or art practice 
that’s not produced as people interact with objects, networks, information 
and/or each other?
Ella Stone: Oui, mais, is it not a question of emphasis? Is dialogic art not especially 
concerned with the intersubjectivity arising from this interaction—this 
exchange?
John Johnson: Okay, but, look, even then, I would argue that all art is ‘especially concerned 
with intersubjectivity’. I mean, isn’t this what’s produced through the triple-A 
relation of artist-artwork-audience? The point is, artworks are interfaces for 
intersubjective encounter; they put subjects in relation—necessarily.
Ella Stone: Well, no, not necessarily. Or, at least, I’m not sure. I suppose it depends 
on how Marsha and Allison are defining intersubjective exchange—
intersubjectivity—does it not?
Allison Jones: Suffice to say, for the moment, that we understand this as arising through the 
interaction or exchange between or among sentient subjects—people, really. 
But our research will require that we elaborate this in due course.
Ella Stone: Allison, I think perhaps you have found a useful placeholder. But could we 
get back to popular culture? Does anyone else find that what Marsha has 
said about the influence of this on dialogic art sounds awfully familiar? Does 
not Nicolas Bourriaud also promote intersubjective exchange as a central 
aspect of relational art in his influential work, Relational Aesthetics?11 More 
specifically, does not Bourriaud say that, relational art, with its meetings, 
openings and services, can be tied back to socio-technological developments? 
In fact, he speaks about this art form—a particular kind of art practice that 
emerged in the 1990s—responding to, for instance, the loosening of social 
relations by the alienating effects of, for example, TV— television—as a one-
way broadcast system.12 Have you any thoughts on this?
Marsha Bradfield: Well, Ella, my PhD research actually evolved from a critique of relational 
aesthetics. I have a slide here somewhere. Just let me find it.
Allison Jones: Bear with us. The upside to making a discussion-based barcamp contribution 
is that it’s dynamic. The downside is that one’s linearly organised slide 
presentation labours to keep pace, and PowerPoint isn’t very nimble.
Marsha Bradfield: Thanks, Allison. So what you’re looking at here is a very old document (Fig. 
1.5). As you can see, it dates back to April 2007, before Allison and I became 
co-researchers. The RF3 is the University of the Arts London’s proposal for 
PhD registration. It sketches the aims and objectives for the research and 
indicates the context of its exploration. It’s really the second paragraph that I 
think is relevant here, as it speaks about the formative relationship between 
relational art, by which I mean relational aesthetics, and my research on 
dialogic art. And so here I wrote:Fig. 1.5
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My research will address a problem that I see characterising participatory 
art in general and relational aesthetics in particular: Participation is 
typically understood as limited to making in the art. It does not extend to 
the making of the art. In Rikrit Tiravanija’s Untitled (Tomorrow is Another 
Day) (1996), for example, participants were invited to ‘make the work’ 
by cooking, eating and so on. They were not, however, encouraged to 
interact with the artwork’s form—to change its structure. Participation 
was thus limited to making Tiravanija’s work in accordance with the 
parameters determined by the artist in advance.13  (Fig.1.5)
 And I remain committed—
Allison Jones: We are committed—and if I may say so, Marsha, would this be a good place 
for me to take over? Many thanks. So we are committed to elaborating 
dialogic art as closer to a self-organising system than one directed by Marsha 
as the artist or me as the critic, curator or art historian. However, in terms 
of pre-existing models, we have come to understand dialogic art as having 
a stronger affinity with the dialogue-based art practice of dialogical art than 
with relational art, underpinned by Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics, per se.
Now, American art historian Grant Kester has been promoting ‘dialogical 
art’ since before the millennium and theorising it through what he calls 
‘dialogical aesthetics’. The most comprehensive expression of this to date 
comes together in his important book, Conversation Pieces: Community 
and Communication in Modern Art. Here, Kester considers the project-
based practices of artists Lucy Orta, Suzanne Lacy, Stephen Willats, the 
Artist Placement Group and others. And Kester’s preoccupation with the 
dialogues composing their practices has been central to evidencing the ways 
in which dialogue is assuming ‘centre stage’, as I made the point earlier, in 
contemporary art. Kester’s argument is built on the premise that:
While it is common for a work of art to provoke dialogue among viewers, 
this typically occurs in response to a finished object. In [dialogical] 
projects, on the other hand, conversation becomes an integral part of 
the work itself. It is reframed as an active, generative process that can 
help us speak and imagine beyond the limits of fixed identities, official 
discourse, and the perceived inevitably of partisan political conflict.14 
(Fig. 1.6)
This premise not only locates dialogue in the artwork, it also describes 
dialogue as a productive process of intersubjective exchange as the artwork—
as art. So when it comes to overlaps between ‘dialogic’ art and ‘dialogical’ art, 
two are especially noteworthy.
Firstly, they share an interest in the dialogues generated in the artworks 
and also composing them; and secondly, they aim to recognise the ways in 
which these dialogues impact each other to generative effect.15 Now, Kester, 
[and I should say he makes this comment with reference to dialogical art] 
Kester celebrates this as an ‘open-ended process of dialogical engagement, 
which produces new and unanticipated forms of collaborative knowledge’.16 
Fig. 1.6
Fig. 1.7
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(Fig. 1.7) This suggests that, in addition to these artworks being produced 
through literal dialogues, the plurality of perspectives that they embody then 
synergise (an awful but appropriate word) to create new forms of knowledge.
Hillary Murphy: I believe this is the fourth time the word ‘knowledge’ or one of its cognates 
has been mentioned today. That’s all very good, but what does Kester mean 
by the ‘collaborative knowledge’ produced in dialogical art?
Allison Jones: Well, knowledge isn’t something that he explicitly considers in Conversation 
Pieces or ‘Dialogical Aesthetics: A Critical Framework for Dialogic Art’—
beyond what I’ve already said.
Hillary Murphy: But, you see, it’s difficult to claim that dialogical artworks generate 
‘collaborative knowledge’ without offering at least some sense of what this 
 knowledge is—how it might differ from other kinds or forms of knowledge 
and other knowledge practices, if you see what I mean. I think it’s best 
not to waylay our discussion by exploring this difference now—I assume 
it can wait until the after-lunch review. At that point, I hope to propose an 
understanding of the dialogic epistemology that might ground dialogic art, 
and I think we all might find that helpful.
Allison Jones: I look forward to that, Hillary. I’m sure your contribution will be very useful to 
our research. Now, having observed Kester’s premise that dialogical artworks 
are composed of literal dialogues, and having also indicated this composition 
is prime to our working definition of dialogic art, I would like to note four 
limitations of Kester’s approach, and I believe these point to key rationales 
for Marsha’s and my research. 
  These rationales are more fine-grained than our overarching conviction 
that dialogue remains an under-theorised, yet nevertheless, vitally 
constitutive aspect of contemporary art in dialogue-based art practices and 
beyond. I believe Marsha has printed out these rationales and will hang them 
in plain view so we can keep them in mind over the day. Marsha? Yes, there is 
fine. Thank you. (Fig. 1.8)
Now, turning to the first rationale, Kester argues that we need a 
more nuanced understanding of communicative experience. He describes 
this as ‘one capable of differentiating between an abstract, objectifying 
mode of discourse that is insensitive to the specific identities of speaking 
subjects’.17 (Fig. 1.9) What this draws into view is Kester’s interest in the 
identity formation occurring through social and discursive interaction. While 
I don’t have time to discuss this in detail, the sociologists in the room may 
be especially interested to learn that Kester elaborates this with reference 
to Jürgen Habermas’s argument that discourse is not merely a tool for 
communicating pre-established content.18 Kester describes discourse as 
a generative process, with ‘subjectivity [being] formed through [it] and 
inter-subjective exchange itself.’19 (Fig. 1.10)  Hence, in light of this declared 
interest, it is surprising that Kester does not substantively explore his concern 
with discourse and/as intersubjective exchange in his discussion of dialogical 
artworks or aesthetics. Kester does point to speech acts20 as constitutive of 
Fig. 1.8
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this art. But, this indication aside, Kester does not pursue what Marsha and I 
have come to term the dialogueness of dialogues in our preliminary research. 
And by this we mean the interplay of dialogue’s social and material qualities 
that have made it such an enduring form of social interaction. In this respect, 
the limitations of Kester’s approach are broadly representative. There is still 
important creative and intellectual work to be done around many aspects of 
dialogue as social and artistic practice in contemporary art.
Shadworth Dyson: Well, one would be hard pressed to speak about dialogue without 
considering the utterance as both the material of communicative exchange 
and a nexus of intersubjectivity, making it an index of dialogue’s sociality. 
What does Kester have to say about Bakhtin’s theory of dialogue?
David Rooksby: I’ll pretend that I understood what you just said. But Bakhtin—remind me.
Shadworth Dyson: The Russian sociolinguist, literary theorist and philosopher of language, 
Mikhail Bakhtin.
Allison Jones: It’s a revealing question, Shadworth, because although Kester declares in 
the introduction to Conversation Pieces that his concept of dialogical art and 
aesthetics derives from Bakhtin’s sense that an artwork can be understood 
as ‘a kind of conversation’;21 and although Kester says this concept will be 
further clarified in his discussion on dialogical aesthetics later in his book;22 
this is never forthcoming—and only brief mention of Bakhtin is made via two 
secondary accounts, namely Ken Hirschkop’s Mikhail Bakhtin: An Aesthetic 
for Democracy,23 and Jeffery T. Nealon’s discussion of Bakhtin in Alterity 
Politics: Ethics and Performative Subjectivity.24
Tina Wiseman: Those are both very useful sources.
Allison Jones: Indeed. Now, in addition to advancing a more nuanced understanding of 
communicative experience, Kester also insists on a dialogical artwork as 
a process of communication in contrast to a physical object.25 Curiously, 
however, this is something else he foregoes exploring in depth. Instead, 
he turns his attention to the interlocutors’ identities in dialogical projects 
(so who they are) as well as the projects’ organisation (the ways in which 
the projects are structured and how they facilitate the interlocutors’ 
intersubjective exchange). He also considers the projects’ purpose (what they 
aim to accomplish).26 But where is reference to dialogue as a material process 
of communication—reference to what, in particular, the dialogues in these 
projects entail? Their substance in contrast to their form or function? Where 
are the data—the actual dialogues—that justify Kester’s broad (though 
theoretically well-informed) conclusions, which he favours in lieu of close 
readings of actual dialogic exchange?
Now, an important reason for Kester’s more theoretical approach 
pertains to his positionality as a researcher. He tends to report on these 
artworks from the perspective of an interlocutor who is not directly involved 
in their production.27 And, to be fair, Kester cites this as a limitation, 
observing that it makes it impossible, for instance, for him to gauge with any 
accuracy the interlocutors’ interactions in their authorial process28—what, 
Fig. 1.10
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exactly, is expressed and what implications this has for their intersubjective 
exchange—as they author dialogical works of art.
Now, I should say that supplementing Kester’s reportage on dialogical 
art as an umbrella for dialogue-based practice, there are some artists, 
including Adrian Piper29 and Suzi Gablik,30 who have written about their 
practice from the perspective of practitioners who are directly involved in 
this art’s intersubjective exchange accreting through its authorial process. But 
these are, in effect, exceptions that prove the rule; first-hand examination 
of dialogue as intersubjective exchange in dialogue-based contemporary art 
remains limited. This points to another area where Marsha’s and my research 
may contribute to the field. As interlocutors in the production of dialogic 
artworks, and by researching them through practice, we may develop modes 
for cultivating, representing and disseminating the complexity of their co-
authorial process, including the intersubjectivity to which they give rise.
I have one—no, actually two more rationales for researching dialogic art 
and evolving it as an approach that both overlaps and departs from dialogical 
art.
Krista Wiseman: Excuse me, Allison. It’s getting so stuffy in here. Do these windows open?
David Rooksby: Some air would be good.
Allison Jones: By all means, Krista. They’re not locked. Now, the second-to-last rationale 
concerns Kester’s ambivalence to aspects of dialogical artworks that are 
not explicitly discursive. These include aspects that have traditionally been 
perceived as artistic, as taking the form of artistic expression. So, for instance, 
Kester writes that it is ‘not through the manipulation of representational 
codes in painting and sculpture, but through processes of dialogue and 
collaborative production’ that identity is negotiated through dialogical 
artworks.31 But why separate dialogue from the material and symbolic 
practice of art? By doing so, isn’t Kester neglecting the variety of possible 
ways that dialogue can occur through objects, materials and forms of one kind 
or another--including but also in addition to verbal exchange? Informed by all 
your contributions today, we imagine dialogic art taking a different approach, 
one that acknowledges a wider range of dialogues.
Clark Chris: Well, yes of course! To my mind dialogic art is an approach to contemporary 
art based on dialogue as labour, different kinds of labour, working with 
different kinds of material and—
Allison Jones: Yes, I can see the connection here, but if you’ll allow me to finish, Clark. I 
would like to conclude this part of our welcome address by noting with critic 
and curator Nicolas Bourriaud that, ‘Artists look for interlocutors and involve 
them in the artwork’s production.’32 As Marsha has acknowledged, your 
contributions in this dialogue are indispensable to our research as we evolve a 
theory and practice of dialogic art. 
      With this in mind, a final rationale for our investigation—and this relates 
directly to today’s event—is to both evolve and understand dialogic art as 
a constitutive practice. This points to the general methodology organising 
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our research, which can be described in broad terms as ‘fine art’. Yet this 
distinction isn’t necessarily an easy one to make, beyond the fact that this 
research developed from Marsha’s practice as an artist and mine as an art 
historian—or by force of nomination, by virtue of an institutional definition 
that leans on the authority of the art school to authorise it as such.33 In other 
words, we can think of this research as ‘fine art’ because it is supported by 
Chelsea College of Art and Design, University of the Arts London. The point 
at issue is this: when it comes to contemporary art practice, very little is 
methodologically intrinsic to this as fine art.34 As the so-called artworlders 
here today will surely agree, the multiple forms, facets and functions of 
contemporary art makes it methodologically polyvalent.
David Rooksby: Say what?
Allison Jones: I’m saying this art depends on other fields, adopting and adapting their 
respective methods, sensibilities and other resources in the service of its 
needs. As my PhD supervisor, Mary Anne Francis, likes to say, when fine art 
deploys these disciplines in its service, it functions as something other—it 
operates differently than they do.35 Looking at the barcamp’s sticky-note 
schedule (Fig. 1.0), it’s clear the understanding or understandings of dialogic 
art that we evolve today will be informed by a wide range of methodological 
and disciplinary approaches that you—the interlocutors—bring to bear. Yet, 
by emphasising the significance of our fine art research on dialogic art as art, 
it may, in effect, be the ways in which this art is not these other disciplines 
that it might acquire its artistic significance.36
Now, a more positive spin on this sense of art’s negative identity is to 
understand it as extra-disciplinary. If interdisciplinary is between disciplines, 
then extra-disciplinary goes beyond them. Philosopher and theorist of cultural 
production Brian Holmes posits extra-disciplinarity in contemporary art as a 
vein of artistic practice—a kind of movement for turning toward and turning 
back via reflexivity. So extra-disciplinarity, in Holmes’s understanding, ‘conveys 
the desire or need to turn towards something else, towards an exterior field 
or discipline; while the notion of reflexivity indicates a critical return to the 
departure point, an attempt to transform the initial discipline’.37 This bending 
back can open up ‘new possibilities of expression, analysis, cooperation and 
commitment’.38 And what Holmes is observing here is a growing commitment 
in contemporary art to regeneration—not from inside the field of fine art, but 
from beyond.
Anne Lang: Allison, may I interject to request, you know—a point of clarification?
Allison Jones: By all means.
Anne Lang: How are you really differentiating ‘extra-disciplinary’ from ‘trans-disciplinary’? 
I mean, couldn’t it be argued that ‘trans-disciplinary’ better describes ‘going 
beyond’ than ‘extra’ does?
Allison Jones: Well, like ‘extra-disciplinary’, ‘trans-disciplinary’ is a contested term. In my 
understanding, the latter tends to deploy action research methods to solve 
often complex, real-world problems by pooling distinct knowledges.39 
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 Trans-disciplinarity also emphasises the social aspect of problem solving 
to achieve ‘a common good.’40 A designer, an engineer and a doctor may 
work together to improve a water distribution system by converging on 
this problem with their specialised knowledge. So I would say that trans-
disciplinarity’s emphasis on perspectivalism makes it predisposed to shoring 
up disciplinary boundaries in contrast to blurring them, with experts 
approaching the task at hand from their personal-professional perspectives.
Phil Hind: Isn’t that what we’re doing in this barcamp? And yet you’re saying that 
dialogic art is ‘extra-disciplinary’.
Allison Jones: Perhaps it’s more a case of this art being trans-disciplinary in some ways and 
extra-disciplinary in others. I mean, perhaps dialogic art is trans-disciplinary in 
structure, as it brings diverse points of view to bear on each other, and extra-
disciplinary in its quest to produce something—an artwork—that subsumes 
these perspectives under a mantel that is not sociology, not pedagogy, not 
education, etcetera.
David Rooksby: Well, when it comes to this meeting being either, what did you say?, trans-
disciplinary or extra-disciplinary? Or a case of and/also? We’ll have to suck 
and see, won’t we? It’s still early days.
Marsha Bradfield: Agreed. Allie, this might be a good time for me to say a few words about the 
barcamp format, and then the contributors can introduce themselves.
Allison Jones: Certainly.
Marsha Bradfield: Very briefly, the first barcamp was in Palo Alto, California in 2005. It focused 
on computer programming, as did the other initial barcamps. Now, these 
user-generated ‘unconferences’, as they’re called, brought coders together to 
work on buggy programs, especially in early-stage web applications.41 In the 
case of our immediate barcamp, the so-called problem is expressed as the 
question, ‘What is dialogic art?’ That’s, clear by now, isn’t it? Yes? Good. 
    Moving right along, a central principle in barcamping is that everyone 
contributes; there are no tourists.42 I’ve invited some of you to discuss specific 
issues, while others responded to the open call. This comes onto the order of 
our barcamp contributions. I should mention that in keeping with barcamp 
practice, there is no preset schedule, because it depends on who shows up 
on the day. I’ve tried to organise your contributions thematically (Fig.1.0). 
But some are bound to sit next to each other more easily than others. Each 
contributor will have approximately forty minutes—which is about four 
times longer than the average barcamp slot—and we have some double 
presentations offered by duos, including Allison and me. 
David Rooksby: So barcamp presentations are now the length of lectures. I thought the whole 
point was to give a quick-and-dirty demo, and then talk about it.
Marsha Bradfield: That’s true. But as this is an intimate gathering and we have the whole day, I 
thought this tweak would create space for deeper consideration of topics of 
interest.
Fig. 1.11
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Allison Jones: At the same time, we encourage you to keep your prepared contributions 
short and split your time fifty-fifty—half of it being focused talk on a particular 
subject and the other half, responsive discussion. The hybridisation of these 
forms of address determines the barcamp as a particular mode of assembly.
Marsha Bradfield: Thanks, Allison. And thanks also to everyone for having their slide 
presentations ready to go. I’ve loaded them onto my laptop and will hand 
you the remote when it’s your turn. I should also mention we’re making 
an audio recording of this event and the transcripts will be published and 
publicly disseminated. I’m doing the transcribing myself and will keep 
editing to a minimum. Speaking of the barcamp’s collation, I expect some of 
your contributions will have citations,43* which would be good to include as 
endnotes following each talk or demonstration for further reference. I’ll ask 
you to supply these in due course.
I should also say that I know from experience that barcamp discussions 
can move from topic to topic at a steady clip. The point is this dialogic form 
is predisposed to going broad instead of deep.  You know, Kester says in 
Conversation Pieces that a ‘good’ avant-garde work of art is ‘provocative 
yet indeterminate, opaque yet open to differing responses’.44 I think this 
also applies to barcamp discussion. In addition to digressing from topic to 
topic, barcamps unfold through a range of discursive approaches: exposition, 
exegesis, reflection, questions, interjections and other discursive techniques. 
All this is to say that, if engaging this discussion demands focused and 
responsive attention in the throes of its real-time exchange, it can be even 
more difficult to follow in transcription.
KK Lin: This may connect back to my comment about the distinction between an art 
practice merely being available and, um,  being accessible in a meaningful 
way, though in this case you’re referring to the transcripts.
Marsha Bradfield: Yes, so when it comes to collating this barcamp, presenting it in fidelity to our 
discussion, capturing the gist of our exchange will be very much on my mind. 
I want it to be accessible to those who encounter it after the fact through 
its transcription. So it’s a question of fidelity and communicability. I have no 
doubt that balancing these distinct and potentially competing demands is 
sure to be challenging and I wonder—do you have any suggestions? This is my 
first time collating a barcamp.
Shadworth Dyson: Well, are you familiar, Marsha, with Bakhtin’s ‘superaddressee’? This 
could, perhaps, be a useful consideration in orienting our discussion—
and your transcription. The ‘superaddressee’ is an authority beyond the 
immediate dialogue—an authority the interlocutors aim to address in 
addition to those actually present—and the superaddressee’s absolute 
responsive understanding is presupposed from a kind of metaphysical 
distance or displacement in time. In the case of a dialogue composed of two 
interlocutors, the superaddressee constitutes the third.45 The significance 
being that bearing in mind this absent interlocutor may help us to anticipate 
the broader reception of our barcamp exchange.  
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Marsha Bradfield: I’ll try and keep this in mind.
Allison Jones: And we encourage you all to do the same.
Cassy Appadurai: This communicability extends to the Twitter feed?
Marsha Bradfield: Yes, of course. Perhaps you could say more about this when we do the 
introductions, Cassy. The published version will spread across several 
registers, in keeping with the ones composing the barcamp as a real-time 
event. So in addition to the transcripts, the slides, the end notes and the 
appendices, the tweets will also be included. I think that’s enough said about 
the barcamp’s publication. What am I missing?
Allison Jones: Health and safety.
Marsha Bradfield: Everyone’s favourite. It’s a little unfortunate they’re testing the fire alarm 
today at 2:15, but there’s nothing we can do about it. So if the alarm rings at 
another time, please flee the building by following the signs. And we’ll take 
lunch at the time of the test, as we’ll have to vacate anyway. It’s late, I know, 
so please help yourself to snacks.
So, with housekeeping done and dusted, let’s do some introductions. If 
you could just offer your name and two or three keywords, and we’ll do the 
intros in order of appearance. I’m a little late, but my words are ‘barcamp,’ 
‘practice’ and ‘dialogic forms’. Allison?
Allison Jones: Hello. As you know, I’m Allison Jones and my words are ‘evaluative 
framework,’ ‘rationales’ and ‘methodological extra-disciplinarity’. Clark, you’re 
next.
Clark Chris: ‘Dialogue,’ ‘dialogic’ and ‘the dialogic’—and labour, of course. 
KK Lin: Hello. I’m KK Lin and I have three key terms or phrases—‘representation’, 
‘reflexivity’ and ‘spatial relations’.
Ella Stone: I’m Ella Stone. Bonjour. Shall I introduce my partner, Brian Updike, as we’ll 
present together, one after the other? Your keywords, Brian?
Brian Updike: ‘Context,’ ‘context,’ ‘context’.
Ella Stone: He is making a joke. My keywords are ‘collective collaboration’ and 
‘alienation’. Brian, encore une fois, s’il vous plaît?
Brian Updike: ‘Agonism, immanence, relational practice’.
Marsha Bradfield: Your reference to ‘immanence’ reminds me that we were expecting the 
eminent Derridean Judith James. But I’ve received a text apologizing for her 
absence today. Now, I’ve asked Shadworth to speak about the significance of 
the utterance in dialogic art and I was hoping Judith’s discussion of Derrida’s 
deconstruction would be a foil for his Bakhtinian approach.
Shadworth Dyson: Well, yes, that would certainly have been an interesting conversation!46 
Perhaps another time. In any event, my keywords would have to be 
‘utterance,’ ‘literacy’ and ‘Bakhtin’.
Krista Wiseman: Sooo, I’m next up and my name is Krista Wiseman and my words are ‘affect,’ 
‘bodies’ and ‘politics’.
Phil Hind: Bodies?
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Krista Wiseman: Right. I haven’t actually prepared anything, but I’d like to say a few words 
about the embodiment of politics, the ways in which politics are located in 
and between our corporeal selves. David?
David Rooksby: That sounds cool. Well, I’m David Rooksby. It’s great to be here. Thanks, you 
guys, for organising this. It’s been terrific so far. So, ‘campaigns’ ‘promotion’, 
‘focus group’. Oh and this is my PA, Tommy—Tommy Low. He is prepping my 
bit as we speak and I’ll explain why we chose this ‘just-in-time’ format for this 
gig later. It’s all good.   
Marsha Bradfield: That just great, that’s everyone before lunch. Hillary, you’ll be kicking off the 
afternoon with an after-lunch review.
Hillary Murphy: Well hello, my name is Hillary Murphy and I’m an art educator. I’ll be 
approaching dialogic art from the perspective of pedagogic theory. 
I’ll facilitate the after-lunch review and discuss what I’ll term ‘dialogic 
epistemology’. Maeve, would you like to follow on from that?
Maeve Cutty: Thanks, Hillary. Rebel that I am, I think I’ll opt for one great long key phrase: 
‘the death of the author and the birth of the reader and scriptor’. Tina?
Tina Wiseman: Well what to say? As artists who work largely in collaboration, Christian and I 
are interested in dialogic art from the perspective of ‘responsive subjectivity’ 
and ‘the ethics of authorial practice’, which we’ll consider with reference to 
Marsha’s project, ‘Art Idol 2010’.
Marsha Bradfield: Thank you. Phil?
Phil Hind: Thank you, Marsha. I’m Phil Hind and my key terms are ‘PARADE,’ ‘Actor 
Network Theory’ and ‘heterogeneous materials’.
Marsha Bradfield: Cassy and Anne, could you say a few words about your respective roles in this 
barcamp?
Cassy Appadurai: Sure. I’m not an artist, curator or academic. I’m an art journalist and, instead 
of making a scheduled contribution, I’ll be microblogging the barcamp. The 
W5 in your contributions—who, where, why, what, when and how—is what 
I aim to capture in my tweets. So if I ask you to clarify these things, you’ll 
understand, well, why. I’d like to avoid misrepresenting anyone, if I possibly 
can.
Now, at the very beginning of this barcamp, Marsha spoke about the 
tweets being kind of like ‘live feedback’ and encouraged us to tweet and 
respond to tweets in our contributions. I think it’s worth mentioning that 
we may not be the only interlocutors involved in this conversation. I’m 
curious to see how well the tweets work to make an event like this barcamp 
accessible in Twitter as another space-time. So it’s worth bearing in mind the 
composition of your tweets. I recommend keeping them simple, expository—
or, alternatively, poetic and impressionistic. I know that is an obvious thing 
to say, but these sorts of considerations will help those who aren’t here by 
making the barcamp a little more outwardly facing.
Also, I really like the idea of a ‘superaddressee,’ Shadworth.  But I’ll 
be taking a different approach. I’m not sure it’s true, but I once heard that 
novelist Kurt Vonnegut wrote for his sister, Alice. Well, I’ll be tweeting for my 
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sister, Heather. She’s an intelligent person who is not part of the worlds of art, 
so I figure that if she can understand my tweets, then others will too. Heather 
is not so much an ideal respondent as she is representative of the kind of 
interlocutor we may encounter online. 
Finally, if you’re addicted to acronyms, like I am, please define them on 
first use. My Twitter name is Duchamp’s Sister, by the way. And I guess my 
keywords would have to be ‘140-character limit’.
Anne Lang: Hello, everyone. I’m Anne Lang. I’m an artist-researcher and cohort of 
Marsha’s and Allison’s at Chelsea, and my practice-based PhD investigates 
the ways in which contemporary art is discursively produced through verbal 
languages—I mean, both written and oral ones. I’ll be tweeting under the 
handle of TheJargonBuster. Basically, I’ll define terms that strike me as 
obscure or specialised, alright? And following on from Cassy’s comment, 
if I ask you to explain something—a word or an expression—it’s because, I 
mean, I’m trying to understand how it is that you are deploying this specific 
terminology. I’ll then try and encapsulate this gloss in the Twitter feed. My 
keywords are ‘dialogic art lexicon’, because that’s really what I’m hoping to 
seed over the course of the day. My tweets will be a sort of embedded and 
abbreviated glossary that Marsha, Allison or, really, anyone else with an 
interest in dialogic art can develop further at some point.
Cassy Appadurai: Marsha, earlier someone tweeted that we should keep a list of questions 
raised in the contributions. Could this be a way of minuting specific areas of 
interest, which we may or may not have time to discuss?
Marsha Bradfield: Well, I don’t doubt this would be useful. But it’s yet another task—more 
complexity, more work. Is there anyone here enthusiastic enough to take on 
the job of minuting the questions?
John Johnson: I’m already on it, as I figured they might inform how I tackle the guideline 
session at the end of the day. 
Marsha Bradfield: Thanks, John. I should preface your introduction by saying that, in addition 
to being our designated agent provocateur, John will facilitate the barcamp’s 
final session, where we’ll establish some guidelines for dialogic art in light of 
the understanding or understandings evolved through our discussion. John, 
would you like to say something about this process? Maybe also mention why 
we plumped for guidelines instead of a plenary?
John Johnson: Now? Really? Okay, first let me say that my keywords are ‘agent provocateur,’ 
‘guidelines’ and ‘questions’. I’m an artist and curator and I’m fascinated by 
organisational structures. Marsha, Allison and I often discuss our projects and, 
on occasion, work together. So when it came to rounding off this barcamp, 
we concluded that a plenary session was going to be at odds with the event’s 
format. A barcamp really is perfect for discussing dialogic art because it’s 
a dialogic form, itself. So, it just didn’t make sense to us to take today’s 
discussions—with all the complex layers that we have no doubt will emerge—
and flatten it into a nice, neat, tidy overview but that would more than likely 
collapse all the interesting lumps and bumps into something, well, flat.
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Rather than that, we’ll aim to produce a list of guidelines, a list that 
can accommodate and aggregate many of the elements we’ll brave today—
elements that won’t necessarily fit together easily in a larger scheme. Our 
goal being that these guidelines will guide anyone interested in the theory 
and practice of dialogic art as they strive to move it forward.
So, look, here’s my invitation: You each formulate one guideline over 
the course of the day in preparation for the final session, where we will bring 
them together. Each guideline should capture a recommendation that you 
believe is indispensable for the theory and practice of dialogic art, so you’ll 
have to be selective. And we can only allow one guideline per contributor. 
Bear in mind that our list won’t chronicle our discussion today—it won’t be 
an account of the way the barcamp unfolds. That said, I would like to know 
how you reach your selections. And it would be good to hear whether your 
perceptions change over the course of the day—and, if so, how. I mention 
this in advance because, look, I’m well aware that articulating this kind of 
knowledge-on-the-move can be a ‘big ask’. But I’m asking it all the same, as 
we—Marsha, Allison and I—believe it could be an interesting experiment. 
David Rooksby: You were saying something about ‘aggregating elements that don’t 
necessarily fit together easily in a larger scheme’. Did anyone else catch that?  
I know I didn’t.
John Johnson: Okay, there are various answers to this. I’ll offer just one, related to 
consensus. We’ll discuss the guidelines in the final session but we need not 
reach agreement on their significance. Some may even conflict, and I think 
this is okay. I mean, we can rejig them through our discussion, right? Let’s see 
how it goes.
Now, consensus is one thing, but communicability is another. To echo 
Marsha’s and KK’s concerns and the microbloggers’ suggestions about 
formulating tweets, bear in mind that, as a resource, your guideline should 
be accessible and meaningful to those in attendance today as well as others 
beyond our immediate gathering—artists, researchers, curators, critics and 
other others who are interested in dialogic art. This double-relevance is 
another ‘big ask’. But, I mean, I think it’s an important one because—
Allison Jones: Important? It’s absolutely vital! We need communicable research outcomes.
John Johnson: Okay, Allie, but let’s not get too hung up on outcomes too soon. Let’s see how 
we get on with researching through the barcamp’s dialogic structure. Look, 
enough said about the guidelines for now. Thanks, Marsha and Allison, for 
your welcome address and especially for outlining the rationales. But I sense 
I speak for everyone when I say it’s high time that we moved into the other 
contributions. Right?
Marsha Bradfield: One final word about the publication: I would like to include your—the 
contributors’—biographies as an appendix. These will be accompanied by a 
brief description of your barcamp contribution—a kind of post hoc abstract, a 
two or three-sentence summary. Please submit these in due course. (See A.2)
Alison Jones: One final, final comment.
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 David Rooksby: Seems like someone has to have the last word.
Allison Jones: I was just going to mention that I know I speak for Marsha when I say we’re 
both very curious about your respective interests in dialogic art. Perhaps you 
could say a word or two at the beginning of your presentations about what 
  brought you here today if you haven’t already.  
Marsha Bradfield:  And I know I speak for Allison when I say, we can’t thank you enough for being 
part of this event. Welcome to, ‘What is dialogic art?’
KK Lin:  Should we clap?
Marsha Bradfield: By all means. Clark, you’re our next protagonist.
[Barcamp claps.]
________________
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Clark Chris: Thanks, Marsha. I’ve already mentioned my reasons for being here today; I 
shouldn’t need to review, should I? No. Right, then, let’s crack on. So I think 
dialogic art is really about labour.1* And we’re going to test this theory in an 
extra-large PechaKucha.
Allison Jones: PechaKucha?
Clark Chris: Not heard of it? Seriously? Well, all right. The name, PechaKucha, comes from 
the Japanese for ‘chit-chat’. The first PechaKucha evening was held as a kind 
of networking event for young designers and architects in Tokyo in February 
of 2003 and used a tight format of brief and focused presentations. Now, 
there are normally twenty slides in PechaKuchas, and each one shows for 
twenty seconds.2 But in this case, there are twenty-five—I found twenty was 
just too few for what I wanted to accomplish. So, over the next eight minutes 
and thirty seconds, precisely, I’ll float a way of putting dialogue to work in 
dialogic art.3
Basically, PechaKucha is another dialogic form. Earlier, Marsha likened 
the prepared parts of our contributions to primers for discussion, right? Well 
keep this in mind, as it will shape how you interpret what I have to say—or, at 
least, it should. If you could hold your questions and comments until the end, 
there will be lots of time for discussion.
 Fig. 2.0
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(Fig. 2.2) Now, obviously, to understand dialogic art, we have to know 
what ‘dialogue’ means. I have a handout of my slide for you to take away.  
(Fig. 2.1) It reproduces part of the Oxford English Dictionary’s entry on 
‘dialogue’.
(Fig 2.3) You’ll note here that the noun, ‘dialogue’, is defined as:             
(1) a conversation carried on between two or more persons; a colloquy, talk 
together; (2) a literary work in the form of a conversation between two or 
more persons; (3) such a composition set to music for two or more voices; (4) 
an attribute or combination, as in the form of a dialogue-author.4
Fig. 2.1
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(Fig. 2.4) The term’s origin, so the dictionary tells us, comes from the 
Middle English via the Old French word, ‘dialoge’, which is taken from the 
Greek ‘dialogos’, meaning ‘to converse with’, from ‘dia’, meaning ‘through’ 
and ‘legein’ meaning ‘speak’.5
(Fig. 2.5) The etymology of the word, ‘dialogue’ is revealing. The ‘dia’ 
is often mistaken for the Greek prefix ‘di’, meaning two, as in ‘dichromatic’, 
the occurrence of two colours. We may think of dialogue as a conversation 
between two people, and two only. What few people realise is that the ‘dia’ in 
‘dialogue’ actually means through, as in ‘diameter’.6 Knowing that, anyone can 
see that dialogue is really better understood as a threshold across speech, if 
you will, or as a space through or across.
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(Fig. 2.6) So, clearly, dialogue is more than just a conversation between 
two interlocutors. There can be many involved. And if you think about it, why 
should we limit dialogue to verbal exchange? Why not also use it to refer to 
visual, haptic or other kinds of communication? So now, when I say ‘dialogue’, 
what I refer to is a form of communication that alternates between two 
or more interlocutors. Their expressions issue across from and perhaps in 
opposition to each other as the interlocutors converse.
(Fig. 2.7) Now, dialogue as communication is one thing; dialogue as 
creation is another. To expand our sense of dialogue, we might also think of 
it as productive interaction—interaction between people, systems, things, 
thoughts and other interlocutors. If you think about it, you can’t help but 
realise that dialogue is what keeps the planet turning.
 71    70
(Fig 2.8) As interaction, dialogue knows that reality is composed of 
things—objects, the body, social norms, conventions and all the rest. But 
dialogue also insists that, in reality, things are only meaningful in relation to 
each other. It should then become apparent that this simply makes ‘dialogue’ 
another name for ‘relativity’.7
(Fig 2.9) Earlier, Phil said that dialogue describes ‘perspectival diversity’—
the interplay of distinct positions and different points of view. So you should 
be able to see that dialogue bridges difference, but also negotiates it. Let me 
simplify that: dialogue brings disparate entities together in the same space or 
frame and helps them communicate.8
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(Fig 2.10) Dialogue also knows something about sharing. It’s a 
commonsense that what is yours is yours and what is mine is mine. But 
understanding dialogue more clearly teaches us that this division denies 
that, for better or for worse, we’re all in this together—because existence  is 
dialogic.9 Dialogue is like the weather. It surrounds us and reminds us we are 
beholden to forces beyond our control.
(Fig 2.11) Like a force of nature, dialogue is objective and mysterious. It 
doesn’t care who you are. Anyone can engage in dialogue or be engaged by 
it. But what you have to understand is that it’s complicated. It’s not always 
easy to know where one dialogue ends and another begins, because dialogue 
is protean. It knows this and can use it against us. It stymies us with its own 
enthusiasm and reproduction. ‘Dialogue’ becomes ‘dialogues’ quicker than 
you can say ‘dialogic art’.
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(Fig. 2.12) I’m going to let you in on a secret. It’s not that dialogue is 
hard. Dialogue is easy; any fool can do it. What’s hard is turning ‘dialogue’ 
into ‘dialogic art’. What’s more, the main thing keeping any dialogic artist 
from making dialogic art— paradoxically, and whether they realise it or not—
is dialogue. So how, you ask, can a dialogic artist take up dialogue through 
dialogic art without being submerged into utter chaos?
(Fig. 2.13) Well, here is an important distinction for you all to consider: 
in common usage, ‘dialogic’ is an adjective meaning ‘related to or in the form 
of dialogue’. So, we might well think of ‘dialogic art’ in the same way— as art 
related to or in the form of dialogue. But don’t. That would be a mistake—
understandable, perhaps, but a mistake, nonetheless.
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(Fig. 2.14) It’s not from the word ‘dialogic’ that the term ‘dialogic art’ 
takes its name—it’s just not that simple. Rather, it’s from ‘the dialogic’. 
Like the adjective ‘dialogic’, ‘the dialogic’ describes interaction, relativism, 
difference and sharing. ‘The dialogic’ is also, and as I have said, protean. By 
that I mean, it arises from dialogue, and includes it, but it also goes beyond it.
(Fig. 2.15) To understand what I mean by this ‘going beyond’, think of ‘the 
dialogic’ as the vocation of dialogue. The dialogic’s higher calling is to manage 
dialogue—its dialogic tendencies, in particular, as well as its enthusiasm and 
fecundity. Clearly, we must also understand ‘the dialogic’ as desire. It’s what 
dialogue wants for itself but can’t achieve on its own.
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(Fig 2.16) I’m sure you’ve all heard the old adage that goes, ‘Keep 
your friends close and your enemies closer’. These are words by which ‘the 
dialogic’ in dialogic art lives and dies as it puts dialogue to work. If, however, 
this strikes you as all too protestant, and a more playful figuration would be 
easier and more fun to grasp, think instead of dialogic art as a game where 
the dialogues composing it play by ‘the dialogic’s’ rules.
(Fig. 2.17) In this game, dialogue moves back and forth and between 
interlocutors, playing at the borders of its own limits. The point here is neither 
to applaud the act of dialogue, nor to win; the point is, rather, to win points 
while keeping the exchange in play—the back and forth and between.
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(Fig. 2.18) Another expression I’m sure you’ve all heard is that ‘so-and-
so is their own worst enemy’. When it comes to dialogic art, ‘the dialogic’ 
is not dialogue’s worst enemy but its best opponent. ‘The dialogic’ is not a 
peripheral opposition to dialogue, but one that comes from within.
(Fig. 2.19) Earlier, I said ‘the dialogic’ has much in common with dialogue, 
but it also goes beyond it. The result of this ‘going beyond’ is what I want to 
call ‘the dialogic bonus’. ‘The dialogic bonus’ is like a point scored in a game as 
opposed to the winning score.
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(Fig. 2.20) Now, I’ve also said that we should think of ‘the dialogic’ 
as dialogue’s own best opponent. They’re well matched. And deep down, 
dialogue knows this—and it knows it needs ‘the dialogic’s ‘management. But, 
like one artist resenting another’s more highly developed talents, dialogue 
also resents it.
(Fig. 2.21) In point of fact, dialogue will do anything to undermine 
or overpower its archrival. So the best way ‘the dialogic’ can self-manage 
dialogue is to beat it at its own game. ‘The dialogic’ has to be more protean, 
more objective and more attentive to the interaction, relationalism, difference 
and sharing that preoccupy dialogue.
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(Fig. 2.22) To outsmart dialogue, ‘the dialogic’ also has to be adept at 
changing shape. It’s not one thing, but a range of tactics for advancing ‘the 
dialogic’s’ vocational strategy. So there is dialogic strategy supported by 
dialogic tactics. These tactics are defined by this strategy, but neither can 
exist independently.
(Fig. 2.23) At least some of these tactics can be resourced from dialogue 
and applied to it with positive effect. I’ve already mentioned relativity and 
interaction, for example. In a dialogic artwork, these could be tactics, topics or 
both—I’ll leave this part to your imagination.
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(Fig. 2.24) A final note about ‘the dialogic’: like the finest artists, it works 
both hard and smart. It’s diligent and relentless in its duties, but it’s also 
strategic—wily, even. So ‘the dialogic’s’ work ethic has a certain disposition. 
It’s through this ‘dialogic disposition’ that ‘the dialogic’ reproduces itself as it 
deploys tactics to manage the dialogues composing dialogic art. If dialogue 
couldn’t be managed, this art form wouldn’t exist. So, in general terms, ‘the 
dialogic’ differentiates dialogic art from other types of what we’ve been 
calling, for far too long, ‘dialogue-based contemporary art practice’. This 
distinction turns on ‘the dialogic’s’ skillful self-management of the dialogues 
composing this art form.
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That’s a lot to absorb—I, of all people, know that—so let me sum up 
to provide you with some of the clarity I’ve come to. In this PechaKucha, I 
have said ‘the dialogic’ is: (1) more than dialogue; (2) a way of self-managing 
dialogue; (3) dialogue’s own best opponent; (4) resented by dialogue; and (5) 
smarter than dialogue. I’ve also said that we can think of dialogue in terms of 
work and sport, both of which depend on labour. And I’ve introduced several 
aspects or expressions of ‘the dialogic’, including ‘the dialogic bonus’, ‘the 
dialogic disposition’, ‘dialogic tactics’ and ‘dialogic strategies’.
(Fig 2.26) It’s taken me some time to reach this point, and I don’t expect 
anyone to get on board in the course of a short presentation. But if you take 
only one thing away from this admittedly motley PechaKucha, let it be this: 
dialogic art based on ‘the dialogic’ is rife with forces and counter forces about 
which I can prove very little. But I’m so convinced that this is the way this 
art comes into being that I can scarcely recall or even imagine ever thinking 
otherwise.
Marsha Bradfield: Thank you, Clark.
[Barcamp claps]
Marsha Bradfield: You’ve given us a lot to think about—and expand on. Your PechaKucha made 
several claims—is that the right word?—that we’ll need to unpack. And 
you’ve introduced some analytic categories for making sense of dialogic art—
when, that is, this art is understood as self-managed by ‘the dialogic’, with this 
being one of its distinguishing characteristics.
David Rooksby: That was a great presentation, Clark, but the dialogic art—the dialogic 
artwork—is where?
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KK Lin: I’m glad you said this, David. I was wondering about this too. As, um, there’s 
no example, Clark, could you talk about ‘the dialogic’ with reference to your 
PechaKucha as a dialogic form?
Clark Chris: Seriously? Well, how do you think ‘the dialogic’ manifests here?
KK Lin: Please, Clark, don’t get me wrong; I enjoyed your presentation. I found the, 
um, initial definitions very clear. And the etymology of dialogic coming from 
‘dia’ as in through or across, as compared with, ‘dia’ meaning two, is very 
interesting, too. I also liked your metaphors of dialogue as work and dialogue 
as a game. But—and maybe it’s just me—I’m still struggling to grasp this thing 
called ‘the dialogic’. Is it, um, a kind of counterforce of dialogue?
Clark Chris: Well, that’s a good start.
Marsha Bradfield: John? You look as though you have something pressing to say.
John Johnson: Okay, look, first let me say that listening to your PechaKucha, Clark, with all its 
speculative depth, was provocative. I took it as a kind of non-narrative fable. 
You know, there’s a theory that there are only seven stories in the world. Man 
versus man, man versus nature, man against God and so on and so forth.10
Maeve Cutty: ‘Man versus man’? Where are we girls in that? You know, when I teach Arthur 
Quiller-Couch’s plot conflicts, I talk about a ‘character versus him or herself’. 
Right, luv?
John Johnson: Okay, I stand corrected. But the point is, Clark, that your PechaKucha, ripe 
with personification, offered a version of a ‘character versus him or herself’ 
in the form of dialogue versus itself. And, as a way of complicating dialogue, 
of moving beyond the common view that it describes a verbal exchange 
between two interlocutors, your non-narrative fable is interesting for two 
reasons. First, it gets at the idea of dialogue occurring internally.
Shadworth Dyson: Well, yes, but—
John Johnson: Just let me finish this train of thought, okay? The point is, dialogue can 
happen inside something, including dialogue itself. And for me, this is a hop, 
skip and jump to thinking about the dialogue occurring inside our own heads 
between man and or versus himself—I’m sorry, character versus him or 
herself—in an internal struggle. So then thought is dialogic, right?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, yes, of course. This is quite consistent with Bakhtin’s theory of dialogue—
that as soon as we begin meditating on some issue, our inner speech assumes 
the form of question and response, with assertions and denials—which is to 
say, it unfolds as dialogue.11
John Johnson: Okay, I agree. But I’m not sure this is the only way we think. Look, this gets 
at my interest in dialogue as an internal struggle of some kind. In the case 
of Clark’s PechaKucha and its discussion of ‘the dialogic’, this was framed as 
‘self-management’. So ‘the dialogic’, which issues from dialogue, is a means of 
managing it. Right?
Clark Chris: Isn’t this clear by now? I mean, I know this is a lot to absorb, but—
John Johnson: Okay, okay, Clark. But in light of your earlier comments about arts policy and 
its impact on your practice, my hunch is that you’re actually tapping a broader 
issue here—an ongoing and internal struggle at stake in cultural production, 
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writ large. This is the struggle between the intrinsic value of art, determined 
by the artist or arts community; and the extrinsic or instrumentalised value 
of art, designated by policy makers—which you earlier described as ‘well-
intentioned but hell bent on making art accountable’, right?
Clark Chris: Something like that, but sooo—?
John Johnson: So, this brings me to my second point. You’ve spoken about dialogue in terms 
of managerial control in arts administration. You gave the example of it being 
instrumentalised in the form of contact days, where you, ‘the artist’, are 
expected to interface with the public by doing things like workshops. So art 
institutions use dialogue to extract value from your artistic practice. 
Clark Chris: Yes—and?
John Johnson: And you’ve also said that, as an approach to contemporary art practice, 
dialogic art might better account for all the labour that goes into producing 
works of art. So you’re invested in this type of art as a way for you to manage 
and extract value from the range of dialogues that ‘cinch together your artistic 
practice,’ as you put it earlier.
Clark Chris: Uh-huh. Is your point coming anytime soon?
John Johnson: My point is, Clark, that, assuming that for you, the intrinsic value of dialogic 
art resides in the interplay of the dialogues composing it, I’m wondering how 
these two things come together in ‘the dialogic’. On the one hand, there’s 
dialogue as a form of external managerial control, right? On the other hand, 
there’s ‘the dialogic’ as an internal strategy for self-managing dialogue. The 
common denominator is management. Do you see where I’m going?
Clark Chris: Well—first, let me acknowledge that I take David’s and KK’s point about my 
not using an example of dialogic art in the PechaKucha. That having been 
said, John, I think your comments point to a bigger issue—the practice of art, 
dialogic art, within the broader context of cultural production.
I thought I made this clear, but as I can see I didn’t, I’ll try again. By 
pitching ‘the dialogic’ as a way of self-managing dialogue in dialogic art, I’m 
not making an argument for the autonomy of this art form, as you seem to 
think. This self-management isn’t a form of self-law. My position is more 
pragmatic than idealistic. You’re partly right in saying that, for me, the intrinsic 
value of dialogic art resides in the interplay of the dialogues composing 
it. But this is only partly right when it presupposes that this intrinsic value 
is something independent of art’s broader extrinsic or instrumentalised 
value. This autonomy is a fiction. Yes, this is very much a fiction, as far as I’m 
concerned—and, I think, as far as we all should be concerned. As I’ve said, 
dialogue is another name for relativity; more simply put, nothing has meaning 
in isolation because nothing exists in isolation. So when it comes to the self-
management of dialogic art relative to arts management in general, my point 
is really that there is no cultural production without management.12* And 
the sooner we accept this, the sooner we can begin the important work of 
creating managerial modes of self-organisation that respond, both critically 
and artistically, to their broader social, cultural and political context.
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John Johnson: Okay. I can accept that. And it’s interesting. This means, then, that, in addition 
to self-managing dialogue, ‘the dialogic’ is also a kind of counter-managerial 
scheme—a kind of antidote to audit culture more generally. Right?
Clark Chris: No. There is no antidote to audit culture—but there are ways of negotiating 
it that are more creative, more artistic. I would say these are better choices 
than artistic practice that either capitulates to arts policy, audit culture or 
otherwise, or burns itself out trying to fight it, because then the struggle 
becomes an end in itself! I’m convinced that dialogic art—motored by ‘the 
dialogic’—is a way of working within the current regime while insisting that it 
could and should be otherwise, by modelling alternative ways of accounting 
for all the dialogues—or at least a broader range of dialogues—as labour that 
composes this art form. But, of course, that’s just my opinion.
David Rooksby: And your opinion is based on—what, exactly? We’re still waiting for an 
example of a dialogic artwork!
John Johnson: Point taken, David. But I think Clark is really talking about institutional 
critique.
Clark Chris: I could, of course, have discussed dialogic art in this way, which is where you 
seem hell bent on dragging it, John. But, instead, I chose to take up what is, to 
me, the more interesting and challenging question of ‘What is dialogic art?’ 
from the perspective of ‘the dialogic’. Understanding this—and I know it’s not 
an easy concept —but, really, getting this, as the central operating principle 
of dialogic art, is more important, as far as I’m concerned, than suggesting its 
potential application—at least for our immediate purposes here.
David Rooksby: So you’re saying we’re trying to put the cart before the horse.
Clark Chris: Yes! Exactly! Finally! Look, John, dialogic art could be a form of institutional 
critique—but this is only one possible application or development. As art 
about labour, it’s more than institutional critique—obviously! Why squelch 
dialogic art’s dialogic potential by pigeonholing it in this way?
John Johnson: Okay—but what is ‘labour’ if not a pigeonhole?
Clark Chris: Well, yes, all right—assuming this hole can hold that many pigeons, making it 
more like a giant aviary. But my point, really, is that I’ve chosen to approach 
dialogic art as a self-management system composed of ‘dialogic tactics’ 
underpinned by a ‘dialogic strategy’ and administered by ‘the dialogic 
disposition’. These aspects or expressions of ‘the dialogic’ are a way of 
pitching dialogic art as something that can be inhabited and deployed to 
many ends. But again, of course, that’s just my opinion. We’re sure to hear 
other responses to the question, ‘What is dialogic art?’ over the course of the 
day.
Ella Stone: Bien sûr! You’re speaking of form as content, are you not?
Clark Chris: In a manner of speaking, ‘yes’.
Shadworth Dyson: Ah ha! Well, then, about the PechaKucha as a dialogic form, Clark, I believe 
you expressed something to the effect that, by ‘dialogue’ you mean a form of 
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 communication that alternates between two or more interlocutors, whose 
utterances—verbal, visual, haptic and others—issue across from or perhaps in 
opposition to each other as they converse.
Clark Chris: Uh-huh. And so?
Shadworth Dyson: So I suppose I have a rather obvious question, vis-à-vis the coupling of the 
visual and verbal in your presentation, which is to ask you to say something 
about how your visual utterances dialogue with your verbal ones and vice 
versa.
Chris Clark: The slides and the commentary? Oh, well, it’s quite simple, really. I searched 
Google Image for ‘the dialogic’ and these visuals came back. It didn’t 
much matter what images went with what commentary. But I’m pleased, 
Shadworth, that you clocked this dialogue. It means my PechaKucha’s dialogic 
tactic made you think about this relation. This may not have happened if, for 
instance, the visuals had been illustrative in a more straightforward way, as is 
so often—too often, really—the case.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, to this extent, this tactic was effective. However, Clark, you also 
distinguished between ‘dialogic’ as an adjective meaning ‘relating to or in the 
form of dialogue’ and ‘the dialogic’ as something that has much in common 
with dialogue but is also different, something that goes beyond it, something 
that is more—more dialogue than dialogue, itself. So vis-à-vis the interplay 
between the verbal and the visual utterances in your presentation, is this a 
dialogic relation or an instance of ‘the dialogic’? 
Clark Chris: It’s a dialogic relation, obviously. It’s clearly too loose for ‘the dialogic’. ‘The 
dialogic’ would pick up the slack by binding the dialogue’s content and form 
together more tightly.
Anne Lang: You know, what you’re saying is really interesting, Clark. Like Shadworth, 
I wondered about the visual and the verbal in your PechaKucha. And, you 
know, I assumed it was intentional. And, in light of what you and Marsha said 
about the barcamp presentations being more like primers than self-contained 
arguments, I took your PechaKucha as a really provocative puzzle. Sooo, the 
questions I was asking myself during your presentation were things like, ‘What 
is the relation between the verbal and visual here?’ and ‘What are the rules of 
this game?’.
Clark Chris: All right.
Anne Lang: But your post-PechaKucha comments have sort of shifted my sense of the 
PechaKucha proper. You know, they’ve done something to my understanding. 
I mean, yes, you’ve given us the missing piece of the puzzle by explaining 
how the verbal and visual interrelate. And, your comments have achieved 
a really good instance of ‘the dialogic’ in the process, in keeping with your 
definition, I think. Haven’t they, you know, tightened the relation between the 
PechaKucha’s content and form? I mean, we now know the interplay between 
the verbal and the visual is staked on a particular relation. The Google Image 
connection. As a kind of revelation, it’s sort of like your post-PechaKucha 
comments are in dialogue with your PechaKucha proper. Thoughts on this?
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John Johnson: Okay, but didn’t you say, Anne, that your PhD research concerns the discursive 
production of art? Right? And isn’t that what you’re doing right now—
performing your own practice-based research on Clark’s PechaKucha?
Clark Chris: Hold on! Who said anything about the PechaKucha being ‘art’?
John Johnson: Well, you did, actually.
Clark Chris: It was just a way to prime discussion about the difference between dialogue 
and ‘the dialogic’. I thought that was clear.
John Johnson: But you’re in no position to argue this point! Look, you yourself identified as 
an artist interested in dialogic art as an expanded theory of the artwork. You 
valorised it as an approach that takes into consideration and aims to better 
account for all labour that cinches together your artistic practice.
Clark Chris: And your point is?
John Johnson: My point is, aren’t you at work right now?
Clark Chris: Yes, yes—all right. I see your point, John. I suppose you’re really asking about 
the scope of dialogic art practice. What counts as practice? This goes back to 
Maeve’s questions about how we’re defining ‘dialogue’ in dialogic art—what 
counts as a dialogue in the practice of this art? What are the boundaries of ‘a 
dialogic art’?
David Rooksby: But you have yet to answer the question, Clark. Is your PechaKucha a dialogic 
artwork? Yes or no?
Clark Chris: I’m not answering your question.
David Rooksby: Then you’re avoiding it.
Anne Lang: You know, maybe Clark can’t answer this question, but I can. Of course, 
this PechaKucha is a dialogic artwork. But it only really achieves this status 
retrospectively, in light of Clark’s comments regarding the visual-verbal 
relation. And I sort of think that’s what makes it interesting. And, really, aren’t 
these comments a way of putting the PechaKucha in dialogue with itself?
John Johnson: Seriously? Does this then mean we should take this entire discussion—maybe 
even the entire barcamp—as constitutive of a dialogic work of art?
Anne Lang: You know—I think we should!
John Johnson: Okay, look—that would make me and you and everyone else here co-authors! 
Well, wouldn’t it? But that’s not a role I’m willing to accept. Quite aside 
from the fact I was never consulted about participating in this barcamp as 
an artistic collaboration, dialogic art is going to have to struggle much harder 
for its own legitimacy and recognition than this, right? My point is, Anne, if 
you’re saying an artwork’s artistic value resides in its discursive production, 
I would counter that anything can be discursively produced as art—and I, 
for one, refuse to reduce dialogic art back to talk. That would be retarding 
our discussion! It would mean that dialogue is basically a linguistic exchange 
between two or more interlocutors. I thought we’d moved beyond that!
Anne Lang: That’s not what I’m saying and I think you know it, John. What I’m really 
wondering is how we might broaden our sense of a dialogic artwork to 
include its discursive production. You know, listening to Allison’s discussion of 
Kester’s dialogical art, I sensed he might be fetishising the dialogue occurring 
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in the artwork. I mean, it’s a kind of overcorrection—he’s sort of reacting 
against the tradition of dialogue occurring about the artwork, after it’s been 
materially achieved. But, really, these things don’t have such clean edges—
or at least not in my sense of dialogic art, nascent as it is. And if, sort of, in 
keeping with Clark’s argument, dialogic art aims to account for a wider range 
of the dialogues that compose it, shouldn’t this include both those in an 
artwork proper and those prompted by this artwork? You know?
Clark Chris: But why fetishise the artwork? I like the idea of dialogic art manifesting as 
something else. I think ‘the dialogic’ might help this art form to concoct itself 
into another kind of assemblage—and I  would wager this PechaKucha could  
be a case in point.  
John Johnson: Okay—because?
Clark Chris: Because we’re having this debate! Isn’t that much obvious? I wasn’t at all 
certain the PechaKucha was an artwork prior to this discussion—and I’m still 
not. But it’s kept us locked in an exchange over its legitimacy long enough to 
convince me that some kind of ‘dialogic bonus’ has been achieved. Earlier, I 
likened this to ‘a point scored in a game as opposed to a winning score’. Well, 
we’ve both scored points in this dialogue, John—you, me and Anne, too. The 
PechaKucha—whatever it is—catalysed our discussion. And the game is still in 
play.
Marsha Bradfield: I’m not quite sure why, but what you’re saying reminds me—a couple of 
years ago I worked on a project that involved a structure held together with 
30,000 cable ties13—lots of pulling, tightening and tying off. You’ve got me 
thinking, Clark, about ties, cords and other mechanisms for holding dialogic 
art together—‘the dialogic’ as some kind of bond, or glue.
Anne Lang: Sort of a bungee cord that could be stretched and clipped in response to 
circumstance?
Allison Jones: So where does this leave us—beyond being confused about the scope of 
dialogic art and where to draw the boundaries around dialogic artworks? If 
you two, John and Clark, can agree to disagree, then we can move on. I think 
we’ve got as much out of this discussion as we’re going to. Can we move on?
Anne Lang: A point of clarification, and here I’m doffing my TheJargonBuster hat: would 
this agreement be an instance of ‘the dialogic bonus’? And if so, wouldn’t it 
be akin to a cessation of ‘the dialogic’?
Shadworth Dyson: Most interesting, yes, not unlike the pause between turns in dialogue, only, in 
this case, we’re moving onto a new topic of discussion, though we’re bound 
to return to ‘the dialogic bonus’ in time.
Allison Jones: How about responding to the tweet, Clark? Could you say something about 
the proposition that, ‘Perhaps there is a Hegelian idea lurking here, e.g. 
the “speech” that is dialogue is actually the synthesis of the two or more 
contributions?’ I think a response to that could be quite useful to Marsha and 
me in our research.
Clark Chris: Well, I can broach this through ‘the dialogic disposition’. I can say this artistic 
sensibility resides with the dialogic artist and finds embodiment in what he or 
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she produces. The point about this way of working is it’s characterised by an 
interest in how it is that something can be both a synthesis on the one hand 
and a combination of things on the other. But how, Allison, would you address 
this tweet?
David Rooksby: So, basically, it’s another instance of dialogic art being and/also instead of 
either/or. But I have to say—Allison, this is your tweet, right?
Allison Jones: Well, yes, I tweeted it but the question really came from my supervisor, Mary 
Anne Francis, and I was sort of interested in how Clark might respond. You 
know, I think it’s actually very difficult to address this conclusively. I mean, 
there is a sort of Hegelian idea lurking here, e.g. the ‘speech’ that is dialogue 
is actually the synthesis of two or more contributions—assuming, that is, that 
we’re approaching dialogue via dialectics. I mean, we know that dialectics 
is propelled by synthesis, and that synthesis is a machine for thought that 
is both a virtue and a vice. I’m reminded of Theodor Adorno‘s critique of 
dialectics via negative dialectics. You know, as an alternative, negative 
dialectics is an attempt to think thought against thought14—or at least 
philosophy based on dialectics against itself so as to transcend its own limits. 
You know?
John Johnson: Okay, look, maybe there’s a parallel here. Maybe we can think of ‘the dialogic’ 
as the negative of dialogue. If Adorno’s negative dialectics is a way for 
dialectics to think thought against itself so as to transcend its limits, then ‘the 
dialogic’ could be a means of dialogue dialoguing with and against itself in 
order to transcend its own limits. Right?
Clark Chris: I would agree with that. There’s something about it that synchs with a sense 
of ‘the dialogic’ as a means of self-managing the dialogue in dialogic art.
Shadworth Dyson: I can certainly appreciate this connection between negative dialectics and ‘the 
dialogic’ as one way of grasping the telos of dialogic art, wherein ‘the dialogic’ 
helps us to understand what dialogue is and could perhaps be. But now, 
returning to the distinction between ‘dialogue’ and ‘dialectic’, Bakhtin would 
surely agree with your view, Allison, in that he tells us that ‘dialectics is the 
abstract product of dialogue’,15 and critiques dialectics on the grounds that 
it flattens or expunges everything that dialogue, on his understanding, holds 
dear—which is to say, the distinct voices, accents and positions.16
Allison Jones: But Shadworth, don’t you think there’s also a case to be made for something 
like dialectical synthesis occurring in the act of response as I fold the 
preceding question or statement—the utterance—into mine? I mean, isn’t 
there room for this view?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, of course, Allison, when the dialectic’s synthesis is viewed as 
monological—which is to say, of course,  having only one meaning—but that’s 
only one perspective. From a dialogic angle, we perceive the synthesis of 
the utterance as micro-dialogic, or a range of voices past and present, whilst 
for Bakhtin, the form of dialectics is indicative of a drive, or will, to silence 
these voices by having the last word—or, differently put, even the monologic 
is dialogic, which is precisely the axis of Bakhtin’s meditations on dialogue. 
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And this is a crucial point because the very telos of dialogic forms, in my 
opinion, is that they draw out the dialogue among their constituent parts. 
If you will recall Clark’s theory of a ‘dialogic disposition’—the counterforce 
to which would surely be a ‘dialectical disposition’—attending to the ways 
in which these dispositions find expression in dialogic art is what makes 
formal conventions the loadstone of Bakthin’s philosophy of art, and 
of communication, such as when he speaks of ‘form-shaping ideology’, 
where forms always express a worldview through their organisation and 
representation of content.17 The ideology of a dialectic form or disposition 
is totalitarian—at least in theory, and in opposition to a dialogical approach, 
which aims to draw out existence as centrifugal, rather than centripetal.
Marsha Bradfield: I think it’s difficult to know what this means without exploring it through an 
example of dialogic art—preferably one that we’re not literally producing 
in some way, as in the case of our discussion of Clark’s PechaKucha. I like 
the idea of this being an instance of dialogic art without necessarily being 
an artwork. But I’m not sure it’s the best example for taking up either 
Bakhtin’s theory of form-shaping ideology or the analytical categories that 
Clark proposed. I can’t really articulate why, beyond saying that I need some 
distance from the PechaKucha as a dialogic form—some time to reflect on 
what we’ve discussed and what it means for dialogic art, more broadly.
KK Lin: I agree. This being the case, Marsha and Allison, do you think this would, um, 
be a good time to move into my contribution? I’ll be proposing a photo-based 
example of a dialogic artwork, if that’s okay.
David Rooksby: At long last! We’ve been talking about ‘Art’ today like it’s some guy named 
‘Arthur’ we know on a nickname-basis. Dialogic ‘Art’ this and dialogic ‘Art’ 
that! Come on, people. Enough with the theory; let’s see some examples!
Marsha Bradfield: I’m wondering, KK, if we might bear in mind Clark’s analytical categories when 
considering your example? Clark, could you remind us what these include?
Clark Chris: Well, there are dialogues, of course, and dialogic as opposed to ‘the dialogic’, 
and then there’s ‘the dialogic bonus’, ‘the dialogic disposition’, ‘dialogic 
strategies’ and ‘dialogic tactics’. 
Anne Lang: You know, it’s practically a micro-theory of dialogic art that has theorised 
about itself through the PechaKucha as artistic practice. I have one final 
thought—I mean one thought to express before we move on, as it relates 
to David’s enthusiasm for  examples. This PechaKucha sort of recalls for me 
an interview I read with philosopher of art Jonathan Dronsfield, where he 
was taken to task for not illustrating his theory with an example. And he said 
something like, when the only instance of an artwork or art practice being 
theorised is itself, an artwork can theorise without examples. So really, theory 
can also theorise itself as art practice.18
Marsha Bradfield: Hold onto that thought, Anne. Before turning to KK’s example, I want to thank 
Clark again for his PechaKucha. I think his proposition that dialogic art is 
distinguished from other dialogue-based contemporary art practice by ‘the 
dialogic’ is an important steppingstone in our own thinking about what this 
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art is and could be. I’m hoping very much that we’ll examine ‘the dialogic’ 
over the course of the day and better understand its significance. Could we 
thank Clark again for his contribution with a second round of applause?
[Barcamp claps.]
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Fig. 3.0
Marsha Bradfield:  KK, the remote?
KK Lin: Yes, thanks. And many thanks, Marsha and Allison, for organising this 
barcamp.
Marsha Bradfield: Could you introduce yourself and say what brings you here today?
KK Lin: Of course. I’m doing my MA at Chelsea and my dissertation is on 
photography—spatiotemporal relations in still images. I’m here because I’ve 
been thinking about dialogic art from the perspective of representation. I’ll, 
um, be proposing a photo-based post-conceptual artwork that demonstrates 
my sense of a dialogic approach. I am, of course, open to your thoughts, 
opinions and suggestions.
I’m not sure how many of you are familiar with Pierre Huyghe’s 
Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart (Fig 3.0), which translates as The Permanent 
Construction Site. It was made in the mid-1990s and documents an 
intervention.1 As you can see from the slide, there is a billboard in the 
foreground that shows workers labouring on a construction site, and in the 
background, in the shadow of the sign, workers labour on what appears, um, 
to be the same site. So Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart shows a sign and a 
site in an image within an image. It’s a mimetic scheme that seems to freeze-
frame two microseconds in a building project that must have taken months, if 
not years—if you see what I mean.
Clark Chris: At last! Someone who shares my sense of labour as a core concern of dialogic 
art.
Fig. 3.1  
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Fig. 3.2
KK Lin: I do think there’s an overlap with my interest in the representation of 
labour in Huyghe’s artwork. And I’ll try taking this up by way of your 
analytic categories, Clark. But first, maybe I should say something about my 
relationship with this image—okay?
Um, I came across it in the recycling bin at college. It was someone else’s 
printout, discarded for whatever reason, and it captured my imagination. So I 
pinned it to my studio wall and let it watch me work for several weeks before 
I went online to find out more (Fig. 3.2). My first hit was an essay by Nicolas 
Bourriaud. I’d like to read you a short excerpt, if I may. So, um, Bourriaud 
writes:
Pierre Huyghe’s strength lies in his understanding of the fact that an image 
always comes with baggage. This is probably what makes his work so 
important today, at a time when commercial signals are proliferating in 
place of works, closed-loop communication is coming to replace culture, 
images have become masks for universal media ventriloquism and it’s 
always power that does the talking . . . [Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart (A 
Permanent Construction Site)], the title of one of Huyghe’s works, could 
apply to them all. The image of the construction site actually contains the 
essential part of what we find in his universe: the fleeting, fragile nature of 
human labour, the relationships of which it is composed, a complex picture 
of the flows, connections and tools that it requires and, more generally, 
an ethical conception of form, never considered as a finished product, but 
rather as the fruit of a slow elaboration.2 
This passage strikes me as interesting, and perhaps you’ll agree, for 
many reasons. To begin with, I’m thinking that Bourriaud’s reflections might 
offer insight into what we might call, in light of Clark’s presentation, Huyghe’s 
dialogic disposition—that is, assuming Huyghe qualifies as a dialogic artist, 
or at least an artist with dialogic tendencies. I’m certainly open to input 
on that but, based on the example of Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart, I’m, 
um, thinking—he does? Bourriaud alludes to Huyghe’s interest in ‘flows, 
connections and tools’ of human labour in relation to an ‘ethical conception 
of form’. So I guess I’m wanting to consider how these things find embodiment 
in Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart—how they come together into some kind of 
representation that show their interdependence? Do you see what I mean? 
I think this goes back to what Shadworth was saying about dialogic forms, to 
which I would suggest adding compositions, which then draw out the dialogue 
among their constituent parts, as I understood Shadworth to say. Is that 
accurate, Shadworth?
Shadworth Dyson:  Yes, well, that’s certainly—
KK Lin:  Let’s see, where was I? Oh, right. Oh, I’m really sorry, Shadworth—you were 
starting to say something and I interrupted.
Shadworth Dyson:  Quite all right, KK. Please do go on.
KK Lin:  Thanks. I mean, sorry. Okay, to pick up—Clark, I also liked what you were 
saying about dialogic art demystifying art practice by accounting for all the 
labour that goes into its realisation. 
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Phil Hind: ‘All the labour’. We’ve heard this phrase several times today and, while 
I’m broadly sympathetic to your interest in catching and auditing the 
interdependence of various labours, KK and Clark, the truth is, and David and I 
have flagged our concern, that this could give way to infinite regress.
KK Lin: Yes, Phil, I’m glad you’ve brought this up. I’ve been thinking about it, too. 
Maybe ‘account for’ isn’t the best way of explaining this. Do you think, 
perhaps, ‘evoke’ would be better? I’ll try and take up this concern in a bit. 
But, to return to Clark’s analytic categories, looking at the Chantier Barbès-
Rochechouart, and thinking about Clark’s idea of ‘the dialogic bonus’, I’m 
wondering if the labour of this image—the labour carried out through its 
representational scheme—could be described as reflexivity. I mean, could 
the artwork be seen as bending back on itself? I’ve been thinking about this 
self-reference unfolding across the billboard image of the construction site, 
which I’ll call the historical image, as it’s embedded in a more contemporary 
one. And it occurs to me—though I’m not really sure about this, it’s really just 
a thought—but it occurs to me that, maybe, in the case of Chantier Barbès-
Rochechouart, the ‘dialogic bonus’ is another way of saying ‘the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts’, and the excess, if you see what I mean, is 
realised through the artwork’s reflexivity. If I’m right about this, the historical 
image would be a part in the whole/part relation and the more contemporary 
image would be the whole. And the significance of the artwork would be 
irreducible to either, in isolation from each other. Is this making any sense?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, the historical image and the contemporary one—in dialogue—‘the 
dialogic bonus’. Very interesting idea, yes.
Marsha Bradfield: Shadworth?
Shadworth Dyson: I don’t wish to hold you up, KK so I’ll tweet my comment. This will be my first 
tweet.
KK Lin: Thanks for that. So, where was I? Right. When it comes to the reflexivity that 
organises Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart, I think the nested image implies 
the passage of time in the construction process. And, maybe it’s just me, but 
the title of the artwork in translation—The Permanent Construction Site, I 
mean—prompts me to think symbolically. I’m thinking this building-in-process 
is maybe a kind of proxy—do you think? 
John Johnson:  Well—
KK Lin:  Well, um, what I mean is, it could be a proxy for the ongoing production of the 
artwork through its interpretation. So, what I’m trying to say, I hope clearly, 
is that there’s production occurring as the image is contextualised and re-
contextualised through its circulation and encounter. Does that make sense?
Maybe I should clarify a bit? I guess I’m wondering, um, about the 
temporalities in Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart being ‘in dialogue’. And what 
would this mean for our sense of dialogic art? Well, first, I think there is the 
past of the historical image. Then, there’s the contemporaneity of Huyghe’s 
artwork overall, which is formally fixed in time and space. I spoke of this 
earlier with reference to the contemporary image. And finally, there’s the 
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artwork in the present—that is, made present to me through my encounter. 
I’m thinking that, as a dialogic artwork, Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart makes 
the dialogue between the temporalities of the building process—by which 
I mean the labour both in and of the artwork—obvious enough, explicit 
enough, that it becomes the focus here. And my acid test for this explicitness 
is that it makes me  wonder  about the ethical, political and artistic issues 
at stake in the construction of the artwork—it’s authorial becoming. Is this 
making any sense?
John Johnson: Yes, okay, maybe. But, look, are you sure it’s the artwork that makes you 
wonder about these things? Or does this interest stem from Bourriaud’s 
discussion of Huyghe’s art practice?
Anne Lang: Does it matter? Or, is what’s important about KK’s analysis that she seems 
to be saying that dialogic art, based on the example of Chantier Barbès-
Rochechouart, is a process-based approach, yes?
KK Lin: I’m sorry, Anne, I don’t mean to be argumentative, but isn’t that a bit like 
saying that all art is dialogic? I mean, it’s true that all art is process-based, but 
isn’t the question—or aren’t the questions—‘How?’ and ‘To what ends?’
Brian Updike: If I may come in on this. I think that by a ‘process-based approach’, we means 
one that shows us an artwork’s authorial process. This is in contrast with 
other approaches that conceal this process, yes? [Anne is nodding and I’ll take 
that as a, ‘Yes’.] Think of Warhol’s Brillo cartons, KK. Of course, the institution 
of art, and especially its mechanisms of attribution, ensure that we know 
that Warhol authored these cartons. But there is very little in the artwork 
itself that points to this fact and there’s nothing that indicates how it was 
produced—which is why Warhol’s Brillo cartons can pass as real ones.3
KK Lin: So in the case of dialogic art, um, would this process-based approach mean 
drawing attention to the dialogues that author the artwork? I think that’s 
what we’re seeing in Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart’s representational 
scheme—spread across its title and images. And, um, it prompts me to 
wonder how the artist—Huyghe, I mean—the construction workers and also 
those encountering this artwork, this dialogic artwork, all author it in distinct 
but maybe also overlapping ways? Do you know what I mean? So, what I’m 
interested in is how authorship is distributed here, and how the artwork 
makes this distribution explicit through its representational scheme.
John Johnson: Right, okay. But, look, before we discuss authorship, KK, I have a more 
basic concern. First, let me say that, as the barcamp’s designated agent 
provocateur, it’s my job to niggle a little—all right? Okay, good. 
So, I have some questions about your analysis of Chantier Barbès-
Rochechouart’s. Okay, you’ll recall that Marsha said something to the effect 
that she’s especially interested in dialogic forms that are predisposed to 
representing a range of authorial relations constellated through the authors’ 
intersubjective exchange in and as this type of art, right? Look, this being 
the case, how does intersubjective exchange feature in Chantier Barbès-
Rochechouart?
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KK Lin: Intersubjective exchange? Could you clarify, please?
David Rooksby: Seems to me that ‘intersubjective exchange’ is just a fancy way to say ‘trading 
something between people’.
Phil Hind: I’ll respond to that. There is actually quite a bit of discussion on this in 
sociological research, David. Alex Gillespie and Flora Cornish identify no 
less than six notions of intersubjectivity. They range from having a shared 
definition of an object; to a more cognitive emphasis that attributes 
intentionality, belief and feelings to others; to more interactionalist 
approaches that focus on intersubjectivity as closer to performativity between 
and among subjects; to a dialogic emphasis that foregrounds the subjects’ 
taken-for-granted context of their interlocution.4
David Rooksby: That’s quite a laundry list. What’s the bill?
Phil Hind: Gillespie and Cornish eventually settle on ‘a variety of relations between 
perspectives’5 in their study on the dialogical analysis of intersubjectivity. 
They favour this definition for its inclusiveness.
David Rooksby: ‘Between perspectives’. Whose perspectives—the folks involved?
Marsha Bradfield: David, you’re flagging the relation between ‘subjectivity’ and 
‘intersubjectivity’.
David Rooksby: Well, of course I am. But just humour me for a minute and define 
‘subjectivity’ again.
Phil Hind: Yes, yes, of course. A relatively non-contentious definition from a social 
science perspective is that ‘subjectivity’ describes a human being fashioned 
through their life experience,6 so—
Allison Jones: So the point of issue here is that a subject is produced through social 
discourses, linguistic and organisational structures and signifying systems. 
‘Subjectivity’, in other words, is not so much given as it is slowly constructed—
and transformed—over time and through experience.7
Marsha Bradfield: But I think we can also understand subjectivity as a subject’s experience 
of self. Subjectivity is not only constructed. It’s also experienced, with this 
experience feeding back into a subject’s—a person’s—becoming, their self-
realisation.
David Rooksby: It seems to me, then, that ‘intersubjectivity’ would be a person’s experience 
of their self in relation to others—other people.
Phil Hind: Other selves. Yes, quite, you would think so, but this is not a popular 
definition, at least not in sociology.
Christian Wiseman:  And post-structuralist philosophies of self-other relations tend to focus 
on ‘intersubjectivity’ as arising between subjects as well as subsuming 
them. Many of them depend on the idea there is no ‘subjectivity’ without 
‘intersubjectivity’.8* Tina and I will explore this later today in our discussion of 
the ethics of dialogic art practice, with reference to the kind of subjectivity we 
believe may be forged through dialogic art. 
Ella Stone: Oui, mais—are ‘subjectivity’ and ‘intersubjectivity’ not simply two points 
along the same continuum? Does ‘subjectivity’, in Marsha’s sense, not refer 
more to a subject’s experience of self? And is ‘intersubjectivity’ not more 
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concerned with, as Christian said, the subjectivity ‘arising between subjects as 
well as subsuming them’ and Phil’s sense that intersubjectivity is ‘a variety of 
relations between perspectives’?
John Johnson: KK, perhaps you could address how ‘intertersubjective exchange’ features in 
Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart?
KK Lin: Um, okay. Let me consider that for a moment. All right, what about the 
exchange between the construction workers as they raise the building? Or 
between the artist and the, um, ‘audience’, I guess, for lack of a better word, 
by way of the artwork?
Phil Hind: Yes, KK. You’re saying that without the construction workers’ intersubjective 
exchange, there would be no construction site. No construction site, no 
Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart—no Permanent Construction Site.
KK Lin: Well, yes. Yes, and I’m also thinking about what’s at stake in Bourriaud’s 
discussion of Huyghe’s artwork. Bourriaud speaks about Huyghe capturing 
‘the fleeting, fragile nature of human labour, the relationships of which it is 
composed’9 but which aren’t always acknowledged in the end product—that 
being a building, or a work of art!
John Johnson: Okay, okay, but, look—Huyghe’s artwork tells us absolutely nothing about 
the construction workers’ intersubjective exchange, beyond the fact that it 
appears to be producing some kind of building.
Brian Updike: And I know for a fact they’re actors.10 Does that matter?
KK Lin: Um, well, I guess I’m not sure. I don’t think so, as they’re still authorial 
subjects. But I was going to say—
John Johnson: Excuse me for interrupting, KK, but there’s also your claim that the ‘triple-A’ 
relation among the artist-artwork-audience is an intersubjective one, right? 
Quite aside from this being a standard relation in art, and therefore anything 
but exclusive to dialogic art, I have to ask how this qualifies as ‘exchange’.11 
Look, I can’t see how the audience might interact with this artwork by 
exchanging anything in a way that alters it perceptibly.12 But then, maybe 
it’s enough for them to give it their attention in exchange for whatever the 
artwork can offer in return. Maybe—
KK Lin: What about the dialogue between the temporalities?
John Johnson: Okay, the point is, this is a figurative dialogue at best and art is full of them! 
So, look, what I’m really wondering is why dialogic art would concern itself 
with figurative dialogues when there is an abundance of contemporary 
art practices that are literally dialogic—relational and socially engaged 
art, for instance. Both often involve people in quite straightforward acts of 
intersubjective exchange.
Brian Updike: Absolutely. I was thinking about this too and—
Ella Stone: Brian, perhaps you let John finish, oui?
John Johnson: Okay, you’ve said, KK, that Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart is an instance of 
dialogic art. But, listen, I think what you actually delivered is much closer to a 
dialogic reading, influenced by Bourriaud’s thinking, of a rather conventional 
artwork. Look, I try to see as much as I can, but I’m just not convinced.
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KK Lin: I guess I’m a little confused about this preoccupation in dialogic art with 
‘intersubjectivity’. Was this ever even up for grabs? Why ‘intersubjective 
interaction’ or ‘exchange’ and not ‘spatiotemporal dialogue’?
Marsha Bradfield: It’s a good question that reminds me of a conversation I recently had 
with my supervisor, Stephen Scrivener. We discussed his impression of an 
exhibition, Mondrian and Nicholson in Parallel at the Courtauld.13 Stephen 
was interested in the ways it placed these two painters in dialogue. And the 
moment I entered the exhibition, I knew exactly what he meant. Mondrian’s 
and Nicholson’s styles and sensibilities informed each other with revealing 
effect through their juxtaposition. Clearly, these paintings were in dialogue. 
But then so is everything! And that was really Stephen’s point. He was trying 
to help me to bound the research, to focus it in a way so that dialogue here 
didn’t become a theory of everything, with ‘dialogue’ and ‘relation’ becoming 
convertible terms.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, if I may say, Marsha, I think it important to stress the disciplinary 
context in which dialogue is being explored—the way sociolinguistics, for 
instance, engages dialogue through language, with emphasis being placed on 
both verbal language and nonverbal exchange.
Marsha Bradfield: Yes, Shadworth, disciplinary context is important. But you’ll recall what Allison 
was saying about art being extra-disciplinary. Contemporary art practice can’t 
rely on a disciplinary focus because it borrows from so many sources.  Going 
back to the idea of everything being in dialogue,  I think this is captured 
in an experience I had when visiting Mondrian and Nicholson in Parallel 
with a friend, Simon Watt-Milne. So we were discussing the significance of 
Mondrian’s and Nicholson’s paintings being in dialogue, and Simon told a 
story I think indicates the kind of challenges Allison and I face in bounding 
and rebounding our research. Simon spoke of an art student who took up 
the project of drawing three smaller circles within a larger one. Here, try 
it.... See what I mean?  Over and over again, the student drew this pattern in 
all possible combinations. He was hoping to produce something that didn’t 
evoke a face. But after countless attempts he found no way of doing this.
David Rooksby: And so? What’s the moral of the story, if I may ask?
Marsha Bradfield: That intersubjective exchange provides a much-needed anchor for our 
research. I mean, you can see everything in dialogue and dialogue in 
everything. So you have to focus on something in or as dialogue and really 
look at that. At the same time—and this is an important point—this seeing, 
this focusing—the focus of our research—points to one of the challenges 
of taking dialogue as a subject of research—it’s reflexive.  It’s another case 
of self-reference—to understand dialogue, I, the researcher, have to be in 
dialogue.
Phil Hind: Yes, of course. This is a well-established challenge in the human sciences as 
well. It makes good sense that a sociological theory, for example, is itself a 
sociological phenomenon—the social theory provides the terms with which 
social phenomena are engaged.14 This differs from the physical sciences, 
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where the subject matter exists more or less independently of the scientist, 
though, of course, there is debate about this—that is, about the degree to 
which anything exists outside of its perception. But the truth is that the more 
immediate issue here is that sociologists are active and creative participants, 
as opposed to objective observers.15 So then the outcomes they generate 
need to acknowledge this in some way.
KK Lin: I guess what I’m wondering is, doesn’t the same hold for dialogic art? I mean, 
um, doesn’t the dialogic artist need to acknowledge their participation in the 
dialogue they’re engaging? Marsha, it would be good to explore this further 
today, along with your broader interest in intersubjective exchange as a 
referent for dialogic art. But I’m not really sure if this type of dialogue is the 
best focus for my dissertation. I’m, um, I’m still wondering, and this goes back 
to something I touched on earlier. I guess, it’s still unclear to me what kind 
of space there is for figurative dialogue—including spatiotemporal dialogue 
like the kind featured in Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart. What kind of space is 
there for figurative dialogue if dialogic art is, as Marsha claims, ‘anchored’ in 
intersubjective exchange? Can anyone help me with this?
John Johnson: KK, you’re interested in photography, right? Well, look, I have an example that 
I think might address this question by way of comparison. Listening to you 
speak about Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart reminded me of an exhibition by 
the Canadian artist, Babak Golkar, which I saw at Centre A in Vancouver back 
in 2003. It was titled The Science and Philosophy of Mutation. I’m sorry, I don’t 
have any images. You’ll have to trust my description and use your imagination.
Okay, like Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart, Golkar’s artwork involved 
a before-and-after relation. This organised the artwork’s mimetic scheme, 
making it ‘the dialogic tactic’, if you will. But rather than nesting images, 
as Huyghe does, Golkar juxtaposed two portraits—two images of the 
same person were hung side by side. The first one pictured a storyteller. It 
featured the storyteller before he told the story of his life—sorry, Maeve, I’ll 
correct myself—before he or she told the story of his or her life. The second 
photograph was made afterwards, after this narration was complete. So the 
before-and-after was about manifesting the sitter’s transformation through 
the storytelling. But, look—there was a catch.
David Rooksby: There always is.
John Johnson: There was a single listener hearing the story, okay, and they became the 
storyteller—the sitter—in the next cycle. So he or she repeated the so-called 
story of their life to another loan listener, who in turn became the narrator-
stroke-sitter,16  if you see what I mean. Okay?
The point is that, as an example of dialogic art, Science and Philosophy 
of Mutation depends on a literal instance of intersubjective exchange. This 
exchange—this literal dialogue—plays a conspicuous role in the artwork’s 
production and representation. Yet this dialogue isn’t literal in the artwork as 
an outcome. But, look—this is what makes it interesting.
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Fig. 3.3
KK Lin: So, Chinese whispers, but the end result is silent—the photographs don’t 
actually speak like the people did when they were telling the story, do they?
John Johnson: Well, the photographs speak by showing—or at least evoking—the authorial 
subject’s transformation through their storytelling.
KK Lin: I’m confused.
John Johnson: Okay, look—assuming we agree that dialogic art is ‘anchored’ in 
intersubjective exchange, what your discussion of Chantier Barbès-
Rochechouart has helped me to clarify, KK, is that the dialogues featured in 
dialogic works of art should be based on literal acts of dialogue.
KK Lin: But I understood you to say that Science and Philosophy of Mutation deploys 
a figurative dialogue. The images don’t actually speak, do they?
John Johnson: No, but this dialogue references an actual—historical—instance of 
intersubjective exchange. I recall thinking that it was practically impossible 
not to recognise the difference between the before-and-after portraits, 
even if there was very little to perceive. That difference was, of course, the 
storyteller’s transformation through their intersubjective exchange. Or at least 
that’s what the juxtaposition evoked.
KK Lin: Across the two images? So you’re saying, simply, that the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts?
John Johnson: Yes, right, that’s exactly right, KK. But, look, I think it’s more important for our 
broader discussion of dialogic art that, instead of personifying spatiotemporal 
or other kinds of dialogue and attributing them with the volition to interact, 
Science and Philosophy of Mutation takes an historical dialogue and renders 
it figurative in a way that refers back to the literal dialogue—the storytelling 
through which the artwork was produced.
Cassy Appadurai: So, to sum up, John, you’re saying that a literal or historical dialogue, as an 
instance of intersubjective exchange, can find figurative representation in 
a dialogic work of art, but that this is not the case in reverse—a figurative 
dialogue can’t or shouldn’t be personified. Have I captured the gist of it?
John Johnson: Yes, you have, Cassy. Or at least that’s my current sense of dialogic art. But 
what would this mean for your dissertation, KK?
KK Lin: I guess, um, it means that I won’t be arguing that Chantier Barbès-
Rochechouart qualifies as a dialogic artwork—when a condition of this type of 
art is that it takes a literal instance of intersubjective exchange as its referent!
[Barcamp laughs.]
So I guess I’ll focus instead on the role that reflexivity can play in drawing 
out the dialogic interplay in spatiotemporal relations by way of self-reference. 
Does that make sense? And here I’m thinking about ‘dialogic’ as ‘related to or 
in the form of dialogue’. Is that a valid argument?
Maeve Cutty: Could we see Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart again, please?
KK Lin: Of course. (Fig. 3.3)
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Mave Cutty : You know, luv, I think you’re proposing a very interesting idea.  And I’m 
wondering if you could say more about reflexivity in Chantier Barbès-
Rochechouart. Like, how, from your perspective, does Huyghe’s artwork draw 
out the interplay of the spatiotemporal relations at stake?
KK Lin: Yes, but, before I do that, may I suggest that you—all of us, really—recall Phil’s 
apprehension that dialogic artworks run the risk of infinite regress. So, I am 
just wondering if reflexivity like the kind in Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart may 
offer a way of coping with this in the form of self-reference.
Should I clarify a bit? All right. Hillary Lawson argues that all our claims 
about the world are reflexive in ways that can’t be avoided.17 So, um, in 
the case of Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart, we can only recognise the 
importance of labour in this artwork by labouring to understand it through 
our interpretation. I think this chimes with your point earlier, Marsha, about 
engaging dialogue through dialogue. Does that make sense? Okay, good.
Um, but Huyghe’s artwork doesn’t actually represent all the labour 
involved in its realisation—and nor could it, right?  I think, instead, it 
references what Clark earlier called ‘this other labour’ or ‘this othered 
labour’. It does this, um, through the interplay of content and form within 
the artwork’s nesting scheme. So, then, the past of the historical image is 
nested within the contemporaneity of the artwork as an object—a cohesive 
expression—and this, in turn, is nested within the artwork in the present, as 
it’s made present to me through my interpretation. And, when I think about 
it, that’s all that I need to get me considering all the work, the labour I mean, 
involved in the production of this artwork—material and conceptual, past, 
present and future. In other words, maybe I don’t need to see all the labour 
involved in bringing Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart into being. Maybe I just 
need a representational scheme that makes me aware of it and locates me 
somewhere in the chain of production. Does that sound plausible?
Allison Jones: Not only plausible but interesting, KK. In fact, Mary Anne Francis, who also 
draws on Lawson’s thinking in discussion of her practice of writing as art, 
argues for something like this, which she calls refractive reflexivity. This occurs 
when the media of something isn’t transparent but instead opaque. For with 
opacity comes deferral—meaning is deferred as the medium thickens.18   So 
it’s like the artwork gestures towards something beyond itself, if you see what 
I mean. 
Shadworth Dyson: Ah, yes. Deconstruction.
KK Lin: Um, well, Lawson  looks at reflexivity in Derrida’s deconstruction, but he also 
considers it in terms of self-reference in Nietzsche’s philosophy. And come 
to think of it, Lawson’s take on this is explicitly dialogic, when he insists that 
you can’t really read any of Nietzsche’s philosophy in isolation. This is a little 
convoluted, as it’s part of a bigger argument. But as part of this, Lawson 
speaks about being able to cite Nietzsche to support almost any point of view. 
He says something to the effect that this can be explained by the fact that 
there are so many complex layers of irony at play in Nietzsche’s texts, the 
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result being that you can’t take any of them at face value.19 Um, I guess I’m 
saying, that there’s an opacity in Nietzsche’s writing like the kind you were 
describing, Allison. And Lawson concludes, following Nietzsche’s thinking 
more generally, that Nietzsche’s implicit stance is that there are no absolute 
conclusions, and that the reflexivity of his texts points to this very fact.20 
Clark Chris: Well, obviously, this trails what I was saying earlier about dialogue being 
another name for relativity. 
Shadworth Dyson: Excuse me, Clark, but I would like to lodge very quickly that this also connects 
to  Allison’s insistence earlier that dialogue is a value neutral form to the 
extent that it can be purposed to multiple ends. Though I should say that, 
when it comes to a ‘dialogic disposition’, a dialogic representation or any other 
expression of ‘the dialogic’ being centrifugal, the ideas of dialogue as value 
neutral and/or relativist run up against a limit the moment we acknowledge 
that the ambivalence of dialogue is a value of sorts.
Marsha Bradfield: I suppose what you’re saying, KK, is that the self-reference in Chantier Barbès-
Rochechouart calls into question the validity of both the so-called historical 
image and the contemporary one. But what do you think this means for your 
concern with the artwork’s ethical form? You mentioned something about 
‘ethical form’ earlier and it strikes me as important, so—
KK Lin: Well, um, the truth is, Marsha, I don’t know. On the one hand, um, on the 
one hand you can say that you can’t take an artwork’s representation at face 
value, as factual, right? But on the other hand, this very same scheme can 
sometimes acknowledge the artwork’s actual authorial becoming, so how it 
came into being, through documenting some process, perhaps.  I guess this 
points to a tension, doesn’t it? Does anyone else have any thoughts? 
Brian Updike: Absolutely! But does that mean anyone has any answers? That, I don’t know.
KK Lin: Good—at least I’m not the only one. But what, um, I think I do know for 
certain is that Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart doesn’t explicitly explore 
intersubjective exchange. And if we’ve agreed this is what ‘anchors’ dialogic 
art, then Huyghe’s artwork doesn’t qualify, does it? But what about reflexivity 
as a ‘dialogic tactic’ for organising and reigning in the dialogues? I’m referring 
to the dialogues composing this representation of labour, dispersed across 
the various dialogues. As a tactic, could this reflexive representation, or what 
Allison called ‘refractive reflexivity’, be, um, a strategy for short circuiting the 
problem of infinite regress in dialogic art? I feel like I’m repeating myself now 
but, well, I guess what I think is that all the labour that goes into the artwork’s 
realisation is evoked without being evidenced. Does that make sense?
Brian Updike: Yes, absolutely, KK. But could I go back to something? Why would dialogic 
art concern itself with figurative dialogues when such an abundance of 
contemporary art practices are literally dialogic? And isn’t this also the 
view that Edwardo Kac takes? Are you familiar with his dialogic approach 
to electronic art? It dates back to, well, all the way back to the late 1990s 
and draws on several philosophies of dialogue, including Bakhtin’s theory of 
intersubjectivity based on reciprocity and mutuality.21 
 133    132
Now Kac absolutely holds the view that dialogic art is about literal 
dialogue—actual intersubjective exchange—and he investigates this idea 
through electronic art and telecommunications, including tele-presence, 
as an exchange with a remote other. He gives the example of two dancers 
interacting via remote imaging and their interaction shaping their dance 
through a literal dialogue, albeit one mediated by technology. Am I alone 
in thinking that, if Kac were producing dialogic art today, he might be using 
Twitter?
KK Lin: Yes, Brian. I mean, yes, I see what you mean about Kac, not that you’re alone 
in thinking that. And I guess I can see this as one approach to dialogic art. But 
I’m also wondering if limiting this type of art to literal dialogue in the form of 
real-time exchange might be too narrow. I mean, who builds and organises 
these interactive platforms? And how does this construction figure in Kac’s 
sense of dialogic art?
Brian Updike: Do I think he’s more concerned with the potential of dialogic art to overcome 
entrenched convictions about art that are rooted in ocularcentrism 
and unilateral reception than with broader issues of authorial labour?22 
Absolutely! But, as I’ve said, I do think he’s correct to emphasise real-time 
forms of interaction as not only being constitutive of dialogic art—these 
interactions themselves are actually also art.
KK Lin: All right, I see. But, um, Brian, I wonder if maybe this limits the experience of 
these artworks. By contrast, the approach to dialogic art that I’m proposing 
offers at least two opportunities for authorship—the co-authorial process of 
the art’s literal production, and the dialogic artwork as an outcome of this 
process. In the case of the latter, it’s authored through its interpretation, and 
this interpretation is prompted, in the case of Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart, 
by its reference to labour. And, also, it extends to the labour of interpreting 
the work of art. I suppose what I’m wondering, Brian, is what is lost by 
reducing dialogic art to real-time intersubjective exchange? I worry that this 
risks eliding the huge range of dialogues that support this kind of relation—do 
you see what I mean?
Anne Lang: You know, this comes onto authorship. And, KK, you said something earlier 
about the mimetic scheme in Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart—about it 
drawing attention to the dialogues that author the artwork in a way. I 
mean, you said that it prompted you to wonder how all the interlocutors 
in this dialogue—the artist Huyghe, the construction workers and those 
encountering this dialogic artwork—author it in distinct but, sort of, 
overlapping ways.
Sooo acting in my role as TheJargonBuster, I would say that ‘authorship’ 
acknowledges the reality of things being made—produced. I mean, it’s a 
pretty basic definition, but ‘authors’ are those who produce these things—so 
an artwork is authored but so are its interpretations. Have you any thoughts 
on this, KK?
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KK Lin: Um, I guess I’m not sure that either dialogic art or I has a ready-made answer 
to the question, ‘What is authorship?’ I think, um, yes I can imagine each 
dialogic artwork exploring authorship by testing and inhabiting familiar 
authorial practices and maybe even experimenting with alternatives? Does 
that make sense?
Allison Jones: For sure, contemporary art is hankering for models that move beyond the 
fiction of the independent author, as well as collaborative authorship as 
a vague description that can mean pretty much anything. As I’m sure you 
know, KK, there has been growing interest in art authored in the first person 
plural—I mean, ‘we’. And many of these collective subjects are discussed with 
reference to the, sort of, you know, ‘c’ words. In keeping with ‘co’, the prefix 
meaning ‘with’, there is collaboration, cooperation, co-ordination, corporation 
and collectivity,23 as well as co-production and co-creation. And there is also 
participation, which I would say, sort of describes interacting with an ‘it’. An 
example might be completing a preset task in a dialogic artwork, which may 
or may not involve interacting with other people by way of objects, if you see 
what I mean?
Ella Stone: Allison, are you familiar with artist and theorist Dave Beech? Particularly, 
his definition of ‘participation’, which I should say he gets from critic and 
curator Claire Bishop? Non? Well, Beech defines ‘participation’ in terms of 
interactivity, and vice versa. But ‘interactivity’ actually has two meanings 
for both Beech and Bishop. So we can interact with each other, can we not? 
That’s the first meaning. And there is also user interaction. An example 
of this latter interaction would include using digital technologies, such 
as a cash machine—you see? This seems to me to be what you’re calling 
‘participation’ when you describe it as interaction with an ‘it’. But, if Beech 
thinks ‘participation’ means ‘taking part’ and ‘having to share’, then is the 
distinction, perhaps, that interactivity is more physical, and participation more 
social?24
Marsha Bradfield: I appreciate what you’re saying, Ella, and I think it’s also really important 
because it points to the range of labour and involvement in cultural 
production. Like most of us here, if not all of us, I often occupy multiple 
roles, each with their own kind of involvement. I suppose I’m saying there’s a 
distinction to be made, for instance, between, on the one hand, my booking 
this project space and organising the projector, screen and chairs for today’s 
barcamp, and, on the other hand, my role as a contributor/facilitator.
Cassy Appadurai: So what is the role of the artist in dialogic art, in light of everything we’ve 
discussed so far? Can we draw a line around it and give it a bit more shape? 
KK, what do you think?
KK Lin: I would say the artist is one of the authors, but I’m not sure all the authors 
are always artists, if that makes sense. I’m thinking this would, um, be 
determined, maybe, on a case-by-case basis. 
Ella Stone: Oui, yes, KK. And does this not bring us back to subjectivity—back to roles 
like ‘artist,’ ‘author,’ ‘participant’ and ‘collaborator’, which socialise authorial 
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subjects in certain ways, wrapped up with expectations? Beech makes the 
point that participants don’t tend to critique something they’re participating 
in because, unlike collaborators, participants don’t have the same rights.25 
Could it not be that these rights would include being party to the decision-
making involved in the production of the artwork? I assume the artist would, 
at least, be involved in that decision-making, if not facilitating it.
But is there not another way of understanding Beech’s argument—
that, the terms of engagement that organise an artwork condition authorial 
subjectivities? Beech thinks we need to question the expectations that come 
with authorial roles and the kinds of subjectivities they shape. He wonders 
how art practice might be configured differently, as something more like, for 
example, an economy—an economy of practice that is more dispersed, more 
sensitive to combinations of agency, control, and self-determination, rather 
than role-based organisation.26 So is it not about getting beyond the roles in 
authorial practice and, by extension, the specific subjectivities they produce? 
And, then, is it not, also, about how we can liberate the practice of dialogic art 
from these roles so that more fluid subjectivities can begin to take shape? 
KK Lin: Well I’m not sure I can answer your question, Ella! Beyond saying that I can 
see value in acknowledging the range of roles and responsibilities in the 
artistic practice of dialogic art. I guess, for me, it’s less about ‘liberating’ 
authorial subjects from these roles and, um, it’s more about acknowledging 
the kind of labour they entail and the subjectivation they involve—so how 
they shape subjectivities, if you see what I mean. There’s a politics at stake 
in this acknowledgment, isn’t there? And different kinds of work do forge 
different kinds of subjectivities—don’t they?
Ella Stone: Bien sûr. If by this you mean—
 KK Lin:  Well, I mean, um, well perhaps I should clarify with an example? I’m struck by 
the mimetic complexity of the Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart’s construction 
of the construction workers. To me, they are objects of representation on 
the one hand, but they are also subjects—authorial subjects—who are 
pictured in the act of constructing. So the workers are authoring the building’s 
construction while they’re authoring the artwork. But they’re also being 
authored—represented—by the images. Do you see what I mean? And 
something this highlights for me is all the civilians—the support workers, if 
you will—whose labour sustains contemporary art but who more often than 
not go unacknowledged. What about their authorial subjectivities? So I’m 
thinking there’s a politics of representation at stake here and I’m wondering 
how it extends to dialogic art more generally. Is this making sense?
Marsha Bradfield: It does, KK. In fact, what you’re saying reminds me of Andrew Chesher’s 
practice-based research on the dialogic documentary. It explores this 
documentary form as it intervenes in social acts. Andrew calls this ‘dialogising 
social practice’.27
Allison Jones: You should mention, Marsha, that Andrew was our cohort at Chelsea and was 
also supervised by Neil Cummings.
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Marsha Bradfield: Yes, that’s right. Now, there’s an important point of overlap between 
Andrew’s research and KK’s concern about the politics of representation and 
attribution in dialogic art, which I think we can connect to what Bourriaud 
called ‘the ethical conception of form’.28 When it comes to Andrew’s research, 
I don’t think it’s conscientious enough in engaging the ethical dimensions 
of documentary authorship. One of his projects, Seeing in the Dark, took 
place in a school for the blind in India, with the documentary dialogising 
the participants’ words and actions.29 But the ethical conundrums of this 
representation aren’t something that Andrew explores—or at least not in his 
PhD thesis. When he does consider the ethics of self-other relations and the 
other’s representation, they tend to be concerned with what happens in front 
of the camera. So he foregrounds the ambiguity and heterogeneity of the 
other’s enunciation of social acts30 but he doesn’t interrogate his own as an 
artist-documentarian.
John Johnson: Okay, so Marsha and KK are preoccupied with the politics of representation 
and attribution in dialogic art, and Ella is worried about the over-
determination of subjectivities in role-based co-authorial art practice. But, 
look, the point is, where does this leave us in our discussion of dialogic art?
Marsha Bradfield: Cassy, you’re our barcamp reporter. I know I’m putting you on the spot, but 
could you identify a few key points that we should take forward, in your view?
Cassy Appadurai: Well, it was a very wide-ranging discussion!
[Barcamp laughs.]
This is funny, sure, but it’s also frustrating. Trying to tweet this session was 
next to impossible. And I’m also aware that we’re already running behind 
schedule. I’m not facilitating here, but maybe these are things we could keep 
in mind—focus and timekeeping.
Marsha Bradfield: It’s a good point, Cassy. Thank you.
Cassy Appadurai: Of course. So key points to take forward, um, well. Hmm. I’ll venture a few.   
Could someone tweet these, please?
Allison Jones: Yes, I’ll do that. We have to make sure we have a record of these for our 
research!
Cassy Appadurai: Thanks. So to begin with, I think KK’s analysis of Chantier Barbès-
Rochechouart signalled that there could, in fact, be dialogic ‘arts’, plural, in 
contrast  to dialogic ‘art’, each one with an approach ‘anchored’ in a particular 
kind of dialogue. There was discussion about the dialogic art that Marsha and 
Allie are theorising being especially concerned with intersubjective exchange, 
and taking an instance of this kind of dialogue as its referent.
Second, John’s comparison between Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart and, 
what was it called? Ah yes, The Science and Philosophy of Mutation. So this 
comparison clarified one way that figurative dialogue might function in the 
service of literal dialogue in dialogic works of art. He argued that, whilst literal 
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dialogues may take figurative form, it might be better to avoid personifying 
figurative dialogues, as this would make the focus of dialogic art too broad. 
Have I captured that correctly, John?
John Johnson: Yes, that’s the gist.
Cassy Appadurai: Good. There was also discussion about reflexivity. I for one was struck by KK’s 
proposition that reflexivity in the form of self-reference could be a ‘dialogic 
tactic’ for exploring the labour that comes together in dialogic works of art, 
but in a way that alludes to all this work without trying to capture everything, 
which is obviously an impossible task. So this is the third point.
Then, discussion moved into talk about reflexivity in the exploration of 
dialogue. The general idea seemed to be that to engage dialogue is to be 
in dialogue, correct? Yes? I believe this was when we turned to the issue of 
authorship—the authorship of dialogic art, composed of dialogic forms, which 
are also somehow ethical in how they acknowledge their own authorship. 
I’m not sure I’m making this point very clearly, but I think KK cut to the 
heart of the issue when she said something to the effect that she, KK, didn’t 
know what it meant to say, on the one hand, that one can’t, of course, take 
an artwork’s representational scheme at face value--especially when this 
scheme is overtly self-referential.  But on the other hand, sometimes this self-
referentiality can effectively acknowledge the artwork’s authorial becoming 
and, by extension, the subjectivation of its authors in the process of its—or 
their—production. I don’t have any answers—that’s not my responsibility 
here, today—but, from my perspective as an art journalist, this tension that 
KK flagged seems to be central in evolving an understanding of dialogic 
art—even if it’s not something that can be resolved over the course of 
today’s discussion. It occurred to me we might term this tension the ‘ethics 
of opacity’, with the knowledge that it encompasses mimetic, political and 
ethical concerns. Clear as mud, right? 
David Rooksby:          Argh! Not punny.  
Cassy Appadurai:       I thought so. The final key point, as I see it, relates to subjectivity and
                                      intersubjectivity, which were salient concerns throughout the discussion. And 
                                      this was explored laterally with reference to authorial roles.
Ella Stone: Yes, and authorial roles and subjectivities are topics on which I will expand in 
my contribution—which is coming up next, oui?
Cassy Appadurai: So this final point will be explored further.
Marsha Bradfield: On that note, Cassy, thank you for your much-needed highlights. Your points 
about timekeeping and focus are well taken. I would also like to thank KK 
again for her contribution. I hope it will be as useful for your dissertation as it 
has been for our discussion of dialogic art. Would you join me in thanking KK 
with a round of applause?
[Barcamp claps.]
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Fig. 4.0
Marsha Bradfield: Ella, may I pass you the remote?
Ella Stone: Oui, bien sûr--Brian has slides. Hello again, everyone. So, this will be a double 
presentation, a combined effort from Brian and me—and, I trust, you too! It’s 
a good discussion, isn’t it?
Marsha Bradfield: So I’ll leave it to you and Brian to split the time. You’ll have an hour and 
twenty minutes, total.
Ella Stone: Yes, of course. That’s fine. But there doesn’t seem to be any water? 
Marsha Bradfield:  Over there, to your left. 
Ella Stone:  Ah yes. Well, many, many thanks for organising today, Marsha and Allison. 
I really must say that our discussions have already given me a great deal to 
think about, and we’re only on the fourth contribution! How many will there 
be, by the end of the day?
Marsha Bradfield: Thirteen, in all.
Ella Stone: Lucky thirteen. Well, considering that the question, ‘What is dialogic art?’ 
is so open, Brian and I feel that surrounding it from many angles and 
perspectives is what makes sense. 
  Alors, I should say that my annotated slide presentation was prepared, 
but our hard drive crashed last night and, it’s embarrassing, but I hadn’t 
backed it up. So this presentation won’t be as, mmm, cohesive as I might 
have preferred. I’ll be speaking from notes, peppered with a few quotes. And 
I’ll supplement the transcript with references when the time comes. Sound 
good? Bien.
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Brian and I are both critics and curators. And because we work in 
collaboration and investigate this practice in our commentary and curation, 
our understanding is constantly shifting—evolving—as we, mmm, lean into, 
shall we say, new projects and methods. So, whereas Grant Kester quite 
confidently asserts on the first page of his new book, The One and the Many, 
that any discussion of dialogic art practice should begin with ‘coming to terms 
with collaboration itself’,1 I’m afraid our beginning is more modest. Quite 
simply, we come to the term ‘collaboration’ afresh with each instance we 
encounter. 
Within the terms of this analysis—by which I mean Brian’s and my 
contributions—art is collaborative to the extent that no artist, artwork 
or anyone encountering either is an island. I would like to think this view 
extends to our barcamp. Authorship, co-authorship, participation, co-
ordination, collectivity and co-operation as well as spectatorship, viewership, 
connoisseurship, collecting, curating—the diverse character of this list 
immediately suggests that co-labouring in art is a domain where a wide range 
of theory and practice meet.
David Rooksby: But there’s no one-size-fits-all.
Ella Stone: Non. So, what does it mean to collaborate in dialogic art? Exploring this 
question was something that Brian and I felt was especially important, not 
only for understanding what dialogic art is or could be. It’s also important for 
locating this art in relation to other practices of contemporary art that are 
conspicuously concerned with collaboration. This is, in point of fact, central 
to how we—Brian and I, or is it Brian and me—anyway, how we think about 
dialogic art. This conspicuousness is something we will both explore in our 
contributions.
Now Kester, in keeping with much discussion on collaboration, reminds 
us that, in addition to ‘working together’—co-labouring—there is a second, 
more sinister sense in play. This is the ‘collaboration’ redolent of Vichy, 
France—co-operating with the enemy, treason, betrayal.2 And at least one 
vein of commentary on collaborative art practice remains caught up with this 
second definition. This commentary is fixated on determining the extent to 
which projects and practices betray contemporary art by collaborating with 
the enemy. Dans ce cas, collaboration is tantamount to pursuing aims and 
objectives beyond art as an autonomous spear—forgive me, an autonomous 
sphere.
John Johnson: Okay, so you’re suggesting that commentary—or commentators—of 
contemporary art who buy into the myth that art is an autonomous sphere 
are hostile to collaboration that doesn’t take art as an end in itself. Is that 
right?
Ella Stone: Well, I would ask you to witness the passionate and provocative position of 
critic, curator and art historian, Claire Bishop. She takes issue with relational 
art practices—including dialogical art—on the grounds that they share an 
interest in ‘the creative rewards of collaborative activity.’3 This sounds, mmm, 
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fantastique! What’s not to love about creative rewards? But this description is 
actually very pejorative in Bishop’s critique of relational practices because, for 
her, ‘creative’ rewards are not the same as ‘artistic’ rewards. ‘Creative’ seems 
to be Bishop’s word for the practical and utilitarian application of art, when 
these aspects take priority over purely its ‘artistic’ significance—which is to 
say, its commitment to art as an end in itself.
Cassy Appadurai: Just to be sure I understand your position Ella—for Bishop, the word ‘artistic’ 
describes practices that pursue art as an end in itself, whereas ‘creative’ is 
a label that she applies to practices that pursue more concrete ends. Have I 
captured the gist of it?
Ella Stone: Oui—at least, that’s my reading. Consider, for example, Bishop’s discussion 
of the Turkish collective Oda Projesi, a group of three artists who work in the 
Galata district of Istanbul. Their neighbourhood projects are an instance of 
socially engaged practice that promotes exchange and dialogue. On Bishop’s 
account, this is primarily concerned with ‘strengthening the social bond’4—
and that’s a quote. When Bishop interviewed Oda Projesi about their practice, 
the women explained their decisions were based on creating dynamic and 
sustained relationships with their community.5 Can you see, perhaps, how, 
for commentators of relational art who, like Bishop, hold that art is an 
autonomous sphere of cultural production, such an explicitly social emphasis 
might be disturbing—disorienting, even?
Phil Hind: ‘The social bond’? I’m constantly amazed by the use of the word ‘social’ as an 
adjective that functions more like an explanation.6 There are ‘social problems’, 
‘social issues’, and here ‘the social bond’—all of which presume that we know 
what ‘the social’ is to begin with. I don’t think this is something we can take 
for granted.
Ella Stone: That’s an interesting point, Phil. Alors, when Bishop says that Oda Projesi’s 
socially engaged practice is preoccupied with ‘strengthening the social bond’, 
I think she actually means two things. She means, on the one hand, that this 
practice promotes people living together more cohesively—feeling part of a 
community. On the other hand, she also means that by being distracted from 
the business of l’art pour l’art, this art as social work self-disqualifies as ‘Art’ 
with a capital ‘A’. What Bishop says is, ‘There can be no failed, unsuccessful, 
unresolved, or boring works of collaborative art because all are equally 
essential to the task of strengthening the social bond’.7 But what she means 
is that this collaborative art cannot fail because it is not actually ‘Art’. She 
simply can’t entertain the possibility that collaborative art, including relational 
practice, might qualify as ‘Art’ in keeping with a different framework, one 
that does not hold autonomy as a defining feature of art’s ontology and 
teleology—what it is, how it exists and to what ends.8 Social work may use 
artistic techniques that result in it being creative. Mais when socially engaged 
or other forms of relational practice, like Oda Projesi’s, seek to be functional 
and utilitarian, in Bishop’s view, they cease to be ‘Art’. Do you see?
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Allison Jones: Ella, there are, of course, many ways of defining dialogic art—and numerous 
ways of broaching it with reference to collaboration. Why the old, hard, 
autonomy chestnut?
Ella Stone: ‘Chestnut?’ Ah, oui. I think the first thing to say is that it’s a question of 
association. Marsha spoke earlier about her research emerging from a 
critique of relational aesthetics. And then you, Allison, went on to qualify that 
your preliminary research indicates that dialogic art has a stronger affinity 
with dialogical art than with relational aesthetics, non? It seems to me that 
something that relational aesthetics, dialogic art, dialogical art, socially 
engaged practice and other practices have in common is that they cannot take 
their status as ‘Art’ for granted. I find that Bishop’s commentary underscores 
this very point.
David Rooksby: Maybe the artists working in these areas should just ignore Bishop and get on 
with their business.
Ella Stone: Oui, I understand what you’re saying, David. But it would be difficult to 
discuss relational practice without engaging Bishop. She’s a well-recognised 
commentator in this subfield of contemporary art. This notwithstanding, I 
think the main issue here, and this—what’s the expression?—goes to the 
heart of what John and KK were saying earlier. That is, dialogic art, as a type 
of relational practice, distinguished by its dialogic forms is going to have to 
struggle for its own legitimacy and recognition.
David Rooksby: Because?
Ella Stone: Because the artistic forms of painting, sculpture and drawing are all well 
established—dialogic forms, less so. As a result, dialogic art, and other kinds 
of relational practice that find expression through dialogic forms are going 
to have to work harder to self-realise as contemporary art. This will involve 
taking up a position in relation to art as autonomous. It’s all very well for 
John to say the autonomy of art is a myth, but what evidence can we marshal 
to support this claim—and by this I mean compelling evidence that might 
debunk the hegemony of this autonomy, while at the same time fortifying the 
status of dialogic art as art.
Hillary Murphy: So, an art that’s grounded in a different epistemology and ontology. Yes, I can 
see what you mean.
Marsha Bradfield: What you’re saying is really interesting, Ella, because you seem to be 
suggesting that dialogic art could engage in the ongoing discussion around 
art’s autonomy by enacting itself in a way that critiques this very definition of 
art. Is that correct?
Ella Stone: Oui! Yes, I think so—and I’ll come back to that. Now, politics, they say, makes 
for strange bedfellows. Collaboration in contemporary art, too. So, to explore 
the question, ‘What does it mean to collaborate in dialogic art?’ I want to 
draw on critic and theorist John Roberts’s theory of collective collaboration. 
I suggest this is an unlikely choice—a strange bedfellow—for dialogic art. 
Roberts, like Bishop, holds fast to art as ontologically autonomous; he 
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 considers autonomy a necessary condition of art’s existence in the world.9 
This notwithstanding, I sense that dialogic art, as a post-autonomous practice, 
has much to learn from Roberts’s theory.
John Johnson: Okay, so now we’re talking about dialogic art as post-autonomous.10 
Ella Stone: Well, isn’t it? Isn’t it an art practice that draws attention to itself as 
conspicuously collaborative in ways that outstretch art as an autonomous 
sphere? Engaging what this collaboration means is the purpose of dialogic art, 
on Brian’s and my understanding. Isn’t that right, Brian?
John Johnson: Listen, I may be putting words in your mouth here, Ella, but your point is that 
you’re busting the myth of art’s autonomy by acknowledging all the ways in 
which dialogic art is not autonomous, or at least dependent on a wide range 
of authors, including the institutions of art, art history, tradition, etcetera? Is 
that it?
Ella Stone: Oui! Bien sûr! For Bishop, art’s autonomy safeguards it against doing other 
kinds of work, such as social work à la Oda Projesi.11 In Roberts’s case, social 
work is precisely what he hopes collective collaboration can accomplish as 
autonomous—albeit a different kind of social work than what Bishop finds so 
unseemly and disorienting.
In contrast with Bishop, Roberts believes that, mmm, insulated against 
the instrumental rationality of capitalism, collective collaboration can, 
among other things, ‘reflect on the division of labour from inside the social 
relations of art’.12 And I should say that the larger argument in his essay, 
‘Collaboration as a Problem of Art’s Cultural Form’13 which is the text I’ll 
focus on here, contends that the de-alienated labour of artistic collaboration 
can provide a ‘model for the de-alienation of socialized labour’.14  It’s about 
acheiving de-alienated labour through a convergence of art as collective 
practice and collectivised labour. Do you see how I might take this to indicate 
the emancipatory potential of this collaborative practice—how it offers an 
alternative to familiar models of production marked by the division of labour 
under capitalism?
John Johnson: Seriously? Look, Ella, no disrespect. But of all the theories of collaboration 
that you could have chosen to explore dialogic art, you opted for one that, 
just based on what you’ve said so far, is almost surely flawed in two regards.
Ella Stone: And these two regards are, John?
John Johnson: Okay, well, look, to begin with, it’s untenable in practice. I mean, ‘insulated 
against the instrumental rationality of capitalism’—really? Show me an art 
practice that enjoys this kind of privilege and I’ll give you a million pounds.
Ella Stone: Is that a promise? But, seriously—the other way this theory is flawed is—?
John Johnson: Okay, because it overdetermines art and collaboration—collaborative art. 
Look, the idea of art achieving ‘de-alienated labour through a convergence of 
art as collective practice and collectivised labour’—that’s a big ask! Too big—
because, the point is, it sets collaborative art up to fail.
Marsha Bradfield: Ella, perhaps it would help if you could give us an example of this ‘collective 
collaboration’.
 157    156
Ella Stone: Bien sûr—the Bauhaus.
John Johnson: The Bauhaus?
Ella Stone: Mais oui. Collective collaboration, on Roberts’s understanding, brings 
collaborators together from different disciplines into a ‘laboratory model’. In 
Roberts’s opinion, this way of working achieves de-alienated labour through 
‘a convergence between art as collective practice and collectivised labour’, 
and the convergence overcomes the divide between manual and intellectual 
labour.15
John Johnson: Okay, what evidence does he offer to support this claim?
Ella Stone: Well, this isn’t something he really explores.
John Johnson: Right. No surprise there.
Ella Stone: Oui. But this notwithstanding, I do think Roberts’s theory of collective 
collaboration throws up some, mmm, considerations that we should at least 
keep in mind when it comes to dialogic art. And I’m especially interested in 
his claim that collective collaboration is distinguished by a specific mode or 
representation, one that recalls KK’s discussion. On Roberts’s account, ‘the 
socially produced character of the art  is made explicit in the form of the 
work’.16
David Rooksby: Whoa, Ella, slow down! That’s a lot to process—like what do you mean by, ‘in 
the form of the work’. Or, I guess, what does Roberts mean?
John Johnson: Exactly. I was wondering about this, too. Okay, so is it ‘the work’ that occurs 
as the collaboration that produces an outcome? Is this ‘the work’? The labour 
in the process—in which case, it would really be the practice of collective 
collaboration? Or is ‘the work’ the ‘artwork’ or some other outcome?17 
Look, what exactly are we talking about here? What does this collective 
collaboration involve? And I’m also interested in the tweet about the 
challenges of the collaboration’s day-to-day organisation. 
Ella Stone: Well, first, let me say that it’s worth noting of Roberts that there are, of 
course, many alternatives to collective collaboration—like what he calls the, 
mmm, ‘artisanal model of teamwork’ that supports the ‘post-Warholian artist 
as editor/appropriationist/ideas-manager’18 in retaining their sole authorship. 
He gives the examples of Damien Hirst and Jeff Koons. Their art is produced 
by factories of artisans, whose authorship is effaced by Hirst’s and Koons’s 
signatures.19
Allors, collective collaboration in Roberts’s understanding is quite 
different from this. To begin with, it is social in a specific sense. It brings 
collaborators together from different disciplines into the laboratory model  
with the intention of producing an outcome that acknowledges the sociality 
of their collaborative authorship.20 Do you see?
Anne Lang: No, not really. ‘The sociality of their collective authorship’?
Ella Stone: Are you asking if this is something that Roberts explores in depth? The answer 
is no. But I take it to mean that the artwork draws attention to itself as socially 
produced—collaborative in a conspicuous way.
John Johnson: But Roberts doesn’t offer any details.
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Ella Stone: Non, c’est vraie. So, when earlier I said that an outcome generated thorough 
collective collaboration on Roberts’s account results in the socially produced 
character of the art being made explicit in the form of the work, I should have 
added that ‘work’ in this instance refers to the ‘artwork’ as an outcome of the 
collaborative process.
John Johnson: Based on what?
Ella Stone: Well, elsewhere in Roberts’s paper, he speaks about the ‘labour in the artwork 
being made conspicuous and critical’.21 And it’s this, more than anything else, 
this interest in producing an artwork in which its collaborative labour and 
socially produced character—indeed, the socially produced character of its 
collaborative labour—that is made conspicuous and critical, oui, this is what 
I wish to focus on here. I would like to think this is an interest, or perhaps, a 
commitment, that dialogic art shares with collective collaboration. 
Marsha Bradfield: Could you say more about your sense that dialogic art makes the socially 
produced character of collaborative labour explicit?
Ella Stone: Mais oui. Consider this barcamp. Doesn’t it place its interlocutors in a critical 
exchange that might result in the possible, mmm, alignment of their interests, 
skills and proficiencies? In a way, isn’t this barcamp a kind of laboratory? Do 
we, the interlocutors, not bring our respective resources to bear on, ‘What is 
dialogic art?’ as we experiment with different ways of exploring this question? 
Does each contributor not approach it from a different perspective? I’m 
interested in dialogic projects that make their interlocutors’ contributions 
conspicuous and critical while also attempting to understand the socially 
produced character of this labour from the collaborator’s respective 
perspectives.
Cassy Appadurai: Ella, let me try and summarise what you’ve proposed so far. Earlier, you said 
that dialogic art has much to learn from collective collaboration. But, from 
the sounds of it, the situation is slightly different. It’s more like collective 
collaboration identifies an ambition that you think dialogic art might share. 
This is to make the socially produced character of a dialogic practice or project 
conspicuous and critical in an artwork as an outcome of this activity—for lack 
of a better word.
David Rooksby:  That’s a tongue twister, isn’t it. 
Ella Stone: Oui, Cassy. Très bien.
Cassy Appadurai: And then you went on to say something to the effect that you’re interested in 
dialogic projects that make their interlocutors’ contributions conspicuous and 
critical while also attempting to understand the socially produced character 
of this labour from the collaborators’ individual perspectives. Have I captured 
what you’re getting at?
Ella Stone: Yes! Yes! Very much so! Formidable!
Cassy Appadurai: So it’s not just a question of making explicit the socially produced character 
of a dialogic artwork in its outcome. It’s about picturing this sociality from the 
collaborators’ respective points of view. Is that it?
Ella Stone: Oui. Exactement.
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Marsha Bradfield: Ella, could you give us an example of a dialogic artwork like the kind you’re 
thinking about? I know you’ve mentioned the barcamp, but, how about an 
artwork that’s uncontentious in its status, well, its status as art? What you’re 
describing sounds quite different from either Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart 
or the artwork John spoke about, the one that used storytelling?
Ella Stone: Oui, I can do that, bien sûr. But first, if I may make one additional point? 
You’ll recall that Allison spoke, in her introductory comments, about fine art 
adopting and adapting methods from other disciplines. What Cassy’s excellent 
summary—if I may say, Cassy, what you were saying just now—draws into 
view is that I’m adopting Roberts’s model of collective collaboration for 
dialogic art based on my conviction that they share an interest in the socially 
produced character of the art being made explicit in the form of the work. 
But, as Allison said, I’m adapting this model, too. I’m suggesting that, instead 
of this art foregrounding disciplinary contributions, as in the Bauhaus’s 
collective authorship, dialogic art might adapt this approach by foregrounding 
the contributions of individual interlocutors.
John Johnson: Hang on! What do you mean by ‘disciplinary contributions’?
Ella Stone: Bien, I mean the idea that an artwork produced by the Bauhaus’s laboratory 
model brings together contributions from ceramics, woodworking, stained 
glass, etcetera, under the mantle of collective authorship.
Cassy Appadurai: But the Bauhaus wasn’t collective in its authorship, was it?  I mean, we often 
hear about so-and-so being a member of the Bauhaus.
Ella Stone: Actually, the Bauhaus did subscribe to collective authorship. I also know 
from a source, beyond Roberts’s paper, that this wasn’t always easy to 
maintain. Students didn’t hold rights to their work produced while attending 
the Bauhaus, and all work made with materials supplied by the institution 
remained its property.22 Yet the Bauhaus ‘masters’, as the tutors were called, 
retained their rights.
Clark Chris: Ha! Maybe collective collaboration is closer to the rackets of Koons and Hirst 
than Roberts would like to admit.
Ella Stone: C’est vraie, peut être. The students tried to contest this. And do you know that 
in 1924, seventeen of them sent a letter to Walter Gropius, who was the head 
at that time? Basically, they wanted the Bauhaus to refrain from publishing 
designs under the institution’s collective authorship. The students, by the way, 
were unsuccessful in their protest.23
Marsha Bradfield: So attribution is something a dialogic artwork would approach differently? 
It would be very good to understand how the interlocutors’ contributions 
compose and are made explicit in the outcome, Ella.
Ella Stone: Oui, bien sûr. Take the example of Sophie Calle’s Take Care of Yourself. I don’t 
have a slide so I’ll just google it and show you a few images online. 
Allison Jones: Ella, are you seriously suggesting this is an example of collective 
collaboration?
Ella Stone: Non, not quite. I’m suggesting that the socially produced character of the 
art is made explicit in the form of the work. Did some of you see this at the 
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Whitechapel Gallery in 2009?24 For those of you who are unfamiliar with this 
artwork or who missed it, Take Care of Yourself comes together as a large-
scale, room-sized installation, with images, texts, objects and video.
Voilà. Here is some documentation. (4.1) So the entire project stems 
from a ‘Dear Jane’ email that artist Calle apparently received from a jilted 
lover—or, I suppose more correctly, a lover who jilted her. The lover’s email to 
her concludes with the line, ‘Take care of yourself’. What, Calle wonders, does 
this really mean? And she goes about exploring it by giving copies of the email 
to 107 women and asking them to interpret it and respond in light of their 
professional expertise. You may not be able to see this in the documentation, 
but the responses range from singing and dancing to clowning and analysing. 
Each respondent uses distinct formal as well as analytical and rhetorical 
strategies to make sense of the phrase. (Fig. 4.2)
Allison Jones: How is this a dialogic artwork?
John Johnson: How is it an instance of collective collaboration?
Ella Stone: Alors, à commencer—to begin, it brings together a proliferation of  responses. 
Take Care of Yourself is a caconn—sorry—a cacophony of voices and 
interpretations. This dovetails with Clark’s earlier comments about audit 
culture. You know, curators often discuss the range of audience response 
to an artwork, an exhibition, an event and so on.25 But do you see how 
Calle’s artwork inverts this to a certain degree as a range of responsive 
interpretations that all sound on top of each other—a polyphony? So when 
you encounter the artwork, you find yourself immersed in this—what’s the 
word?—din. As you engage with some responses and not others—after all, to 
appreciate the installation in its entirety takes time—you place some of the 
responses in dialogue.
John Johnson: Okay, so these responses produce the dialogue through each viewer’s 
engagement. Does this mean we’re back to spatiotemporal dialogues as an 
organising principle? My point is, I thought we decided that, on its own, this 
was an insufficient basis for dialogic art.
Ella Stone: Oui, I understand your concern. But these spatiotemporal dialogues further 
the literal one initiated by Calle’s breakup.
John Johnson: Okay, let’s say, for the sake of argument, that I can accept that. Fine. But how 
does this exemplify an instance of collective collaboration?
Ella Stone: That’s a very good question, John. The artwork, you see, makes explicit its 
socially produced character, with the respondents’ responses finding voice 
in the very fabric of the project. Going back to Roberts’s laboratory model, 
it’s interesting, don’t you think, to consider Take Care of Yourself from the 
perspective of disciplinary alignment, which is paramount to his theory of 
collective collaboration.26 The artwork brings together collaborators from 
wide-ranging disciplines—doctors and dancers and so on—and all of their 
personal responses are mediated through their professional expertise. Here’s 
another image. This is a detail of the clown reading the letter. (Fig 4.3)
David Rooksby: So there were 108 women involved in this project?
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Ella Stone: Oui.
David Rooksby: How many of them can you name—aside from Calle? Go ahead and google 
the press and see how many other women pop up. I’ve been at it for the last 
five minutes and guess what? None. Or maybe they’re all named ‘Sophie 
Calle’. Is she some kind of mega brand or something?
Ella Stone: Calle does acknowledge the respondents by name, some of them by first and 
last names, some of them just by their first names.27
David Rooksby: But going back to John’s problem: I don’t see how this is collective 
collaboration in light of what you said. What am I missing?
Ella Stone: You’re taking issue with the attribution of this artwork to Calle?
David Rooksby: Yeah.
John Johnson: Okay, look—I can’t see how Calle’s artwork is an example of collective 
collaboration because it’s not even collectively authored.
Ella Stone: Granted, the artwork’s authorship isn’t collective in a literal sense. It’s not 
attributed to the 108 women under a shared name like ‘the Bauhaus’.
David Rooksby: Unless ‘Sophie Calle’ is the group’s name!
Ella Stone: But Take Care of Yourself isn’t only authored by Calle.
John Johnson: But, look, is this project even collaborative? Are the respondents 
collaborators? Did they have input on the project’s format? Do they have 
authorial rights and, if so, to what extent? I mean, could they take Take Care 
of Yourself on tour?
Ella Stone: Je ne sais pas, mais—I doubt it.
John Johnson: Absolutely not! These women are not collaborators. They’re participants in 
Calle’s project, by Beech’s definition—they ‘take part’ and ‘have to share’.28 I 
know from reading an interview with Calle that she had very strict rules that 
were set in advance. She asked the respondents to address the letter from 
their professional perspectives. She didn’t want the women expressing any 
kind of sentiment on her behalf. They were briefed to speak from a personal-
professional point of view29 but not one that acknowledges Calle’s own 
experience of being dumped. The point is, personalised empathy like this 
wasn’t part of the deal.
And, look, in this interview Calle describes the line in the email, ‘take 
care of yourself,’ as being a kind of directive from her lover30—who isn’t 
named, by the way, in the artwork. Is this to protect his identity or to deny 
him authorial rights? It’s a classic case of passing the buck. Calle takes, ‘take 
care of yourself’ as a directive she felt compelled to obey. And she says that 
her way of taking care of herself was to answer her lover with the women’s 
responses.31
Shadworth Dyson: Is this ‘passing the buck’ or an instance of a dialogic artwork organised as a 
chain of call and response?
Ella Stone: Here is an image of the email. (Fig. 4.4) John, do you think, perhaps, we need 
to be careful about saying that Calle ‘answers’ her lover with the women’s 
responses? Would you not agree that the women are responding on Calle’s 
behalf and by way of their own experience?
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I also read Calle’s interview with Louise Neri. You’ll recall that Calle says 
that even though she didn’t approve of all the respondents’ interpretations, 
she didn’t censor any aspects of what the women gave her.32
John Johnson: Okay, but is this a case of tolerating difference to the extent that it gets Calle’s 
needs met as an artist? It’s the women who are taking care of Calle. The point 
is, how is this being reciprocated?
Ella Stone: Can you not see the email as a pretext for the women to explore the very 
human experience of having a relationship end on someone else’s terms—
and the forced closure implied in the phrase, ‘take care of yourself’?
John Johnson: Okay, it’s therapy in public. More social work—only aestheticised as a slickly 
produced installation. Nothing too revealing—or compromising. It’s what I call 
‘charming’ art.
Maybe this is a dialogic artwork, Ella, but it’s definitely not an instance 
of collective collaboration on Roberts’s account, at least not according to your 
description. You said that, in the case of collective collaboration, the artwork 
is produced through a laboratory model. But these women responded to 
the letter individually. Their responses are monadic, single units. The point 
is, if collective collaboration is what you’re after, why not stage a self-help 
group—a support session for the dumped—where they can commiserate? 
Have a good moan and interpret it from different professional perspectives.
Shadworth Dyson: If I may interject here, the respondents may well appear to be monadic, 
but let us not forget they all responded to the email and are therefore 
linked together by this relation. I can imagine these 108 responses could 
provide a great deal of insight into a very common but nevertheless 
difficult interpersonal experience, and it seems to me there is a very useful 
comparison to be made between—what was the artist’s name?
Ella Stone: Sophie Calle.
Shadworth Dyson: Sophie Calle and Dostoevsky.
John Johnson: Seriously?
Shadworth Dyson: Bakhtin is fascinated by Dostoevsky’s dialogic authorship, which he describes 
as ‘polyphonic’,33 and which accords with Ella’s description of Take Care of 
Yourself as multi-voiced. In polyphonic texts, the author activates a plurality of 
perspectives, which may or may not entail a clash of languages, as in the case 
of heteroglossia, and Bakhtin holds that Dostoevsky is ‘an artist of an idea’34 
with his novels tracing ideas as they circulate among characters. Earlier, 
someone used the word ‘protagonist’; Bakhtin’s word is ‘hero’.35 The heroes 
in Dostoevsky’s novels communicate with each other, transferring their 
thoughts, feelings and impressions—which move and are taken up in their 
minds, bodies and souls—and with this transfer, these things are penetrated 
by the heroes’ psychological understanding, which then animates them from 
the inside out.36
David Rooksby: Say what? 
Shadworth Dyson:    Well, then. Allow me to explain by way of example. There is an exemplar of 
this transference—this transmission—in Crime and Punishment. You’ll soon 
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understand why Calle’s email made me think of it. You see, poor Raskolnikov, 
poor fellow, receives a tortuous letter from his mother. That woman bangs on 
about the sacrifices that his sister must make for his well-being, in what I can 
only describe as37 one of the most spectacular guilt trips in modern literature, 
and it is, in part, this letter that drives Raskolnikov to follow through with 
his plot to—well, I won’t spoil it for those who’ve yet to read this classic. 
But Calle’, artwork, Ella—well, it occurs to me  the phrase, ‘take care of 
yourself’ circulates in ways that draw out its inter-individuality as well as 
intersubjectivity. The presuppositions rolled into this sentiment are dialogised 
through a communion of consciousnesses38—this being the 108 responses—
and I would like to think that Calle draws out this communion in much the 
same fashion Dostoevsky does. I use those words deliberately—they draw 
this out! As Raskolnikov meditates on his mother’s words, we hear her 
speaking in his thoughts, and as the women meditate on the letter, we hear, 
see, even feel their personalised responses, which reverberate with other 
voices, including their professional expertise. Bakhtin insists there is no such 
thing as an idea, in itself, in a Platonic sense—at least, as far as Dostoevsky 
is concerned—and, in fact, Bakhtin describes Dostoevsky’s artistic form as a 
‘sociology of consciousness’,39 which, based  on what you’ve been saying, Ella, 
seems similar to what can be said of Calle’s Take Care of Yourself.
Tina Wiseman: But these women aren’t characters in a novel, Shadworth. They are historical 
people—flesh-and-blood respondents in Calle’s project.
Marsha Bradfield: Shadworth, I’m taken with the idea of Take Care of Yourself as ‘a sociology of 
consciousness’. There’s something fascinating about the shared subjectivity 
that I felt was achieved through Calle’s installation when I encountered it. 
I was immersed in all those voices, all those forms—all that labour. I guess 
I’m saying that I experienced something like a sense of solidarity with these 
women. I could identify with them and their experience, in light of my own 
life experience.
Allison Jones: What does this say about your romantic history?
Marsha Bradfield: But haven’t we all been dumped or had a relationship end abruptly?
Ella Stone: Moi-même, not yet—but I suppose there’s still time!
Brian Updike: Don’t look at me in that tone of voice.
Ella Stone: Ha! But, seriously, on the matter of subjectivity—Roberts speculates that the 
de-alienated labour achieved through models like collective collaboration 
can engender what he calls, mmm, ‘a collective spontaneous subjectivity’.40 
Although, I should be clear, this isn’t something he explores in depth.
John Johnson: Okay, no surprise there.
Ella Stone: I understand your concern, John, but—what’s the expression—reading 
between the lines, Roberts seems to imply this subjectivity is realised as 
individual collaborators subordinate their will to a collective one. This 
surrender of agency is then returned to them through a sense of collective 
subjectivity, which erupts from within the joy of de-alienated labour.
John Johnson: Seriously!?
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Ella Stone: I have to confess, John, this part doesn’t sit well with me, either. The collective 
subjectivity that Roberts indicates may overcome the alienating effects of 
the division of labour; but, then again, this pretense for collaboration may, in 
fact, mask alienation in the production process. Does this make anyone else 
wonder—John, does it make you wonder—what possibilities there might be 
for acknowledging a wider range of alienation than Roberts allows?
John Johnson: Such as?
Ella Stone: Such as, well, mmm. Bien sûr, working collectively can produce a sense of 
solidarity.
Krista Wiseman: Yes, of course it can. I know from working with other activists that solidarity 
can be sooo empowering when it feels like you are the group—all in it 
together.
Ella Stone: Oui, mais, does one have to surrender their individual voice to achieve this 
togetherness? Isn’t there value in recognising the contributions of individual 
collaborators as situated and specific, as Calle does? Could this be a way of 
overcoming feelings of alienation that might result when the collaborators’ 
labour—by which I mean, their responses—are absorbed into a group 
response, as is the case in collective authorship?
Krista Wiseman: It’s no good fetishising de-alienated labour in art or collective subjectivity until 
we overhaul social relations. Nothing is going to change until we dismantle 
capitalism.
Ella Stone: Roberts would agree with you about the need to change social relations, 
Krista—hence, he embraces collective collaboration as a space in which to 
reflect on the labour relations in art. He critiques relational aesthetics and 
collaborative groups like Critical Art  Ensemble for dissolving artistic technique 
into social praxis. He believes it’s ineffectual unless accompanied by actual 
changes in property relations, which would result in the reconfiguration of 
social relations in a substantive way.41
But, for me, I don’t think that alienation can be reduced to the effects of 
capitalism. Is it not a condition of working collectively, regardless? And, this 
being the case, couldn’t dialogic art engage this by making the contributions 
of individual interlocutors explicit in dialogic artworks?
John Johnson: So you think that by attributing authorship to individual collaborators, dialogic 
artworks will stave off feelings of alienation? It seems to me that you’re then 
conflating alienation with the expropriation of labour and that’s too—
Ella Stone: John, please do not misunderstand me. Recognising the need for attribution, 
well, I don’t see it as a, mmm, panacea. But I do think this recognition—
recognising this need for attribution—might at least open up space to explore  
alienation and other effects that occur when we deny this need. And this is a 
process that begins, necessarily, with unhinging alienation from the exclusive 
purview of capitalist labour relations.
John Johnson: In Marxist dogma.
Anne Lang: Ella, could you say how you’re defining ‘alienation’?
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Ella Stone: Bien sûr. I see it as a social phenomenon—estrangement from something of 
importance to a subject, including their work. We might think, very generally, 
of the four kinds of alienation Marx identifies in The Paris Manuscripts. 
First, there is alienation from the project that a worker produces; second, 
alienation through the impersonalisation of labour; third, alienation from 
the human race; and, finally, alienation from other human beings.42 And, of 
course, these forms of alienation are interrelated. In the case of collective 
collaboration, it seems to me the collaborators’ collective subjectivity is 
prioritised over their individual fulfillment. I suppose I’m interested in how it 
is that collective collaboration, which I understand as a context for exploring 
the creation of common life through cultural production, might actually 
result in the exact opposite of what it aims to achieve when collaborators feel 
alienated from what they produce.
Shadworth Dyson: Bakhtin would say that something like estrangement is fundamental to 
authorship, that an author must finalise his work by externalising it and 
making it available for response—that, quite simply, there is no authorship 
without this separation.43
Phil Hind: Yes, yes, of course. It’s all interesting but, well, I really don’t think this is the 
right time to debate the ins and outs of alienation and its effects. So I’ll just 
say in passing that the division of labour doesn’t always result in alienation—
provided that the workers, or group, are regularly in contact with each other 
and ‘consecrate’ their relations with authority.44 That’s how Emile Durkheim 
puts it in his critique of Marx’s theory of alienation. The lesson there is that 
the workers need to authorise their own labour relations—it simply makes 
good sense that it can’t be done for them by anyone else.
Clark Chris: Ella, I would agree there is a range of alienations in collaborative practice, 
and that we’d benefit from drilling down to better understand this. I’m not an 
expert in Marxism, alright. But I’d wager that arguments like Roberts’s may 
downplay issues around subjectivity because orthodox Marxism is a largely 
objective theoretical system—it’s more preoccupied with social facts45 than 
subjective experience, if you see what I mean.
And I just don’t see how you can attribute utterances to individual 
interlocutors and hold onto collective collaboration as a Marxist or, for that 
matter, a Communist theory of collaborative art practice. I mean, doesn’t 
this attribution shore up ownership—the sense that says, ‘This is mine and 
that’s yours’? It converts relations between the collaborators into property 
relations. It’s classic commodity fetishism! So if you are trying to advance this 
idea of attribution from a Marxist perspective, I’m afraid you’ve defeated your 
own argument.
Ella Stone: C’est vraie, that’s a valid perspective, Clark. But do you really think that 
observing the value in Marxist thinking means swallowing the paradigm in 
its entirety? Is it not more that Marx asks us to seek out alternatives to our 
current regime, and then work them out through practice to the best of our 
abilities and resources? Isn’t this what he meant when he said that ‘people 
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make their history but not in the circumstances of their own making’?46 I 
take this as a mandate to evolve something in the context in which we find 
ourselves, which most immediately and for the purposes of this barcamp 
is contemporary cultural production, is it not? I think KK was right to say 
there’s a politics at stake in the representational scheme of dialogic art—a 
politics that surely extends to its practice, too. And I think this politics entails 
reckoning with the very conditions and counter—ah! Pardonnez-moi!—
contradictions of its existence. You understand, I trust, that I’m not saying 
that collective collaboration is an ideal approach. I’m just saying, I think we 
can gain insight by exploring the contradictions and limitations of Roberts’s 
models and trying to understand what significance they might have for 
dialogic art. 
So, Clark, even if the authorship of Take Care of Yourself isn’t collective—
even if it’s not authored under a group name—it’s authored by the 108 
respondents, the 107 women and Calle, and all those encountering this 
artwork besides, is it not? The women’s dialogues with the letter—the 
108 utterances they produce—not only compose the artwork, but they are 
also conspicuously attributed to their author-respondents. And, I think this 
connects to what KK was saying earlier about dialogic art exploring authorship 
as a collaborative process—a process that needs to be understood on a case-
by-case basis by paying close attention to how the author is authored.
Tina Wiseman: As with the artwork, so with the artist. Sophie Calle is, herself, authored 
through this and her other artworks as well as our interpretation of them. 
We’ll return to the ways in which dialogic art authors subjectivity, in addition 
to the artwork, in our contribution this afternoon.
Maeve Cutty: I’m glad you brought this up, Tina. I’ll be considering the construction of the 
author in my talk, too. Maybe we could chat about it a bit over lunch, right?
John Johnson: Okay, that’s all well and good, but, to go back to what you were saying, Ella. 
I mean, does any of this really address the question, ‘What does it mean to 
collaborate in dialogic art?’
Marsha Bradfield: Well I think so! Assuming that we can agree that Take Care of Yourself is a 
dialogic artwork.
Phil Hind: The truth is, I have some reservations about this. Or at least I’m not sure 
of the extent to which the socially produced character of this artwork’s 
collaborative labour is actually made explicit. Granted, I didn’t see Calle’s 
artwork but I get the impression that it moves directly from the email to the 
responses, but what happened in between? Is there any discussion of the 
planning process in Take Care of Yourself? Does it consider problems with the 
project’s workflow? Does Calle’s artwork use a representational approach like 
the one that KK analysed in Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart? It’s reification 
of the construction process? That is, does it use a reflexive approach that 
indicates the labour that is necessarily othered47 by the limitations of its 
representation?
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Ella Stone: I agree, Phil, that Take Care of Yourself could have been more forthcoming in 
the ways you describe. Bien sûr.
John Johnson: Look, I thought the whole point of Roberts’s model of collective collaboration 
was to overcome the alienating effects of capitalism normalised by the 
division of labour and property relations, right? Well isn’t that the point? 
Okay, I haven’t read his essay. But from what I know about Roberts’s 
scholarship, and based on your description of collective collaboration, I 
naïvely assumed that, by ‘collaboration’, we were talking about a way of 
working that prioritises the collaborators’ equal rights to what they produced 
collectively. I mean, isn’t that the point of Roberts’s collective collaboration?
Ella Stone: I think that’s part of it, John, and I’ve also acknowledged this model isn’t 
ideal. It doesn’t consider a broad enough range of alienation or expropriation 
or the day-to-day dynamics of collaborative practice.
Marsha Bradfield: I’m wondering if the way of working together that John seems to be edging 
towards is more like ‘collectivity’ than ‘collaboration’? I’m thinking of Florian 
Schneider’s argument that collaboration should, in fact, be understood as an 
ambivalent process that is often negotiated through diverse and conflicted 
interests.48
John Johnson: Okay, I thought we were talking about collectivity—collective collaboration. 
But it’s moot anyway, because collaboration in the form of collectivity isn’t 
even on offer in Take Care of Yourself. By following Calle’s rules, the women 
are subordinating their wills to hers, rather than exercising a collective will.
Allison Jones: But Calle is wholly dependent on the women’s responses. Take Care of 
Yourself simply would not exist without them. Calle invites the women to 
respond and—
John Johnson: Okay—so?
Tina Wiseman:  The crux of Ella’s contribution, in my understanding, resides with the 
relationship she has established between authorial subjectivity and authorial 
representation in Take Care of Yourself. There is space here for self-expression 
that simply does not exist in collective authorship when a condition of this 
authorship is that it suppresses any recognition of a ‘self’ doing the expressing 
that’s not collective! I would suggest, John, based on Calle’s example, that 
it’s not simply a case of either-slash-or in dialogic art—either individual 
or collective subjectivity, either individual or collective attribution, either 
collaboration or collectivity. I would suggest that we should instead be 
thinking about ‘subjectivities’ and ‘attributions’ and multiple ways of working 
together, perhaps even trying to understand them as interdependent and 
overlapping? 
Allison Jones:  That could, in fact, be a really interesting facet of our research.
John Johnson: Right. That sounds like a pretty picture of liberal tolerance to me. At least try 
taking off your rose-tinted glasses, Tina.
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Allison Jones: We’ll let that one pass, John. In addition to the questions, ‘What is dialogic 
art?’ and ‘What does it mean to collaborate in dialogic art?’ I think we should 
also be asking, ‘What are the subjectivities that accrete through the practice 
of dialogic art, and how do they overlap?’
Cassy Appadurai: I’d like to interject here. As the designated tweeter, I’ve been listening to the 
ebb and flow of this discussion and trying to capture key points so that those 
not in attendance might follow along.
For me, there’s a big question about the barcamp’s question, ‘What 
is dialogic art?’ and the ways it’s organising the discussion. Of course, 
addressing questions is productive. Of course it is. But is it the same thing 
as being generative? What I’m trying to suggest is that I’m unsure what is 
gained from celebrating more agencies, more subjectivities, more attributions, 
more ways of working together, more questions, more dialogues and more 
interlocutors with such wild abandon! It seems to me that it’s a bit like the 
inverse of the infinite regress that was mentioned earlier, only it’s a case 
of infinite progress.  How is this discussion going to engage dialogic art in a 
substantial way if everyone keeps acknowledging the complexity of this art 
practice by formulating more questions about it?
David Rooksby: But the passage of life is not about answers, Cassy—either giving them or 
getting them. It’s about better understanding the questions so we can fashion 
richer and more profound ones.
Cassy Appadurai: From your tone of voice, I can only assume you’re being ironic, David. Thanks 
for the comic relief. But, at the very least, I want to try and understand what 
makes some questions sharper than others. Whilst this means grasping our 
basis for asking them, it also means we need to hypothesise what yield there 
might be by addressing them through practice.
Allison Jones: I think you’re suggesting we need to be more discerning in the questions we 
select to take forward. I would certainly agree with that—not to mention 
more rigorous in our engagement.
Clark Chris: What Cassy is saying goes back to what I was saying about dialogue breeding 
more dialogue, when left to its own devices.
Cassy Appadurai: Exactly. There is now not one but four big questions on the table, and 
countless little ones. The big ones seem to be: ‘What is dialogic art?’ but 
there’s also ‘What are the ethics of opacity?’ with this pointing to the issue 
of truthful representation that KK observed earlier. But now we’ve also 
got, ‘What does it mean to collaborate in dialogic art?’ and ‘What are the 
subjectivities that accrete [though I would say, are produced] through the 
practice of dialogic art?’ For sure, there’ll be more questions. For sure. But 
a few answers, in addition to responses along the way—even if they’re just 
placeholders in anticipation of deeper insight—would be good too. So I’m 
staging a mini-intervention.
Krista Wiseman: This is a mini-intervention?
Cassy Appadurai: Yes, but let me explain what it is before you dismiss it out of hand. Basically, 
it consists of reformulating our problem-question, ‘What is dialogic art?’ into 
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a problem-statement: ‘Dialogic art is [fill in the blank and solve for “x”]’. Of 
course, ‘x’ may be many things. But I’m wondering if this reformulation—
which we might think of as a ‘dialogic tactic’ in this discussion—could re-
 situate or re-orient the thinking here by making our dialogic exchange a little 
more accountable for its reckoning. It might rein in the dialogue and harness 
it for more focused effect?
Clark Chris: I, for one, like the idea of deploying ‘the dialogic’ in this way.
Cassy Appadurai: Well, don’t you think there’s a need to push the envelope and inhabit the 
barcamp more critically by investigating how, as a mode of assembly, it’s 
organising forms of address?
Marsha Bradfield: I can get behind your intervention, Cassy.
Brian Updike: Absolutely—in fact, brilliant. And on that note, and in the spirit of your 
friendly intervention, I’m staging my own. I’m up next and, as time is of the 
essence, I’ll get on with it.
Marsha Bradfield: Of course, Brian. I apologise. I haven’t managed the discussion very well.
Brian Updike: Well, please don’t start now on my account! A little slack would be good.
Krista Wiseman: A little slack would be good. I have a suggestion. I know we’re rushed but, 
if we could just take a minute to get up and move, I think it would shift the 
energy in here, which has become—well, tense. Would everyone, would you 
just stand up—stand up, please. And just take three deep breaths. One . . . in 
and out; and two . . . in and out; and three . . . in and out. And now just roll 
your head a little and shake your shoulders, your arms, your legs. That’s much 
better. There’s nothing like a good body stretch to consolidate all our cognitive 
exercise.
Marsha Bradfield: And a clap? Could we thank Ella for her contribution?
[Barcamp claps.]
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Brian Updike: Thanks for insisting on that stretch, Krista. Now, shall we re-engage?
John Johnson: Okay, I’ll respond to that. I’d like Ella to address our problem statement by 
saying, simply, ‘Dialogic art is [fill in the blank].’
Ella Stone: Bien sûr. First, shall we all thank John for his very direct suggestion as to how 
we might get back on task? Alors, the first thing to say in response to John’s 
point is that the aim of my presentation has been to answer the question 
‘What is dialogic art?’ with the question, ‘What does it mean to collaborate 
in dialogic art?’ And then, drawing on Roberts’s theory of collective 
collaboration to explore Take Care of Yourself, I have suggested that dialogic 
art might make explicit the socially produced character of its authorship in 
its dialogic form. So, to ‘fill in the blank’, dialogic art is about our ability and 
desire to represent the collaborative process—the sociality of the artwork’s 
becoming, if you will—in its outcome.
John Johnson: Okay, but if that’s your position, it doesn’t quite work in the case of Take Care 
of Yourself.
Ella Stone: I can see, John, that you’re very concerned about the degree to which this 
artwork makes its socially produced character explicit. Or what kind of 
character this is, or from whose perspective it’s represented? Or is it more an 
issue of editing—and elision?  I’m thinking here of Phil’s point about Calle’s 
installation moving from the email to the responses without acknowledging 
what occurred in between.
Fig. 5.0 
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John Johnson: In a word, ‘yes’. I do think it’s problematic from the perspective of dialogic 
art on your definition that Take Care of Yourself omits what Clark described 
earlier as the artwork’s ‘other dialogues’, including Calle’s correspondence 
with the respondents, discussions regarding the installation’s design and so on 
and so forth. Don’t these dialogues also ‘build’ the artwork’s social character?
David Rooksby: Speaking of character--characters, actually, don’t forget the respondents’ job 
titles in Take Care of Yourself. Come on: are they collaborators or participants?
John Johnson: I don’t think we’ve come to any conclusion, beyond the rather tepid 
agreement that at least an expression of their authorship is made 
conspicuous in Take Care of Yourself.
Allison Jones: Well, in a way, these and other unresolved issues make this artwork all the 
more vital for our research on dialogic art—vital as a kind of test case. The 
problems in Take Care of Yourself point to the challenges of collaborative 
practice—challenges that I believe, based on what’s been said today, dialogic 
art aims to explore on a case-by-case basis.
Cassy Appadurai: So, would it be fair to say, Allison, that you’re suggesting this is what dialogic 
art aims to explore—what it means to dialogue or to be in dialogue in 
contemporary art when dialogue, itself, describes a kind of collaboration or 
collaborative relation?
Allison Jones: Well—
Brian Updike: Absolutely! Excuse me, Allison, I don’t mean to cut you off. But as this is my 
opportunity to present, let me respond to Cassy by saying that I think you’ve 
just created exactly the segue I was looking for! To begin with, I want to go 
back to something that Shadworth said. Recall that he described Take Care of 
Yourself as ‘a sociology of consciousness’, wherein—and do correct me if I’m 
wrong, Shadworth—but wherein ‘sociology’ described a coming-together of 
the respondents’ consciousnesses through a communion of their responses? 
Now it’s interesting to think of the extent of this coming-together.  To cut to 
the chase, I want to note that Take Care of Yourself stops short of including 
the impressions—the responses—of those who encounter the installation on 
exhibition, if you follow. So there’s a limit there. 
Now to take up these responses and consider the role they play in 
building contemporary art’s social character, I’ll look at the discursive 
production of relational practices through their commentary. So earlier, Ella 
mentioned that we’re curators and critics? What she didn’t say is that we’re 
also co-editors of a new magazine called Assume the Position. You can find 
out more about this by visiting http://assumethepositionforart.tumblr.com. If 
you visit this site, you’ll learn this publication explores writing in, on, about, 
around and, most importantly, as art. No doubt, my fascination with what 
has come to be called ‘art writing’ informs my take on the commentary of 
relational practice, yeah? 
Yet my reason for responding to the question, ‘What is dialogic art?’ 
by commenting on this commentary, if you follow, is that I think we can do 
a better job of explaining what this type of art is by examining it through 
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the lens of relational practice—and its discursive production. And I’ll say 
more about how I’m defining ‘relational practice’ in a moment. Suffice to 
say for now that, earlier, Ella mentioned that Claire Bishop puts what she 
calls ‘dialogic art’ in the relational-art category1—though, it’s more likely she 
means Kester’s ‘dialogical art’, given her extensive critique of his commentary  
on dialogical art and aesthetics than ‘dialogic art’ as we’re discussing it here. 
It’s not yet, to the best of my knowledge, a well-recognised approach. 
So in the next thirty or so minutes, I’ll concentrate on two particular 
relations—relations that organise commentary on relational art. First, there 
is the commentators’ relation to relational practices; second, there are the 
commentators’ relations to each other through their commentary, if you 
follow.
Let me state the crux of my position very simply. The body of 
commentary that I will consider forsakes relational practice in some ways, 
whilst expanding the relations that make up this practice in others. In this 
expansion, we get a glimpse of an especially compelling instance of dialogic 
exchange, one that ultimately makes what is immanent to relational practice 
immanent to its criticism, too. Or at least that’s my hypothesis!
Let me begin making my case by telescoping into the maelstrom of 
critique around critic and curator Nicolas Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics.
Clark Chris: I guess this discussion was inevitable.
David Rooksby: Because?
Clark Chris: Ask Brian.
Brian Updike: No doubt Clark is saying this because, as a theory of art in the 1990s, 
relational aesthetics, which brings together artists as wide-ranging as Liam 
Gillick and Sophie Calle, has been around for some time, and—
Clark Chris: We’ve been talking about it for the last decade, at least!
Brian Updike: Two, actually. Two decades. And that discussion is ongoing. If anything, 
it’s becoming more vexed as a result of the proliferation of dialogue-based 
practices that Allison said earlier were ‘taking centre stage’ in contemporary 
art.  
Anne Lang: ‘Vexed’?
Brian Updike: Absolutely. As a theory, relational aesthetics is, anything but straightforward. 
So is it any wonder that its legacy—what it means for contemporary art 
today—remains unsettled?
Allison Jones: This is anecdotal, but it’s been my observation that the more an art practice 
has in common with relational aesthetics—or at least how  Bourriaud 
describes it—the more likely it is that the practice will actively dissociate from 
Bourriaud and his theory.
Anne Lang: You know, I always think of Relational Aesthetics as a bit like a car crash. I 
mean, you really should look away from the mangled wreckage, but you just 
can’t. All those suspect readings of critical theory and other texts and—2
Brian Updike: Interesting reflections, Allison and Anne. And no doubt all the more so when 
it comes to dialogic art. Is there any question that it has much in common 
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with relational aesthetics? They’re both, after all, explicitly concerned with 
intersubjective exchange. Wouldn’t you agree that dialogic art shares with 
relational aesthetics an interest in redirecting our attention from objects to 
subjects—human subjects?3 Clark, let me, if you will, just ask if you can really 
imagine wrestling with the question, ‘What is dialogic art?’ without taking 
Bourriaud’s theory into consideration?
Clark Chris: Oh yes—if so long as I may ask you what you’re going to tell us about this that 
we don’t already know.
David Rooksby: I’d be happy with someone telling me what we do already know. Like, what is 
relational aesthetics?
Brian Updike: Yeah, well, it’s a theory of cultural production, David, a theory that takes its 
name from a collection of Bourriaud’s essays. Some of these essays were 
published previously in exhibition catalogues, but most of them appeared in 
French in 1998 and in English four years later.4
Bourriaud posits early in his text—which no doubt we can all agree reads 
a bit like a manifesto—that ‘relational aesthetics does not represent a theory 
of art, [as] this would imply the statement of an origin and a destination, but 
a theory of form’.5 (Fig. 5.1)
Marsha Bradfield: Brian, what do you think Bourriaud means by this?
Brian Updike: Let me suggest that, within the broader context of his thinking, he created 
this definition as a nod at the belief that it’s the goal of relational aesthetics 
to experiment with open-ended forms that bring people into relation—social 
relations.
Clark Chris: But what’s the basis for this?
Brian Updike: Well for me, Clark, the issue is slightly different, yeah? I mean, is it the basis 
of Bourriaud’s belief that’s in question? This is something Bishop leverages in 
her widely read critique. Bishop’s issue is that forms of relational aesthetics 
are open-ended, resistant to closure, socially engaged—perpetual works-in-
progress, if you follow—instead of closed objects.6 Bishop, in other words, 
finds the ‘willfully unstable’ identity of artworks that are generated through 
relational practices—challenging. The question for Bishop is then, ‘How does 
one discern what, exactly, this type of art is?’7
Ella Stone: Or where it is! In the artwork, the practice, etcetera. 
Brian Updike: So there is no doubt about the open-endedness of relational art. The question 
is, ‘What consequences does this have for our engagement and experience of 
relational art and practice?’
Marsha spoke earlier about her interest in dialogic forms, which I took 
to mean forms relating to or being in the form of dialogue. Bourriaud, on the 
other hand, is concerned with what he calls relational forms.
David Rooksby: Because they relate to or are in the form of relations.
Anne Lang: But, you know, isn’t that a tautology? I mean, to say ‘Relational forms relate 
to or are in the form of relations’?
Brian Updike: Well, here’s what Bourriaud offers as a definition in the glossary in his book, 
Relational Aesthetics: ‘Relational (art)—A set of artistic practices which take 
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as their theoretical and practical point of departure the whole of human 
relations and their social context, rather than an independent and private 
space’.8 (Fig. 5.2)
David Rooksby: So you’re talking about human relations?
Brian Updike: If you’re finding this puzzling, David, let me say you’re not alone. Bishop 
wonders, no doubt with more than a little exasperation, ‘if relational art 
produces human relations, then the next logical question to ask is what types 
of relations are being produced, for whom and why?’9 (Fig. 5.3)
Allison Jones: Well, Brian, that these questions remain unanswered by Bourriaud’s theory 
explains why it’s drawn such extensive critique!
Brian Updike: Absolutely! It’s been extensive, no doubt about that; in fact, this critique 
is a veritable rite of passage for anyone wishing to be a commentator on 
relational practice. Let me offer, for your consideration, a brief catalogue 
beginning with philosopher of art Stewart Martin’s Marxist reading. You’ll 
notice that he exposes the tendency of Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics to 
aestheticise capitalist exploitation.10 This critique begins with Martin indexing 
Bourriaud’s preoccupation with the social composition of contemporary art:
Bourriaud states this repeatedly: ‘Art is the place that produces a specific 
sociability.’ ‘Art is a state of encounter.’ ‘The aura of contemporary art is 
a free association.’ Art’s ‘sociability’ is the principle of the ‘object’ or the 
‘work’ of so-called relational art; all art’s ‘objects’ are subordinate to social 
or relational dimension: ‘what [the artist] produces, first and foremost, is 
relations between people and the world, by way of aesthetic objects.’11 
(Fig 5.4)
Martin eventually formulates a definition of relational aesthetics that 
he thinks Bourriaud would be happy with, and from which his own critique 
springs, that definition being that ‘the idea of relational aesthetics is that art 
is a form of social exchange’.12 Do you follow? 
John Johnson: Okay, look, I know I’ve made this point before, but can you name a type 
of art that doesn’t involve social exchange—or at least some kind of social 
encounter?
Brian Updike: Absolutely—or perhaps I should say absolutely not—and this goes to the 
heart of Martin’s argument. As you’ve no doubt gathered, Bourriaud insists 
that relational art is preoccupied with social relations. But Martin is skeptical. 
Instead, he argues that this preoccupation is left wanting in relational art 
when it uncritically reproduces these relations. This occurs when, for instance, 
relational art fails to engage the relational forms that compose it in ways that 
question their normative significance as forms of capitalist exchange.13
Clark Chris: Right—back to commodity fetishism.
Brian Updike: Do we need to go back to that discussion, or will you let me simply say, ‘yes’? 
But going back to something else we discussed earlier, Martin would likely 
have a lot to say about literal dialogue as a referent for dialogic art.
Marsha Bradfield: Well, don’t keep us in suspense!
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Brian Updike: Martin would no doubt wonder what, if any, consequences there would be 
for this type of art to engage in, or perform, social relations in the process of 
shifting from literal dialogue to figurative dialogue. To what extent would this 
shift normalise or critique the alienation of social relations within capitalist 
culture—yeah?14
Marsha Bradfield: Brian, could you give an example of what you mean by a relational artwork 
that might ‘normalise social relations within capitalist culture’?
Brian Updike: Briefly, because this is tangential to my focus on the commentary of relational 
practice, Martin calls out Vanessa Beecroft’s use of people in her artworks, 
which are living tableaus composed of models on display, often en masse. 
Martin wonders in what ways these artworks question capitalist exchange 
when in fact they are reproducing it through their own commodification of 
the models’ bodies, yeah? In what ways, Martin asks, are Beecroft’s living 
tableaus more than literal instances of the same kind of commodification 
we encounter in fashion magazines, for example? Martin is hard pressed to 
see how relational art, like Beecroft’s, critically engages with relational forms 
marked by capitalist exchange. And I absolutely agree. Not only does it rely on 
the very same relational forms for its social exchange as art, but it reproduces 
them without, well, question.15
Allison Jones: Brian, this approach to critically engaging forms of exchange could be a 
compelling point for our research. Could you indicate what this might mean 
for dialogic art?
Brian Updike: Yes, Allison. For starters, it means attending to the intersubjective exchange 
that constitutes this art through the fulcrum of the capitalist and other kinds 
of exchange that organise its authorial process, if you follow. So it’s about 
unpicking what is exchanged, by who and to what ends, yeah? Are you with 
me? 
Marsha Bradfield: Say more? 
Brian Updike: Well then, let me explain. This is something that critic and philosopher of art 
Stephen Wright considers in his critique of relational aesthetics. I’ll quote him 
at length, owing to his no-nonsense position. He takes aim at the authorial 
attribution and expropriation in relational art. And you know, this makes me 
think about our earlier discussion of the authorship of Take Care of Yourself, 
specifically with regard to what the respondents gain through their response. 
So according to Wright:
[In] The intellectually and aesthetically impoverished practices broadly 
(and somewhat slackly) known, thanks to Nicolas Bourriaud, as ‘relational 
aesthetics,’...artists make forays into the outside world, ‘propose’ (as 
artworlders like to say) usually very contrived services to people who 
never asked for them, or rope them into some frivolous interaction, then 
expropriate as the material for their work whatever minimal labour they 
have managed to extract from these more or less unwitting participants 
(whom they sometimes have the gall to describe as ‘co-authors’). In so 
doing, they end up reproducing within the symbolic economy of art the 
sort of class-based relations of expropriation that Marx saw at work in the 
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general economy: on the one hand, those who hold the symbolic capital 
(the artists), and on the other, those whose labour (such as it is) are used 
to foster the accumulation of more capital. And this is precisely what 
is usually passed off as ‘collaboration’—making cynical mockery of the 
term—not just by such artists as Rirkrit Tiravanija, Maurizio Cattelan and 
all those whose names figure in all the almanacs of relational aesthetics, 
but by countless others besides.16 (Fig. 5.5)
Brilliant, yeah? But, as sympathetic as I am to Wright’s argument, I would 
counter that relational artworks like Take Care of Yourself gesture towards 
the potential of this practice to offer more than a ‘usually contrived service’. 
I can see how Calle’s project has benefit in ways that outstrip the symbolic 
significance of the responses that make up this artwork as ‘Art’. And I’m 
thinking here about the respondents’ personal lives, how participating in the 
project might help them make sense of their love life. And I agree the email 
is a pretext for engaging with their subjectivation—the production of their 
subjectivity through these relations. In a sense, and somewhat curiously, 
this gestures towards an overarching argument in Wright’s research. He calls 
for the ‘non-visibility’ of art—for putting art to work beyond the art world 
as a semi-autonomous sphere. It’s a kind of double movement: displaced 
from the symbolic and other economies organising the worlds of art, art and 
art practice can deploy their skills in the service of real-world problems17—
including romantic ones. Do you follow?
David Rooksby: Well art should be put to work beyond the art world—and in the service of 
broader concerns.
Brian Updike: Well interestingly enough, this is very close to the way curator Anthony 
Downey understands relational aesthetics. As part of his broader concern 
with the politics of aesthetics in contemporary art in general and relational art 
in particular, Downey summarises Bourriaud’s theory like this: ‘[It] is a vision 
of art reflecting and producing inter-subjective relations and imbricating those 
relations within a sociopolitical rather than, strictly speaking, an art-related 
forum’.18 (Fig 5.6)
Now keeping that in mind, I think it’s fascinating that when it comes 
to Bourriaud on Bourriaud’s role in imbricating relational art in the broader 
context of contemporary art and beyond, he describes his own responsibility 
like this: ‘The critic’s primary task, is to recreate the complex set of problems 
that arise in a particular period or age, and to take a closer look at the 
answers given’.19 But in noting this, he’s really just observing the obvious—
that criticism today engages art practice within a broader socio-cultural-
political context—yeah? And in the case of Bourriaud’s own commentary 
of relational practice, the focus is somewhat different. Relational Aesthetics 
tends to focus more on the theoretical context of this type of art than on the 
art practices that are brought together by this categorisation.
Anne Lang: You know, I agree that Bourriaud’s theory is, well question-begging, and his 
plagiarism in Relational Aesthetics is nothing short of shocking! Shadworth 
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will be interested, in that it appears Bourriaud often refers to Bakhtin’s 
thinking without citation.20 But, I mean, the meaning of Bourriaud’s text is 
also compromised by its appalling translation, which really plays a role in 
authoring Relational Aesthetics.21
Maeve Cutty: It sounds as though Bourriaud has been a target of sorts, at least in the world 
of art. I haven’t read his text, so I don’t have a position. But I would like to 
press the point that, regardless of its substance or lack thereof in Relational 
Aesthetics, this text has many authors. As Anne was saying, there are also 
authorial considerations related to the text’s publication, its translation 
among them. And, of course, the other commentators’ critiques also have a 
bearing on how we read Bourriaud’s text. 
Brian Updike: Absolutely. You’re dead right about that, Maeve! But regardless of who or 
what authored Relational Aesthetics, this text is, bar none, the most acute 
instance of commentary to my knowledge that purports to be art criticism 
and/or art theory while actually operating as something closer to incantatory 
prose. It foregoes rigorous analysis of relational art, yet it tries to conjure up 
the various effects of this type of art via performative speech, if you follow. 
Here’s a rather understated example. When Bourriaud references relational 
artworks, they tend to take the form of what he calls ‘quotes’.22 Here is one of 
his so-called quotes:
Rirkrit Tiravanija organises a dinner in a collector’s home, and leaves him 
all the ingredients required to make a Thaï soup. [sic] Philippe Parreno 
invites a few people to pursue their favorite hobbies on May Day, in a 
factory assembly line. Vanessa Beecroft dresses some twenty women 
in the same way, complete with a red wig, and the visitor merely gets a 
glimpse of them through the doorway.23 (Fig. 5.7)
Just let me say that brief and descriptive ‘quotes’  like this one make 
relational art even more ‘non-available’, to use Bourriaud’s own parlance.24 
You know, a lot of this practice is spatiotemporally specific. We’re talking 
event-like projects, yeah? Not stationary or so-called ‘discrete objects’. I 
reckon this makes it all the more important to carefully describe relational 
artworks.  But Bourriaud’s quotes actually obscure them by being so partial 
and impressionistic. And doesn’t this make it all the more frustrating, as 
the vast majority of us only have access to these practices through their 
re-presentation in commentary? I’m repeating myself now, but doesn’t 
this, then, make the depth and accuracy of this commentary all the more 
important? Do you follow? This is a very important point. 
So then, adding insult to injury, the lack of illustrations in Relational 
Aesthetics—photographs, drawings, diagrams or any other form of non-
verbal reference—intensifies the conspicuous absence of relational practices 
in the book. Actually, I’ll correct myself—there is one image. (Fig. 5.8) The 
2002 English edition features a woman on the cover reading to herself inside 
Tiravanija’s Untitled (One Revolution per Minute), which was presented at Le 
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Consortium, Dijon in 1996.25 The irony is palpable, as it shows the artwork 
being experienced through an individualised act of reading.
David Rooksby: ‘The irony.’ Come on, Brian. Tell me what I’m missing. 
Brian Updike: The cover image is an ironic choice, David, because it seems to contradict 
Bourriaud’s argument throughout Relational Aesthetics that what 
distinguishes this theory of form is its emphasis on art as intersubjective 
exchange—
Maeve Cutty: But—
Brian Updike: Sorry, Maeve, I’ll come back to you momentarily. First, let me ask you all 
to recall Bourriaud’s definition of ‘relational art’. He defines it as an artistic 
practice that takes as its theoretical and practical point of departure 
the whole of human relations and their social context. This is in contrast 
with other practices that rely on independent and private space for their 
absorption and interpretation, yeah?26 This much should be clear by now, 
this distinction. And, in case there is any doubt that this view is central to 
Bourriaud’s theory, elsewhere in Relational Aesthetics he makes the rather 
spectacular claim that, ‘Aesthetic theory consists of judging artworks on the 
basis of inter-human relations which they represent, produce and prompt.’27 
(Fig. 5.9) So—
Maeve Cutty: May I interject now, Brian? Thanks, luv. Right, so going back to the book 
cover, do your remarks mean that in your opinion, reading can’t be a form of 
intersubjective exchange? Because I’m not so sure about that.
Brian Updike: No doubt, it can be—but not on Bourriaud’s account of relational practice, 
owing to his emphasis on face-to-face interaction, which could perhaps be the 
most salient feature of relational form in his view.28 
Maeve Cutty: Oh!
Brian Updike:   ‘Oh!’ is right. Can you see the rub? Now as many of you are no doubt 
aware, when it comes to Bishop’s critique of Relational Aesthetics, it’s the 
failure of this interaction to prompt more than convivial exchange that 
proves especially problematic. Bishop writes, ‘When Bourriaud argues that 
“encounters are more important than the individuals that compose them”, I 
sense that . . . [for him] all relations that permit “dialogue” are automatically 
assumed to be democratic and therefore good. But what does democracy 
really mean in this context?’29 (Fig. 5.10) For those of you who are familiar 
with Bishop’s commentary on relational practices in general, you’ll know that, 
in her opinion, there is only one answer to this question: agonism arising from 
antagonism is an antidote for the lack of criticality that she believes pervades 
relational art, yeah?
For those of you unfamiliar with this discourse, let me say, very briefly, 
that Bishop pins her colours to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s theory of 
agonism, which they develop from Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. 
This turns on the idea that healthy democracy [and I see Shadworth has 
tweeted a connection with ‘heteroglossia’ as a clash of voices] is sustained by 
ongoing political struggle.30 So for Bishop, good democracy [and I think this 
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applies to ‘dialogue’, too—‘good dialogue’] is marked by ‘conflict, division, 
and instability’ on the grounds that, rather than ‘ruin the public sphere, they 
are conditions of its existence’.31 
So let me just say that, in my opinion, Bishop’s preoccupation with 
agonism has two profound consequences for her commentary on relational 
art, which then have an impact on the commentary of relational art, in 
general—yeah? First, this preoccupation prompts her demand for more 
overt agonism in relational practice. She critiques, for example, Tiravanija’s 
practice of cooking and serving curry dinners on the grounds that it promotes 
an harmonious common experience.32 She challenges Liam Gillick for similar 
reasons, namely that his work argues for compromise and negotiation, which 
then render his installations non-contentious.33
Allison Jones: And of course Bishop is critical of Kester’s dialogical art and dialogical 
aesthetics for the same reason. Well isn’t she?
Brian Updike: Well, in Kester’s case—or in the case of his commentary on relational practice, 
at least—Bishop takes issue with what she describes as evidence of an ‘ethical 
turn’. So when Kester promotes practices, such as those by the Austrian art-
activist group WochenKlausur, and projects of theirs like Intervention to Aid 
Drug-Addicted Women, Bishop actually castigates Kester for confusing social 
work with art. She says, ‘Kester’s position adds up to a familiar summary 
of the intellectual trends inaugurated by identity politics: respect for the 
other, recognition of difference, protection of fundamental liberties, and an 
inflexible mode of political correctness’.34 (Fig. 5.11) This, then, brings me to 
the core of my position on this vein of commentary on relational practice—
that, when it comes to Bishop’s particular sense of what constitutes ‘good’ 
dialogue, it has important relevance for commentary on relational art in a 
second way. Can you see where I’m going with this? Drumroll, please! Not 
only does Bishop call for greater agonism in relational practice but, to her 
credit, she also practices this in her own commentary by being antagonistic 
towards other commentators, especially Bourriaud and Kester.
Anne Lang: So you mean that Bishop’s commentary embodies the agonism that she, you 
know, calls for in relational art?
Brian Updike: Absolutely. And, in doing so, she makes what she thinks should be immanent 
to the practice of this type of art immanent to its commentary, catalysed in 
good part by her own antagonistic stance—yeah?
No doubt one of the most obvious places where this antagonism has 
played out is on the pages of October,35* where Bishop critiqued Bourriaud in 
a full-length essay called, ‘Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics’. This drew a 
critical letter of response from Gillick, whose art practice figures prominently 
in both Relational Aesthetics and Bishop’s critique. Bishop responded to 
Gillick’s response and, subsequently, Kester voiced a rejoinder with a scathing 
letter of his own to Bishop, which was then published in Art Forum in 2006, 
and to which Bishop responded in kind.36
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Anne Lang: So, more letters—first Calle’s email, then the letter in Crime and Punishment 
and now these. I mean, maybe, this makes correspondence the optimum 
format for dialogic art as an instance of relational art, you know?
Brian Updike: Your observation, Anne, brilliantly highlights the significance of commentary 
on relational art as itself a practice of intersubjective exchange, one that 
comes together as an agonistic union of consciousnesses—voices that sound 
in relation to each other in the discourse of contemporary art, yeah? And to 
give you a sense of the agonism prompted by Bishop’s commentary, let me 
offer for your consideration an excerpt from Gillick’s letter. He writes:
A text so full of contentious statements and willful omissions requires a 
detailed response, exploring its false dichotomies, which have depressing 
consequences for anyone who might believe in the potential for radical 
reconsideration.37 (Fig. 5.12)
Then, countering Gillick’s counter, Bishop writes that ‘It is a pity that 
he used this opportunity to respond rhetorically rather than theoretically’.38    
(Fig. 5.13) So, is Bishop correct in her assessment of Gillick’s response? That’s 
open to debate. But let me ask another question: is her overall point valid? 
In my opinion, yeah. The rhetoric of commentary on relational practice—so, 
the way this type of art is performed through its commentary—has important 
consequences for how it’s received.  Do you follow? The discursive exchange, 
like the deeply personal type between commentators of relational art, 
mediates our understanding of the practice of this type of art to the extent 
that I don’t think we can easily separate the commentators’ highly charged 
perspectives from the practice itself—or at least from representations of the 
practice. Added to this, there is the issue of what might be described as ‘non-
commentary’ on relational practice exemplified by Bourriaud’s Relational 
Aesthetics. I will say that Bishop and Kester are both more thorough in 
their descriptions. But even then, their representations—or should I say re-
presentations, for emphasis—are necessarily partial. This is not only because 
re-presentations are always more and less than what they re-present. Nor is 
this reducible to the spatiotemporal nature of many relational artworks. And 
here I’m thinking about the non-availability of these artworks, which no doubt 
makes their re-presentation even more challenging. It’s also because the 
commentary foregoes any aspirations of objectivity by being explicitly subject 
to the perspectives and agendas of its commentators—which, in Bishop’s 
case, involves antagonising her peers! 
So if you’ll let me now return to Clark’s provocative question—that 
is, what have I told you about relational art that you may not have known 
before—I would say I have suggested that there is a vein of commentary on 
this cultural production that, in some ways, forsakes relational practices. This 
occurs when, for example, instead of substantive engagement with this art 
and practice, the commentators engage each other in a struggle over the 
significance of a relational approach. And it is in this engagement that I think 
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we see clear evidence of the kind of literal intersubjective exchange that 
appears to be increasingly key to dialogic art . Do you follow?
Moreover—and if you can hold your comment, John, just momentarily—
the significance of relational art is not constituted solely or even primarily in 
the intersubjective exchange among the relational forms through which it is 
most apparently organised. The intersubjective exchange that composes its 
discursive production and dissemination also has authorial significance—and 
it has this significance because it makes the authorship of relational art and 
practice ‘highly distributed’, to borrow KK’s turn of phrase.
John Johnson: Okay, but look—isn’t this true for all art? My point is, isn’t authorship always 
highly distributed?
Brian Updike: No doubt. But doesn’t this make it all the more important for relational art in 
general and dialogic art in particular? Doesn’t this make it crucial to draw this 
to our attention by making this revelation one of its central concerns?
KK Lin: I think, if I may interject, John and Brian, well—does this go back to Clark’s 
discussion of ‘the dialogic’? I mean, his view that dialogic art is rife with forces 
and counter forces? That it’s actually authored by a wide range of dialogues, 
and that those dialogues don’t always find unequivocal expression in the 
artwork as an outcome of its authorial process? Does that make sense?
Clark Chris:  Well, I’m not quite sure I expressed the last bit, but I certainly agree.
Brian Updike: Well yes—or at least, I’ve tried to frame commentary on relational art as 
a battlefield where contests are fought among commentators over the 
significance of this art by way of their re-readings of each other’s readings and 
re-readings—yeah?
Marsha Bradfield: So is this an instance of infinite regress? Or infinite progress? Or—?
KK Lin: Self-reference?
Brian Updike: No doubt. These are all questions I’ll keep in mind  as I research how it is that 
this commentary is expanding the field of relational practice—how it is that 
it comes together as agonistic dialogue, yeah? And how, in doing so, it makes 
what is immanent to relational art also immanent to commentary on this art.
Marsha Bradfield: So ‘form follows function’—or maybe ‘form is function’?
Brian Updike: Maybe it’s more the case that ‘form follows function as content’. To my mind, 
the criticality of the commentary stems from the agonistic dialogue among 
commentators as they critique each other’s points of view. This is often the 
substantive content, not discussion of the art, per se.
John Johnson: Okay maybe. But to play devil’s advocate—don’t we understand relational art 
through its commentary?
Brian Updike: Well, in the case of this commentary, I think what we might understand is 
the ethos of this practice more generally in contrast with the significance of 
specific artworks—if you follow. To say it again, what is for me so interesting 
about this is that it makes what is immanent to relational art also immanent 
to commentary on this art.
  Alright, listen, I know this has been a lot to process. But let me leave you 
with one final point. It concerns Bishop’s conviction that ‘good’ democracy is 
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distinguished by agonism. Obviously, agonism is preferable to totalitarianism. 
Yet, when it comes to contemporary art practice, it’s rarely a case of either/
or. I think artist and critic Simon O’Sullivan is absolutely right when he writes, 
and I’ll conclude with this quote:
My take on this (following Jean-Francois Lyotard) is that such dissent—
which critiques of relational aesthetics takes as the very modus operandi 
of radical contemporary art practice—can be caught by the very thing 
they dissent from. They are forced to operate on the same terrain as their 
‘enemy’ and, as such, these forms of dissent can merely reproduce more 
of the same albeit dressed up as opposition.39 (Fig. 5.14)
Thank you all very much.
Cassy Appadurai: Thank you, Brian. A point of clarification: you’re quoting O’Sullivan to make 
the point that, when it comes to commentary on relational art, dissent for its 
own sake is commensurate with conviviality for its own sake?
Brian Updike: Dead right, Cassy. Brilliant. But what do you think about the idea that the vein 
of commentary on relational practice, as I’ve described it, has developed in 
such a way that it makes what is immanent in this type of art also immanent 
in its commentary?
Clark Chris: But the commentary is not the art! 
David Rooksby: Enough already, please!
Brian Updike: No, this is important, David. Isn’t the commentary tantamount to the art? If 
there are more people who encounter relational practice through reading 
Relational Aesthetics and Bishop’s critique of it than through the relational art 
practices directly, is this not their experience of relational art?
Allison Jones: If nothing else, this shores up the importance of Marsha’s and my research 
rationale that, as interlocutors in the production of dialogic artworks, and 
by researching them through practice, we might produce commentary that 
differently disseminates the complexity of this art’s authorial process. And in 
light of your contribution, Brian, this might entail an approach that prioritises 
specific instances of dialogic art and practice on the one hand, while on 
the other hand it explores the ethos of this art as irreducible to any one 
characteristic, in contrast to Bishop’s preoccupation with agonism.
Brian Updike: Absolutely. That sounds like a promising direction for your research, Allison. 
And creating a critical context where different kinds of commentary—a wider 
range—might find voice is one of the reasons why Ella and I founded our 
magazine, Assume the Position as a space for writing in, on, about, around 
and as art. But I’m really interested in the most recent tweet by ‘What is 
dialogic art? ‘Could be really interesting if art were in overt dialogue with its 
commentary—if it actively responded in the same way the commentators 
do to each other in relational art and practice through their letters, etc’. Well 
absolutely, and wouldn’t this also be an interesting direction for your future 
research, Allison and Marsha?
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Cassy Appadurai: Before recommending directions for their research, Brian, how would you, 
in light of what we’ve discussed so far, complete the problem-statement, 
‘Dialogic art is [fill in the blank]’?
Brian Updike: I would agree that dialogic art is a relational practice especially concerned 
with dialogue as intersubjective exchange, yeah? Added to this, dialogic art 
recognises that intersubjective dialogues, in addition to those composing 
the artworks—including its commentary—also author it. And I would 
recommend that dialogic art explore this through its cultural production 
by, for example, developing ways of self-representing in the art worlds that 
will ensure that what is central to the practice of dialogic art practice is 
also central to its commentary. Or at least, at the very least, investigate the 
relation between the dialogues composing the artworks proper, if you know 
what I mean, and those dialogues surrounding the artworks and expanding 
the dialogues therein.
Allison Jones: Well earlier, we spoke about meta-dialogue, and I think this is a good place 
to begin. How might dialogic art generate dialogue about itself and, in doing 
so, offer to make what is immanent to this type of art also immanent to its 
commentary? No doubt, we should let this be a rhetorical question for now, 
something for us to explore further.
Marsha Bradfield: Thank you, Brian. I think I agree, I think so. I mean, if dialogic art foregrounds 
dialogue as intersubjective exchange, then why not embrace commentary—
generated by the author-artists of this practice and others beyond—as 
constitutive of the theory and practice of its authorship? 
David Rooksby: Marsha, can we have a comfort break?
Allison Jones: Well, there are still three contributions to get through before lunch.
David Rooksby: Five minutes! We’ve been at it for four hours.
Marsha Bradfield: Of course, David. The time now is 1:07. Could everyone be back here 
at 1:20? Please help yourself to tea and coffee, which I should say was 
generously provided by our institution, Chelsea College of Art and Design. 
The facilities are down the hall. Allison, could you pause the recorder, 
please? Thank you.
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Marsha Bradfield: Shadworth, may I pass you the remote.
Shadworth Dyson: Thank you, yes. Well, I was delighted to receive Marsha’s invitation to 
address dialogic art from a Bakhtinian perspective because, of course, I teach 
sociolinguistics and literary theory and, consequent to this, dialogue as verbal 
language is my ken. However, the languages of art intrigue me for the same 
reason that nonverbal languages do, which is to say that there is no end to 
understanding the complexities of communication, and it is this interest in the 
ways in which dialogic art might advance this broader project that brings me 
here today.
You will recall that Clark championed ‘the dialogic’ as a way of self-
managing dialogue, wherein he defined dialogue as a ‘form of communication 
that alternates between two or more interlocutors, with their expressions 
issuing across from or in opposition to each other as the interlocutors 
converse’. In sociolinguistic theory, these expressions are called utterances—
units of expression bound by pauses and which link together into chains of 
call and response, as interlocutors take turns in dialogue. Therefore, what 
‘the dialogic’ manages, if we accept Clark’s recommendation, is as much 
utterances as it is dialogues. Of course, we may not agree ‘the dialogic’ is 
actually the workhorse of dialogic art, and in that case we may only concur 
that dialogue as intersubjective exchange is the stuff at stake here, and that 
even then the utterance must be singled out.
Clark Chris: Even then?
Fig. 6.0
 219    218
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well it occurs to me that if exploring intersubjective exchange as people 
interact with objects, networks, information and/or each other to produce 
works of art is what most concerns Marsha’s and Allison’s research, they 
might just as easily have termed it ‘utterance art’ as ‘dialogic art’. After all, 
why give ‘dialogic’ such pride of place? Presumably they did this because, as 
a cognate of dialogue, it’s better known than ‘utterance’ and certainly easier 
to say. But as I will show, the indispensability of the utterance recommends it 
to the student of dialogic art for, when we really examine it, listen to it, feel 
it and taste it, the utterance gains importance as the actual workhorse of 
dialogue, in contrast to Clark’s ‘the dialogic’.
David Rooksby: So it’s another case of putting the cart before the horse? Get it?
Shadworth Dyson: I suppose that’s one way of putting it, assuming that ‘the dialogic’ is the ‘cart’ 
in your figuration. Yes, well, the utterance has many functions in dialogue, 
some of them so essential we take them for granted, and it also has many 
lessons to teach us about communication, some of them quite surprising.
Clark Chris: We’ll be the judge of that!
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, yes of course. Now turning to some examples, let me first say that, as you 
are no doubt aware, ‘utterance’ is a noun and as such, is, perhaps, no more 
ambiguous than most, but as a referent, ‘utterance’ is quite ambiguous—
sneaky, even—hiding itself inside dialogues. So, to flush out the utterance, 
consider the comparatively straightforward example featured on the slide. 
(Fig. 6.1) ‘How are you?’ is an utterance, in this case a question, addressed 
by one interlocutor to another, and ‘Fine.’ is also an utterance, the other 
interlocutor’s response, and together these two utterances compose a 
dialogue in a very non-contentious sense. You should all have a handout that 
catalogues some characteristics of an utterance (Fig. 6.2) and you’ll note that 
both ‘How are you?’ and ‘Fine.’ qualify, insofar as they are separated by a 
change in speaking subjects—addressed to someone and linked together in a 
dialogue, however brief in this case. 
Our second example is more complex, in that its resemblance to a literal 
dialogue is slight. (Fig 6.3) So who are the interlocutors here? To begin with, 
there is the driver, who responds to the sign by stopping, but there is also 
the law, the unseen but nevertheless powerful interlocutor that issues the 
utterance demanding the driver’s response.
David Rooksby: What did you call those uttering the utterances? The ‘interlocutors’? Only 
you’re saying the interlocutors aren’t always people.
Shadworth Dyson: Well, yes, although it was people who made the laws in our second example. 
David Rooksby: So the driver is in dialogue with the sign.
Shadworth Dyson: The driver is in dialogue with the law, and the utterance-as-sign is a concrete 
expression of the law’s authority, because you see, signs like this one 
interpolate us as social subjects, reminding us that we are bound by the social 
contracts brokering our shared existence.
Fig. 6.1
Fig. 6.2
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KK Lin: Oh, is this what Clark meant in his PechaKucha when he spoke about 
existence as dialogic and likened it to the weather? Dialogue surrounds us and 
reminds us that we’re beholden to forces beyond our control? I didn’t really 
understand earlier but it makes more sense now—
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, yes—vis-à-vis social contracts. From a sociolinguistic perspective, 
dialogue is unthinkable outside of its relation to language, language is 
unthinkable outside its relation to society and, based on my brief conversation 
with Marsha about her research, coupled with Allison’s opening remarks, it 
seems their investment in dialogic art stems from exploring the complexity of 
these relations as they organise our existence. 
Allison Jones:  Yes, in a way. As I said in the welcome address, we were hoping, Shadworth, 
that your discussion on the utterance would help us develop a more nuanced 
understanding of communicative experience, thereby enabling us to advance 
research on dialogue-based art practice. 
Shadworth Dyson:  And it is with this firmly in mind that I now wish to outline what I have come 
to understand as ‘utterance literacy’ and propose it as a skill set for working 
with the relations at stake in the sociolinguistic dimension of dialogue and 
hence dialogic art. So what precisely, you may be wondering, do I mean 
by ‘literacy’, and why is Bakhtin’s sociolinguistic theory an especially useful 
basis for the utterance literacy proposed here? I take ‘literacy’ to designate 
the abilities of ‘reading’ and ‘writing’, but I am also using it in a more far-
reaching way to indicate skills, ranging from perceptual acuity to practical 
know-how, or to artistic or aesthetic adroitness in combining utterances into 
the dialogues composing dialogic artworks. We could include practice here, 
too—dialogic artworks and practice—because, of course, both are composed 
of utterances as the building blocks of communication.
Well, yes, I see there are tweets from AssumethePosition. Thank you for 
your question, which I shall address, owing to its relevance. The reference to 
‘competency’ here refers to the thinking of Noam Chompsky, and you will, 
of course, know that Chomskyan competence turns on the theory of the 
universal, which we can think of as an innate body of linguistic knowledge 
that resides with language users and structures all languages,1 enabling us to 
learn and use them proficiently through mastering syntax and semantics. It is 
with regret that the merit in this argument for language learning is the stuff 
of another discussion, but suffice it to say that I cannot see how universal 
grammar applies to art because Chompsky’s sense of competency assumes a 
universal innateness that art simply does not enjoy.
Marsha Bradfield:     Could you say more? I’m not quite sure I understand.  
Shadworth Dyson:    Well there is no universal grammar of art, is there? No a priori embodied 
                                      knowledge of art—or at least not one that can account sufficiently for art’s
                                      polyvalence.
Fig. 6.4
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Brian Updike: Absolutely! Or should I say, ‘not’. But listen, on this subject of a priori 
embodied knowledge, what do you make of something like of Noël Carroll’s 
theory that aesthetics originates with pattern recognition in evolutionary 
physiology?2 To my mind, this would suggest that aesthetic appreciation is, to 
some degree, a priori.
Shadworth Dyson: Interesting theory, the limitation being that aesthetics as sensuous 
expression, and the perception thereof, is only one aspect of art, and 
an extremely contentious one at that. Not only is everything that can be 
perceived aesthetic, but there is terrific debate among philosophers over 
what constitutes the aesthetic aspect of something.3 
Marsha Bradfield:  Could we get back to utterances, please. 
Shadworth Dyson:  Oh yes, yes of course, but one final comment on the difference between 
literacy and competency. Tell me: Have you ever found yourself in a situation 
trying to get your bearings—and doing so, moreover, with knowledge that 
what you are engaged in, whatever that may be, is a moving target of sorts? 
As opposed to ‘competence,’ ‘literacy’, to me, means becoming acquainted 
with something in dynamic flux, not gaining access to what is more or less 
fixed, as in the case of universal grammar. 
Marsha Bradfield:  Perhaps an example would—
Shadworth Dyson:    For instance, we can speak of literacy in taste cultures, including art, wherein 
‘taste’ is determined culturally and hence subject to both variation and 
change as opposed to being something given. I would even go so far as to 
say, however dogmatic this might sound, that it is precisely because so little is 
innate to art that we need literacies, utterance literacy among them, to help 
us hone what sociologist Pierre Bourdieu describes as ‘a feel for the game’, a 
discernment for what is appropriate in response to a given situation based on 
our experience and knowledge—what makes sense, or is sensible, in a specific 
context.4
Simply put, utterance literacy is indispensable to dialogic art 
because, when it comes to ‘a feel for the game’ of dialogue, the better 
the practitioner’s command of utterances—the more creatively as well as 
precisely they employ them—the more effectively both the utterances and 
the practitioners will be able to respond to the pragmatic demands of their 
artistic communication, whatever they may be, anticipating possible effects 
and responses in the sensorium of the artwork, for example.
KK Lin: Um, Shadworth, there’s something here I want to explore, a kind of intuition, 
okay? So are you familiar with the ongoing debate in contemporary art 
over this, over the medium? I’m thinking here of, well, Rosalind Krauss’s 
preoccupation with recuperating the medium in our ‘post-medium 
condition’?5 So, has contemporary art lost its medium-specificity, the result 
being that today we’re producing what Krauss calls ‘art-in-general’—artworks 
that no longer rely on this kind of material support? I’ll get to my comment in 
just a minute, but—
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, I’m unfamiliar with this debate but I can imagine—
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KK Lin: I’m sorry, I don’t mean to interrupt, but I just want to say that I’m really 
interested in Krauss’s reflections on the ‘post-medium condition’ and 
photography. Could I just outline two aspects, very quickly? Thanks, so much. 
So, okay, in Krauss’s view, the photograph shifted from being an aesthetic 
or historical object to being a theoretical one by the 1960s, and this shift 
precipitated a kind of ontological cave-in.6 This must have been disorienting 
for photographic practice. But this ontological instability was also productive, 
because, um, it helped photography to deconstruct its own significance. So, 
photography critically engaged with photography? Or, as Jeff Wall  puts it, 
photography went through an intense stage of auto-critique. He describes 
this as a kind of rite of passage for avant-garde art forms, with auto-critique 
being part of their self-realisation as a legitimate approach to practice.7 This 
was part of photography’s self-realisation as an art form as compared with an 
aesthetic or historical object. 
Shadworth Dyson: I’m not sure how this relates to the utterance literacy—
KK Lin: And maybe it doesn’t. I don’t know. Maybe I’m off on a tangent. But I’d just 
like to propose, I mean, I’m wondering if dialogue is the medium of dialogic 
art? If this were the case, and with the history of photography in mind, is it 
possible that dialogic art is, um, you know, auto-critiquing dialogue? Could 
this be part of dialogic art’s project of self-realisation, in keeping with the 
avant-gardist tradition of auto-critique? 
So that’s the first of my two questions—three, actually.
John Johnson: Hang on. These questions strike me as being pretty important. Could you 
repeat them?
KK Lin: The first one is, ‘Is dialogue the medium of dialogic art?’ Or maybe it’s 
an alternative to a medium, with dialogic art being a case of ‘art-in-
genaral’? I’m also wondering, ‘How does auto-critique figure in dialogic 
art’s development—or not?’ Wall, for example, speaks about auto-critique 
occurring in photography through conceptual art. Conceptualism was 
an attempt to refresh this medium by making it available to the world 
in a new way.8 I guess, um, I’m just wondering: Might dialogic art have a 
similar ambition? To make dialogue available to the world in a fresh—and 
expanded—sense?
Krauss says—Wall, too—that part of photography’s auto-critique was to 
make itself available as a tool for enacting and documenting art-in-general, 
and that this really came to the fore under conceptualism in the 1960s and 
1970s.9 So is this closer to how we’re thinking about dialogue—and perhaps 
dialogic art more generally? This is a little muddled, but—
Shadworth Dyson: I’m struck by this question of tool or medium. Yes, well—
KK Lin: There’s a third option, too, if I may just go on for one more minute, 
Shadworth. Thanks, so much. I promise not to take up too much more of your 
presentation time. Okay, maybe there is a drive to invent a medium in dialogic 
art by mining the support of dialogue in its practice?10* I’m not sure these 
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 three things are mutually exclusive in dialogic art’s overall project—the auto-
critique of dialogue, dialogue as a tool for art-in-general and a drive to invent 
a new medium. Do you see what I mean?
Marsha Bradfield: No, I’m not sure I do—especially not the last bit.
KK Lin: About inventing a new medium? Could be I’m just thinking aloud here but, 
um, keeping in mind the post-medium condition and art-in-general, might 
dialogic art come together as something other than an artwork defined by 
its medium or something else. Maybe it’s very straightforward. Maybe it’s 
practice—could it be that dialogic art places a greater onus on practice as an 
emergent process? After all, you’re incubating dialogic art in your practice-
based research, right Marsha? Maybe—
Shadworth Dyson: Forgive me for interrupting, KK, but I would like to respond to the medium- 
versus-tool question by noting that ‘medium’ is not a word Bakhtin favours 
in his ruminations on dialogue. I would wager this stems from his taking 
language—both verbal and nonverbal forms of communication—for granted 
as the medium here, because, you see, ‘genre’ is a more salient concern. Now 
it is your turn to bear with me as I make a few general comments about genre 
that link this back to ‘utterance literacy’, thereby avoiding our discussion 
drifting too far afield.
Now the first thing to say is that genre is by no means a straightforward 
designation. There is terrific debate regarding what constitutes a ‘genre’ 
in genre studies,11 but this much is generally agreed—that as processes of 
systematisation,12 genres turn on nominological and typological functions, 
which is to say the division of the world into forms, types of forms and 
the naming of these forms. To this extent, it is tempting to think of genre 
divisions as akin to orderings, such as botany or zoology, yet there are limits 
to this analogy for, when it comes to genres, their distinction is by no means 
scientific.13 While there are many reasons for this, one pertains to genres 
being cultural forms that are subject to cultural norms as opposed to scientific 
laws.
To explore genre studies in any depth and breadth and determine 
their specific significance for dialogic art is the stuff of another barcamp 
contribution—perhaps another barcamp! Suffice to say in passing that, for 
Bakhtin, genre is a way of conceptualising reality.14 When he notes that 
utterances take many forms—a wide range of speech genres—he does so 
with the express purpose of acknowledging that the choice of genre shapes 
communicative exchange, owing to how it represents the world.15
Marsha Bradfield: I think I understand what you’re saying, Shadworth, but—
Shadworth Dyson: By this I mean that we expect something quite different from the genre of a 
horror movie than we do from a musical, because each accomplishes different 
things and in different ways. Both involve conflict and resolution and both 
invite catharsis, but they see the world in distinct ways, and this difference is 
manifested in the values and, by extension, the ideologies they advance.
John Johnson: So everything is political and genre is no exception.
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Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, yes! And one way that genres are political is in the ways in which 
their forms organise social interaction, and this extends to the speech 
genres of dialogue. The form of my utterances—the diction I use, the tone 
of my voice, my choice of grammatical conventions, the aspects I emphasise 
through repetition—all these things shape the significance of this expression 
for me and those to whom it’s addressed. Is the genre of my utterance 
polite, formal, aggressive, dramatic, full of jargon? What purpose does my 
expression seek to accomplish by force of adopting one genre as opposed 
to another? Because, you see, if we accept that each genre sees the world 
through a specific lens, the question then becomes, ‘What view is at stake in 
their form?’16 And this brings me back to Bakhtin’s concern with form-shaping 
ideology, to which I earlier referred. When genres organise something, an 
artwork, perhaps, they have performative effect vis-à-vis socio-political 
consequence and—
Ella Stone: Oui, mais, this is in keeping with a structuralist approach, is it not? Isn’t the 
idea, Shadworth, that genres normalise ideologies and, in so doing, service 
dominant power structures by reproducing them?17 We might think, for 
example, of the ‘Dear Jane’ letter in Calle’s Take Care of Yourself as a genre 
that normalises patriarchy, a genre in which men—what’s the expression?—
call the shots.
Clark Chris: Ella, that’s a stretch!
Ella Stone:  Oui, je sais. It’s a provocation. I know that’s just one point of view. There 
are, of course, others,18 and, were genre the focus of your contribution, 
Shadworth, we would surely unpick these. But, going back to the idea that 
genres present and perform the world in particular ways, and, assuming 
I accept this position—though I’m not really sure we’ve fleshed it out 
sufficiently for me to do so—but assuming yes, what does this mean for 
something like what KK referred to as ‘art-in-general’ in contrast to popular 
culture? In the case of a mainstream Hollywood romance, we can expect 
the man to ‘get’ the woman and then to live happily ever after in keeping 
with this genre of film, but is it not rare for contemporary artworks to be so 
straightforward?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, yes, and using Take Care of Yourself as a case in point, I would 
suggest the artwork is non-generic to the extent that it comes together as 
generically hybrid and by this, I mean to say that the genres, which present in 
the respondents’ responses as they draw on diverse personal experience and 
professional experience, do not so much disappear in Take Care of Yourself 
as they are cast into relief through their juxtaposition. Discerning their 
significance makes genre knowledge all the more important—for the artists 
and for those encountering Take Care of Yourself. Both Bakhtin and Derrida 
are quite clear about their sense that texts always resonate in relation to pre-
existing genres and, as Derrida puts it, ‘there is no genre-less text’.19
Now, other scholars have nuanced this by saying that, as modes of 
cultural organisation, genres link together producer, consumer, topic, medium 
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and occasion by controlling the producers’ behaviour on the front end 
and the consumers’ expectations on the back.20 And, of course, yes, we do 
expect something particular from a Hollywood romance. So the question is, 
‘How should we think about these expectations and the experiences they 
engender?’ I would suggest as an answer that we might conceptualise them 
as social processes.
We have, of course, already spoken in some depth today about the ways 
in which our barcamp contrasts with a standard academic conference as a 
social process of knowledge production—or at least producing meaning in 
some way—in that a barcamp cashiers socio-ideological relations through 
its onus on user-generated discussion unfolding amongst its interlocutors, 
thereby composing the barcamp’s explicitly dialogic form. This contrasts 
with the academic conference as a less dialogic form, by force of its greater 
emphasis on linear arguments elaborated and ideally resolved by individual 
interlocutors in advance of their discussion with a community of peers. Based 
on the question, ‘What is dialogic art?,’ for example, the barcamp genre 
is quite different, emphasising dynamic, multi-centred exchange, with co-
produced meaning arising in situ and being sui generis—which is to say that it 
is specific and situated in this context.
Allison Jones: Shadworth, your discussion of genres is certainly relevant for dialogic art, and 
I expect Marsha will speak this afternoon about her own foray in the world of 
genre—reality-TV in particular. And, as much as I see this as a useful primer 
for this discussion, I’m also aware that this contribution has moved away from 
‘utterance literacy’ and I’m slightly concerned about the time and—
Shadworth Dyson: Point taken. And yet, our ad hoc look at genre sets up a rather interesting 
transition into my next section, which concerns Bakhtin’s sociolinguistic 
theory as a particular genre—a specific type of analysis. And—
KK Lin: But what about the medium of dialogic art? What about its critical capacity—
for auto-critique or other types of critique.
Allison Jones: Could we return to these questions at the end?
KK Lin: That’s fine by me—but can we just make sure that we do come back to them?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, of course. Well, you’re all no doubt wondering what in particular 
makes Bakhtin’s sociolinguistic theory of the utterance useful for dialogic 
art. The answer is that it refuses a purely linguistic approach because, 
you see, linguistics is understood as the scientific study of languages,21 
whereas Bakhtin sees language as a socio-cultural rather than a scientific 
phenomenon, for reasons that should soon become clear.
For as an alternative to linguistics, Bakhtin offers meta-linguistics, an 
idea that we find in a germinal sense in one of his earliest works, Marxism 
and the Philosophy of Language, published in 1928.22 Here, Bakhtin examines 
language as the basis for Marxist ideology, vis-à-vis knowledge mediated 
through signs. The proto-meta-linguistics he proposes in Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language attempts to move beyond two then-existing schools 
of linguistic thought, those being subjectivism and abstract objectivism.
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Now, the failing of subjectivism, on Bakhtin’s view, is in holding language 
to be the province of individual psychology.23 For him, language cannot be 
understood as individualistically psychological, but abstract objectivism is 
equally problematic on the other extreme, and we can think of Saussure’s  
structural linguistics as a familiar instance of this. Bakhtin takes issue, in 
particular, with linguistics’ abstraction of language from its everyday use into 
a code,24 [something we might think of as akin to universal grammar,] and his 
meta-linguistics both critiques and builds on Saussure’s theory by overcoming 
its dichotomisation into either langue or parole. And to remind us of what 
this split entails, let me summarise it by saying that, if langue refers to the 
relations between synchronic signs, the body of signs in concurrent operation 
within the same system, parole describes an individual’s everyday speech, 
with its heterogeneity placing it beyond linguistic study, at least on Saussure’s 
account.25 (Fig 6.4)
Yet it is exactly this semantic and syntactic heterogeneity that Bakhtin 
observes in the utterance and that so fascinates him, making it the workhorse 
of his meta-linguistics, which seek to account for a greater range of 
communication than linguistics will allow. Bakhtin posits meta-linguistics as 
‘[the exploration of] the word not in a system of language and not in a “text” 
excised from dialogic interaction, but precisely within the sphere of dialogic 
interaction itself, that is, in that sphere where discourse lives an authentic 
life’.26 (Fig. 6.5) Therefore, from a meta-linguistic perspective, it is not only 
that the meaning of signs expressed in the utterance is determined in relation 
to all other signs in the syntactic sign system, but that the demands of their 
immediate context also come into play, this being where the authentic life 
of the word as utterance is lived out. The utterance bridges Saussure’s split 
between langue and parole by insisting on a remit that is and/also, and 
meta-linguistics promotes an understanding of language as social through 
and through. So viewed through the lens of sociolinguistic theory, the 
utterance emerges as a double environment—a social matrix both within 
and without. Without, it encounters and interacts with other utterances 
as they link together in the great chain of communication, while within, it 
is social, absorbing and responding to the other utterances composing the 
environment of its expression through a process of call and response.
Cassy Appadurai: Shadworth, could you explain how utterances absorb each other?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, returning to our prosaic example, ‘How are you?’ the response, 
‘Fine.’, refers back to question—and so, too, does the question anticipate a 
response. So you can see that one way utterances absorb other utterances is 
as rejoinders.
We might also think about reported speech. Earlier, I referred to Clark’s 
definition of dialogue and, in doing so, absorbed his utterance into my own, 
while at the same time inflecting it with local significance, resonant with its 
Fig. 6.4
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immediate enunciation. To call into question Clark’s contention—his view that 
‘the dialogic’ is the workhorse of dialogic art—and posit the utterance 
instead, I had to restate his position so as to engage it in dialogue.
David Rooksby: So let me get this straight. It’s all about dialogue being in dialogue being in 
dialogue. I’m assuming there’s dialogue between the inside and outside of the 
utterance, too, right?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, quite right—that is, if you are referring to them being enjoined in a 
reciprocal relation, by which I mean a relation that is performed, experienced  
or felt on both sides.
Cassy Appadurai: Speaking of restating positions: We’ve heard from Clark that ‘the dialogic’ 
names a self-management strategy for dialogue. And we’ve heard from KK 
that ‘dialogic’ refers to reflexivity. Ella and Brian both took up the ‘dialogic’ 
qualifying dialogic art from the perspective of collaboration and spoke about 
this type of art representing the social character of its production. Now you, 
Shadworth, are coming at ‘dialogic art’ from the perspective of ‘utterance 
literacy,’ and you’ve just said that utterances depend on reciprocal relations. 
So the ‘dialogic’ in dialogic art is another name for the reciprocity that you’ve 
described. It’s like what you’re calling ‘utterance literacy’ is actually closer to a 
literacy for working with reciprocities.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, there’s more to this literacy than that. I shall turn to an example 
momentarily and explore this in further depth and breadth, but first I’d like 
to say a few words about the structure of this lesson. I’ve organised it around 
a quote from Bakhtin, which I would suggest provides a kind of directive for 
practitioners of dialogic art by indicating areas of particular import. With 
reference to meta-linguistics, Bakhtin writes, ‘Therefore the orientation of a 
word among words, the varying perception of another’s word and the various 
means of reacting to it, are perhaps the most fundamental problems for the 
meta-linguistic study of any kind of discourse, including the artistic’.27 (Fig. 6.6)
So, in the time remaining we’ll consider each of these three ‘problems’ 
by way of an example of dialogic art. As I’ve said, my interest here is to 
demonstrate the ways in which utterance literacy is an important skill set for 
practitioners of this art, so our example is Interview by Hans Ulrich Obrist and 
Hans-Peter Feldmann. (Fig. 6.7)
Now, when Marsha approached me about speaking today, I proposed 
exploring utterance literacy vis-à-vis one of Dostoevsky’s novels, but she 
suggested that I consider a contemporary artwork instead and, knowing my 
penchant for print, she sent me this book-length interview between the two 
Hanses. I understand from Marsha that Hans-Peter Feldmann is a German 
visual artist principally known for his photography and Hans Ulrich Obrist is a 
Swiss  critic and curator, who Marsha tells me has made an art of interviewing 
artists.28 As you can see from the sample page in the slide (Fig. 6.8), Interview 
moves between Obrist’s questions and Feldmann’s images, the latter being 
the nonverbal utterances that the photographer offers in response to the 
interviewer’s verbal ones.Fig. 6.7
Fig. 6.6
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So the first of Bakhtin’s three meta-linguistic problems pertains to the 
‘words among words’. In Bakhtin’s view, all words can be utterances, but not 
all utterances are words. An utterance can be a single word as in the case of 
‘STOP’,29 but it can also compose an entire book, such as Interview. Bakhtin 
calls utterances that are composed of utterances secondary types, whereas 
‘STOP’ is a primary one.30
KK Lin: But a stop sign would be a secondary utterance, wouldn’t it? Because it’s 
composed of sign, the word, the red paint, its location at an intersection and 
the law it invokes? Am I getting this right?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, precisely, KK. And, given what has been said so far, where are the 
utterances in Interview?
David Rooksby: Like you said, the questions and pictures.
Shadworth Dyson: And how are these utterances articulated as well as differentiated from each 
other and from their context?
David Rooksby: Meaning?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, you’ll recall that an utterance is a unit of expression bounded by 
pauses. In the case of verbal dialogue, this occurs when an interlocutor takes 
a turn, expresses himself and then pauses, inviting a response. So how are the 
utterances bounded here?
KK Lin: Are they bounded by the question mark that terminates the question? And 
also set off from their surroundings in black type against a white page? Sorry 
to be so thick but is this what you mean by being ‘bounded’?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, precisely. Very good again, KK. I am not an art historian, but I would 
suggest we think about this as a figure-ground relation.31 Formal strategies 
such as contrast differentiate utterances from each other.
David Rooksby: More reciprocity. 
Clark Chris: Relativity, too. Black is black because it’s not white.
Cassy Appadurai: So, chiaroscuro—light/dark visual value. More dialogues. Forgive me, 
Shadworth, but I thought ‘utterance literacy’ would investigate something 
closer to the threshold of intersubjective exchange—communication between 
or across interlocutors.
Shadworth Dyson: Correct, and this is what we’re looking at here in Interview. However, higher-
level exploration into these thresholds—‘cusps’, as someone tweeted—
depends on basic acts of recognition that make us cognisant of how 
communication is transacted through its linguistic and non-linguistic aspects. 
The principles can be applied to varying degrees of ambiguity, but evaluating 
this depends on our acuity—which is what we’re building here, as acuity is a 
core skill of ‘utterance literacy’.
David Rooksby: You must walk before you can run, Grasshopper.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well—this brings us to the second fundamental ‘problem’ that 
preoccupies Bakhtin’s theory of meta-linguistics, by which I mean ‘perception 
of another’s word’. What might this mean in the case of Interview?
Tina Wiseman: That we perceive Feldmann’s images and Obrist’s questions by reading them.
David Rooksby: Obviously.
Fig. 6.8
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Tina Wiseman: But it is also obvious that more than one direction is possible, across question 
and answer on the same page, and across questions across pages. Isn’t this 
a  cheeky little book, teasing us to read diagonally, across both pages, moving 
from ‘What couldn’t you live without’ across to the tearful Madonna. (Fig. 
6.9) The humour is very Feldmann—the signature of his collections, his 
orderings of images that he curates into artist books.
Shadworth Dyson: So an invitation to read transgressively, in a way that confounds Interview’s 
prosaic structure of moving from left-to-right, front-to-back and top-to-
bottom.
Maeve Cutty: You know, luv, Interview is what Roland Barthes would call a ‘text’. It’s a weave 
of signifiers activated through readings and re-readings as, for instance, we 
move across language and image,32 across their material expressions—their 
textual and inter-textual presence on the pages as they inform each other.
David Rooksby: More reciprocity. I’m starting a list.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, however, Interview is also a text in Barthes’s sense by virtue of 
achieving—and Bakhtin shares this view—language relations.33 Barthes 
speaks about the text being a place where no language dominates and 
languages circulate,34 which accords with Bakhtin’s theory of heteroglossia 
as the constant flux and clash of languages, in this case the German and the 
English as well as the verbal and the visual.
Anne Lang: In Interview? Really? You know, I’m not seeing much clash here—at least not 
in comparison to the agonism in the commentary Brian spoke about. I mean, 
when you said you were going to offer an example of a dialogic artwork, I was 
expecting something along the lines of Tino Sehgal’s live events. Do you know 
this artist’s practice? I experienced This Object of That Object at the ICA in 
2005.35 We entered the gallery and were sort of surrounded by several people 
moving backwards and chanting, ‘The objective of this work is to become 
the object of the discussion’. After a while, the performers said the artwork 
was over and fell to the ground. And, you know, predictably, I guess, people 
reacted in different ways. Some left and others stayed, including me, and we 
talked. And I was very much aware of being in dialogue, you know?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well—agonism. Granted, the discursive struggle in Interview is subtler 
than in your example of physical encounter, Anne, or the commentary 
to which Brian referred. The contest, however, is still there in Obrist and 
Feldmann’s exchange—in the push and pull of meaning across the visual and 
verbal, between the English and the German, with the languages informing 
each other through their reciprocal relation as they jockey for our attention. 
Take a look at the slide (6.9) and take a moment to think how different our 
perception of the Madonna would be without Obrist’s question. Feldmann’s 
visual response leads me to think he doesn’t like Catholicism—assuming, this 
is in fact a Madonna—or perhaps Feldmann takes exception to all organised 
religion, or— 
David Rooksby: Or to emotional girls!
Fig. 6.9
 241    240
Allison Jones: Shadworth, if we could return to ‘perceiving another’s word’ in the quote 
from Bakhtin, I’d like to know how these two aspects relate—the other and 
his or her word? And could you elaborate on why, in particular, you deem 
utterance literacy important for dialogic art?
Shadworth Dyson: Surely by now we can agree that part of ‘utterance literacy’s’ import for 
dialogic art relates to its capacity to engage the wide range of reciprocal 
relations that come together in dialogues based on what Bakhtin calls 
‘the simultaneity of difference’.36 Dialogue results from the interplay of 
unmerged entities, which is to say that it is a live event played out at the 
point of dialogic meeting between them as distinct beings or things.37 We 
might think of the plurality of interpretations of the email in the case of Take 
Care of Yourself, and the relation between the questions and the images in 
Interview. Embedded in Bakhtin’s reference to ‘perceiving another’s word’ 
is an unmerged relation between interlocutors—between addresser and 
addressee—that is mediated by the word, or the utterance, which is in turn a 
threshold that presupposes an other, the inference rendering the utterance 
an intersubjective relation.38 So who are the interlocutors in Interview?
Tina Wiseman: Well, there’s Obrist, Feldmann—and us, of course.
Shadworth Dyson: Precisely! Oh yes, Interview knowingly unfolds for our benefit. Obrist’s 
questions are addressed to Feldmann yet, as Tina was quick to note, they are 
concurrently directed at us—at those encountering Interview, the Julias and 
Julians.
KK Lin: The ‘Julias’ and ‘Julians’?
Shadworth Dyson: Earlier, someone tweeted that we might use these names, ‘Julia’ and ‘Julian’ 
to personalise—to humanise—what I would otherwise term ‘second-order 
interlocutors’. The tweeter’s naming implied a concern to acknowledge this 
referent as a person with his own unique past, present and future.
So we are the second-order interlocutors—the Julias and Julians—in 
our encounter with Interview. We don’t literally alter the primary source but 
instead produce a secondary and overlapping account, however temporary, as 
we engage Interview.
Anne Lang: And discursively produce it.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes. So when it comes to perceiving ‘the other’s word’ in dialogic art vis-à-
vis ‘utterance literacy,’ this entails dialogic artists anticipating the responses 
of second-order interlocutors as links in the great chain of communication 
comprising the work of art. For in the same way that Bakhtin insists there 
is no dialogue without unmerged consciousnesses in communication, there 
is no artwork without response, which makes an artwork’s second-order 
interlocution—in potentia—constitutive of its first-order one. 
Marsha Bradfield: And what about the ‘superaddressee’ that you spoke of earlier today?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, this is a figure that exists wholly in the interlocutors’ minds, 
by which I mean that it is an authority—a space for projection—above 
and beyond the interlocutors’ immediate exchange, one whose absolute 
responsive understanding is presupposed. I assume that Bakhtin terms this an 
Fig. 6.10
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‘addressee’, as opposed to an ‘interlocutor’, to emphasise their significance as 
such, though you are correct in your observation that there are, in fact, three 
interlocutor types in the case of art. There are the first-order interlocutors 
who produce the artwork; the second-order interlocutors who interpret 
the artwork; and the superaddressee to whom both the first-order and 
second-order interlocutors’ utterances are addressed, above and beyond the 
immediate interlocutors with whom they are directly engaged.
This relation among the interlocutors brings us to the third and final 
‘problem’ identified in Bakhtin’s reflections on meta-linguistics catalogued 
in the quote. Recalling it in its entirety: ‘Therefore,’ writes Bakhtin, ‘the 
orientation of a word among words, the varying perception of another’s word 
and the various means of reacting to it, are perhaps the most fundamental 
problems for the meta-linguistic study of any kind of discourse, including the 
artistic’.39 (Fig. 6.10) So far, we have considered the questions and images 
composing Interview to better understand the relations among utterances 
in this dialogic work of art, and we have taken up the perception of these 
utterances by discussing our encounter and interpretation of Interview as 
second-order interlocutors. What remains to be explored is ‘the various 
means of reacting to another’s word’ vis-à-vis this dialogic artwork, and this 
is both the most interesting and most complex aspect of ‘utterance literacy’ 
in my opinion—and here I am referring, of course, to the addressivity of 
utterances.
Alright, so, we know that, when it comes to Interview, the utterances 
are addressed to both the first- and second-order interlocutors, yet there 
are other ways of thinking about an utterance’s addressivity. In addition to 
it being addressed to a person, it is also addressed to its theme40—what it’s 
about, its subject. In the case, for instance, of Feldmann’s image of the tiger 
behind bars, (Fig. 6.11) we may interpret the theme variously as an outing to 
the zoo, the enclosure of animals and so on and so forth.
KK Lin: Oh. I read this page as a reference to Interview. It’s like holding the book 
in your hands. Here, like this. (Fig. 6.12) Doesn’t the thumb, between the 
two images with their white borders, refer to how we, as second-order 
interlocutors, might engage with the book? Come to think of it, isn’t the 
formal strategy here similar to that in Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart, with an 
image of the authorial process nested within itself?
Cassy Appadurai: That’s interesting. Would you pass me the book please, so I can get a closer 
look?
Tina Wiseman: Yes, I can see that, but I think there is another reading of the Interview’s 
addressivity to its theme. Non-artworlders may not know about Feldmann 
ambivalent relationship with the dominant art world.41
John Johnson: Thumbs his nose at the establishment—just enough to give his practice 
the aura of institutional critique without actually receiving threats of 
excommunication.
Fig. 6.12
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Tina Wiseman: I was thinking along those lines, too. For me, this ambivalence is captured 
in the earnestness of his tongue-in-cheek response to Obrist’s questions. So 
there’s something about the way Feldmann uses humour in his interview that  
conveys disease—their uneasy relations.
Shadworth Dyson: Forgive me, Tina, as I am not as familiar with Feldmann’s and Obrist’s relations 
as I should perhaps be; however, your comments strike me as sociological 
in interest and this, together with KK’s formalist one, means that we now 
have two readings of Interview in play and crucially, this range accords with 
a meta-linguistic perspective; specifically, its concern with cultivating an 
appreciation for the multiple ways in which utterances are directed at their 
themes, at other interlocutors and at their immediate spatiotemporal horizon, 
while concurrently attending to this horizon as it pervades them, becoming a 
constituent aspect of their significance.42
David Rooksby: Another reciprocal relation. I should have a bell and ring it every time one 
comes up.
Marsha Bradfield: Alright, so, on KK’s reading, Feldmann’s image refers back to Interview?
Shadworth Dyson: Correct. And Bakhtin speaks about this kind of relation as a social act 
embedded in a social context with these things—the act and the context—
reciprocally informing each other.43 In this case, the tiger image informs our 
reading of Interview and Interview informs our reading of the tiger image.
David Rooksby: Ding ding!
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, hmm. Reciprocity also pervades Tina’s reading, although in this case, 
it is not Interview—not the book as an object qua artwork—that organises 
the spatiotemporal horizon, but rather Feldmann’s and Obrist’s exchange as a 
kind of sociological index of what Tina referred to as the ‘dominant art world’.
John Johnson: Which we’re actually producing—or entrenching—through our discussion 
of Obrist’s and Feldmann’s exchange as indexical! I’m not sure I’m really 
comfortable with this.
Shadworth Dyson: I’m more immediately concerned to observe that, together, Tina’s and 
KK’s readings point to the utterance as the double environment I spoke of 
earlier—a social matrix both within and without.
KK’s reading foregrounds the internal sociality of Interview as a 
secondary utterance composed of primary ones, with the tiger image drawing 
attention to the relation between these two types vis-à-vis self-referencing 
Interview as an object qua artwork.
By contrast, Tina’s reading is concerned with the social matrix that 
surrounds Interview—the artwork indexes the kind of intersubjective relations 
that organise and produce the art field. Common to both readings, however, 
is the reciprocity between the utterance and its spatiotemporal horizon.
John Johnson: Ding ding.
Cassy Appadurai: If I understand you correctly, and I do apologise for the repetition but I’m 
still struggling to get this straight. You’re saying that, in KK’s reading, the 
nested self-reference informs our understanding of the artwork—assuming 
we accept this self-reference as fact. On Tina’s reading, self-reference points 
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to the interlocutors’ relations as cultural producers. So, in addition to the 
utterances in Interview addressing the interlocutors, they are also addressing 
Interview and the dominant art world to which it belongs by virtue of being a 
work of contemporary art. It’s art about art, twice over. Is that the gist of it?
Allison Jones: Shadworth, you have five minutes.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, thank you Allison. Yes, Cassy, I think your understanding is correct. Now, 
with so little time remaining, and with KK’s questions still outstanding, let me 
briefly conclude by looking at the utterance’s addressivity vis-à-vis its verbal 
and nonverbal aspects.
The verbal aspect of the utterance refers to its repeatable part. Imagine I 
asked you the same question that Obrist put to Feldmann, but in the context 
of this barcamp. ‘What don’t you like at all?’ I’d be most surprised if you 
responded with the image of a weeping Madonna, though you could easily 
say ‘audit culture’ and I would understand why—it’s been a concern in the 
discussion composing the barcamp’s spatiotemporal horizon. To repeat: The 
verbal aspect of the utterance is repeatable; it can mean different things in 
different contexts.
Anne Lang: So the context of an utterance has direct bearing on its  specific and situated 
significance.45
Shadworth Dyson: Precisely. However, the nonverbal aspect of the utterance’s addressivity—
specifically , its intonation—is also context-dependent. If the interlocutors’ 
spatiotemporal horizon is partly responsible for the utterance’s immediate 
meaning, an interlocutor’s intonation conveys his or her social evaluation 
of this horizon or a specific aspect of it.46 We can think of intonation as 
an interlocutor’s attempt to objectify their expression in line with what 
they intend to communicate but are unable to express outright.47 Is the 
interlocutor’s intonation sarcastic, sympathetic, sensual? Can we hear the 
interlocutor’s intention in his voice? In fact, Bakhtin holds the intonation 
saturating an utterance’s addressivity to be one of the most sensitive 
indicators of the intersubjectivity transacting the interlocutors’ social 
relations, and this is precisely because intonation operates on the border of 
what can and cannot be said.
Anne Lang: You don’t mean the ineffable?
Shadworth Dyson: No. Rather, in what can be expressed in keeping with social norms. Intonation 
enables us to say more by dint of its ambiguity, and this creates space for 
plural interpretations. Was Mr. So-and-so being sincere or sarcastic when he 
said he enjoyed my barcamp presentation? As Bakhtin notes in Marxism and 
the Philosophy of Language, ‘we never say or hear words, we say and hear 
what is true or false, good or bad, important or unimportant, pleasant or 
unpleasant’.48 Yet when it comes to intonation, determining what is actually 
heard or said is by no means straightforward.
John Johnson: Well obviously that’s the whole point of Feldmann’s ambivalent humour. It’s 
a wily form of institutional critique. So the critique is there but it’s not there, 
making it a kind of duplicity.
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Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, it’s worth bearing in mind that a definition of dialogue is ‘double 
speak’,49 which is precisely what you’re observing Clark. It seems this brief 
lesson in utterance literacy is already proving beneficial.
Clark Chris: And surprise, surprise—the ambiguity of Feldmann’s utterances is another 
reciprocal relation. 
David Rooksby: Ding ding.
Clark Chris:  They’re critical on the one hand and humourous on the other, undercutting or 
contesting each other—just enough to ensure that no single one dominates.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, I would agree, and perhaps this would be a good time to share your list of 
reciprocities, David, as we draw this barcamp contribution to a close.
David Rooksby: You bet. They may not all be perfect examples, but I’ve got reciprocity 
between: question and response, language and society, individual and 
collective, langue and parole, image and text, verbal and nonverbal, primary 
and secondary utterances, figure and ground, black and white, English 
and German, artist and curator, self and other, primary and secondary 
interlocutors, content and form [as in the case of intonation,] ‘the said’ and 
‘the unsaid’—I think, though this wasn’t totally clear—between the utterance 
and its spatiotemporal horizon, addressivity and answerability, the repeatable 
aspect of the utterance and its unrepeatable and context-specific aspect, and 
between the points of view or voices in dialogue like what you were saying 
about ‘double speak’.
KK Lin: Um, okay, I’m just wondering: Does this mean reciprocity as a social relation 
is actually the medium of dialogic art? You know, Krauss quotes Walter 
Benjamin’s  preoccupation with the medium of photography in her analysis 
of the medium more generally, and says he’s concerned with photography’s 
capacity to render the human subject as woven within a network of social 
relations.50 Maybe I’m mistaken but this seems very similar to how the 
reciprocal relations on David’s list put interlocutors and their interlocution in 
relation.
Shadworth Dyson: Very good, KK, that’s quite intriguing, as Bakhtin speaks, for instance, of genre 
being a means through which an interlocutor can orient himself in social 
intercourse, with genre structuring their approach to communication.
David Rooksby: Is this medium-form-genre stuff really that tricky? I mean, think about it in 
relation to painting. Dialogue is the form, the painting in its entirety. Language 
is the medium—it’s like the paint on a canvas as well as the canvas itself.
KK Lin: So the material support?
David Rooksby: Something like that. The utterances are like brush strokes. They build up 
the artwork, give it mass. There’s technique here. And you have to learn 
technique. So there’s a kind of literacy involved.
Shadworth Dyson: Actually, that’s a surprisingly good analogy, David. However, I’m uncertain 
it works in all respects. I would be more prone to speak, for instance, of 
utterances as closer to material than technique, but then again, there is no 
such thing as a ‘raw utterance’—at least, not in the same way there are ‘raw 
materials’—because utterances are always saturated with the histories of 
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their prior use. Genre is indubitably technique. One has to gain familiarity 
with a genre to press it into service—effectively. We observe this in the 
women’s responses in Take Care of Yourself, which deploy a wide range of 
genres. You’ll recall the clown and—
Allison Jones: Shadworth, I’m afraid we’re already well and truly overtime.
Shadworth Dyson: That being the case, let me conclude by saying that, in my tutorial, I have 
been concerned with sketching an utterance literacy and proposing it as a 
skill set for identifying and working with the utterance as the building block 
of dialogue, this being the form of communication that is explicitly taken 
up and explored in dialogic art. Behind all the reciprocities identified in 
Interview, there is an overarching insistence on the extent to which dialogic 
art is drenched in what Allison earlier termed ‘the dialogueness of dialogues’, 
which she defined as ‘the interplay of dialogue’s social and material qualities 
that have made it such an enduring form of intersubjective exchange’.
David Rooksby: Ding ding. There’s another reciprocal relation for the list—between 
dialogue’s social and material aspects.
Shadworth Dyson: And, had we more time, we should explore this in greater depth. We’ve 
really only scratched the surface of ‘utterance literacy’. Nonetheless, I hope 
that our brief lesson has demonstrated how it is that a dialogic artwork 
like Interview has a more dialogic form than, for instance, Chantier Barbès-
Rochechouart. Interview put in dialogue a range of entities, each tethered to 
a specific instance of intersubjective exchange, between Feldmann, Obrist 
and us.
I hope also this lesson has established the utterance as the actual 
workhorse of dialogic art, and hence also established its merit for serious 
and ongoing discussion. It is, perhaps, most to do with the reciprocity at 
stake in the utterance that we find the most purchase when it comes to 
grasping both the empirical and theoretical dimensions of dialogue through 
which dialogic art can be progressed. I would suggest that, in future, this art 
practice turns its attention to not only demonstrating ‘utterance literacy’ but 
also developing ways of teaching it. In so doing, the literacy at stake in the 
accomplishment of dialogic art might also provide cues for its reception and 
interpretation. Central to—
[The fire alarm sounds]
David Rooksby: Well that’s a wrap.
Marsha Bradfield:  Thank you Shadworth. I’m afraid we’ll have to leave immediately. If you all 
would like to get your things, we’ll meet downstairs and make our way to the 
pub for a quick lunch. Allie would you stop the recorder, please?
__________________
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Marsha Bradfield: Allison, we’re recording?
Allison Jones: We are.
Marsha Bradfield: Thanks. Welcome back, everyone. I hope you enjoyed lunch, and it gave 
you a chance to reflect on this morning’s barcamp contributions as well 
as anticipate this afternoon’s. There seemed to be some intense exchange 
happening at the other end of the table. I heard snippets about human and 
non-human actors and something about tradition and technology being 
authors of dialogic art. I’d like to keep this debate going.
That said, there are time constraints to consider. We need to vacate the 
space by 7:30, as there is another group arriving at 8:00. I know that some of 
you have family and other obligations this evening, and will have to leave at 
around 6:00. Please be sure to give your guideline to John, me or someone 
else before you go, so we can incorporate your recommendation into our 
final session. Some of us have decided to go for dinner afterward, if you fancy 
debriefing over some food.
So we’ll have seven sessions this afternoon instead of five, which 
means that everyone will have a maximum of thirty minutes instead of 
forty. Recalling Shadworth’s contribution, this compression strikes me as a 
clear example of utterances internalising the terms and conditions of their 
spatiotemporal horizon, only to constitute this horizon in turn!  
So for better or for worse, I’ll be relying on a timer going forward. Apologies 
to those of you who prepared longer contributions and have had to rejig 
in response to circumstance. I should have flagged this as a possibility in 
Fig. 7.0
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advance; every barcamp I’ve ever attended has gone overtime. Without 
further ado, I’ll turn over to Hillary.
Hillary Murphy: That’s terrific, Marsha, thanks. Top marks on the day so far. By way of a 
personal introduction, I work with BA and MA students in what has come 
to be called ‘informal education’. We can understand this as learning what 
goes on in everyday life—beyond the classroom.1 I would think that all of us 
here today recognise the wealth of learning that occurs as we interact with 
each other informally, and that with that recognition our whole conception 
of teaching and learning begins to change. We start appreciating that 
some of our most important education occurs on the fringes of curricula as 
learners put their learning into practice. This can occur anywhere—late at 
night in the studio, on the way to lectures, even in the pub. At one level, this 
learning supplements and supports formal education, right? But it also, and 
importantly, lays the foundation for life-long learning with a peer group. So 
you see, for me it’s a real treat to be engaged in this barcamp’s peer-to-peer 
exchange, a nice change from educating students about the value of this kind 
of interaction for their practice and a chance to focus on my own practice. So 
it’s great to be here as both a learner and a teacher.
Over lunch, I chatted to John about my intuition that informal education 
shares with dialogic art an appreciation for its core activity in an expanded 
sense. So what do I mean by this? There are actually three characteristics 
of informal education that I wish to highlight. They include that: it works 
through and is driven by conversation, to which I would add dialogue; it’s 
often spontaneous and involves exploring and enlarging experience; and it 
can take place in any setting.2 Understood? I sense these things are also true 
for dialogic art—its commitment to expanding or enlarging our sense of 
dialogue as an artistic practice, whilst at the same time recognising the crucial 
role that it plays in art practice more generally. So you see, I’m struck by the 
preoccupation, in this art, with dialogue across art practice, in the artwork 
and the reception and interpretation of both. 
Now, it was decided over the lunch that John would kick off the after-
lunch review with a few select reflections on this morning, based on some of 
the questions he has collected so far. 
David Rooksby: Why John and not Cassy, our illustrious and eminently qualifed barcamp 
reporter?
Cassy Appadurai: Because I can’t report back to the barcamp and tweet at the same time.
John Johnson: And I want to prime your thinking in advance of our final session, where we’ll 
author some guidelines for dialogic art. 
Hillary Murphy: And I would like to thank John in advance for his help with this—Cassy, too. 
Marsha, you mentioned a timer? Why not set it for ten minutes. We’ll spend 
the final fifteen or so talking about dialogic epistemology. John, shall we?
[The timer is set.]
 263    262
Fig. 7.3
Fig. 7.2
John Johnson: Okay, right, thanks very much, Hillary. So, Allison and Marsha launched 
the barcamp with what they called a ‘welcome address’, though, truth be 
told, it seemed closer to an introduction designed to acquaint us with their 
preliminary research on dialogic art. They shared their sense that this type 
of art ‘explores intersubjective exchange as people interact with objects, 
networks, information and/or each other to produce dialogic works of 
art’. And what emerged over the course of the morning—especially in KK’s 
talk—was an interest in dialogue as intersubjective exchange rather than, for 
instance—and I’m making up an example here—automated communication  
between two computers. The onus, then, is on exchange between unmerged 
consciousnesses. I should also mention that Allison identified several 
rationales for Marsha’s and her research in the so-called welcome address, 
which are posted on the wall. (Fig. 7.1)
Okay, look, there was something else I wished to flag, something we 
didn’t explicitly discuss and that struck me as an oversight. Marsha, would 
you bring up the slide of your RF3?
Marsha Bradfield: Of course, but why? (Fig. 7.2)
John Johnson: Because I have a question. You’ll note that right at the bottom there’s a 
statement to the effect that you, Marsha, are interested in developing an 
approach to art making that, ‘in contrast to collaborative models privileging 
collective authorship, highlights the contributions of individual interlocutors 
by using their subjective utterances to structure the work’. And for me this 
flags the composition of dialogic works of art, which is something that has 
surfaced several times today and which I hope we’ll be able to explore further 
going forward. So to put this as a three-fold and general question, ‘What is 
dialogic art composed of?’
Shadworth Dyson:  Utterances! 
John Johnson: Alright and then the second part of my question is, ‘How is it composed?’
Shadworth Dyson: Through dialogues, surely!  
John Johnson:  And, ‘To what ends?’ Hopefully this is something that Hillary is going to be 
able to help us with when she explores dialogic epistemology. 
      Okay, so our second contribution was delivered PechaKucha style. You’ll 
recall that Clark, first thing this morning, declared that for him, dialogic art 
was really about labour—about acknowledging all the work that goes into 
making art happen. 
Maeve Cutty:  I expected Clark might speak about invisible, feminised or other kinds of 
labour that are vital to artistic authorship but often go unrecognised.3
John Johnson:  Okay, but his contribution took a different tack. After defining dialogue as a 
‘form of communication that alternates between two or more interlocutors 
. . . whose expressions issue across from and perhaps in opposition to each 
other as the interlocutors converse’, he went on to reify—to personify—‘the 
dialogic’ as a kind of interlocutor in dialogue with dialogue. For me, this raised 
an interesting question about where dialogue occurs and between what or 
whom?
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Okay, later in Clark’s contribution, following a ripping discussion about 
the relation between his verbal and visual utterances—the commentary and 
the slides—Allison made a distinction between ‘dialogic’ and ‘dialectic’. And 
Shadworth expressed his view—Bakhtin’s view, actually—that, although 
propelled by higher-order synthesis, dialectic argumentation is still dialogic. 
So I guess I’m still a little confused about where this leaves dialogic art. I’m 
assuming the goal of this type of art is to draw out the dialogic dimension 
of its subjects and forms by deploying dialogic strategies and dialogic tactics 
to find ways of highlighting and representing their existence as dialogic. 
Assuming this is indeed the purpose of dialogic art—or at least one of its 
express concerns—Clark’s analytical categories would be useful to this 
project. To refresh your memory, these categories include ‘the dialogic’, 
manifesting in the ‘dialogic bonus’, ‘dialogic disposition’, and ‘dialogic strategy’ 
and underpinned by ‘dialogic tactics’.
Immediately following Clark’s non-narrative fable, KK based her 
contribution on a specific example. So yes, with reference to Chantier Barbès-
Rochechouart, we looked at spatiotemporal dialogues, which opened a 
discussion about the relation between literal dialogues and figurative ones in 
dialogic art. And I believe we reached broad agreement that, without taking 
as its referent a real-world instance of intersubjective exchange, Huyghe’s 
Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart failed to qualify as a dialogic work of art.
KK Lin: Well actually, um, John, I believe you advanced this view. You’ll recall that 
Cassy noted that we might actually think about dialogic ‘arts,’ in the plural, 
with each ‘art’ each being anchored in different types of dialogue? 
John Johnson:  Fair enough. But actually, I was picking up on Marsha and Allison’s 
preoccupation with dialogue as intersubjective exchange, with this being a 
pivot for dialogic art. But you’re right to say this is only one possible pivot. 
What’s crucial, however, is that there’s some—well, pivot. Agreed? Okay. 
Now KK’s contribution also drew interesting queries related to reflexivity, and 
especially how it might enable dialogic artworks to bend back on themselves 
in ways that evoke a wider range of dialogues, beyond those the artwork 
might realistically contain. We also surfaced what Cassy dubbed ‘the ethics 
of opacity’—the challenge of reconciling dialogic art’s commitment to 
representing a range of authorial contributions on the one hand whilst, on the 
other, making no pretense to this being an accurate representation.
KK Lin: I’m not sure that ‘accurate’ is quite the right word, is it John? It’s really about, 
well, um, not taking this art on ‘face value’ would be better—does that make 
sense? The challenge is that dialogic art might honour the contributions of 
diverse interlocutors in the dialogues composing the artwork and/or practice, 
without making truth claims about it being a literal representation of some 
kind. I think. Or does that sound wrong?
John Johnson: No, no, KK, quite right, point taken. And actually, in a way, this introduces a 
central concern in Ella’s contribution, which explored the question, ‘What 
does it mean to collaborate in dialogic art?’ Ella seemed primarily concerned 
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with the challenges of making the socially produced character of artistic 
practice explicit in the artwork as an outcome. And when we looked at the 
example of Sophie Calle’s Take Care of Yourself, we wondered about the terms 
and conditions at stake in this artwork’s mimetic scheme. What was included? 
What was excluded? Who made the decisions? And what implications did this 
have for our interpretation?
Ella’s contribution also raised fascinating questions about subjectivity—
in fact, subjectivities in the plural, including the ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ 
subjectivities produced through dialogic art as an explicitly and self-
consciously collaborative approach. This discussion culminated in Cassy’s 
concerns that we may be diluting our discussion of dialogic art by spreading it 
too thin in an attempt to accommodate more and more considerations—more 
interlocutors, more ways of working together, more dialogues. And I liked the 
way that Cassy expressed this.
Cassy Appadurai: You did? You know it all seems so long ago that I’ve forgotten!
John Johnson: Okay, allow me to refresh your memory. You spoke about this inclusion being 
the inverse of earlier concerns about dialogic art running the risk of infinite 
regress, because adding more and more complexity runs the risk of infinite 
progress. This brought us back to a concern that was salient throughout most 
of the contributions: How do we bound dialogic art? What counts as a dialogic 
artwork? What counts as the practice of dialogic art and what doesn’t? And, 
look, to my mind, these questions remain very much outstanding as we go 
into the afternoon’s contributions.
Okay, moving on. Brian’s contribution surveyed the commentary on 
relational art, more broadly. But he zoomed in on agonism and conviviality 
in the practice of relational art and the ways in which agonism, in particular, 
is shaping commentary on relational art through its content and form. This 
led him to suggest that what is immanent to the practice of relational art has 
become immanent to its commentary, as well, right? And this in turn led to a 
question about whether this commentary is, then, an extension of relational 
art practice, as Brian seemed to suggest, and, if so, where does one end and 
the other begin?
David Rooksby: Well, surely it’s a reciprocal relation! Ding ding.
John Johnson: Thank you for that segue, David. ‘Reciprocal relation’ seems to have, become, 
well,  a kind of refrain in our discussion, a central organising principle for 
dialogic art, if you will. Consider the list of reciprocal relations David compiled 
coming out of Shadworth’s contribution alone—
[The timer rings.]
Okay, to wrap up very quickly and before we were interrupted by the 
fire alarm, Shadworth offered us a lesson in utterance literacy informed by 
Bakhtin’s meta-linguistics. For me, this was another challenging contribution 
in that it coughed up a huge range of disparate and often complex and 
technical concerns, many of which we were simply unable to address. We 
never did get back to KK’s question about the auto-critique of dialogue—or 
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other kinds of critique—in dialogic art, and nor were we able to resolve what 
constitutes the medium, form or genre. 
Shadworth challenged us to think about dialogue in terms of utterances, 
interlocutors and exchange in an expanded sense. The red thread seemed to 
be addressivity. In addition to utterances being addressed to interlocutors, we 
also considered the ways in which they’re addressed to their themes. Okay, 
now this culminated in two quite distinct readings of Interview. KK broached 
this from a formal perspective and Tina from a more sociological one, but 
both considered Interview as an utterance composed of utterances and 
interpreted the range of meanings it prompted as pointing to ‘the whole’ in 
a dialogic artwork being greater than the sum of its parts. And this idea of a 
loose synthesis—an organic or non-systematic coming together—is something 
else that we’ve been circling around in our discussion. 
A core question raised by Shadworth’s contribution, and for me the 
central one, goes back to this ongoing issue of scope: if everything is in 
dialogue, then doesn’t a dialogic perspective end up being limited?
Shadworth Dyson: Not at all, so long as—
John Johnson: Okay, look, I suppose what I’m saying is that when dialogue becomes a theory 
of everything, it is reduced to a theory of nothing—
Hillary Murphy: And I would think that’s a good place to leave our after-lunch review. John, 
that was excellent, gold star, thank you very much. Marsha, would you reset 
the timer, please, for fifteen minutes from now?
[The timer is reset.]
Very good, off we go! For my part, I want to offer several reflections 
on dialogic epistemology as prompts for discussion. These stem from my 
intuition that this theory of knowledge might ground the practice-based 
research of dialogic art.
Cassy Appadurai: A point of clarification: I may be preempting your contribution, Hillary, but 
how are you defining ‘dialogic epistemology’?
Hillary Murphy: Very good question, Cassy. The answer is that I’m not. Or rather, I’m hoping 
we might establish this through our discussion. I guess I’m interested in how 
dialogic art might be employed to explore the production of knowledge and—
Allison Jones: And this is, of course, crucial from the perspective of our investigation as 
research.
Hillary Murphy: I would think it’s worth acknowledging that, for those who are outside 
the culture of art research in the UK, either because they’re embedded in 
alternative research cultures or different contexts, the idea of ‘art research’ 
generating ‘new knowledge’ may seem surprising. We may well ask, ‘Why 
think about art as though it were science?’4 Some would say that scientific 
research produces ‘knowledge’, whilst the arts and humanities produce 
something else—‘meaning’, perhaps.5 But you see, pitting objectivist 
connotations of ‘knowledge’ against subjectivist ones of ‘meaning’ can result 
in an unhelpful opposition6—it crushes scientific research on the one hand 
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 and arts and humanities research on the other into monolithic categories.  
This may suggest that art research is, well, plastic whilst the terms of 
knowledge in scientific research are essentially fixed. 
Phil Hind: That’s reductive.
Hillary Murphy: Agreed, Phil. So what is the alternative? I would say that one way of 
bridging this opposition may be to adopt ‘ways of knowing’ instead of 
‘new knowledge’ as the touchstone of research in general—art research, 
at a minimum. (Fig. 7.3) You see, the present participle ‘knowing’ implies 
an ongoing process. This is closer to a practice of knowing as exploration 
than it is to ‘knowledge’ as a compact and static noun.7 And if we embrace 
knowledge as a process of ‘doing’ or ‘undoing’ rather than ‘having’—
or perhaps, in addition to—a plural conception begins to take shape. 
Understood?
John Johnson: Okay, but, look—reading between the lines, it sounds as if you don’t think 
dialogic art as practice-based research generates knowledge.
Hillary Murphy: Very good point, John. When I mentioned to Marsha my interest in discussing 
dialogic epistemology, she encouraged me to locate this in relation to ongoing 
debate about knowledge in practice-based art research. I should say this 
isn’t an area with which I’m really familiar. As an educator, my interest in 
dialogic epistemology differs from that of an art researcher. So you see, it’s 
not so important for me to know how this epistemology defines knowledge. I 
mean, of course it’s important. But what is reallly at stake in my own practice 
is the kind of learning opportunities it enables—the ways in which dialogic 
epistemology might host and support informal education via peer-to-peer 
exchange, in particular. 
Allison Jones: Well, discussing the epistemic basis of art research, along with this ontological 
and methodological significance, is paramount not only for our immediate 
investigation into dialogic art, but more generally, in terms of the relation 
between art research and other types, most immediately academic research.8
John Johnson: Okay, as the researcher on this project, Allison, what position do you take on 
dialogic art as an enterprise focused on knowledge-acquisition?
Allison Jones: Dialogic art? Well, I don’t, actually, because the claim to new knowledge in 
my research will likely reside in the ways in which the evaluative framework 
I am evolving for dialogic art expands on pre-existing ones, including Kester’s 
approach, which I described earlier today when I established our research 
rationales.
John Johnson: Marsha?
Marsha Bradfield: Well, to reiterate what Hillary was saying, the status and significance 
of knowledge in art research—in fact, in the arts and humanities more 
generally—remains very much unresolved. It’s a kind of moving target. After 
surveying some of the literatures on art research, I’ve opted for a provisional 
position that’s close to home. In the perspective of my supervisor, Stephen 
Scrivener, art practice needs to be recognised in its own right as a form of 
research.9
Fig. 7.3
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David Roosky: That’s convenient, isn’t it—falling in line with your supervisor?
Marsha Bradfield: Well, yes and no. Is it any wonder that all of my supervisors—Stephen, 
Neil Cummings and Mary Anne Francis—have influenced my thinking and 
practice? And my cohorts too? We’ve been in dialogue for over half a decade 
about dialogic art. That said, the challenge is, of course, to critically integrate 
these influences into my practice. And with this in mind, I’ll try to express the 
following as briefly as I can. 
David Rooskby:  Meaning? 
Marsha Bradfield:  Well, I mean, this is complex but I sense there are at least three options 
when it comes to thinking about knowledge in art research. First, we can take 
the view that art generates its own kind of knowledge. This being the case, 
we’d be stretching normative definitions of knowledge as, for instance, ‘true 
justified belief’. 
Krista Wiseman:  Things like tacit or embodied knowledge come to mind. 
Marsha Bradfield:  Right, with them being closer to a practical knowing than a theoretical one.10 
But I suppose my concern with this view is that it might other art research 
from research practice and culture more generally. I’m not sure this is really 
what’s best for art research as a fledging field.
Alternatively, we might follow Hillary and take the view that art 
generates something distinct from knowledge—meaning perhaps. Though, as 
she’s said, this sets up an opposition between the sciences in the pursuit of 
‘knowledge’ and the arts and humanities as searching for ‘meaning’.11 Again, 
I’m not sure this split is necessary, let alone desirable. So more interesting, 
to my mind, is the possibility of art research approaching research from the 
perspective of extra-disciplinarity. And you’ll recall that Allison advanced this 
as a basis for art, in general, in our opening comments.
Now, Stephen—Scrivener, I mean—argues that, because art has not, 
historically, been concerned with the production of knowledge, it is difficult to 
see how it might adopt this teleology without compromising effect. You know 
it’s difficult, for instance, to settle into agreement about what an artwork 
means in the same way we might agree about the research outcomes of a 
medical trial. For Stephen—and I agree with him on this—what artworks 
generate is actually something closer to calling into question our assumptions 
about the way things are—how the world works. He terms this ‘creating 
apprehensions’. I can’t do justice to his whole argument here, but he comes to 
the conclusion that, in the case of making art, research can be defined as an 
original creation that is pursued in order to encourage novel apprehensions.12
David Rooskby:  ‘In the case of making art, research can be defined as an original creation that 
is pursued in order to encourage novel apprehensions’? Is that what you said?
Marsha Bradfield:     Yes, and I guess I’m interested in these apprehensions being a kind of 
negation—a negation like the type Allison earlier described with reference 
to art as extra-disciplinary. She spoke, for instance, about this art developing 
something like a negative identity by adopting and adapting the skills and 
resources of other fields to art’s own ends. The result being that, although 
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art draws on sociology, literary theory, pedagogy and so on and so forth, it 
does not claim to be doing sociology, literary theory and pedagogy in the 
same way these fields do. So I’m interested in Stephen’s argument as a kind of 
compliment to this, with art research raising apprehensions about disciplinary 
norms as well as social norms more generally, among other things. In the case 
of dialogic art, this would include how we conceptualise dialogue as a social 
practice. Listen, I feel as though I’m dominating Hillary’s session, so perhaps—
John Johnson: Okay, but, look, going back to Scrivener’s position, couldn’t we just as easily 
describe everyday art practice in these terms—as raising apprehensions?
Marsha Bradfield: It’s a fair point. Let me just say that Stephen’s response hinges on intention 
and convention. Art researchers, in his view, are distinguished from artists 
in general by their purposive approach to generating apprehensions that 
are culturally novel through some form of artistic production. As part of 
a research community, art researchers approach this conventionally, in 
compliance with the norms through which research is realised.13
Krista Wiseman:  But it’s art research! In keeping with the history of art as creative practice, 
shouldn’t this research be creative as well?
Allison Jones:  Creativity is all well and good but when it comes to art research, this practice 
is distinguished by its ability to generate significance through the conventions 
of both research and art--so there is a double qualification at stake.  
Hillary Murphy: May I come in on this? It opens onto my next prompt, you see, and I’m 
conscious that the clock is ticking. 
Marsha Bradfield: Of course, Hillary.
Hillary Murphy: Let’s, for argument’s sake, say that we accept Scrivener’s position. In the case 
of dialogic art, its research status resides with the apprehensions it achieves. I 
would think these could well relate to calling into question the ways in which 
dialogue is conceived and functions in contemporary art. Is anyone in radical 
disagreement? No? Good, very good.
So you’ll recall that my first prompt was about embracing ‘knowing’ as 
a process in art research whilst ‘knowledge’ is more of an outcome. With this 
in mind, what might knowing mean in dialogic art? Or how might this art be a 
process of knowing? So you see, what I’m really asking is ‘How does dialogic 
art know?’ (Fig. 7.4)
Cassy Appadurai: ‘How does dialogic art know?’ So we’re back to personifying dialogue? As an 
inanimate object—even as a social practice—art can’t know because it can’t 
think. Or at least not the way that people do. 
Hillary Murphy: You’re right, Cassy, but art can model ways of knowing. You see, some would 
argue that, when it comes to practice-based endeavors, we can distinguish 
between ‘knowledge’ and ‘skill’. This has been thematised in debates in 
continental philosophy as the difference between ‘knowing that’ and 
‘knowing how’. We touched on this earlier, but a little repetition won’t hurt. 
You see, ‘knowing that’ is wrapped up with more familiar notions of research, 
concerned with the convention of true justified belief and persuasive 
argumentation, whilst ‘knowing how’ is closer to practical knowledge, which Fig. 7.5
Fig. 7.4
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is largely tacit and embodied, making it resistant to discursive or conceptual 
expression.14 It’s my intuition that, when it comes to dialogic art, we’re really 
talking about ‘knowing how’ in contrast to ‘knowing that’. I would think we 
need to at least try to make explicit some of the distinguishing characteristics 
at stake in the form of this cultural production as a way of knowing—dialogic 
art’s tacit assumptions and theories-in-use—and to consider them in relation 
to dialogic epistemology, and vice versa. So the question is, ‘How does the 
form of dialogic art propose a way of knowing or understanding?’ (Fig. 7.5) 
Phil Hind: Yes, quite. But let’s go back, for a moment, to Scrivener’s emphasis on ‘the 
artwork’ generating the apprehensions that distinguish art research—but 
what about the practice?
Marsha Bradfield: Well, it’s true that Stephen—Scrivener—is concerned with contesting art 
objects as what he terms ‘knowledge artifacts’ that convey knowledge in a 
straightforward way. To give you an example, he compares and contrasts a 
functional Tube map with Simon Patterson’s Great Bear, where the names of 
celebrities take the place of stations and locations on the map. So it uses this 
association to propose another way of understanding both the Underground 
and the relations among these historical people. Anyway, my point is really 
that Stephen is more concerned with artifacts than with artistic practice—
at least in his paper titled, ‘The art object does not embody a form of 
knowledge’.15 
Phil Hind: It’s quite an interesting point in the case of dialogic art, isn’t it. I’m not sure 
the practice and artwork can be teased apart—assuming, that is, we accept 
Ella’s contention that this art is distinguished in part by its social character 
being made manifest in the artwork as an outcome of this production.
Cassy Appadurai: I second Phil’s thinking. I was struck by the resistance in this morning’s 
discussion to drawing a nice, neat line between the practice of generating 
the artwork and the artwork as an outcome of this practice. So, right there, I 
think we’ve got something like an apprehension. It contests the notion of the 
artwork in dialogic art as an outcome that is largely discrete—or, at the very 
least, cleaved from the broader practice of dialogue through which it evolves.
Hillary Murphy: There’s something in what you’re saying, Cassy, that makes me think of Kevin 
Barge and Martin Little’s argument about dialogue in organisational life. They 
discuss the tendency to see it as ‘abnormal’—an exceptional conversational 
episode rather than to the stuff of everyday exchange.16 They report that, 
in some organisational contexts, dialogue takes the form of special sessions 
facilitated by experts. An example might be, ‘On Friday, there will be a 
dialogue on appropriate email correspondence at work’. And they remark that 
this model has similarities with David Bohm’s approach.
John Johnson: Okay, as in the case of his MIT Dialogue Project—I’m familiar with it. But what 
does this have to do with the relation between artworks as distinct from 
practice—or dialogic epistemology for that matter?
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Hillary Murphy: Well, you see, we don’t have time to discuss the Dialogue Project at length. 
So let me just say that Bohmian dialogue is an intentional act occurring within 
a dedicated space, in which interlocutors meet together regularly to practice 
this skill. I’m not sure how many of you are familiar with Bohmian dialogue? 
Well, it assumes that by coming together and thinking together repeatedly 
[once or twice a week for months if not years] we might be able to draw out 
and expose our implicit assumptions through discursive exchange, thereby 
better grasping the incoherence of our thought.17
Shadworth Dyson: If I may interject, Hillary. Does this mean the connection here pertains to both 
the Bohmian approach and dialogic art as forms of research that is concerned 
with creating apprehensions? In Bohmian dialogue, wouldn’t interrogating 
our faulty thinking shift our worldview?
Hillary Murphy: I hadn’t thought about this, Shadworth, but it’s a very good point. Top marks! 
I was actually going to say that the emphasis on dialogue occurring in a 
discrete space on Friday afternoons between 2:00 and 4:00 o’clock among 
thirty kindred spirits, strikes me as related—at least, structurally akin—to 
Kester’s sense of dialogue as constitutive of dialogical works of art—with this 
dialogue occurring in the artworks in contrast to being in response to them. 
So you see, the emphasis is placed on dialogue being located in this particular 
space.
Barge and Little, on the other hand, advance a Bakhtinian approach to 
organisational life—dialogue as everyday interaction, including peer-to-peer 
exchange.18 What I’m trying to say—in what I would think is coming across 
as a very round-about way—is that this approach, this Bakhtinian approach, 
seems to me to be closer to the inclusive and holistic one that we seem to be 
favouring for dialogic art.
Allison Jones So it’s Bohm/dialogical art and Bakhtin/dialogic art? You appear, with this 
formulation, to be echoing the implicit critique that I made when outlining 
our research rationales—a critique, that is, of Kester’s expanded and yet still 
limited sense of dialogue in dialogical art. And here I’m thinking of his view 
that if, in the past, artworks have prompted dialogue about themselves and, 
by contrast, dialogical artworks are themselves composed of dialogue, why 
not, I would argue—well, why not also acknowledge the dialogues comprising 
the practice as constitutive of this authorial activity overall?
Brian Updike:  Including its commentary. 
John Johnson: Okay, I can see that. And yes, it could be that calling into question the taken-
for-granted division between art practice and the artwork it generates result 
in an apprehension like the kind that Scriven—
Tina Wiseman: But isn’t there another apprehension at stake, or at least something like an 
apprehension? I’m thinking here that, in addition to an art practice producing 
artworks, it might also produce authorial subjects, subjectivities and—
John Johnson: Okay, I can see that too. But, look, I’m still wondering how—how does all this 
relate to dialogic epistemology?
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Hillary Murphy: Well, you see, John, Barge and Little identify dialogue as a ‘relational 
practice’ through which people use language to connect with each other. This 
intersubjective exchange helps them to organise their experience and make it 
meaningful19 as they co-construct an understanding of the world.
John Johnson: Okay, so you’re talking about social constructivism.
Phil Hind: This makes good sense to me, John—assuming you’re referring to social 
constructivism as a theory of the social world, including knowledge, which 
develops between interlocutors.
David Rooksby: As opposed to—
Phil Hind: As opposed to cognition that evolves in the minds of individuals, which 
would make it something closer to subjective meaning. In other words, 
knowledge from the perspective of social constructivism isn’t something that 
exists out there on its own—like, for instance, the solar system as a factic 
phenomenon—any more than knowledge is something that resides entirely 
inside the minds of individuals. Rather, it is produced through intersubjective 
exchange in response to political, cultural, technological and other 
developments. When these changes are substantial enough, they make it 
necessary for us to rethink how we hold the world in common—as knowledge 
in common.20
Hillary Murphy: Yes, very good—dialogic epistemology is a variation of social constructivism. 
Excellent response. This constructivist approach seems to me to be akin to 
the idea of ‘distributed authorship’ that has been circulating throughout our 
exchange. I think this could help to overcome essentialist notions of what the 
author or authorship is and—
Clark Chris: As well as what dialogue is! Clearly, dialogic art is a contemporary art practice 
that results in apprehension when it questions the form and function of 
dialogue in this type of cultural production—which is central to all its aspects!
John Johnson: Right, Clark. I can see this as a possibility. But, look, I’m concerned that, 
by embracing everything as dialogue or in dialogue, dialogic art succumbs 
to its own rote ontology, not unlike the ontology that plagues social 
constructivism.21 I’m thinking here of what results when the perspectives of 
those constructing ‘the social’ are ‘relative and never absolute’. I mean this 
sounds okay, right? What’s not okay about undermining meta-narratives 
as ‘Truth’ with a capital ‘T’? But, look, I have to admit that I agree with 
Michael Taussig’s observation that knowledge marked by relativism and 
responsiveness tends to result in a case of mistaken identity. And this occurs 
when we confuse the beginnings of knowledge—in this case, the recognition 
that things are constructed—for the end of knowledge. The problem, in other 
words, is that we fetishise this construction by seeing it as an end in itself, 
when we should be unpicking the privileges of construction.22
Brian Updike: Absolutely. But doesn’t this point to the importance of social constructivism? 
So how certain constructions are advanced?  And how this occurs through 
dialogues, including those that make up dialogic art? No, that’s not quite what 
I wish to say. Let me try again. Isn’t it less important that we decide whether 
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dialogic epistemology holds fast to dialogue as limited to a particular type 
of communicative exchange or embraces it in an expanded sense, than that 
we examine its effects on both the artwork and those involved in it? Do you 
follow? Doesn’t the epistemology that informs dialogic art need to pay close 
attention to the dialogues that dominate its construction and maintenance, 
whether it’s practice, artwork or reception? That’s really what I’m trying to 
say.
Allison Jones: Brian, approaching this from the perspective of research methodology, what 
consequences would it have with regards to pursuing the research?
Brian Updike: No doubt the first move would be to establish what qualifies as dialogue in 
the practice of dialogic art.
David Rooksby: Or how about where the dialogue occurs? Like you’ve said, its dialogic art’s 
interest in the dialogues that spread across all its various parts that sets this 
art apart. And these include—what? The practice, the artwork, its reception 
and, uh, its discursive production, right? It’s the same old story: what are 
the three key factors in the success of any business? Location, location and 
location. And then we’re also talking about different types of dialogue: verbal, 
nonverbal, visual—
Tina Wiseman: And there are dialogues among subjects—first- and second-order 
interlocutors—and the way each dialogue shapes all the different kinds of 
subjectivity.
Hillary Murphy: In those terms, I would think of dialogic art as a kind of dialogue of dialogues, 
each one struggling with the others to produce significance in the same way 
that interlocutors contest each other’s points of view—and build on—in 
dialogue—
Allison Jones: This is really assuming that we privilege dialogue as agonistic. 
Ella Stone:  Regardless—is it not more important that this exchange we’re discussing finds 
form in the artwork? 
Allison Jones:  Concomitantly, this dialogue of dialogues could raise apprehensions about 
the ways in which dialogue operates in dialogue-based practice, in particular, 
and contemporary art more generally. Critically however, this needs to be 
researched on a case-by-case basis, that is, in the case of each dialogic work 
of art evolving through practice and--
[The timer sounds.]
Marsha Bradfield: Hillary and John thank you. You’ve given us a lot to think about and—
Hillary Murphy: If I may offer one more comment in closing. I would think that what this 
after-lunch review has established—or at least begun to establish—is a sense 
of dialogic art arising from the constructive alignment of its epistemology, 
ontology and teleology. You see, this art’s dialogic theory of knowledge is 
aligned with its dialogic form—its way of being in the world and relating to 
it, as well as its purpose—which I hold is to better understand how it is that 
we co-construct the world through dialogue—dialogues, actually. Dialogue 
is, of course, the common denominator here, in this alignment. Dialogic art 
promotes dialogue as a form—a mode—of achieving novel insights via co-
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constructed understanding arising through dialogic exchange. One important 
thing about this kind of alignment is that it can be used as a mechanism 
of coordination—in this case, a way of coordinating energies, actions and 
practices across these three areas into dialogic art as a shared enterprise.23 So 
you see, we might think about these aspects as being in dialogue in dialogic 
art. That said, one of the trade-offs of coordinating a shared enterprise in this 
way is that it can become a kind of unquestioned alliance—dialogic art is all 
about dialogue. What this means, however, needs to be regularly reviewed 
and disturbed to avoid it becoming common sense and remains an ongoing 
process of discovery.24 Listen, thank you all for taking up the discussion of 
dialogic epistemology with such enthusiasm. 
Marsha Bradfield:  And thank you too, Hillary. Will you all join me in giving her a round of 
applause?
[Barcamp claps.]
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Marsha Bradfield: You don’t have any slides, do you Krista? I’ll make one to introduce your 
contribution in the publication. (Fig. 8.0)
Krista Wiseman: That’s great, thanks. Sooo—hello, everyone. I’m Krista Wiseman and Tina 
and Christian are my parents. I’m here because they asked me to drive. I was 
kvetching the other day that we never talk about our projects—we’re all 
three artists—and they said, ‘Oh, you should come to this barcamp. It’s about 
dialogue so they have to talk to you’. I thought about this and it depressed 
me. What a sad thing to do, to come to a day on dialogue so people, including 
my parents, will talk to me about my art practice and theirs. I said, ‘No’. And 
then Chris said, ‘Fine, but can you still drive?’
Marsha Bradfield: Is it true that you used to be a comedian?
Krista Wiseman: Yes, but I wasn’t a very good one. And I think a big part of what I do is trying 
to deal with this.
Marsha Bradfield: So now you’re an artist?
Krista Wiseman: Artist, writer, curator, educator and activist. I’m just happy to have a job.
Marsha Bradfield: You get paid for your art?
Krista Wiseman: For driving my parents around.
Marsha Bradfield: So what do you think?
Krista Wiseman: About?
Marsha Bradfield: Dialogic art, solving for ‘x’. ‘Dialogic art is’—[fill in the blank].
Krista Wiseman: Well, I didn’t prepare anything but I thought I’d talk about affect. I sense it has 
a lot in common with the ‘dialogueness’ of dialogic art. I feel as though I know 
what this is in the same way that I feel I know what affect is. I have many 
Fig. 8.0
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associations in both cases. But I’m still not really sure. Or rather, there’s much 
to understand, and I’m interested in the porousness of this understanding.
Marsha Bradfield: So tell us about the significance of affect for dialogic art.
Krista Wiseman: Well, first let me say that I’ve been trying to understand the manyness of 
affect’s forms.1 It’s a complex concept and it’s used in diverse contexts. 
When it comes to art discourse, we hear about affect in discussions on self-
organised art practice to new media platforms for interaction and labour—
labours, actually, different kinds of work—and, and, and. And then again, 
there is something predictable about the way affect is rehearsed in some 
conversations on the fringes of what we’ve been calling ‘the dominant art 
world’. My thinking about affect and the language I use to speak about it 
has been forged through working in art as activism, sooo—socially engaged 
practice. When someone says ‘affect’ in this context, read: how bodies affect 
each other—bodies in productive relation.2
David Rooksby: Productive relation. Sounds mysterious—stimulating, even.
Krista Wiseman: That’s Brian Massumi’s  influential definition, following Spinoza’s even more 
influential one. Massumi says that ‘affect is the ability to affect and be 
affected’.3
Maeve Cutty: Are you sure that even makes sense, luv?
David Rooksby: Sure it does—as ‘bodies in productive relation’.
Krista Wiseman: Right. Brilliant. It’s another reciprocal relationship—transference of some kind 
of feeling—if that’s what you’re getting at.
David Rooksby: Well, ding-a-ling.
Krista Wiseman: Sooo—Massumi goes on to say that what’s useful about this definition of 
affect is that it moves transversally across a stubborn division. This is the 
tendency to think ‘subject’ and ‘object’ as discrete categories of being. But 
then again, ‘affect’, understood as the ‘ability to affect and be affected’, 
unites them in the same event—an unfurling of an event that’s a becoming of 
subject and object together.4 
David Rooksby: You’re saying that subjects and objects make each other—affectively?
Krista Wiseman: You look confused—or maybe intrigued? How to put it? It may help to say 
something about what affect is not. When Spinoza’s notion of affect is taken 
out of context, torn from his broader philosophy, it sometimes gets reduced 
to being something like a state of the body or a state of the mind, one that 
either enables or disables a body’s or mind’s ability to act.5 But the thing 
about this definition is that it locates affect in the body and mind without 
acknowledging that, in addition to acting, these things are also acted upon.
Then again, the word ‘state’ is interesting when it comes to affect, 
because ‘state’ can connote something stable or substantial, like a ‘nation 
state’, ‘state of the art’, ‘state of war’. But, following Massumi, we can also 
think of affect as a transition-like state between or across bodies—including 
subject and object. ‘Transition’ is something we’ve come close to today with 
talk of ‘thresholds’, ‘cusps’ and ‘overlaps’ in dialogic art. Shadworth spoke 
about the overlap between utterances as rejoinders in the chain of call and 
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response as they absorb each other. Sooo—we’ve been circling around the 
liminal in dialogic art. And when it comes to what makes this art different, 
it’s the liminality of the dialogic—that’s the thing. It’s kind of like the link in 
our metaphorical chain, if you see what I mean—as a nexus of relations, a 
space of interrelation between subject and object, self and other—bodies as 
they affect and are affected by each other. So I want to think about the link 
between these bodies as a transition where affect occurs.
John Johnson: And between ‘minds’?
Phil Hind: What about ‘entities’?
Krista Wiseman: Right. Brilliant. ‘Entities’ is more inclusive. But it’s really the affect among 
bodies—among embodied subjects—that I’d like to bring into this discussion. 
Anyway, I think that affect as a transition-like state is conveyed in Massumi’s 
gloss as an ‘ability to affect and be affected’.6 And this gets us closer to 
Spinoza’s overarching  interest in affect as arising from causal relations.7   Now, 
Phil you’re looking concerned, so let me say—
Phil Hind: Oh, no! Not concerned. Curious, as ‘causal relations’ is a hot topic in sociology 
and it would be good to hear your views on this. 
Krista Wiseman: Well, I’m not really thinking about causality in a straightforward way, not 
something that’s easily reduced to stimulus and response, if that’s what 
you’re wondering about. Actually, that’s not quite right. I mean, affect is 
produced through stimulus and response, but this doesn’t always crystallise 
as a linear structure. How to put this? Massumi favours the word ‘priming’ to 
describe something like the causality that gives rise to affect.8 He likens this to 
‘modulation’, and I take this to mean that affect is variable—unpredictable.9 
It’s complex and can’t easily be reduced to a clear narrative of events. With 
so many subtle relations, it’s not always clear which is the stimulus and which 
the response. And this leads Massumi to describe affect as something like a 
felt passage, something that opens onto a problematic field instead of ending 
in a particular solution.10 For Massumi, it invites an ‘indefinitely constructive 
thinking of embodied, relational becoming’.11 So affect is open—speculative, 
even. I think this kind of flexibility is something that dialogic art desires for 
itself but isn’t quite sure how to achieve.
Marsha Bradfield: What dialogic art desires for itself?
Krista Wiseman: How to put this? It occurs to me that your research is quite—thorough.
Allison Jones: As in rigorous?
Krista Wiseman: I suppose so, but not in a good way, if you see what I mean.
Allison Jones: No, frankly. I don’t. What’s wrong with rigour?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, ‘rigour’ is a complex metaphor. You know, in medieval times, ‘rigour’ 
evoked ideas of absolute perfection, a rigid universe in keeping with the 
ideal scholastic thesis—book, that is—as an embodiment of Christ as the 
incarnation of truth. I’m not, of course, suggesting this is the kind of rigour to 
which your research aspires, but12—
David Rooksby: And then there’s rigor mortis.
[The barcamp laughs]
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 So either ‘perfection’ or ‘death’. Nice one, Krista. I thought you said you 
weren’t a very good comedian.
Allison Jones: And this is funny to you? Wasn’t it Aristotle who said, ‘There’s no knowledge 
of things which are in a state of flux’?13
Krista Wiseman: Actually, rigor mortis is, well—how to express this? It probably sounds 
strange, but I’m wondering if there’s a way to limber up your research 
practice? Something like an unworking or loosening of its affective relations in 
the spirit of dialogic exchange as dynamic.
Marsha Bradfield: Krista, I’m not really sure what you mean, but I’m interested in where this 
is headed. On a practical note, and assuming that our research does need 
‘limbering up’, what did you have in mind?
Krista Wiseman: Well, to begin with, when it comes to the definitions or understandings 
of dialogic art reached in this barcamp, couldn’t they come together into 
something closer to Massumi’s sense of affect? As a problematic field—or a 
complex of relations—instead of a solution? And this tracks back to Cassy’s 
insistence on reframing the question, ‘What is dialogic art?’ into the problem/
statement, ‘Dialogic art is’—and we all have to fill in the blank or solve for ‘x’ 
to focus our discussion. But the problem with this kind of solution-oriented 
thinking is that it can, well, reify dialogic art in ways that stifle its dialogic 
disposition as an ongoing process of becoming. 
Allison Jones: Personally, I thought Cassy’s suggestion was a good one. Bear in mind, Krista, 
that when it comes to dialogic art coalescing as a complex of relations, 
Marsha’s and my research is already enmeshed in plural contexts and these 
have a bearing on the development of our investigation. So there’s the 
complex of contemporary art but, in some ways, and even more immediately, 
there’s the institution of art research.
You know, Hillary’s and Marsha’s reflections on dialogic epistemology 
made me think of Christopher Frayling’s cardinal point about art and 
research. Frayling reckons that research is best understood as communicable 
knowledge.14  So whereas art is open to multiple interpretations, research by 
contrast needs a question, aims, objectives and methods. Research outcomes 
have to insist on a particular and cohesive meaning and—
David Rooksby: Rigour.
Allison Jones: Well, there needs to be a degree of consensus about what the research 
means to the field in which it aims to contribute. This agreement is largely 
antithetical to art, placing art research in a bind—maybe even a double bind 
as art on the one hand and research on the other.
David Rooksby: So neither fish nor fowl.
Cassy Appadurai: For the record, I didn’t mean to be authoritarian—or monological—when I 
suggested we should be solving for ‘x’, Krista. It was to check the barcamp’s 
progress as a format for exploring dialogic art.
Krista Wiseman: ‘Check’ as in ‘evaluate’? Or ‘check’ as in ‘arrest’? I didn’t say you were being 
authoritarian, Cassy. But there’s something very disconcerting about reifying 
dialogic art for the sake of manageable exposition.
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Allison Jones: And you deem this problematic?
Krista Wiseman: Yes, and I meditating on how to approach this. You know, Félix Guattari’s 
transversal approach may be helpful. His theory of affective politics is 
galvanising socially engaged practice and art as activism by conceptualising 
this practice in an expanded sense—transversally—across micropolitics 
and macropolitics. There is growing interest in Guattari’s non-systematic 
methods—his collaborative and participatory ways of working.15
Sooo—very briefly—if macropolitics is the province of largely fixed, 
stratified realities that are mapped by dominant cartographies in social 
contexts, we can understand micropolitics, by contrast, as concerned with 
the flows of connections and desires that exceed macropolitical systems 
as broadly stable articulations. So the transformation of sensibilities across 
registers of affect, often occurring through relations and processes unfolding 
below the level of perception—that’s what preoccupies the micropolitical.16
Allison Jones: Below perception?
Krista Wiseman: Right. Brilliant, isn’t it? Much of Guattari’s militant-psychotherapy looks 
at micropolitical forms of subjectivation—so, becoming subject—and 
how this occurs through macropolitical structuring.17 Guattari examines 
the territorialising effects of micropolitical forces acting in the service of 
macropolitical ones on this process. I find him especially useful for speculating 
about ways in which territorialisation might be resisted as subjects recognise, 
or become conscious of, how they’re internalising and reproducing 
hegemonic orders, such as patriarchy and chauvinism. It’s this resistance—
this possibility of resisting—that I’d like to discuss here and how this might 
open up avenues for recomposing Allison’s and Marsha’s research.
Sooo—let me preface this by saying it’s difficult to talk about these 
things and I accept in advance that we may not get very far. But it seems to 
me that your research, Allison and Marsha—your very approach to dialogic 
art—indicates that you’ve been territorialised by the macropolitics of the 
formalised—read: academic research. It’s palpable in your anxiety about the 
concrete outcomes that you feel the research must generate to qualify as 
such. And of course—of course—this is reasonable. But the more interesting 
question for me is how this anxiety may be influencing the micropolitics in the 
sites of your research, including this barcamp. So I’d like to discuss how this 
anxiety is transmuted in subtle and not-so-subtle ways that shape things—like 
your management of our discussion.
Marsha Bradfield: Our management of the discussion?
Allison Jones: Our anxiety?
Krista Wiseman: Right. As I said, these are tricky things to surface and recompose. I can 
only really speak for myself, but I think we’ve all noticed the way you’ve 
nudged our discussion in certain directions and not others—and this is to 
be expected. As Allison has reminded us several times today, the barcamp 
is a site for your research. You have a vested interest in ensuring that what’s 
realised here is relevant to your project overall. But you’ve got to know the 
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meaning and significance—either as fodder for your study or our shared 
understanding—isn’t the only thing being forged through our exchange. 
Our subjectivation is also at stake, and this comes onto the ethico-aesthetic 
production of our intersubjectivitity.
Of course, we wouldn’t be exchanging much in the absence of affecting 
or being affected by each other, and it’s not surprising that some voices are 
dominating others—after all, the barcamp is a polyphonic form. But it’s also 
an affective one. Our verbal utterances ripple with affect and so, too, do our 
nonverbal or bodily ones. The tension we hold in our faces, shoulders and 
arms as we concentrate—
Marsha Bradfield: But also the nods and encouraging smiles. I’ve found these very supportive. 
Isn’t this also an indication of us being in dialogue?
Krista Wiseman: As I’ve said, affect is a difficult thing to surface and discuss, and especially 
when it comes to things like anxiety, which I sense is circulating here.
Marsha Bradfield: Well, isn’t this understandable? The stakes of our research are high—research 
into dialogic art is important, in our view—
Allison Jones: Urgent!
Marsha Bradfield: As you’ve said, Krista, affect is as messy as it traffics intersubjective exchange. 
But I’m just wondering if, in addition to discussing our anxiety, we couldn’t 
also acknowledge our commitment to understanding dialogue as a way of 
recomposing subjectivation and by extension subjectivity and—
Krista Wiseman: I can, well, I hope you won’t take this the wrong way but I can sense your 
anxiety about the outcomes of this research admixing into the affective 
registers of this discussion. I can feel it in my body as a kind of in-bracing 
as we put dialogic art through the wringer of research—as we return, for 
example, to the problem-statement, ‘Dialogic art is’, etcetera. It’s starting to 
feel a bit forced—strained.
Cassy Appadurai: That strikes me as a strange thing for a self-proclaimed activist to say. Practice 
is always subject to strain, forces and other kinds of constr—
Krista Wiseman: Yes, but then again, when it comes to the strain that research places on 
practice, friends of mine who have pursued practice-based PhDs assure me 
there’s room for bidirectional flow and recomposition. The art in art research 
could and should also be territorialising the research.
David Rooksby: Ding ding.
Brian Updike: Dead right about that. This kind of transmutation is at stake in the very 
institution of research as a self-critical activity. One doesn’t need to be a 
trained researcher to know that research takes up its terms and conditions 
and attempts to configure them in ways that support the project at hand, 
so—
Krista Wiseman: But then isn’t this all the more reason for art research to resist being 
absorbed into academic research and insist on a different kind of relation 
instead—a relation based on the idea that what art research pursues is 
as much an artistic approach to research as it is art that is research. Most 
important of all, this research should serve the field of art.18
 301    300
Allison Jones: But don’t you think that by conducting our research through this barcamp, 
we’re actually exploring this! 
John Johnson: Okay, look, I’m going to  try and tack the discussion in a different direction 
because, well—right. What you’re saying, Krista, is a good reminder that 
the research generated through this barcamp is specific to this context. This 
means that whatever outcomes we eventuate here—analytical conclusions, 
practical techniques, artistic forms—they’ll need to be reconfigured if they’re 
to be applied somewhere else.
Krista Wiseman: I’m saying this barcamp is a research site, dialogue is the form of this 
investigation and this dialogue is teaming with micropolitics that are laced 
with affect. These affects sculpt how we feel—how we experience today—and 
this impacts the understandings that we eventuate.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, I would certainly concur that a good reason for conducting this 
research through dialogue is to investigate dialogue’s dialogueness in all its 
complexity, and this includes the affective register dispersed across the social 
and material aspects of its intersubjective exchange.
Allison Jones: I can take that on board, but what Krista’s said does, indeed, have interesting 
consequences for the micropolitics of this barcamp. Really, really, really 
interesting consequences. I mean—
Krista Wiseman: You’re taking this personally.
Allison Jones: How else could I take it when you’ve referenced my anxiety? I’ve witnessed 
the reification of affect like this before, how it’s made unequivocal.19 It’s bad 
theatre unless very, very skillfully handled. Oh, it starts off innocently enough. 
Someone will pluck up the courage to say that they feel someone else—or 
some other body—has affected them badly, and then there’s a sudden change 
in atmosphere. Dialogue shuts down or gets diverted as the interlocutors 
work out their personal differences. Earlier, you spoke about affect as a 
transition, likening it to a link in the chain of communication. Well, it can also 
be a break in the chain—affect can decouple subjects from each other in a 
productive relation and actually become destructive. It’s a very crafty form of 
bullying, Krista.
Krista Wiseman: Bullying? Seriously?
Allison Jones: Well, you tell me how I can possibly respond to what you’ve been saying. That 
I didn’t actually make you and others here feel anxious about my research, 
despite feeling this way myself? When affect gets reified like this, it almost 
always favours the affected whilst discriminating against the body doing the 
affecting—the affectee. It’s fascist!
David Rooksby: Ouch!
Chris Clark: That’s not true, is it?
David Rooksby: Pots and kettles. Who is the ‘affected’ and who is the ‘affectee’ here—now? 
Didn’t a switch just happen? Wasn’t Allison the ‘affectee’ and now she is the 
‘affected’? Ding ding.
Marsha Bradfield: Perhaps we could all take a deep breath. I think, Krista, that what Allie 
is trying to say is that both your reflections on affect and the way you’ve 
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brought them to bear on our discussion strike at the heart of dialogue and 
just how charged—how personal—its dialogueness can be. For sure, affect 
seriously sensitises us to a register of intersubjective exchange and—
Anne Lang: I’m interrupting, I know, but what you’re saying, Marsha, makes me think that 
intonation is ripe with affect. The point is, you know, that dialogic art needs to 
pay special attention to the intonation of the utterances, because isn’t it here 
that we can, sort of, sense what cannot be expressed outright?
Shadworth Dyson: Precisely!
Marsha Bradfield: But becoming hypersensitive to the micropolitics of a dialogue can also 
result in the interlocutors becoming self-conscious to a fault. And this can 
make ‘affective awareness’, which is something that should be empowering 
and enlightening, just the reverse when it shuts down our intersubjective 
exchange.
David Rooksby: Krista, you used to be a comedian. How about a joke to break the tension?
Allison Jones: Not funny.
Maeve Cutty: Allison, luv, here’s a tissue.
Krista Wiseman: I’m confused, Allison, but will you settle for an apology? I wanted to say 
something about art research in general and about the affective in dialogic 
art in particular, and these things seemed to come together so clearly in your 
relationship to the research—your research positionality. I just thought—well, 
I just thought that discussing this might be revealing—a way of coaxing affect, 
which is something that is often very difficult to surface, into view. Do you see 
what I was trying to demonstrate?
Allison Jones: Oh, it was very effective in demonstrating the power of affect.
Krista Wiseman: I don’t really know where to go from here. Maybe we should move on to the 
next presentation. David?
David Rooksby: Seriously?
John Johnson: Okay, fair enough. This might not be the best time, Krista, to transition, as 
there’s still stuff for us to work out. Why don’t we change tack? Why don’t 
you try approaching affect in dialogic art, as our discussion seems to have 
moved away from this and in—
Krista Wiseman: Right, brilliant. Okay. Sooo—what I’ve said about the affective aspect of this 
barcamp applies equally to the intersubjective exchange in dialogic art. But 
I’m concerned that, by saying more about this, Allison or Marsha or someone 
else may think that I’m just moving on for the sake of moving on.
Allison Jones: Move on, Krista.
Krista Wiseman: Clearly, you’re upset, Allie. Step outside?
Allison Jones: What on earth does that mean?
Marsha Bradfield: We should move on.
Maeve Cutty: It’s an impossible situation, isn’t it? Krista, I wonder if you’re overthinking it, 
at this point. I suggest we do move on.
Krista Wiseman: Right, well, if that’s the consensus, then that’s exactly—exactly what I’ll do.
Christian Wiseman: Krista, don’t be that way.
 305    304
David Rooksby: How about a couple of deep breaths. One—in and out. Two—in and out. 
Aaand, three—in and out.
Maeve Cutty: Tissue, Krista?
Krista Wiseman: No! I mean, no. No, thank you. I’m fine. Let’s just get back to Guattari. Sooo—
Guattari examines Bakhtin’s concern with the aesthetics of enunciation, the 
utterance’s sensuous expression and its reception. And he begins with the 
idea of affect being sticky. It attaches itself to someone or something and 
won’t let go.20
David Rooksby: Like gum in hair—it gets in so easily but it’s a bugger to get out.
Krista Wiseman: Something like that. Sooo—Guattari says the affect of an utterance sticks 
just as effectively to the addresser as it does to the addressee and, in so 
doing, it overcomes ‘the enunciative dichotomy between speaker and 
listener’,21 to which I would add subject and object. So affect is a very personal 
transference. But then again, it’s also in some ways what Guattari calls pre-
personal—occurring before the circumscription of identities.22 Sooo—we 
might think of affect as something like contagion; it’s often impossible to find 
the source.
Allison Jones: But not always.
Krista Wiseman: No, Allison, not always. But if we think back to what I was saying earlier 
about cause and effect, when it comes to affect, we have to move beyond 
conceptualising experience in such linear terms and think in more liminal 
ones. Experience is much more complex. It’s shot through with all kinds of 
associations, memories, fears, joys and so on and so forth that are activated 
by something or23—
Allison Jones: Someone.
Krista Wiseman: Yes, Allison, or someone. I get the point. I thought we were moving on.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, yes, hmmm—another challenge to thinking about affect is that 
despite being spread through language, through things like intonation, it’s 
actually non-discursive—which is to say that it resists reification. The moment 
one attempts to isolate an affect, it slips its qualitative dimension24 and what 
is displaced in the process is its significance as an eventful composition.
Krista Wiseman: I know that a line of thinking Guattari develops through Bakhtin’s train of 
thought is that, when it comes to understanding affect, it’s the ‘cut’ or the 
‘gap’ that counts. These things refer to the process of turning an association 
or a reference around on itself. This not only gives rise to a feeling—a sensory 
affect—but also an active way of being. I like to think of this as a kind of 
consciousness or awareness, although Guattari terms it a ‘problematic 
effect’.25
John Johnson: Okay, problematic in what way, Krista?
David Rooksby: I know, I know—that it causes problems! If this contribution is any indication, I 
heartedly agree. 
Krista Wiseman: No, David. It’s not that it causes me problems—and here I thought I was 
the failed comedian in the room. I take ‘problematic’ here to mean that it 
problematises our feelings as absolute or definitive and, as a result, helps us 
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to recognise that they could, and perhaps should, be different. I should also 
say that, for Guattari, recognising this—I mean really recognising this—can 
impel the subject to imagine and begin composing other ways of being. This is 
that it has the potential to catalyse ‘deterritorialisation’.26 How to put it—the 
unhinging of oneself from, or at least a greater awareness of, oppression, and 
macropolitical oppression, in particular.
But then again, I think we can understand Guattari’s ‘problematic effect’ 
in a second sense. Sooo—this recognition might also impel us to imagine 
other micropolitical ways of being by enabling us to grasp that an experience 
could be and often is perceived differently. Anyway, I’m not sure this is the 
best time to explore this.
David Rooksby: Because?
Krista Wiseman: I’d rather not say.
David Rooksby: Come on, you can’t say something like, ‘I’m not sure this is the best time to 
explore this’, and then not at least explain why.
Krista Wiseman: Right. Well, it gets into a multi-centred understanding or distributed 
experience of something. How I perceive something might not be the way 
you do, and vice versa. Or, to draw this towards Guattari’s thinking about the 
ways in which subjectivity is composed and recomposed, subjectivation is 
variable—heterogeneous.27
Take group work as a case in point. Its affective dimensions are not 
experienced in the same way by all those involved, which can complicate the 
subjects’ coming together and becoming together, if you see what I mean. It’s 
really about developing an awareness that experience can be variously, well, 
experienced.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, I would suggest there is a second way of thinking about the potency 
of the utterance’s affect, in terms of a kind of transmission or transition, 
which may well connect to what Marsha earlier referred to as a ‘charge’, or 
at least a ‘charging’ of the dialogueness of dialogue—as in the intensification 
experienced by the embodied subject.28
Krista Wiseman: Massumi names this ‘a shock’.29
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, ‘shock’ is a little misleading, don’t you think, Krista? These 
intensifications can reverberate  through registers of affect, so they don’t 
always tally with what is consciously registered—although they can be 
deeply felt, as we’ve seen here today. And, in some ways, their stealth makes 
them all the more indispensible for understanding our individual and shared 
becoming in social events like this barcamp, where multi-current tributaries 
fed by pluralised territorialisations all vie for our affective response whilst at 
the same time shaping us—our experience—below our radar, as it were.
Maeve Cutty: Charges? Shocks? How can something be a charge or a shock if one doesn’t 
notice it? And can’t affect be spread in other wa—?
Krista Wiseman: Sooo—let me give you an example of a subtle instance of an affective shock, 
Maeve. Consider the slight change in my focus as I note David texting on his 
mobile phone. This perceptual shift affects a difference in my experience and 
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possibly David’s, as well—and yours, too. Massumi understands microshocks 
like these as moving us between ‘consistencies’. ‘Consistency’, in his view, is 
the texture of every drop of experience.30 Microshocks transition us between 
different consistencies of experience. But then again, Guattari actually comes 
closer to surfacing the violence of affects, when—
David Rooksby: Violence?
Krista Wiseman: Affect is violent—symbolically violent—to the extent that it marks a 
differential that is significant enough to impel a body into another state 
distinguished by a different consistency of experience. It seems so long ago 
that Clark proposed the ‘dialogic bonus’ as a way of describing a change—a 
difference—that results through ‘the dialogic’s’ management of dialogue. 
When it comes to affect in dialogic art, I sense this bonus results from bodies 
being together in a productive relation. In other words, dialogic art isn’t just 
about the material relations of dialogue—between utterances, that is. It’s also 
about the bodily ones—among interlocutors.
Phil Hind: Krista, I have some reservations about the way you’re using ‘symbolic 
violence’. ‘Symbolic violence’, on Bourdieu’s account, refers to actions that 
are injurious—subtly injurious, as they shore up power relations through soft 
forms of control that are socially and culturally embedded, often in the form 
of rituals.31
Allison Jones: But isn’t that exactly what happened when Krista accused me of infecting the 
barcamp with my anxiety and controlling our discussion? Isn’t this fascist?
Chris Clark: Come on ladies. Take it outside, will you?
Marsha Bradfield: Clark, please. Allie—
Krista Wiseman: No, Allison is right. Affect is messy, in part because it’s not something that we 
can really control.
David Rooksby: Now you’re capitulating because Allison has squeezed out a tear or two. With 
all due respect, Allison, you’re overreacting.
KK Lin: David! You’re being rude to our host!
David Rooksby: In which case, we’re her guests so—ding ding!
Krista Wiseman: I guess it was a mistake to approach affect the way I did. I don’t really think 
affective politics are fascistic any more than I think affect is a straightforward 
process of stimulus and response. I mean, there is also thought involved—we 
have some control over how we choose to interpret and respond  to affect.32 
And, on that note, I think it’s time to turn over to David. This contribution 
hasn’t developed quite as I’d hoped.
David Rooksby: Hi-ho.
John Johnson: Well, what had you hoped for, Krista?
Krista Wiseman: Well, I assumed that dialogic art is a practice that, in keeping with its general 
concern with the dialogueness of dialogues, would take seriously and engage 
with the affective registers organising its intersubjective exchange. I also 
assumed this was something that we might be able to talk about in a more 
open and self-aware way.
Tina Wiseman: Krista!
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John Johnson: Okay but, look, don’t you think we’ve all become acutely aware of these 
registers in this barcamp? Clearly, what’s happened here has reified affect 
as something that’s intrinsic to this exchange as both personal and shared 
experience.
Krista Wiseman: It’s a good point and to bring closure to this discussion, I’d like to return 
to Marsha’s concern that becoming hypersensitive to the mircopolitics of 
dialogue can result in self-consciousness to a fault. I can see this. But then 
again, I’d like to think this sensitivity could make the practitioner as tough 
as it does considerate. Yes, affect is deeply personal, but it also names a 
complex of ethical, aesthetic, emotional and volitional dynamics that are pre-
personal. I’m not sure I’m expressing this as well as I might do, but it’s really 
about affect being both personal and not personal. Again, I can only speak 
for myself, but coming to terms with this tension has made me both more 
aware and more resilient. It’s helped me to appreciate that my feelings are 
important and how I experience art and other kinds of practice does impact 
my contribution and experience. But it’s also helped me to appreciate that, 
then again, the same holds true for the other subjects, too. As Maurizio 
Lazzarato makes the point with reference to Guattari’s reading of Bakhtin, 
intersubjective space—dialogical space—is sui generis ‘public space’ that is 
produced through these relations.33 John was right to say that an awareness of 
affect keys into the interplay between the individual and the shared, and for 
me surfacing and acknowledging this is incredibly important—second only to 
the fact that, when it comes to affective relations, they’re reciprocal without 
being symmetrical.
Cassy Appadurai: I think this is also really, really important. We’ve been talking about reciprocity 
like it’s an equitable exchange, but this is incredibly reductive. Equitable how? 
It’s not always equitable, is it?
Krista Wiseman: No, it’s not. And I’m hoping this might be something that dialogic art takes 
up and explores. Sooo—the ways in which reciprocity operates among 
individuals, among individuals and groups, among groups and other 
compositions of intersubjective exchange, all as reciprocal without being 
symmetrical.
Ella Stone: And is this something you’d be interested in researching, would it not? 
Reflecting on your tacit knowledge of affective politics and making it 
accessible to others? I ask because Brian and I often work with emerging 
collaborations, cooperations, collectives and other formations. Whilst each 
one needs to evolve its own modes of self-organisation, there is actually very 
little guidance available on the microplitical dimensions of collaborative art 
practice. As you know, we’ve started this publication, Assume the Position, 
and if there’s interest in this barcamp in developing some shared thinking 
and writing around affect in shared working processes, we could publish it—
perhaps even grow the project into a hardcopy publication, something like a 
manual of sorts.
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David Rooksby: I can see the book jacket now: Affect and Collaborative Art Practice for 
Dummies.
Marsha Bradfield: I think Allison and I might be interested in this, too, Ella. Thanks for the 
constructive suggestion. 
Allison Jones: Well, this is something we’ll need to converse about. 
Marsha Bradfield: I know I’m intrigued by the prospect of a collaboratively authored manual by 
practitioners for practitioners of collaborative art practice.
David Rooksby: Then you guys should talk. Marsha, the time now is 4:20.
Marsha Bradfield: David, we’ll load your slides quickly, if you’re ready to go. Thank you, Krista. I 
know this wasn’t an easy contribution but I think it was productive, perhaps 
even because it was uncomfortable. Could we all give Krista a round of 
applause?
[Barcamp claps.]
________________
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Fig. 9.0
Marsha Bradfield: David, I’ve set the timer for thirty minutes.
David Rooksby: And the slides are good to go? Great. So why am I here today? Well, once 
upon a time I went to art school, but today I work in the creative industries—
advertising, actually. And Tommy and I saw this as an opportunity to learn 
about dialogic art and suggest some directions for branding it. So Tommy, 
bless him, has been hard at work. While we’ve been busy dialoguing with you 
lot, he’s been innovating some promotional material on his laptop. 
Marsha Bradfield:  Promotional material? 
David Rooskby:  Yeah. Think of Tommy’s and my barcamp session as a mini focus group. I’ll 
pitch three campaigns and we can talk about how they capture the essence—
the heart—of dialogic art, so what sets this art apart, making it different.
John Johnson: Seriously?
David Rooksby: Sure, because here’s the thing: We’ve spoken a lot today about dialogue in 
contemporary art, and especially dialogue as intersubjective exchange, and 
how dialogic art is harnessing a wider range of dialogic activity, right? It’s like 
Hillary said: When theories like Bohm’s concentrate on dialogue as happening 
at a scheduled time, in a designated space between predetermined 
participants, they overlook all the other kinds of dialogue that happen—not 
to mention all unexpected forms of value they generate. Hillary gave the 
example of informal education through dialogue occurring on the fringes of 
formal study, as a way of adding value to the learner’s experience, right? This 
is only one example, of course. So I’ve been thinking about dialogic art as a 
‘dialogue of dialogues’ and—
Cassy Appadurai: Can we assume this is your definition of dialogic art? 
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David Rooksby:  You want a sound bite for the record? What about something like this:  
Dialogic art happens through a ‘dialogue of dialogues’, with this art being 
spread across relations and made through them. This art is also about 
valuing its own production by innovating schemes for representing the 
‘dialogic bonus’. So, highlighting, zooming in on and drawing out dialogic art’s 
productive relations as well as the bounty—all the value—they produce. And 
it’s about helping others to better appreciate what they might otherwise take 
for granted by finding ways of showing what happens behind the scenes, 
under the surface—‘back house’. Are you with me? 
Now we’ve talked about practice-based research on dialogic art generating 
meaning, knowledge and apprehensions that might contribute to the greater 
good, right? The question that springs to my mind is how to get these things 
shared. The simple answer is to think across contexts. Why reinvent the wheel 
when there is much to gain from applying the insights achieved in dialogic 
art to, say, informal education, and vice versa? Are you still with me? Now 
way, way back this morning, Allison spoke about art being extra-disciplinary 
because it adopts and adapts resources from other fields. Well, shouldn’t this 
cut both ways? What’s good for the goose is good for the gander? 
Marsha Bradfield:  I’m not quite sure I follow? 
David Rooksby:  Think of my campaigns as returning dialogic art to its roots in popular culture. 
They’re a chance for this art to give back—part of what we call in the industry 
its ‘bigger big’, going back to its roots as it lends itself to the service of the 
world.
Clark Chris: Are you rationalising the intrumentalisation of dialogic art?
David Rooksby: I’m celebrating its potential contribution beyond the ‘dominant art world’. 
Tommy and I are really excited about dialogic art as a mode of production for 
creating value—rich values but many of them difficult to catch and quantify 
because they’re so, what’s the word, ‘emedded’. We can think about dialogue 
in terms of so-called ‘soft skills’—like emotional intelligence developed 
through affective sensitivities and social graces that we all achieve through 
honing what I think Shadworth earlier described as ‘a feel for the game’. 
But ‘soft-skill value’ is only one type, of course. As a product for generating 
diverse values through hyper-distributed production, dialogic art is a prime 
model for entrepreneurialism as a creative practice that—   
Clark Chris: Is this a joke? Do you think you’re being funny?
David Rooksby: Does it look like I’m laughing here? Seth Godin, the American business guru, 
advises entrepreneurs to imagine themselves as artists, to think of their 
business as a creative practice.1 Daniel Pink says the MFA is the new MBA. 
We need artists in business to innovate and identify new forms of value.2 
About six months ago, The New York Times ran a four-page ad that talked 
about ‘curator’ being the word of the century.3 Curators are curating business 
information and artifacts.4 I can see real benefit in dialogic art as a toolbox for 
self-managing and enriching entrepreneurial activity in a big way.
Clark Chris: Bloody hell!
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David Rooksby: Like you said, Clark, and this is a quote, dialogic art is a way of ‘better 
managing and extracting value from all the dialogues that cinch together 
[your] art practice’.
Clark Chris: But—
David Rooksby: Well, I couldn’t agree more, but why should you have all the fun—and 
benefit? Why shouldn’t others profit, too?
Clark Chris: Ah. It’s an ironic display—you’re performance artists. Very convincing—bravo!
David Rooksby: Why is it so hard for you to accept that I’m sincerely interested in dialogic art?
Clark Chris: Because if you are, in fact, here to profiteer, it’s a flagrant instance of 
instrumentalisation that flies in the face of art’s long history of critiquing 
capitalist and bourgeois society. Artists have dedicated their careers to 
advocating for personal freedom and individual fulfillment and demanding 
social justice—the redistribution of wealth, environmental accountability, 
better working conditions. But neo-management has changed all that by co-
opting this critique in the name of profit—exploitation.5 Yes, they’ve adopted 
art-world practices—you’ve adopted these practices—and—
David Rooksby: And by ‘art-world practices’, you mean—?
Clark Chris: You’re taking the piss. Open your eyes, David! Art has been co-opted by the 
service economy. Today we’re all artists and entertainers, all entrepreneurs, 
all self-styled information managers—artists and non-artists, alike. We’re all 
delivering some kind of ‘unique service’, but in return for what? It’s very much 
a case of being careful what you wish for—and what you work for. What’s 
come to be called ‘artist critique’6 advocated for more flexible working hours 
in the name of greater individual freedom—and we got them. It’s called 
precarious labour. Today, most work in the arts is unpaid, and it’s a business 
model that’s being implemented writ large. Don’t tell me that Tommy here is 
interning for free—Tommy, what’s he paying you?7
David Rooksby: You don’t have to answer that, Tommy. It’s none of Clark’s business.
John Johnson: Okay, look, let’s just—
Clark Chris: None of my business! You’ve got a lot of nerve. You’re here, David, to co-
opt it for the benefit of business—to poach all our creative production. It’s 
revolting, really. Marsha and Allison, did you know about this?
Marsha Bradfield: No. But this barcamp is an open event; anyone can attend. So—
David Rooksby: Getting back to dialogic art. In the time remaining, I want to introduce the 
three campaigns, one after the other. Keep in mind these ideas are still rough. 
But we’re excited about the direction they could take dialogic art in by making 
it more mainstream—an approach with popular appeal, for marketing just 
about anything, really.
Clark Chris: Really! Marsha and Allison—all of you! You’re actually going to tolerate this 
expropriation? It’s bloody offensive!
David Rooksby: Don’t want to participate? Go back to the pub, Clark. Have a drink on 
me—have two. Tommy will text you when it’s time for Maeve’s demo on 
authorship.
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Clark Chris: Well, are you at least paying us? Not even some trivial coupon? Twenty quid’s 
worth of Sainsbury’s or an iTunes voucher?
David Rooksby: Look, mate, I came here today to answer the question, ‘What is dialogic art?’, 
just like everyone else, and brainstorm ways of taking it to the next level. I 
offered feedback on your PechaKucha—in fact, all the presentations. Now I’m 
just asking for the same in return.
Clark Chris: Don’t you dare ring your annoying reciprocity bell, David. Nope. I’ve had 
enough.
Marsha Bradfield: Clark, don’t get up. Can’t we—
David Rooksby: Let him go. It’s his prerogative. Bloody artists.
Marsha Bradfield: David, please!
David Rooksby: Like you said, Marsha, I have as much right to be here as anyone else. I’m as 
much a part of this barcamp as Clark is.
Clark Chris: Blimey, David. Step off!
Marsha Bradfield: Clark, I understand your concern, but—
David Rooksby: But you’re not actually going to censor my campaigns because of a difference 
in opinion about the value of dialogic art, because that wouldn’t be very 
dialogic—would it? In fact, wouldn’t it exemplify the ‘monological drive’ that 
Shadworth described as counter-dialogic? The drive to silence other voices? 
Diverse points of view? I believe the word is ‘dissent’—dissenting voices. I 
didn’t picture you as the type that would squelch dissenting voices, Marsha. 
Where’s your appetite for agonism? If anything you should be thanking me 
for providing a different perspective on dialogic art!
[Notable silence.]
Look, just hear me out, okay? That’s all I’m asking. I think you’ll be surprised 
by what your thinking about dialogic art has inspired! Remember Marsha’s 
interest in evolving this kind of art as a—let’s see if I can find the exact quote 
in my notes. Right, here it is—a collaborative approach to art making that, ‘in 
contrast to collaborative models privileging collective authorship, highlights 
the contributions of individual interlocutors by using their subjective 
utterances to structure the work’. Well, consider our campaigns a practical 
application of your contributions!  
[The door slams.]
Tommy, let’s have the first slide, please. (Fig. 9.1) So, this campaign was 
inspired by Ella’s and Brian’s contributions. We’ve come up with the strap line, 
‘Putting the “I” into “TEAM”!’ We’re keying into the idea that, in contrast to 
collective authorship, which denies individual expression, dialogic art opts 
for a more—what’s the word that’s been bandied about? Tommy? Right—
‘polyphonic’. It opts for a more polyphonic take , where individual voices 
sound in dynamic relation to each other. It’s about promoting dialogic art as a 
way of being polyphonic.
Marsha Bradfield: Okay . . .
David Rooksby: Well isn’t it? And isn’t it it really about belonging, being part of something 
through co-authoring dialogic forms, like this barcamp, right? 
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Phil Hind: Yes, quite—I mean, actually, it’s quite a good point. We’ve been developing 
a shared repertoire of understanding in our discussion today; how to work 
with others to evolve collaborative and participatory practices that respond 
to the terms of a commonly held context; and how to have your voice and 
contribution acknowledged and included and made meaningful as and 
through dialogic exchange. What we’ve been discussing, essentially, are 
all the criteria for membership in a community of sorts. Yes, dialogue as 
community is quite an interesting idea. 
David Rooksby: Nicely said, Phil. So ‘Putting the “I” into “TEAM”’ is our first idea for an ad 
campaign. Thoughts on our visuals? Can you see how this gets at what Phil 
was just saying? No? 
[Notable silence.]
Well, our second one, and we haven’t yet worked up any visuals for 
this, but it takes its cues from Shad’s was saying about intonation and Krista’s 
reflections on affect. This campaign trades on what we’ve been referring to as 
the ‘nonverbal register of intersubjective exchange’ by playing off the classic 
‘John-Marsha’ Snowdrift shortening advert.8
Shadworth Dyson: If I may, David, it’s Shadworth—Shadworth.
David Rooksby: Right, absolutely. Sorry about that, Shad—worth. No offense.
Shadworth Dyson:  None taken. 
David Rooksby:  Tommy found the original commercial on YouTube. It’s less than a minute 
long, so I thought it would be fun to watch it together. Tommy, roll the video. 
(Fig. 9.2-9.4)
‘Jo-hn.’
‘Marsha.’
‘John!’
‘Marsha!!’
‘John . . .’
‘John . . .’
‘Snowdrift.’
‘Snowdrift?’
‘Snowdrift.’
‘John.’
‘Marsha.’
‘Jo-hn.’
‘Marsha!!!’
‘John.’
‘Snowdrift?’
‘Snowdrift.’
‘Mar-sha!’
‘John!’
‘Marsh-a . . .’
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John Johnson: Marsha!
Marsha Bradfield: John?
David Rooksby: Catchy, isn’t it! So for the remake—reiterations, actually, as we’ll do a series—
we’ll present scenarios where characters—what Shadworth likes to call 
‘interlocutors’—deliver services to each other through dialogues. But instead 
of the cake, as in the Snowdrift promo, imagine a backrub or childcare or life 
insurance—the possibilities are endless! But rest assured, dialogic art would 
have the last word. Instead of ‘Snowdrift’ being the final utterance, it would 
be ‘Dialogic Art’. Can you see where we’re going with this? I mean this is 
golden product. By drawing out the intonation in a really simple dialogue, we 
can suggest a world rich in reciprocity. So, in this campaign we’re moving from 
the general idea of dialogic art tapping into existence as dialogic into dialogic 
art as a lifestyle culture that’s detailed through bespoke services. That’s hot!
Marsha Bradfield: Lifestyle culture?
David Rooksby: Sure. This is where I was going before Clark—well, let’s just say I got 
distracted. But this is what I meant by returning dialogic art to its roots in 
popular culture, giving dialogic art a crack at a ‘bigger big’. Like I said, why 
limit the value of the dialogic to, well, art?! Why not use Clark’s analytic 
categories to generate dialogic value in other products and services?
Okay, so our final campaign markets ways of living together, being 
together and growing together in, for instance, communal housing as a 
combination of shared and individual space. The tag line is, ‘Apart, we are 
together’. (Fig. 9.5) The idea is inspired by the whole idea of dialogue as 
interdependence. I think it was Shadworth who talked about a relationship 
between distinct consciousnesses that come together in a communion but 
aren’t themselves smushed together, whilst what they produce together 
is shared—it’s something they hold in common. Right? So here, in this 
campaign, it’s about applying the dialogic disposition to communal housing—
residential space that combines private and common areas. Our campaign 
deploys dialogic art to contour these spaces by valuing the movement 
between them. It’s about celebrating this passage across thresholds. It’s 
about developing an awareness of how we compose community—a way 
of making something that we might otherwise take for granted more 
interesting—more meaningful. So what it means to be in community and 
cherish it. We see real promise in dialogic art as a way of rebranding the 
whole notion of neighbourhoods with the word ‘becoming’. ‘Apart, we are 
together’ in our hopes, our fears and our desires. Can you see where we’re 
going with this? 
So what do you think? Pretty creative stuff, right? 
[Notable silence.]
Is this the sound of thinking, or . . . We’re dying for your feedback.
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Phil Hind: Well I can’t help thinking that your campaigns highlight the significance of 
dialogic art as what is called a ‘boundary object’ in sociological research. 
The concept was developed by Susan Star and James Griesemer in their case 
study on Berkley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology?9 But—
Hillary Murphy: Ah yes, good connection. I’ve come across boundary objects in pedagogical 
theory—Etienne Wenger’s work on communities of interest and communities 
of practice. Here a boundary object is a threshold amongst community 
members.10
Allison Jones: If I may say something about how they’re being applied to art research, 
researchers in the California collective Sponge have also used this concept 
to investigate art practice as it aligns and integrates the efforts of diverse 
practitioners as they create and reshape artworks and creative events through 
negotiation and other forms of engagement.11
Hillary Murphy: Interesting! Boundary objects in Wenger’s theory can be conceptual or 
material. A group or groups of people converge on a particular interest, you 
see, with the boundary object manifesting among them. Wenger gives the 
examples of documents, language, concepts and expressions; it’s through 
shared artifacts like these that the community reifies and organizes it 
interconnections.12 We can even think of this barcamp as an example, par 
excellence!
Marsha Bradfield: Phil, do you want to add to this?
David Rooksby: But the campaigns—
Phil Hind: Well, I would say that when it comes to boundary objects, it’s useful to 
know that Star and Grisemer originally proposed this idea to complicate 
what Actor Network Theory calls ‘translation’. When it comes to realizing 
something—manufacturing, medicine, understandings of dialogic art—the 
actors involved have to commit to the activity. We can map their involvement 
by tracking their enrolment and movement through what sociologist John 
Law calls ‘an obligatory passage point’.13 In the case of today’s barcamp, we 
might think of signing up on the schedule as an instance of this—a declaration 
of involvement. By moving through this point, we—the actors—‘translated’ 
ourselves into the task at hand and this barcamp as a community intent on 
realizing it, which is of course to address the question, ‘What is dialogic art?’
But Star and Grisemer suggest another, more complex way of 
conceptualizing translation. So, instead of looking for a single point of 
passage, they seek out the overlaps—the thresholds, cusps or transitions—
among the spheres of obligation that the actors must negotiate on an 
ongoing basis in their life-work existence. Put another way, boundary objects 
enable us to conceptualize inter-actor relations as an ongoing process of 
negotiation. Star and Grisemer describe this as ‘many-to-many mapping’: 
it pays special attention to what happens after an actor or actors make an 
initial commitment. 14  Many-to-many mapping concentrates on how this 
commitment is sustained and stabilized—so it’s more about an ecology of 
practice than an isolated act, a demonstration of commitment or otherwise. 
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So it makes good sense to think of boundary objects as living amongst 
different worlds simultaneously.15 It’s a bit like a Venn diagram where some 
aspects are shared whilst others generate significance in distinct ways.
Marsha Bradfield: So, in the case of Calle’s Take Care of Yourself, the email would be a boundary 
object?
Phil Hind: Yes, quite, and all the more so because it foregrounds a range of 
interpretations, points of view. The truth is, the email resonates with 
distinct and specific significance for the individual respondents as first-
order interlocutors, as well as those encountering the polyphonic 
artwork as second-order ones. The point about boundary objects is that 
they’re animated by multiple perspectives—no one vantage point holds 
epistemological primacy. This makes them anti-reductionist—at least in 
theory.16
David Rooksby: Nice one, Phil. But if we could get back to the campaigns, please. This is my 
contribution and some feedback would be good—and we’re running out of 
time.
Phil Hind: Yes, yes, of course, David. But just before we do, one final thought: Star and 
Grisemer remark that, as the boundaries of these objects are recursively 
redrawn, the actors must recalibrate their relation to the object and each 
other.17 We might think of Clark’s departure as evidence of this. I expect he 
felt torn between his alliance to this immediate community, which shares this 
barcamp as a boundary object, and the community that shares anti-capitalist 
beliefs, or at least capitalist critique. But I can, of course, only speculate about 
this.
And finally, I should say that, though Star and Grisemer’s theory of 
boundary objects is useful, the truth is that it tends to overemphasise the 
perspectives of those who share the object at the expense of other analytic 
approaches. I think Marsha described the barcamp as a ‘user-generated un-
conference’ in her opening remarks. I would suggest that, as a boundary 
object, it is also user-centred in its attempt to balance the diverse needs 
and ambitions of the community it convenes. Now this is interesting and 
important, to be sure. But boundary objects are invariably shaped by more 
than the perspectives of those who produce and maintain it. Sociologically, 
they are also shaped by all kinds of non-human and other actors and—
David Rooksby: Did you say ‘balance the diverse needs and ambitions of the community that 
a boundary object convenes’? Exactly. So getting back to Tommy’s and my 
needs: about the campaigns—comments, questions, concerns?
[Notable silence.]
Phil Hind: I’m sorry to be so, well, clinical, David, but this silence points to the ways in 
which actors establish obligatory points of passage for each other—either 
intentionally or unintentionally—as they negotiate boundary objects.18
David Rooksby: So this silence is pushback. Nice one.
Anne Lang: You know I just can’t help thinking, David and Tommy, that had the campaigns 
been presented as dialogic artworks, and had you invited our feedback in 
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the spirit of something like art school critique instead of a focus-group-
like scenario, there would have been no issue. But the fact that you were 
forthright enough to pitch them as advertising campaigns . . . well you’re right 
to say that this discursive production has performative effect—
David Rooksby: It’s discrimination, pure and simple.
Marsha Bradfield: I’m sorry you feel that way. In keeping with the barcamp ethos, I think you 
should be able to use your slot however you see fit—assuming that your 
contribution isn’t intentionally injurious to others involved. But by the same 
token, they have the right—we have the right—not to engage. For better or 
for worse, this goes back to our discussion about reciprocal relations being 
mutual but unsymmetrical.
David Rooksby: So that’s it, then.
Tommy Low: Should I pack up our stuff?
David Rooksby: Seriously? Why would we leave when there’s so much free user-generated 
content up for grabs.
Marsha Bradfield: Well, I’m glad you’re staying, David, but that’s awfully cynical—
David Rooksby: And just to show there’re no hard feelings, does anyone have any other 
burning questions or concerns completely unrelated to our presentation 
they’d like to discuss in the time remaining? 
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, we’ve heard quite a bit about the ‘discursive’ today, and Marsha 
made reference to this again just moments ago vis-à-vis the discursive 
production of dialogic art in your pitch, David. Perhaps, Marsha, you could 
offer a few words on how you’re defining this?
Marsha Bradfield: Well, what to say about ‘the discursive’? I suppose it’s one of those elliptical 
words, in that its ubiquity has made it meaningless, emptied of significance. 
Or perhaps it has become ubiquitous owing to its meaninglessness. I often 
sense ‘discursive’ is used as a kind of placeholder. It’s definitely imprecise. 
Well, let me ask you, Shadworth. What do you think of when I say ‘discursive,’ 
from a sociolinguistic point of view, at least?
Shadworth Dyson: ‘Discourse’ comes to mind first and foremost. We might, of course, think 
of Michel Foucault’s sociological sense of ‘the discursive’ in terms of 
conventions—ideas, habits, assumptions, practices, beliefs, etcetera that 
not only structure discourses as bodies of knowledge, such as art discourse. 
These conventions also structure the subjectivities of those who embody 
and reproduce this knowledge through their discursive interaction. Foucault 
speaks, for instance, of the discourse of history as work—labour—that is 
expended on material forms of documentation to produce some kind of 
memory.19 We might well understand both this memory and the discourse 
producing it as boundary objects shared by members of a community who 
purpose this memory to distinct ends. What is for me so intriguing about 
boundary objects is that they point to the non-equivalence of understanding, 
which is to say, understanding that is somehow shared without being co-
extensive.
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Marsha Bradfield: That’s interesting, as it seems connected with the idea of reciprocal relations 
as being mutual without being symmetrical.
Shadworth Dyson: Well, in the case of discourse, and I expect the same holds true for boundary 
objects more generally, this non-equivalence or asymmetry means the 
boundaries are unstable. Developments in art discourse in London, for 
example, may or may not mesh with those in Cape Town, with this creating 
tension as well as evolution in the development of this discourse more 
broadly. There is often terrific concern over where the boundaries of 
discourse fall and who has the authority to police them. Underpinned by 
epistemologies (positivist, constructionist and so on and so forth), discourses 
tend to inculcate certain points of view, by which I mean that discourses 
have ideological dimensions that have practical consequences. Foucault 
explores these through what he describes as ‘discursive events’. These are 
events that highlight the terms and conditions of a discourse, where some 
statements can be made and to resonate with meaning, whilst others cannot. 
And this distinguishes Foucault’s archeological approach to discourse from, 
for instance, that of language analysis, which tends to focus on the rules—
syntax or semantics—that enable statements to be made.20 Foucault is much 
closer to Bakhtin in his preoccupation with discourse being both a creature of 
convention and responsive to circumstance, with this response being in part 
how discourses evolve. 
David Rooksby: Good stuff, Shad. I mean, in the case of my contribution, you have the 
agency not to engage. Fair enough. You can kibosh my pitch by denying me 
feedback—it’s practically censorship—and you can hijack this discursive event 
to your own ends.  But what you can’t do is stop me from taking everything 
I’ve learned about dialogic art today away with me as a resource for my own 
creative practice. 
Krista Wiseman: We get the point, David. There is always the risk with cultural forms that 
strive for openness and inclusivity to have whatever they produce co-opted in 
some way. Yup, it’s a risk for sure. But like Marsha said, I have the right not to 
engage. Sooo—in this spirit, back to our discussion about ‘the discursive’. As I 
was going to say, I think there is another way of understanding ‘the discursive’ 
and it’s often characteristic of the discursive art events I’ve attended. And 
this sense both depends on and departs from Foucault’s as you’ve sketched 
it, Shadworth. This discursive describes the way discussion can digress from 
subject to subject with our barcamp discussion being a case in point. So it 
connects with what you’re saying, Shadworth, because how these tangents 
come together has a lot to do with how they sit with each other as utterances 
at the time of their enunciation. But it also departs from, or perhaps builds 
on, your point about memory because the significance of these tangents 
isn’t always immediately obvious. Sooo—I guess what I’m trying to say is 
that what’s really interesting about a discussion often only becomes clear 
after the fact, in retrospect, from the perspective of the event overall and the 
implications it has for future talk, future exchange.
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[The timer sounds.]
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, we can also think about the discursive with regards to Bakhtin’s 
theory of heteroglossia. You will recall that monologism is the centripetal 
drive towards stability and stasis21—it insists it can have the last word!22 
Heteroglossia, by contrast, contests the monologic by insisting there is no 
last word! Heteroglossia is the clash of different languages, official and 
unofficial languages, dialects, accents—all tension-filled, saturated with 
history. Languages—verbal, visual, somatic and so on. These languages 
contest each other through dialogue—in discourse. And I would suggest the 
drift in discussion that you are describing as tangential, Krista, is due in part 
to heteroglossic forces bubbling below the surface as interlocutors attempt to 
shape the discussion in the service of their own design.
David Rooksby: Isn’t that exactly what’s happened here in the case of this barcamp as a 
boundary object? I can see value in dialogic art above and beyond co-creating 
an understanding or understandings of dialogic art of benefit to Marsha’s and 
Allison’s research! My question is, what happened to the idea of the ‘dialogic 
disposition’ as a mindset distinguished by ‘and/also’ thinking in contrast to 
‘either/or’? I just don’t get why feeding back on the campaigns is such a ‘big 
ask’?
Maeve Cutty: Yes, well, ‘live and let live’ works well enough as long as the ideological 
differences aren’t too acute—by which I mean it’s still possible to bridge 
them. In a way, Clark was right to leave, wasn’t he? Absenting himself was 
the only way to opt out of your focus group, David. But even then, he has still 
contributed to your sense of dialogic art, because his comments over the day 
have helped to shape the discussion and understandings for all of us.
John Johnson: Okay, but, look, Maeve—you’re not acknowledging that Clark has also been 
influenced by David’s contributions. What about all the feedback he offered 
on the PechKucha?
David Rooksby: Doesn’t that count for something?
Maeve Cutty: Of course it does, luv. And I’m not saying that I approve of Clark’s departure—
only that I understand it as a gesture of protest and the best course of action 
for him under the circumstances. 
Krista Wiseman:  Clearly, David, your advertising pitch affected him and he, in turn, was looking 
for some way to affect this barcamp—on something closer to his own terms.
Marsha Bradfield: You know, Allison and I organised a reading group last year on relational art, 
and one of the texts we discussed was Charlie Gere and Michael Corris’s Non-
Relational Aesthetics. And here Corris talks about artist Rirkrit Tiranavanija’s 
dinner parties. You’ll recall that both Brian and I mentioned him earlier. 
Tiranavanija is perhaps best known for cooking and serving Thai curry and pad 
Thai. Anyway, Corris says that his dinners may only really be interesting from 
the perspective of being an artwork if something unexpected happens. After 
all, we’re used to dinner parties—they’re a familiar kind of social ocassion. 
And this leads Corris to conclude that it’s unlikely that something interesting 
will happen unless it’s introduced from outside. 23But actually, ‘outside’ isn’t 
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quite right I don’t think. By this, I think Corris means that a conscious effort 
needs to be made to create the right conditions for something else to unfold. 
I would like to believe that, as a dialogic form, this barcamp is flexible enough 
to accommodate something interesting—some unexpected difference—on 
 the occasion that it might blow in, blow up and blow out.
Maeve Cutty: But it couldn’t accommodate Clark, could it?
Marsha Bradfield: I think it was rather Clark who couldn’t accommodate the barcamp, as it was 
Clark who left. 
Krista Wiseman:  ‘Blow in, blow up and blow out.’ What you’re saying, Marsha, leads me to 
think about the discursive as something like keeping a window open. By 
moving from subject to subject, it circulates ideas. I’m not quite sure where 
that leaves us.
David Rooksby: Out of time?
Marsha Bradfield: Well, I’ve had a text from Clark and it reads as follows: ‘All: Thanx for 2day 
but thought DA was something else. Best wishes, C’. So he’s not coming back, 
which is unfortunate but . . . but . . .  I’m not sure what to say, really. 
Allison Jones:  Thank you, David, for your contribution. The discussion it generated will no 
doubt be very useful to our research. 
Marsha Bradfield:  Yes. Whereas earlier we wondered about how this art might be bounded, in 
this session we’ve also engaged who has the authority to take up this task—
though ‘task’ is not, perhaps, the best word.
Allison Jones: Marsha, the time is now 4:53 and Maeve is up next. 
Marsha Bradfield: Yes, of course. Would you please join me in thanking David with a round of 
applause.
[Barcamp claps.]
_______________________
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Marsha Bradfield:  Shall I set the timer for twenty-five minutes, with this giving you a final five to 
wrap up your contribution?
Maeve Cutty: Yeah, that sounds good. As others have said, I’d like to express my 
appreciation for your organising today, Marsha and Allison. Our discussion has 
challenged my thinking about authorship in unexpected ways, and I hope time 
will permit me to share at least some of them.
Now, I’m an AL—an associate lecturer—and I teach theory at several 
art colleges in London and beyond. I should say that I’d planned to deliver a 
condensed version of a lecture I recently presented to my third-year students 
as part of an elective on authorship. But, things do change, don’t they? For 
starters, I hadn’t anticipated that our slots would be reduced from forty 
minutes to thirty, but then I guess none of the other afternoon contributors 
did either. My point is that the full version of my lecture is an hour-and-half 
long, so boiling it down even further would have meant missing the lunchtime 
discussion and risking incoherence. So, in light of this afternoon’s unexpected 
time constraints, I was faced with a very serious dilemma—miss lunch and 
prepare, or take a break and reflect.
I wouldn’t normally mention this, but it seems to mesh with the whole 
idea of expanding our understanding of authorial production in the theory 
and practice of dialogic art, so I should say it’s more than usually relevant. 
In fact, I should even say it’s germane for thinking about this barcamp as a 
context for authoring an understanding—or understandings, as Marsha and 
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Allison have pointed out—of dialogic art. I should also say that, as a seasoned 
conference attendee, I don’t like missing lunch or the other less-structured 
periods of the day, as I find they’re often the most productive and interesting 
parts of the whole event—not to mention that the food is usually pretty good. 
I think it was actually Hillary who was talking earlier about informal education. 
Anyway, her comments reminded me just how crucial the soft edges of events 
like this one are for synthesising and complicating new understandings of 
things as we strive perpetually to put theory into practice, right?
David Rooksby: So you decided on lunch.
Maeve Cutty: Well, obviously, David. I was sitting right next to you, wasn’t I! 
[Barcamp laughs.]
It’s actually very interesting, because, all kidding aside, if I were delivering 
a paper at an academic conference it wouldn’t even occur to me that there 
was a choice. I’d work through lunch without question. But first there’s 
been our ongoing discussion ‘round authorship as a responsive process; and 
then I recalled Clark’s comments this morning about personal sustainability; 
and then I was pondering the idea that what’s normally recognised as an 
‘authorial outcome’, whether it’s an artwork, a publication or what-have-
you, is almost always only a fraction of what’s involved in the outcome’s 
production; and then I put it all together, and in that new light, I was inspired 
to take a different tack. And I shall explain that in a jiff, right after I’ve 
recovered well and truly from that awful run-on sentence.
Phil Hind: I’m glad you did join us for lunch, Maeve. It was a good discussion.
Maeve Cutty: Yeah, it was, wasn’t it? In the case of today’s barcamp, having time over lunch 
to unpick some of the issues—to excavate and interrogate, if you will, some 
of what we think about authorship, implicitly—this proved interesting. It 
enabled me—us, actually, by which I mean Phil, the Wisemans and me—to 
analyse what may distinguish the authorship of dialogic art. So my revised 
goal for the next thirty minutes is to feed back to the barcamp some of what 
I got out of our lunchtime conversation. In fact, I hope we’ll all four feed 
back, as a kind of prompt for our discussion here and now. So Phil, Tina and 
Christian, I hereby invite you to chip in as co-authors on this contribution. 
I should say that our lunch discussion exemplified authorship occurring 
at the edges of the barcamp proper—and by barcamp proper, I mean the 
thirteen slots, each one designating a zone for authoring some kind of 
understanding, singular or plural, of dialogic art. A second reason why I found 
this lunchtime conversation particularly noteworthy—and, actually, I’ve 
only recognised this in retrospect—is that it reinforced something like social 
constructivism as an epistemic basis for the practice of dialogic art. So there 
we were, trading utterances and elaborating a sense of dialogic art that might 
be both individual—to the extent that we hold different views, rooted in our 
respective histories—and shared—in so far as they emerge and are tested 
and reconfigured through each other—and also in relation to each other. So 
the idea of dialogic epistemology as an instance of social constructivism really 
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highlights dialogic art as something that produces knowledge through an 
activity—something that turns on engagement rather than observation. And 
for me, what our lunchtime exchange—and in fact, this whole barcamp—has 
snapped into focus is an acceptance, or maybe a celebration, of a wide range 
of views, sensibilities and approaches that feed into a co-constructed, co-
authored understanding. But—and this is a big but—is this encapsulates how 
social constructivism is being manifested in our barcamp. But there is also the 
question of where this occurs. Because, as we’ve heard several times today, 
when it comes to the authorship of dialogic art, it is both distributed and 
contingent.
All of this assumes, of course, that dialogic art does not make a clear 
distinction between the way it’s theorised in contexts like our barcamp here 
today as a dialogic form, and other dialogic forms that come together as 
dialogic works of art—if you see what I mean. They’re all dialogic.
Phil Hind: Yes, indeed. And I also think dialogic forms are central to organising dialogic 
art, Maeve. In keeping with this observation, an especially interesting aspect 
of our discussion, as far as I’m concerned, pertained to the ways in which 
the authorship of this art is accomplished through the contributions of both 
human and non-human actors—
Maeve Cutty: Or authors, in the language of cultural and literary theory. So, we have 
authorial subjects, who author dialogic art through their intersubjective 
exchange; and then we also have things like the material-semiotic aspects 
of their utterances, which have something like non-human authorial agency. 
And I agree, Phil, this is something else we should explore further in the next 
half-hour. I’d like to take as my point of departure my growing conviction that 
dialogic art turns on what I’d call authorship qua authorship. By this, I mean 
authorship in the capacity of authorship or, to put it another way, authorship 
as authorship—so, authorship that’s concerned with its own authorial 
practice. This is the ground I’d like to cover—or at least begin covering—in the 
next half-hour in lieu of my prepared lecture, although it’s probably already 
five minutes less than that—assuming that’s okay with all of you.
Marsha Bradfield: Well, yes. Coming to terms with the constitutive role that authorship plays 
in dialogic art strikes me as in keeping with how our sense of this practice is 
evolving over the day, with us constantly circling around this subject. 
Maeve Cutty: Good. Right, then. So, for starters, let me observe that authorship brings 
to my mind certain practices, conventions and institutions, that function 
together in ways that are, at once, both predictable and mysterious.
Authors, themselves, well understand some of the functional and 
predictable demands of their own authorship. ‘To author’ is to produce 
something that’s going to be experienced by someone else—it’s going to be 
‘read’ by an other, and I’m using the word ‘reading’ in a broad and inclusive 
sense, here.
David Rooksby: Maeve, I’m sorry to interrupt, but what were you planning to lecture us on? 
Not knowing is killing me.
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Maeve Cutty: Ha! It’s always good to know one can still tantalise, isn’t it? I promise to 
try and weave aspects of this into our exchange, David, but, basically, I was 
going to focus on some of the more mysterious dimensions of authorship, 
elaborated through post-structuralist theory.
David Rooksby: The mysterious aspects of authorship? That does sound tantalising!
Maeve Cutty: Well, for starters, two quick comments: First, Marsha’s going to post a version 
of my full lecture on her website, marshabradfield.com, in case any of you 
are interested enough in this subject to listen to an hour-and-a-half long 
audio recording of me talking; that, all by itself; takes a brave heart. There 
are, of course, visuals to add entertainment value, as I’ve synched the whole 
production with PowerPoint slides. All in all, not an evening at the cinema, 
perhaps, but some of you might like it. Second, the post-structuralist and 
other authorial theories I’ll be referencing might not be familiar to all of 
you. You can, of course, ask questions. For anyone who wants additional 
information, you’ll find most of what you’ll need in a book called Theories 
of Authorship, edited by John Caughie. It’s the textbook for the elective 
I referred to earlier; recalling that my contribution to this discussion is 
informed by the lecture I’d prepared as part of that elective course.
Now, back to the issue of ‘mystery’ that’s got David all excited. I see 
the mystery of authorship in a rub between the theory and practice of ‘the 
author’. This is a source of, well, uncertainty for many authors as they try 
to integrate theory into practice. I want to draw out a particular friction 
that authors experience. This friction arises between the author as a 
living, breathing, sovereign subject—by which I mean a factic or historical 
individual—engaged in authorial practice and theories that hold authorship to 
be—as distributed and contingent. I hope, in due course, you will see how this 
would complicate the way we understand the relation between what I’ll call 
‘the author’ and ‘the authored’. 
I should say, also, that my thinking is informed by and responds to two 
post-structuralists whose names have already come up several times today. 
I’m speaking particularly with regards to Roland Barthes and his essay, 
‘The Death of the Author’ and Michel Foucault and his essay, ‘What is an 
Author?’ as well as the commentary associated with those two pivotal works. 
(Fig.10.2) As part of the canon of authorial theory, both of these essays are 
touchstones that aim to problematise how ‘the author’, in a broad sense, has 
been historically theorised. Barthes and Foucault both acknowledge the ways 
authorship outstrips the efforts and output of any individual producer. So this 
makes authorship into a practice that’s far more dispersed—diffused even—
than is usually acknowledged.
Anne Lang: Speaking of authorship being a diffuse practice, could you clarify how 
you’re taking up and applying post-structuralist theory here? You know, 
when it comes to subjectivity, I think there’s general agreement that post-
structuralism explores the self as multiple and diffuse, contrasted with the 
enlightenment or Cartesian subject—the universal subject—as largely stable 
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and coherent.1 But could you say a few words about post-structuralism 
in general. I mean, it might help to explain the basis for post-structuralist 
subjectivity. That’s assuming you’re going to suggest, with dialogic art I mean, 
the subjectivity it gives rise to is based on a post-structuralist model. Is that 
where you’re going with reference to Barthes and Foucault?
Maeve Cutty: Good question. Now let’s see if I can come up with a good answer! For 
starters, post-structuralism is what I would call a ‘broad church’. I say 
this because it brings together a loosely affiliated body of mainly French 
theory from the 1960s and 1970s. This theory aims, among other things, 
to complicate the idea that the world is produced and reproduced through 
structures. There are three examples of socio-structural organisation that are 
often referenced, including language, economics and the unconscious. We’ve 
explored two of these three today to one degree or another.
You’ll recall that Shadworth mentioned that Ferdinand de Saussure 
theorised language through structural linguistics, whilst Bakhtin’s meta-
linguistics took a more post-structuralist approach. Bakhtin foregrounded 
the ways in which communication is achieved through a combination of 
characteristics or aspects. These are both linguistic and non-linguistic in 
nature, and they include intonation, with this pointing to the way that 
communication outstrips language as an abstract code. 
Now when it comes to economic structures informing structuralist 
thinking, Ella tapped into something interesting through her look at John 
Roberts’s theory of collective collaboration. Informed by, but also departing 
from, Roberts’s Marxist thinking, she advanced the idea that we can’t just 
reduce the alienation often experienced by group workers to economic 
considerations. This is something that can also occur when an individual’s 
voice, or will, becomes subsumed as part of a collective one. I’m not really 
doing justice here to our heated discussion over what constitutes alienation 
in collaborative art practice, but when it comes to dialogic art, a central idea 
seemed to be that it might be able to explore a broader range of—or perhaps 
more nuanced forms of—alienation than Marxism from a largely structuralist 
perspective would allow.
Now, something I’ve noticed as missing from today’s discussions is an 
explicit exploration of Freudian psychoanalysis. This, of course, holds fast to 
the view that the human psyche is motivated by the unconscious. No surprise 
there, right? So this is the third important structure to note. I think Krista’s 
discussion on affect came closest to acknowledging that which hovers below 
the surface of our intersubjective exchange. At the very least, affect shares 
with the unconscious a resistance to being expressed outright, so they’re both 
supple structures that resist easy apprehension. All this is to say that I think 
we’ve been edging towards the relation between structuralism and post-
structuralism all day long. It might be useful to expressly acknowledge 
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that post-structuralists take issue with the idea that we—in our human
condition—are wholly shaped by sociological, psychological and economic  
structures over which we have no control.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, this is not to say that post-structuralists deny the existence of 
structures but rather that they contest their universality and objectivity, as 
in the case of Bakhtin’s post-structuralist meditations on dialogue, where 
primacy is placed on the interplay between interlocutors and their shared 
spatiotemporal horizon as a local and immediate context. Though it is quite 
correct to say they communicate through language as a shared structure, this 
communication unfolds in response to the specific and situated requirements 
of their intersubjective exchange, the crux of the matter being that, from 
a post-structuralist perspective, the world is, to some extent, organised by 
structures. However, to grasp the significance of these structures, we must 
not only study the structures themselves, but also the ways in which they 
come into being—the forces, conditions—the slippages, cracks and fissures—
and other considerations that shape how they organise our very existence, 
moment-by-moment—from our situated and specific point of view.
Phil Hind: Yes, quite, but we can also connect our discussion of post-structuralism 
back to boundary objects. Recall we explored them as aggregates that 
coordinate the perspectives of various stakeholders. From a post-structuralist 
perspective, the significance of boundary objects resides in their coming 
together, staying together and even falling apart as they are fashioned by a 
huge range of forces and counter forces that outstretch meta-narratives as 
easy explanations that deny the complexity of how things actually work—or 
don’t. Over lunch, we discussed the importance of dialogic art in developing 
an awareness of authorship as it connects the distribution of authorial 
practice with the author’s authorial subjectivity as multiple, malleable and 
dispersed.
Maeve Cutty: Well for me, exploring the threshold among ‘the author’, their ‘authorship’ 
and what they author is what lies at the heart of dialogic art, don’t you agree? 
It seems to be another way of describing this art as composed of a higher 
order dialogue—a dialogue that brings into relation the dialogues through 
which dialogic art emerges and makes this explicit.
But, I’d like to go back now to Anne’s question about post-structuralist 
subjectivity and the universal subject. When it comes to theories of 
authorship advanced by both Foucault and Barthes, both take issue with ‘the 
Author-God’,2 as Barthes calls it. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say 
they take issue with the idea that authors not only produce but also control 
the meaning of their authorial output.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, yes, of course—the ‘Author-God’ is a version of the universal subject.
Maeve Cutty: In a way, yes. Both Foucault and Barthes critique what others have identified 
as the theo-auteurist, which is not a tourist named Theo—sorry, a little 
silly humour to see who’s still awake—but rather an author who enjoys 
exceptional authority on their own text3—wouldn’t that be lovely? So, 
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theo-auteurism—which loosely translates in layperson’s terms into ‘man-
in-his-work criticism’—roots into the idea that, through careful analysis of 
the author’s output, we can achieve access to his or her personality and 
character.4
Now, as the title of Barthes’s essay suggests, his post-structuralist position 
issues from his call for the author’s demise—hence, ‘The Death of the 
Author’.
David Rooksby: What, like pushing up daisies?
Maeve Cutty: Well, Barthes is not, of course, calling for the author’s literal death, but 
instead the demise of the ‘Author-God’ as an authorial position marked 
by absolute privilege. Because, contrary to the perspective advanced by 
theo-auteurism—it’s a mouthful to say, isn’t it?—when it comes to post-
structuralist theories of authorship, the author does not enjoy absolute 
‘authority, presence, intention, omniscience and creativity’—as Seán Burke’s 
notes in his commentary on Barthes’ essay.5 Rather, authorship also occurs 
through the reception and interpretation of the authored. So Barthes’s theory 
is a corrective of sorts. As Barthes says right at the end of his canonical text—
rather polemically, I might add—
We are now beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer by the arrogant 
antiphrastical recriminations of good society in favour of the very thing it 
sets aside, ignores, smothers, or destroys; we know that to give writing a 
future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must 
be at the cost of the death of the Author.6 (Fig. 10.3) 
Ella Stone: Bien sûr, ‘the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the 
author’. Mais, and with all due respect, Maeve, these closing lines of Barthes’ 
essay have always, how should I say, irritated me. Why conceptualise 
authorship in terms that are so either/or? This whole idea of the author 
‘dying’ really isn’t ideal because where is the agency of the factic author in 
this ‘Author-God’s’ wake? I know, of course, that Barthes is being polemical, 
but even so.
Maeve Cutty: Well, take heart, Ella, you’re in good company in your ‘irritation’. This is 
something Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford raise in their broader discussion 
of authorship as a collaborative practice when they consider the political 
consequences of Barthes’s mandate. They wonder if it was merely 
coincidence that the ‘author’s death’ appeared at precisely the time when 
women and authors of colour were beginning to publish and gain recognition. 
I have a quote here somewhere. Bear with me—ah! Here it is: 
Other feminist scholars have been at pains to argue that the death of the 
author does not and cannot entail the abandonment of agency, as have 
some postcolonial and race theorists. Such scholars have insisted as well 
on the urgent need to recover the voices of those whose otherness denied 
them authority.7 (Fig. 10.3 )
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David Rooksby: Now, just a minute, Maeve. If I follow what you’re saying, Barthes wants to kill 
off the author, figuratively speaking—or a least kill off the author’s authority, 
right?
Maeve Cutty: Yes.
David Rooksby But you also seem to be implying, ironically, that Barthes is an author with 
the authority to mandate this death! So is this a case of the right hand not 
knowing what the left hand is doing or having your cake and eating it too?
Maeve Cutty: Well, it’s a contradiction, for sure, and one that William H. Gass pokes fun at 
in the opening lines of his critique of Barthes’s essay. Here’s the slide:
Popular wisdom warns us that we frequently substitute the wish for the 
deed, and when, in 1968, Roland Barthes announced the death of the 
author, he was actually calling for it. Nor did Roland Barthes himself sign 
up for suicide, but wrote his way into the College of France where he 
performed volte faces for an admiring audience.8 (Fig. 10.4 ) 
I think this points to something Jeffery T. Nealon says; he says it with 
reference to ethics, but for my money it applies to authorship just as well. 
Nealon says that, when it comes to post-structuralist theory, we seem to 
have a case of ‘can’t live with the subject, but we can’t live without it either’.9 
This was something else we wrestled with over lunch. So, what ‘bout if I ask 
you all the same question I put to Phil and the Wisemans? In keeping with 
my sense that dialogic art as an approach to cultural production explores 
authorship qua authorship, how does it balance these two concerns? How 
does dialogic art acknowledge the authorial contributions of living, breathing, 
sovereign authors—authors who contribute to dialogues, and thereby bring 
dialogic art into being? And not only that, but at the same time, how does 
dialogic art also recognise that both the authors’ subjectivities and what the 
authors produce is never self-contained, as it were, but always contingent 
and distributed? Or, to try another tack, what would it mean to say that I—or 
we—authored a dialogic work of art? What would that claim entail?  And how 
might it be explored as an or concern in the artworks produced through this 
artistic practice? 
Marsha Bradfield: Well, what did Phil and the Wisemans say?
Maeve Cutty: Well, somewhat predictably, Phil-the-sociologist immediately went for the 
sociological side of Foucault’s thinking in ‘What is an Author?’
Phil Hind: Ha! Yes, quite. But, seriously, I was merely echoing the observation that 
Maeve made earlier today that when it comes to authorship, the author’s 
initial efforts—putting words on paper, creating an artwork—are really just 
moments in an ongoing and multiplex process of authorial practice. Isn’t 
that a little more accurate, Maeve? Yes it’s sociological but it also trails your 
comments earlier about, for instance, Foucault’s interest in developing a 
‘theory of the work’, with this having a sociological dimension, of course.
Maeve Cutty: But we should also mention that Foucault, responding to Barthes’s text, 
explores this through what he calls ‘the author function’.10*
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Phil Hind: Yes, of course. So if Barthes foregrounds the reader as author, Foucault 
foregrounds other aspects of what Maeve has been calling ‘the authored’—
for example, ‘the authored’ as a function of discourse, having the force of 
‘circulation, valorisation, attribution and appropriation’,11 in Foucault’s words. 
The turnkey of both Barthes’s and Foucault’s discussions is, of course, that the 
authored is authored by more than the author. The sooner we acknowledge 
the sociologically complex terms and conditions of authorship, the sooner we 
can begin to understand what it means to say that something is authored—
whether it’s a dialogic artwork or anything else.
Maeve Cutty: I think that’s quite right. Today’s barcamp discussion has elaborated dialogic 
art as an approach to authorship spread across its practice, the artwork to 
which that authorship gives rise and the artwork’s subsequent authorship 
through its encounter and commentary.
David Rooskby:  So Maeve, back to your earlier question: ‘Is Nietzsche’s laundry list a ‘‘work’’? 
Is it authored or not?’ 
Maeve Cutty:  Well from a post-structuralist perspective, this would surely depend on your 
point of view. When Gass takes a look at this issue, he refers to Beckett and 
remarks that sometimes an author’s so-called ‘private’ works are made 
accessible and even included in what has historically been referred to as his 
or her œuvre. So in his response to what it means to claim that something 
is authored, Gass says [with luscious language, I might add] that ‘Beckett’s 
schoolboy copybooks are [authored] too, and attract lawyers and legalese as 
though they were papers sticky with honey’.12 So, let me ask you all, ‘Do these 
copybooks attract this kind of attention because Beckett authored them or 
does this attention designate them as authored?’13 Phil perhaps you could 
share what you said over lunch?
Phil Hind: Yes, yes, of course. As I’ve said, I don’t think these dynamics can be pulled 
apart; they act on each other with performative reciprocity.
David Rooksby: Ding ding.
Phil Hind: Yes, quite. It’s my view the copybooks attract attention because Beckett 
authored them, and this attention in turn cements the prolificacy of his 
authorship. But perhaps you should also talk about your student’s question, 
Maeve, as I think it makes a cogent point.
Maeve Cutty: Well, in response to Gass’ quote, one of my students came up with a real 
corker: he wondered whether we desire these copybooks to be authored by 
Beckett and, if we do, in what ways does this attribution inform how we read 
them?14 Anyway, for me, this runs head first into the broader and ongoing 
question of the relation between the author and what they author, and 
especially its broader social significance of authorship, in contrast with the 
author’s personal relationship with their work. And I believe that it was at 
about this point in our lunch-hour discussion, Phil, that you observed how the 
origins of authorship are wrapped up with the law. Would you like to speak 
about that, and give me a little break?
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Phil Hind: Yes, yes, of course. Thank you, Maeve. Well again, I was thinking about 
Foucault’s discussion in ‘What is an Author?’ where he tells us that it was only 
really when texts and books and discourses began to have authors who were  
subject to punishment that discourses became transgressive.15
The question is, what makes a discourse transgressive and why is this 
so important to conceptualising authorship? Foucault asks us to think about 
this as a twofold shift. On the one hand, we can mark this as a movement in 
content, which in practice means shifting from ‘the sacred to the profane, 
the licit and illicit, the religious and the blasphemous’,16 as far as Foucault 
is concerned. This shift resonates within a system of dominant perceptions 
and beliefs that, up until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
were broadly aligned with the Christian Church. So, to be transgressive in this 
historical sense, and from the perspective of Foucault’s reading of authorial 
practice in the West, is to go against the perceptions of the Church as an 
institution—and the truth is, not just any institution, but a legislative body 
with tremendous authority.
But Foucault also asks us to think about authorship as transgressive in 
a second and more contemporary sense, this one located at the intersection 
of law and capitalism. In this case—and this makes good sense to me—this 
movement relates more to form. It is the difference between authorship 
as an act as opposed to producing ‘a product, a thing, a kind of goods’.17 
These circulate within the system of property relations that characterise our 
secular culture today, wrapped up in complex considerations like copyright. 
Authors produce novels, poems and blogs, yes, but also films, artworks and 
interventions and—
Tina Wiseman: Yes, Phil, but as I tried to say over lunch and to echo Ella’s concerns expressed 
moments ago, for me—and Christian too—what’s more important than 
what authors produce is that they produce it through some kind of act, some 
activity.  So, I think we also need to consider the author’s relationship to 
their practice and what they author. And, in a way, this goes to the various 
complexities about this relation that were flagged in Ella’s discussion of Take 
Care of Yourself. Here I’m thinking, for instance, about the relation between 
the respondents’ responses and the way they figured in Calle’s artwork, with 
this being attributed to her first and foremost. On the other hand, I know 
that for you, Phil, the connection that Foucault makes between authorship 
and ownership is especially important, which I suppose is yet another way of 
examining the often fraught relation between authors and what they author.
Phil Hind: Yes, quite. It’s important to me because it acknowledges that authorship is 
treacherous, particularly when it means that the authored can be attributed 
to a factic, historical, flesh-and-blood individual who, under the law, is 
accountable for their authorial production.18
Tina Wiseman: But, Phil, from our perspective as artists who work largely in collaboration 
with other flesh-and-blood authors, what is prime to any discussion on 
authorship is its importance to authorial agency, with authorship being a 
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space for self-expression—both more or less individual and more or less 
shared.19 You know it’s not as though post-structuralism has emancipated 
humanity. Though it has put the decentred subject on display. In and of itself, 
this display is not a problem, but when it becomes a stand-in for actually 
taking action and insisting on the representation of your own voice, well then 
there is a problem, I think.20 I suppose that what I’m trying to say is that from 
an author’s perspective don’t we need authorship all the more as a political 
position of struggle from which to wrestle with who we are in the world as 
well as the conditions of our existence?21
Phil Hind: Yes, but, Tina, as I tried to suggest, I think we need to tease apart the politics 
of authorship and its material composition. And there is also agency in the 
author’s dissociation from what they author. By refusing ownership that 
comes with attribution, in some ways they have space for more voice. An 
anonymous or collective voice can sometimes say more  than one that can be 
prosecuted, when its owner is known. 
Maeve Cutty:   Moreover, both Barthes and Foucault note in their essays that, when it comes 
to the ‘I’ writing, this textual ‘I’ is not the same as what we might term the 
factic or historical ‘I’. To borrow a linguistic term from Roman Jakobson, 
this textual ‘I’ is a shifter. Barthes says the ‘I’ is just an instance of writing, 
that language knows the grammatical subject—he, she, they—but not the 
enunciating person.22 And what ‘bout what Foucault says—that when we 
read a novel, we know the ‘I’ narrating is not the same ‘I’ as the author. I 
should say this ‘I’ is really a kind of alter ego operating at a distance—granted, 
a distance that varies rather than a constant distance—from the factic 
individual who’s writing.23 So, I should say that the historical person of Michel 
Foucault may have written ‘The Death of the Author’, but it would be naïve, 
wouldn’t it, to assume that it’s literally he who is actually, as Barthes might 
put it, ‘confiding’24 in us.
Shadworth Dyson: Ah ha! I was wondering when this discussion would alight on what we’ve 
been calling the ‘dialogueness of dialogues’—the socio-materiality at stake in 
the textuality of utterances.
Maeve Cutty: And this is an important point, Shadworth, because language is, after all, 
central to Barthes’s theory of authorship. He describes, for instance, language 
as a space into which the writing subject disappears. So in this way, in its 
capacity to disappear the subject, language has authorial agency too. Right?
Phil Hind: Yes, yes, of course. But, Maeve, aren’t you pinching a quote from Foucault? 
Or, at least, this is expressed almost word for word in ‘What Is an Author?’25
Maeve Cutty: So what are you now, luv, the attribution police? Ha! All right, all right, I’ll 
attribute the authorship of that gem to Foucault. But for me this points to the 
ways in which these two essays author each other. 
David Rooksby:  Ding ding. 
Maeve Cutty:  Though it’s true that Foucault is responding directly to Barthes, the polemic 
of Barthes’s essay anticipates—or rather invites, or even insists on—such 
a critical rejoinder in the likes of ‘What is an Author?’ Yet, whether you’re 
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reading Foucault or Barthes, they’ll both say language is not an abstract code, 
as Saussure’s linguistics theories would have it. Nor is it a key that magically 
unlocks the author’s inner world or personal history, as in theo-auteurism. 
And nor is language mere ‘messaging’, nothing more than a transparent 
transmission of meaning. So when Barthes says, ‘[I]t is language which speaks, 
not the author; through a prerequisite impersonality . . . to reach that point 
where only language acts, “performs”, and not “me”’,26 what he’s actually 
doing is valorising both the anonymising and performative potential of 
language. You see? It’s this play of visual, somatic and other semiotic systems 
that communicate the meanings—in the plural—of a text, right? The reader’s 
encounter then catalyses this communication, and brings forth interpretations 
through their, the reader’s, responsive understanding. And this, of course, is 
quite different than reading as a process of uncovering some kind of ‘”secret” 
or ultimate meaning’, that’s been authorised by some Author-God.27
Tina Wiseman: Well, yes, Maeve, but what does this mean for dialogic art? What does it 
mean if Christian and I are of the opinion that this art is a space for self-
expression and political organisation, whilst you, Phil and others believe it’s a 
space in which to disappear the subject?
Maeve Cutty: So you’re saying there’s a contradiction here.
Tina Wiseman:  I am. For whilst Barthes’s and Foucault’s thinking is fascinating in theory, 
where does it leave the author in practice? What agency do they afford to 
flesh-and-blood authorial subjects? I think this is something that we need to 
address and I’m sure Christian will agree with me—and I hope Marsha, too—
that it provides on obvious point of departure for our conversation on the 
ethics of authorial practice, coming up next.
Marsha Bradfield: I think that’s a good suggestion, Tina.
Hillary Murphy:  Yes, well, you see, what you’re saying makes me think about just how 
much we take for granted the primacy of the reader as an author in critical 
discussion of authorship—at least in academic discussions on this subject—
today.  I’m thinking, for example, art school culture. A great deal of effort is 
invested in cultivating and refining subjective response as a form of critical 
and creative reading. This occurs, for example, as emerging artists and 
designers realise artistic outcomes through collaborative working practices—
by interpreting and responding to each other’s points of view through their 
practice of co-creation. In fact, responsive understanding is the core premise 
for art school critique, as a central practice in art school education.
KK Lin: But, you know, um, this isn’t an easy author-position to inhabit as a student.  
Our theory tutors tell us over and over again from BA to MA that the author 
is a fiction. But then, when it comes to studio practice, to our own authorial 
practice—and especially the marking and  assessment of this practice—
it’s our individual authorship that counts. Trying to get collaborative work 
assessed is a nightmare.28 So I guess I’m fingering a disconnection between 
theory and practice?29 Does that make sense?
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Maeve Cutty: Actually, KK, it does make sense—very good sense. And, in my experience, 
it applies to tutors as well. We scholars, it appears, often get quite comfy 
with just theorising about complex things like subjectivity, agency and 
authorship. What we should be doing is trying to reconfigure the conditions 
of practice by attempting to evolve alternatives to some of these entrenched 
assumptions and practices.30 On the other hand, and in fairness to myself and 
my colleagues, we don’t have many choices when our institutions are using 
assessment schemes to champion individual autonomy, and in the process 
pitting learners against learners and faculty against faculty as they compete 
for grades or grants. Hardly seems right, does it?
Phil Hind: Valid point, Maeve. And then we must add to this that there are trends afoot 
to make knowledge the property of the institutions where it is produced. It 
recalls Ella’s reference earlier today to the Bauhaus students not having rights 
to their own, collectively produced work.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, as I near retirement, this is perhaps less a concern for me than it 
should be for emerging authors working within institutions, because in the 
future, in addition to contending with skyrocketing fees and shrinking pay, Phil 
is quite right say that it could well be that knowledge generated by students 
and faculty in educational institutions and beyond will be expropriated and 
sold off.
Krista Wiseman: It’s the logic of capitalism—marketisation to generate revenue streams as our 
temporary age of austerity becomes a permanent condition.
Shadworth Dyson: And what would this mean in the case of the author as reader? Pushed 
to an extreme, could we find ourselves in a double bind, our authorship 
expropriated, charged to ‘read’ whatever it is that we once produced?
Allison Jones: Maeve, as interested as I am in this discussion, it occurs to me that we’ve 
drifted away from authorship qua authorship and I’m wondering—
Maeve Cutty: Actually, Allison, I think you’re wrong about that—I think we’re right on 
target. What ‘bout this? Dialogic art is an approach to cultural production 
intent on exploring authorship qua authorship, rooted in contradictions like 
the ones we’ve flushed out through our discussion—
John Johnson: Okay, slow down—could you repeat this, please?
Maeve Cutty: Well, to phrase it as a question for the list, John, we might ask how the 
authorial practice of dialogic art takes up and works with two contrasting 
points of view. For starters, there is the challenge of acknowledging the 
authorial contributions of the living, breathing, sovereign authors—I’ve lost 
count of how many times I’ve said that in the last half hour, but anyway—the 
living, breathing, sovereign authors who contribute to the dialogues that 
bring dialogic artworks into being—
Phil Hind: If I may, Maeve, there is also the importance of recognising that the authors’ 
activity composes a much broader network of authorial practice, a network 
that is subject to a whole host of terms and conditions, many of which are 
beyond the control of individual author-agents .
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Maeve Cutty: Right you are, Phil, which is the other side of the rub. So then, Allison, when 
I say our discussion is right on target, what I mean is that the first step in 
engaging and working through all these distinct points of view in dialogic art 
is to understand what they are and the ways they conflict.
For Foucault, this involved identifying the author function as well as 
many other aspects through which authorship occurs, including tradition 
and citation, whilst Barthes contested the ‘Author-God’ as a variation of the 
universal subject, which then meant introducing the idea of reader as author. 
But, when all is done and dusted, what dialogic art seems to be calling for 
is something of a mixed economy of author-positions, isn’t it? An economy 
that acknowledges an even more expanded understanding, one that charts 
multiple registers of authorial activity, when you consider voices, textuality, 
mechanisms of publication, dissemination, citation and so on and so forth. 
I suppose what I’m proposing, really, is that by exploring authorship qua 
authorship, dialogic art might be able to evolve a theory and practice of 
authorial production with the ability to be more sensitive to all these complex 
and contingent registers in dynamic relation.
[The timer rings.]
Ella Stone: As you’ve been speaking, Maeve, I’ve been thinking quietly to myself how 
exciting it would be if, for instance, one of the respondents in Take Care of 
Yourself claimed it as an artistic outcome. Oui? Not as participation in Calle’s 
project, but as an artwork in their body of practice, with their rejoinder in 
the dialogue linking with others to compose a shared artistic process and 
outcome.
John Johnson: Okay, but look. I’m beginning to get the feeling that there’s a question sitting 
in the middle of the room like the proverbial elephant: ‘What does the artist 
of dialogic art actually do?’ And what claim to the artwork do they have, if 
they acknowledge it as radically distributed and contingent?
Christian Wiseman: What claim do they have? Shouldn’t we instead be asking what responsibility 
they have to the artwork and the other artists—the other interlocutors—
involved?
Tina Wiseman: Well, this comes onto our contribution, doesn’t it, Christian.
Christian Wiseman: It does indeed. Now Maeve, you spoke in the final part of our lunchtime 
chat about the second authorial figure that Barthes proposes in his essay. In 
addition to the reader as author, he also recommends the artist as ‘scriptor’.31 
It occurs to me that, as we’ve run out of time in this session and what you 
were saying has, in my view, real credence for dialogic art, and as Tina and 
Marsha and I will sit in conversation next, perhaps you would like to join us in 
discussing this author position at this time.
Maeve Cutty: Well, that’s a very nice invitation, Christian, and I should like that very much. 
Thank you for remembering this and finding a way to accommodate it in your 
discussion. Very kind.
Marsha Bradfield: And thank you, Maeve and Phil, for feedback back on your lunchtime 
exchange. Your proposition that dialogic art might explore authorship qua 
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authorship is not something I’ve been able to put into words, but could 
incredibly useful for conceptualising this fledgling practice.
[Barcamp claps.]
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Fig. 11.0
Ethical Vectors for Dialogic Art  
 
1. The authors of dialogic artworks are all those people ‘directly’ involved in the artworks’ 
production (via decision making and other creative acts). The artist-authors are those who take 
responsibility for this production. Any of the authors can claim authorship for their contributions 
(creative, organisational, reflective, practical, etc.). Both the specifics of these contributions and 
the authors’ direct involvement are subject to negotiation with the artist-authors. 
2. Dialogic artworks are composed of their authors’ utterances. But these artworks also seek to 
acknowledge that authors and their utterances are not coextensive. As authored expressions, 
utterances exist in the world independently of their authors. But they also tie back to their authors 
and are the fruits of their labour. Exploring the utterance’s dual status as both authored by and 
distinct from their authors is central to dialogic art. 
3. Like all utterances, those in dialogic art are always co-authored. As concrete expressions of 
intersubjectivity, they are thresholds across self and other. Dialogic artworks explore this relation 
through their composition. 
4. Dialogic artworks tend to unfold in stages. These artworks often spread across both an event 
and its representation. The representational aspect of a dialogic artwork should strive to 
acknowledge the ways in which it is partial in its representation, with this aspect also making 
explicit the terms of its editorial process and its performative effect: how the form or forms of 
this representation shape its content and vice versa. 
5. The utterances generated in a dialogic artwork are shared resources and should be 
available for use by all the authors. Any of the authors can use the utterances for their own 
purpose. But this usage should take into consideration the aspirations expressed in these ethical 
vectors. 
6. Artist-authors are responsible for their decision making in dialogic artworks. This is because 
as authorial subjects they are able to respond in various ways. The practice of dialogic art seeks 
to innovate representational strategies for making this authorial response manifest in dialogic 
artworks. 
7. In addition to the artwork, the practice of dialogic art creates relations among the authors. 
This intersubjectivity is a key concern in dialogic art, with its significance being on par with the 
dialogic artwork that aims to explore it. In the same way that authors and their utterances are 
contingent without being coextensive, so too the intersubjectivity generated through the practice 
of dialogic art and its representation in dialogic artworks is also contingent without being 
coextensive. Balancing the needs and ambitions of the authors’ relationships with the needs and 
ambitions of the artwork as an exploration of this intersubjectivity is an ongoing process in 
dialogic art. 
Marsha Bradfield: In our second-to-last barcamp session, I’ll be sitting in conversation with the 
Wisemans and Maeve. We’ll explore the intersection of subjectivity, ethics 
and authorship in dialogic art. Now, I should say that we’d planned on this 
being a double contribution. As things have turned out, it will be shorter than 
this. So I’ll set the timer for forty-five minutes and we’ll see how we get on.
I’ll begin by connecting this conversation to two lines of thought 
that have ebbed and flowed over the course of today. You’ll recall Tina’s 
suggestion that we take authorial agency as our point of departure. In my 
view, exploring this in terms of practice, and most immediately what this 
agency might involve in the context of dialogic art, seems crucial, if we 
are, as David insisted, to begin contouring the artist’s role in this particular 
approach to dialogue-based contemporary art practice. Now for me, there is 
a strong connection here with subjectivation—to the sense that in addition 
to authoring something, authorship also authors someone, or plural subjects, 
author-subjects. But before considering the relation between agency and 
subjectivation, let’s situate this exchange with a few words about your art 
practice, Tina and Christian. I think it exemplifies an interesting approach to 
dialogic art.
Tina Wiseman: Yes, thank you, Marsha. Over twenty years of working together, Christian and 
I have evolved something like a parasitic practice of collaboration.
Christian Wiseman: Symbiotic.
Tina Wiseman: Instead of initiating our own projects, we work on existing ones.
Christian Wiseman: Why start more projects when there are so many in process, the vast majority 
of which are underdeveloped?
Fig. 11.1
 377    376
Tina Wiseman: We collaborate in compliance with the terms established with or by the other 
co-authors. But we also pursue our own agenda, using the larger project to 
host our activities.
Christian Wiseman: ‘Pursuing our own agenda’, as Tina put it, means that we create a body of 
work using the project’s resources without necessarily involving the other 
collaborators—at least not directly, as first-order authors. The symbiosis 
occurs when our work informs the project overall.
Tina Wiseman: In the case of Marsha’s project, Art Idol 2010, we worked with her to develop 
Some Ethical Vectors for Dialogic Art. (Fig 11.0) At the same time, to our own 
ends, we generated a series of photo-based artworks from stills that Marsha 
made of the project’s video footage.
Marsha Bradfield: Before discussing these outcomes, would you like to say something more 
about your parasitic/symbiotic approach as authorial practice? I find this 
fascinating.
Tina Wiseman: Yes, thank you, Marsha. We’re very transparent in our designs to take projects 
we’re involved in elsewhere through what I suppose should be described, in 
keeping with the catch phrases we’ve heard recurrently today, as authorship 
that is ‘distributed and contingent’. Yes, we strive to be transparent about our 
intentions; but no, our parasitic relation to the project doesn’t always make 
for an easy working relationship with the other collaborators. Yet it can be a 
generative one when what we produce puts the project in dialogue with itself 
in ways that would not otherwise occur, in keeping with its initial remit.
We’ve spoken today about dialogic art with regards to boundary objects, 
cusps, thresholds, collaboration, collectivity, matrixes, networks and, of 
course, dialogue. In contrast, we organise our practice through vectors.
Now, I supposed you’re all familiar with a ‘vector’ as something—a 
quantity—that has a direction as well as a magnitude? In mathematics, 
‘vectors’ can determine the position of one point relative to another in 
Euclidean space.1 The same goes for our practice. Our agenda is to focus 
on aspects of a collaborative project in relation to each other and to their 
immediate context. This collaboration, then, is located within a context. what 
Shadworth would term a ‘sociolinguistic horizon’ composed of social, political, 
cultural, economic and other kinds of conditions.
John Johnson: Okay, so to extrapolate from what you’re saying, your dual approach of both 
collaborating on a project and taking it elsewhere through your related but 
also independent activity is an example of vectoring?
Christian Wiseman: Yes, that’s right. The relation between these two forms of collaborative 
engagement is never static; recomposition is constant. In fact, it’s this ongoing 
process of negotiation that motors our practice, as we develop ways of 
evolving our independent collaboration at the same time as we’re evolving 
the broader one—and evolving within the broader one, too.
Tina Wiseman: This unfolds through ongoing response—ours and the other collaborators’ 
response to the project—including our contingent body of work. Yes, we seek 
feedback on this at regular intervals with the caveat that we may or may not 
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incorporate it into what we produce. I suppose I should mention that we also 
use the term ‘vector’ in another way, in keeping with its secondary definition.
Christian Wiseman:  I don’t like this definition, but Tina does—so that’s why we use it.
Tina Wiseman: It’s in this secondary definition that our ‘parasitic’ sensibility really comes 
to the fore. As well as a mathematical term, ‘vector’ is the name of a tick or 
insect—a carrier—that transmits a disease from one plant or an animal to 
another.2 There is a critical dimension of our practice that turns on this idea 
of spreading dis-ease. We bite someone or something and this creates an itch 
that has to be scratched. This itch in Marsha’s research has been around the 
authorial ethics of dialogic art.
Cassy Appadurai: That doesn’t sound very ethical to me. Ethics are about what one should or 
ought to do, aren’t they? Good and right actions that should be pursued and 
bad or evil ones that ought to be avoided?3 Biting someone or something and 
infecting them with ‘dis-ease’ sounds harmful.
Tina Wiseman: What about inoculations? Exposure to disease in small quantities builds 
resistance and prevents sickness.
Christian Wiseman: I don’t think we’ve made quite clear what we mean by ethics, as compared 
with morality. The word ‘moral’ comes from the word ‘custom’—as in 
‘mores’.4 
Tina Wiseman: Christian, we don’t have much time and everyone’s tired. Could you try to 
stay on topic?
Christian Wiseman: Yes, but if you don’t mind me saying so, Tina, ‘moral’ connotes generally 
accepted standards of goodness and rightness that are based on cultural 
norms, as compared with ‘ethical’, which refers to fair and honest behaviour 
in a more specific context—think about ‘professional ethics’, by way of 
example. Although social mores play a role, ethics are more immediately 
beholden to the terms of engagement and conditions of possibility in a 
particular field. By way of example, ethics in medicine differ from those in 
business5—and don’t we all know it? Yes, Tina, I know.
The key point here is that ‘ethics’ calls up a whole range of issues in the 
practice of art. If we accept Allison’s view that art is extra-disciplinary—that it 
goes beyond disciplines, then where does this leave art when it comes to an 
ethical code?
John Johnson: You’re saying that, if art is extra-disciplinary, it’s also extra-ethical?
Christian Wiseman: No, that’s not right. I’m saying the ethics of artistic practice is more 
ambiguous than in medicine, teaching, law or other more regulated 
disciplines. The key point here is that it’s really up to individual practitioners 
to work out the ethical basis for their practice.
Allison Jones: If I may come in on this, Christian. Art research as a hybrid approach is even 
more complex, especially when it involves people—sovereign others—as in 
the case of dialogic art. A seam in Marsha’s research has been preoccupied 
with aligning the principles of human-subjects  research, which underpins her 
PhD as institutionalised enquiry with the practicalities of working artistically 
and collaboratively.
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Marsha Bradfield: And if I may add, Allison, this model of research emerged from a post-World 
War Two commitment to research that prioritises the rights of the human 
subject over that of the research—
Allison Jones:  In response to the atrocities committed by Nazi physicians in the name of 
research.6
Christian Wiseman: Yes, there’s no question is very, very important, but it’s not always easy 
to translate into practice—into action, is it? And this is partly because it’s 
difficult, isn’t it, as Allison said, difficult to anticipate all the ethical and 
other considerations in advance of making an artwork, owing to the creative 
process being one that’s dynamic, a process of becoming.
Marsha Bradfield: I think this is especially so in collaborative practice. It’s rarely the case, in my 
experience, that something is determined in advance and then executed as 
planned. Things invariably change, with these changes directly impacting 
the project, as well as those involved. This is really to make the obvious 
but nevertheless important point that the dialogic artworks I‘ve been 
involved with unfold in unexpected ways, often in response to changing life 
circumstances.  People move, have babies; funding appears at the last minute 
or it doesn’t or—
David Rooksby: There’s a case of creative differences and the band breaks up.
Marsha Bradfield: That’s another very real possibility, as coordinating collaboration is 
challenging—demanding, for sure, but also very rewarding—when, that is, it 
manages to meet and accommodate the needs of those involved. But coming 
back to Tina and Christian’s collaborative role in Art Idol 2010, something they 
were able to help me understand is that certain considerations are recurrent. 
And it was through identifying these patterns that we were able to formulate 
general principles for good practice in dialogic art.
Tina Wiseman: Marsha, why don’t you offer a little background to these vectors? Perhaps say 
why for you exploring the intersection of ethics, authorship and subjectivity in 
dialogic art is so important to your practice.
Marsha Bradfield: Well, very briefly, I met the Wisemans when I was trying to make sense of 
Art Idol 2010. This was a large-scale, long-term project that brought together 
eight emerging London-based artists and me, along with two documentarians 
and a small army of support staff for a one-day event. Now, initiated through 
an open call, Art Idol 2010 announced itself as concerned with a particular 
figure in the London art world—the emerging artist. And I’ve got a slide, 
here, of the open call. (Fig. 11.2) but ‘the emerging artist’ was only one of the 
project’s concerns. Another was its organisation in the form of a contest. 
So over approximately eight hours, the artist-contenders decided 
amongst themselves which one of them should receive £300.00 and an 
exhibition. The event was videotaped, as were the one-on-one interviews 
with the artist-contenders before, after and during the day. (Fig. 11.3) 
Now Art Idol 2010 will eventually come together in an installation, as 
the most comprehensive expression of the project to date. It will include my 
edits of the documentation informed by the genre of reality TV, as it was this 
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approach to cultural production that inspired the project’s contest format. Art 
Idol 2010 evolved in response to the possibility of creating a dialogic artwork 
that critically explored this genre. And here is an image of the constituency in 
the throes of the one-day event. (Fig. 11.4) 
So in most reality-TV scenarios—and we can think of School of Saatchi as 
an art world example—a panel of experts puts the contestants through their 
paces via various tasks and trials. But I wanted to organise Art Idol 2010 in a 
way that reconfigured this hierarchy by creating a more horizontal one. In this 
case, the temporary constituency not only decided amongst themselves who 
should be Art Idol 2010—so, who should take the title and the prizes—but 
also how this decision—or, in this case, decisions—should be made.
Now, speaking of decisions, I should also mention that Art Idol 2010 
generated nearly forty hours of video footage in addition to a wealth of 
research, emails, submissions, legal contracts, photo documentation, 
artworks and an exhibition at the Red Gallery on Rivington Street in London 
in the summer of 2011, which was an important outcome of this one-day 
decision-making event. I won’t say much more about this exhibition, except 
that it brought together artworks authored by all the artist-contenders, and 
me, of course. I have some slides of the installation. (Fig. 11.5-11.6) And I 
have included a copy of the press release in your barcamp packs. (See A.3) 
Alright now, having said all that, assuming that Tina and Christian are 
agreeable, I would like to use this opportunity to talk about the challenges I’m 
facing in collating all this material, as these are very much ongoing.
David Rooksby: Two years after the initial event?
Marsha Bradfield: Well, I’ve been trying to figure out how to produce a dialogic artwork as an 
outcome of Art Idol 2010 through an authorial process that is sensitive to the 
ethical dimension of co-authorial practice. And in taking up this challenge, 
I’ve immersed myself in discussions and commentary on transparency, 
self-organisation, roles and goals, networks, representation and self-other 
relations to support my broader practice of collaboration. When it comes 
to my research into dialogic art, I should mention that Art Idol 2010 is an 
important practical element of my PhD. 
You know, for me, one of the fascinating outcomes of this project 
was that I was not at all prepared for is that it would produce so many 
important—wonderful—personal relationships. The intensity of Art Idol 2010 
proved a kind of bonding experience for many of those—for us—involved. In 
other words, we, the co-authors of this project, now have history. I learned a 
great deal about the artist-contenders as people through their often revealing 
interviews and the drama of the contest. (Fig. 11.7) I expect they learned a lot 
about me too. I have collaborated with some on subsequent projects7 and all 
of them remain friends. This friendship then means that an additional layer 
of consideration above and beyond what is always at stake in representing an 
other or others has complicated the project in ways that I had not anticipated. 
And this made the collation all the more difficult to realise.
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John Johnson: Okay, but, look, if you’re worried about misrepresenting the other co-
authors—the artist-contenders, as you call them—why don’t you edit the 
footage together? Or give it to them to edit—or someone else? Or why not 
show all forty hours of it?
Marsha Bradfield: Oh I’ve thought about these and other strategies. Showing all the footage is 
antithetical to reality-TV-style editing, which favours extreme condensation. 
You know, a week becomes an hour, in this genre. So editing the project 
together isn’t practical, and nor was it part of my initial agreement with 
the artist-contenders, which was set down in their legal contract. Now, I 
should mention that another suggestion was that I turn all forty hours of 
footage over to an editor and ask him or her to organise it on my behalf.8 But 
absolving myself of this authorial responsibility didn’t seem to me to be the 
solution, either.
David Rooksby:  Because? 
Marsha Bradfield:  Well to begin with, through editing the footage I aimed to improve what 
Shadworth earlier termed utterance literacy. Though I didn’t, until today, 
have the language to describe this, I think Shadworth gets very close to my 
commitment to developing an adroitness at combining utterances in ways 
that draw attention to their contingent significance as they compose dialogic 
works of art.
So, as an artist-researcher attempting to collate this project, there was 
also the challenge of how to locate myself as I responded to the wide range 
of utterances that link together Art Idol 2010 as a project diffused across 
time and space. And, in addition to determining the formal and artistic 
considerations in my approach, I became caught up in the ethical basis 
for my collation. What, in other words, was the rationale for my edit and 
organisation of all this intersubjective exchange?
Okay, so this leads into the second reason why surrendering the footage 
was untenable. Negotiating it through a process of decision-making, which 
was self-consciously ethical, to the extent that it acknowledged ethics as a 
valid basis for both the practice of dialogic art and its realisation through 
dialogic artworks, struck me as an important aspect of the research. Christina 
Allen’s name for the knowledge produced through this experience is ‘ethical 
wisdom’.9 It’s a deep understanding of how to engage and action—take 
action—that develops through practice.
Phil Hind: Ah yes. Pierre Bourdieu would term this a ‘disposition’ that develops through 
a subject’s recursive response to their life-world.10 
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, this thought also occurred to me, and I expect Bakhtin would 
describe what you’ve identified, Phil, as a ‘disposition’, as something like an 
‘unsystematisable responsive action’, because it impels us to respond in ways 
that are particular and varied as opposed to transcendent—in other words, 
ethical in contrast to moral.11
Fig. 11.6
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Marsha Bradfield: You’re right, Shadworth, that decisions are always situated and specific—
responsive. It’s also true that they’re made based on some consideration, 
which is something that I feel, as a practitioner and in the case of Art Idol 
2010, I need to surface and unpack. And this came into focus for me when I 
realised just how important it was to me to collate this project myself. And 
moreover, how important it was to me to do so in a way that was sensitive 
to it being networked across friendships, the demands or research and the 
importance of this collation coming together as a dialogic artwork, despite 
not really knowing what would distinguish it as such, as a dialogic work of art.
KK Lin: Well, I hope today has helped!
Marsha Bradfield: It certainly has. In fact—
Allison Jones: Excuse me, Marsha, but I have to say this. When it comes to intersubjective 
relations, I keep telling you there are limits to accommodating the perceived 
needs, desires, ambitions, concerns and other considerations of the artist-
contenders—let alone all the other co-authors involved. What about the 
documentarians? Or the assistants who helped out on the day? Or the owner 
of the property where the event took place who gave you the space for free, 
Marsha?
Phil Hind: So we’re back to bounding dialogic art and the pitfalls of infinite regress and 
progress. 
Allison Jones: Yes, and the model that Marsha seems to be plumping for—against my 
advice, I should add—prioritises her perceived ethical obligations to the first-
order interlocutors above all else. But what about the others—and especially 
the second-order ones? In what ways does dialogic art consider the needs 
and desires of those encountering your collation—as either an artwork and/
or practice-based research?12 And what about the needs and desires of Art 
Idol 2010? What about doing justice to it as a contemporary work of art? If 
I’ve said it once, I’ve said it a thousand times, the artwork as an outcome 
of the research process should take priority over everything else, within 
reason, of course. What Marsha should be concerned with is making the most 
interesting artwork that she can.
John Johnson: Okay, so you’re saying the means justify the ends, right? But you’re also saying 
that the outcome of an artwork takes priority over its practice. And, look, if I 
understand you correctly, you’re also implying that the ethical dimension of 
artistic practice isn’t an interesting subject for artistic exploration?
Allison Jones: Not exactly. But it’s hard enough to produce a compelling and provocative 
work of contemporary art, let alone a dialogic artwork in keeping with the 
huge range of criteria that we’ve identified today, taking into consideration 
the challenge of acknowledging the labour and the reciprocity, drawing out 
the dialogueness of dialogue, finding ways to make the socially produced 
character of the art explicit in the form of the work—in the artwork, I mean— 
and ensuring that it meets the requirements of research. I could go on and on 
and on. My point is why should we encumber the practice of dialogic art with 
added expectations? 
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Marsha Bradfield: With all due respect, Allie, the co-authors of Art Idol 2010 aren’t your friends 
and, this isn’t your art practice—though I’ll be the first to admit that it’s 
evolved through our collaborative research in important ways. The point is 
not simply to develop an ethical basis for practice.
You know, one of the key challenges in the case of Art Idol 2010 recalls 
our discussion earlier concerning genre. The project takes its direction 
from reality-TV, right? And as a discursive format, this worked wonders for 
ramping up Art Idol 2010’s ‘dialogic disposition’ in the one-day event. But the 
format doesn’t easily accommodate the human-subjects research ethics that 
underpins the project as research. You know, one of the principles of these 
ethics concerns the research subjects’ rights. These take priority over those of 
the research.13
Allison Jones: Yes, of course. But this becomes problematic when you compromise the 
researcher’s rights to make interesting artworks because they may offend 
some of those involved. But don’t let that stop you, Marsha. Do continue.
Cassy Appadurai: Marsha, were you even researching the artist-contenders? Were they 
research subjects? Why would human-subjects research ethics even apply in 
the case of Art Idol 2010 ? That’s simply not clear, at least not in light of your 
description.
Marsha Bradfield: It’s a fascinating question. I would say they were subjects in the research—
as was I—which I think we can distinguish from their being actual research 
subjects. By this I mean that we were all part of this project, all subjectivated 
in the process. We were all observing each other, in keeping with the genre 
of reality TV. Granted, in some ways, Art Idol 2010 was a kind of social 
experiment, albeit a collaborative one where the subjects together made 
the rules. But it was also a game, a competition, a networking event and a 
peer-to-peer critique, with the artist-contenders sharing their practice and 
receiving feedback. And, in my view, the project’s plural identity is another 
example of what Shadworth earlier described in passing as the ‘simultaneity 
of difference’. There were multiple interests at stake—multiple forms and 
functions and personalities—in play in the same frame.
David Rooksby: A boundary object.
Marsha Bradfield: Yes, but there’s a catch.
David Rooksby: There always is. Don’t keep us in suspense.
Marsha Bradfield: There is no question of the one-day event being a boundary object. But what 
about my editing the documentation and collating it into artwork outcomes? 
Granted, this doesn’t make it any less of a boundary object in keeping with 
the way it’s been discussed. But it does have consequences for how all the 
co-authors, including the artist-contenders, relate to the project’s eventual 
collation. With every development in Art Idol 2010, I wonder how they will 
receive their representation as well as the project overall.
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Allison Jones: I understand this concern, Marsha, but I think you take it too far—especially 
when it becomes an excuse for a boring artwork that fails to realise itself as 
an instance of reality TV because everyone is being so nice to each other. 
There’s no conflict, no drama, which is really the whole point of reality TV.
Cassy Appadurai: I’m confused. Are the artist-contenders, as you’ve been calling them, the main 
audience for this research? Maybe ‘audience’ isn’t the best word, but are you 
collating Art Idol 2010 for this constituency?
Marsha Bradfield: That’s another good question. Yes and no. They are one constituency and an 
important one, owing to their having co-authored the event that the collation 
aims to re-present.
Phil Hind: Yes, well, fine. The truth is, of course, that many of these issues—
representation, objectivity, subject and researcher vulnerability and 
participant observation—have been addressed in sociology and anthropology.
Marsha Bradfield: Good point. In fact, social science Internet research has been especially 
useful to me in thinking about these things in the context of dialogic art. This 
seems a good time to turn to the working document, Some Ethical Vectors 
for Dialogic Art, which arose through my discussion with the Wisemans. Does 
everyone have a handout? (Fig.11.0)  I should mention that this document 
is dynamic. It’s under erasure and will evolve with reflection-on-experience. 
It attempts to indicate the ethical complexity of practising dialogic art by 
observing it in some way without losing sight that, as such, it will necessarily 
need to be taken up and critically applied in response to the specific needs of 
practice. I find it useful to think of these vectors less as a contract and more as 
a set of aspirations for practicing this art in a self-consciously ethical way. We 
won’t have time to discuss this document in depth. But you’ll note the second 
vector attempts to differentiate between authors and their utterances.
Now, going back to Phil’s comment about social science research having 
useful resources, Internet research is preoccupied with the relation between 
someone’s online presence and their offline embodiment. I’ve been thinking 
about this as roughly analogous to the presence of those involved in Art 
Idol 2010 as an event and their recorded utterances on the one hand, and 
their real-world existence as London-based emerging artists with feelings 
and futures on the other. You know, I often think of something expressed by 
researchers E. H. Basset and Kathleen O’Riordan about this relationship when 
they say, ‘There are no bodies online’.14 Instead of embodiment, there are 
all kinds of representations, with social media profile photos being a case in 
point. Do you think the same argument could be made in the case of video 
accounts like Art Idol 2010?
Maeve Cutty: Well in a way, this takes us to the textuality of traces, authorial traces, doesn’t 
it? For starters, you have these people, these artist-contenders. And then they 
come together and you document themdoing thier thing. I should say that, if 
Barthes’s ‘The Death of the Author’ has taught us anything, it’s not to conflate 
a representation—an utterance, I mean—with either what it’s describing or 
who is producing it.15
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Tina Wiseman: Yes, someone has to author these utterances! And, as Phil made the point 
earlier in Maeve’s discussion, that someone is liable for their authorship and 
also to have rights to it—moral rights, copyright and so on and so forth. And 
that makes it political, does it not? People produced the utterances in Art Idol 
2010—the artist-authors, Marsha and others.
Maeve Cutty: Hmm, well, Tina luv, according to vector number two in this working 
document, the utterances and the people who make them don’t overlap, do 
they? And I want to hold onto that point. But I also have something to say 
to Marsha. To be frank—and I don’t mean any offense here, Marsha—but 
the idea of a reality-TV project being used as a context for human-subject 
research sounds ludicrous to me—and it’s all the more ludicrous that the 
authors then became your friends. I’m sorry, luv, but I think Allie has a valid 
point. The genre of reality TV is premised on intersubjective drama. The 
audience sits back and watches as people behave in ways that palpably affect 
each other, and the result is some kind of ‘dialogic bonus’, as Clark would 
describe it, if he hadn’t stormed out of here in a huff. But in this genre, the 
‘dialogic bonus’ is not much of a bonus for the participants, is it? Because 
these representations are rarely flattering and often downright embarrassing! 
As you yourself mentioned, Marsha, representing the other is difficult enough 
when all things are equal. Earlier today, someone used the word ‘vexed’—
lovely word, isn’t it? So few letters, so much meaning. But my point is that 
this is definitely a ‘vexed’ subject, as any ethnographer or anthropologist—or 
any author, for that matter—would surely confirm. But to try and accomplish 
this representation on behalf of friends, whilst at the same time fulfilling the 
expectations of the reality-TV genre, of all things, and whilst also taking into 
consideration the ethics of human-subject research—all I can say is good luck 
with that! I’m sorry, Marsha, but, honestly, luv, something has to give. The 
contradictions are simply intractable.
David Rooksby: You know, for a bunch of creatives we’re not very, what’s the word, ‘creative’, 
are we! What were the Wisemans saying about their practice being parasitic/
symbiotic? Couldn’t this provide a directive for your collating Art Idol 2010, 
Marsha?
Maeve Cutty: Or the ‘author as scriptor’, perhaps. That’s an author-position Barthes 
recommends in the author’s wake—a kind of citation machine, remixing a 
text in the knowledge that the remix is a remix of earlier ones.16 
Shadworth Dyson:  It occurs to me in the case of your research, Marsha, that doing all this 
remixing in an explicit way would serve to reify the crux of Barthes’ss 
argument—and Bakhtin’s, too—about the text being a ‘multi-dimensional 
space in which a variety of [traces,] none of them original, blend and clash’.
Maeve Cutty:  Agreed!  And this contrasts with—and this is important—a ‘line of words 
releasing a single “theological” meaning (the “message” of the Author-God)’.17 
What I’m saying—what we’re saying—Marsha, in an admittedly convoluted 
way, is that, in my opinion, this approach might help you tackle your problem. 
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 Wouldn’t being a citation machine enable you to organise the utterances into 
some kind of collation, or account, more easily than this continual striving to 
be an ethics machine that gets hung up on trying to do the right thing?
John Johnson: Ah ha! So, what you’re saying, Maeve, is that Barthes’ theory provides a kind 
of loophole—a license to remix utterances—verbal, nonverbal and all the 
rest—with gleeful abandon. Is that it? What about Tina’s concern that it’s 
people who author these utterances? It’s not, of course, that their utterances 
are necessarily original. As you say, we’re all remixing material that’s 
already been remixed. Or is it a case of authors and their utterances being 
interdependent. But this doesn’t make what they author—what we author—
any less important to us as authors, does it?
Maeve Cutty: All right, then, how ‘bout this? In a spirit of compromise, perhaps the 
Wisemans’ practice offers a third way—an approach that’s not only possible 
but perhaps even desirable—one that moves between multiple author-
positions. Using this technique, being a scriptor would not preclude Marsha 
from assuming other kinds of positions—including one that is concerned with 
Art Idol 2010’s intersubjective relations from an explicitly ethical perspective. 
In fact, when I think about it, there could be a real advantage to approaching 
this project by occupying multiple vectors, Marsha. Sitting in the middle 
of this nexus, you would be in a good spot to think about your positions in 
relation—to really think through their distinct yet sometimes overlapping 
obligations, be they artistic, ethical and otherwise. Yes, now that I ponder it 
from the authorship qua authorship perspective, I can see this has potential 
to be quite an interesting aspect of dialogic art.
Marsha Bradfield: It’s a provocative suggestion. You know more about textuality than I do, 
Maeve, but the Internet researchers I spoke about earlier, Basset and 
O’Riordan, consider three models of literary criticism with reference to 
online research—text as reflection of the author, text as object and text as 
reader response.18 And I’m thinking that, so far, we have focused primarily 
on the first two. So in a way, Allison is right to wonder about the second-
order interlocutors. Why haven’t we discussed them more explicitly today? 
And what obligations, ethical or otherwise, do dialogic artists have to this 
constituency?
Krista Wiseman: I think one of the reasons we’ve avoided this discussion is that we don’t know 
what to call these people. ‘Julia and Julian’ have yet to catch on; ‘viewer’ 
always was an ocularcentric dud; and ‘audience’ smacks of performance. 
Shadworth’s second-order interlocutor is the best option we have so far. But if 
authorial practice in dialogic art is concerned with authorship qua authorship, 
as Maeve names it, does it make more sense to speak of these people as 
second-order authors?
Maeve Cutty: Well now, let’s see if we can sort this out. In the case of Art Idol 2010, the 
authorial response of these second-order authors stems from Marsha’s 
response to the event, which she has collated into some kind of account, with 
herself responding to the artist-contenders’ responses? However, from your 
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perspective, Marsha, it’s your edit, ripe with your intention—right? But this 
doesn’t tell us very much about how it will be received, does it? In fact, the 
only thing we can say for certain is that, however the artwork is received will 
be subject to subsequent remix through the responses of the second-order 
authors, this being in keeping with their own points of view. That was a long 
and winding road, but does it sound about right?
Brian Updike: Dead right, Maeve. The way I see it, an author has to take a position—or 
positions, often choosing the best one in light of their own knowledge and 
experience. This positionality is quite simply a condition of authorship. Once 
this has been established, the author’s challenge then becomes to engage 
the inherent contradictions of their position or positions—immanently. In 
the case of Art Idol 2010, this would mean working with these contradictions 
through the practice—the practice of producing a dialogic artwork as an 
edited or remixed account of the event. No doubt, the real challenge here is 
to develop an ethics of practice that resides with the artwork and emerges 
through the process of its becoming. Do you follow?
Tina Wiseman: Yes, of course—there is the project’s becoming and there is also the author’s 
becoming. Perfectly sensible.
Marsha Bradfield: Yes, Tina. And then there is also the authors’ intersubjective becoming 
through their co-authorship.
Tina Wiseman: Well, from my perspective, Marsha, Allison is right—but only partly right. She 
is right with regards to authorship as a space for self-expression. For even if 
what is expressed is a remix, it’s still the remix of flesh-and-blood, sovereign 
author who, regardless of all the obligations in which she finds herself 
enmeshed, is nevertheless responsible for her authorship. Where I disagree 
with Allison’s perspective, if indeed this is what she was saying, is that we 
should be producing artworks for second-order authors. I take issue with this 
idea for the simple reason that we can never really anticipate how they will 
respond. This applies equally to your representation of the artist-contenders 
in Art Idol 2010, Marsha. Despite your best intentions, they may still take 
umbrage. In fact, this calls up the whole problem with ‘The Golden Rule’ as an 
ethical basis for social engagement, artistic or otherwise.
Cassy Appadurai: You mean ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you’?
Tina Wiseman: Yes, of course. But this principle of reciprocity is flawed for two reasons. 
On the one hand, and from the perspective of the ‘you’ that it evokes, ‘The 
Golden Rule’ assumes that everyone is just like ‘you’, to the extent that what 
is good for ‘you’ is good for everyone else.19 And on the other hand, ‘The 
Golden Rule’ is flawed because it promotes empathy.20
Krista Wiseman: And so it begins. You just couldn’t resist, could you? Please don’t. Not today. 
Not here.
Hillary Murphy: Please don’t what?
Krista Wiseman: My parents have this ongoing debate over whose philosophical perspective 
on self-other relations is more ethical as a general basis for their artistic 
practice: Bakhtin’s or Lévinas’s. Empathy is one of their trigger—
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KK Lin: Excuse me Krista, but BINGO!
Cassy Appadurai: No.
KK Lin: YES!
Cassy Appadurai: Tweets don’t count.
KK Lin: No tweets. Mouffe, Bakhtin and Lévinas. We’ve been playing dialogue-
theorist bingo and I won. We made up a card of possible suspects and I won! I 
never win anything! (Fig.11.8)
Marsha Bradfield: Well, I’m sorry our references have been so predictable. But if we could get 
back to Bakhtin, Lévinas, subjectivity and authorial ethics, please. I should say 
that the Ethical Vectors for Dialogic Art emerged from my discussion with the 
Wisemans regarding Bakhtin’s and Lévinas’s theories of intersubjectivity and 
their ethical theories of self-other relations,21 though the document does not 
explicitly acknowledge this.
Krista Wiseman: So, if you hadn’t noticed, my mother favours Bakhtin’s ethics and my father, 
Lévinas’s.
David Rooksby: And Lévinas would be?
Krista Wiseman: Emmanuel Lévinas, Jewish French philosopher, spawn of Heidegger and 
Husserl, explored ethics—among other things.
Phil Hind: Your parents debate this recursively, do they?
Krista Wiseman: Regularly! It’s our family equivalent to Abbot and Costello’s ‘Who’s on first?’ 
I’ve heard it so often that I know it like the back of my hand—or your face, 
Mother.
Tina Wiseman: Oh, darling, no wonder you never made it as a comedian.
David Rooksby: That was a joke?
Krista Wiseman: Well, if there was any doubt in anyone’s mind of her interest in vectors and 
infecting someone with dis-ease—
Christian Wiseman: I should say that Krista’s face comment relates to something that Bakhtin’s 
and Levinas’s thinking on intersubjectivity share. Both conceptualise self-
other relations in terms of face-to-face encounter, with the self being 
produced through encountering the other and vice versa.22
David Rooksy:  Ding ding. 
Tina Wiseman: For Bakhtin, this encounter turns on what he calls an ‘excess of seeing’. I can’t 
see my forehead or other parts of my own face, which is why I need you—
an other—to see them on my behalf.23 You, in effect, complete me through 
bearing witness to my existence. 
Christian Wiseman: In the case of Lévinas, it is the sight of another’s face that implores me not to 
kill. In the other’s face, I can recognise my own humanity.24 
Krista Wiseman: But wait, there’s more.
Christian Wiseman: I don’t think there’s any question that Levinas’s approach offers the most 
ethical basis for co-authorial practice, because it prioritises the other over the 
self. And this is the great corrective in the Western philosophical tradition, 
which has historically privileged the self over all others.25 This is, of course, 
one of the ways that Descartes’s Cartesian subject—cognito ergo sum, ‘I think 
therefore I am’—has been interpreted. The self’s subjectivity—the self’s sense 
Fig. 11.8
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of self—depends on the self’s thinking. But there’s no recognition of the self 
and the self’s thinking being socially produced through their relations with 
other selves.
Tina Wiseman: Yes, of course the other takes priority. But this priority accrues by force of the 
other completing the self through their excess of seeing, which is a reciprocal 
act.26 This empirical need for the other confirms our interdependence. 
David Rooksby: Ding ding!
Maeve Cutty: What round is this, then, and who is winning? Is this still bingo or are we 
boxing, now?
Tina Wiseman: Granted, I am reliant on the other, but I am also responsible for my own self—
owing to what Bakhtin terms my ‘non-alibi of being’. This is the idea that no 
one else can occupy my unique place in the world and, consequent to this, 
no one else can be responsible for me, any more than I can be responsible for 
anyone else.27
Christian Wiseman: Which is precisely what makes Bakhtin’s approach selfish and self-serving.28 
According to Lévinas, I am infinitely responsible to and for the other—even 
my worst enemies. And bear in mind that his entire family perished in the 
Nazi concentration camps.29 Yet Lévinas holds fast to is what he calls the 
‘relation without relation’. This is to say that I can never fully know an other 
because I can never assimilate the other’s alterity into myself.30 And yet I am 
still responsible to and for the other—even when I cannot fully grasp this 
responsibility. The asymmetry of this relation, my obligation to the other—
Tina Wiseman: ‘Is the crucible of my existence.’
Krista Wiseman: And then she says—
Tina Wiseman: What is the point of grappling with something ethically when we cannot 
understand it? What is the basis for our decisions if they are beyond our 
grasp? It’s tantamount to shirking our responsibility for our singular existence 
by saying that we’re not responsible for our actions because they’re subject 
to forces beyond our control! All this points to the significance of a responsive 
subject as foundational to ethical life, as a subject who is able to respond! 
There is no productive agency in Lévinasian ethics because I will always fail 
to meet the other’s needs—necessarily—by force of never being able to 
assimilate their alterity—to never know them fully and hence fully know what 
they need from me.31
Krista Wiseman: And then he says—
Christian Wiseman: Levinas’s ethics are based on something deeper than understanding—a 
precious affinity, a shared humanity. 
Krista Wiseman: Which brings us to—
Tina Wiseman: Next you’re going tell me that empathy is the core of ethical life, but I contest 
this—in the name of Bakhtin, I contest this—for the same reason that I 
contest ‘The Golden Rule’32. How can I walk in someone else’s shoes without 
leaving my own? I can no more know what they are thinking and feeling 
than I can escape my own thoughts and feelings.33 Empathy is a myth; it’s 
psychological projection masquerading as care for the other. What we need is 
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dialogue based on sociological interaction as a basis for self-other relations—
as a basis for ethical life. And we need to understand this dialogue as co-
authored. It is produced between us and in the process inscribes the terms 
of our intersubjective relation.34 It defines us as responsive subjects because, 
as I’ve said, it draws out our agency to respond which results in our need 
to account for our lives and recognise ourselves as subjugated through our 
experience.
John Johnson: Seriously?!
Krista Wiseman: Seriously.
[The timer rings.]
Allison Jones: Well, then, as the time is up, Krista, could you tell us how this routine ends?
Krista Wiseman: She fakes a seizure and he falls for it.
Shadworth Dyson: Ah, the seduction of the utterance.
Marsha Bradfield: Seduction?
Shadworth Dyson: It’s Paul de Man’s critique of Bakhtin’s scholarship on Dostoevsky as a 
polyphonic author.35 But I sense this is beyond the scope of our discussion. 
We’ll leave it for another time.
Krista Wiseman: No please continue—anything to make them stop.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, this is rather convoluted, albeit germane for our consideration of 
Art Idol 2010—and, in fact, dialogic art more generally, as it gets to utterance 
literacy as the very heart of this way of working. For Bakhtin, polyphony 
refers to the author’s relationship to the heroes in his text; polyphony, in 
Bakhtin’s thinking, describes, in particular, the way that Dostoevsky’s heroes 
take up markedly distinct points of view from their author. Dostoevsky’s great 
accomplishment, as far as Bakhtin is concerned, was to make their voices 
sound ‘alongside’36 his own, without their becoming a ‘mouthpiece’37 for his 
views.
Marsha Bradfield: I don’t follow. How does this relate to the seduction of the utterance and to 
ethics and subjectivity?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, de Man notes the common sense that Dostoevsky’s heroes cannot 
achieve literal alterity because they are still the author’s heroes38—will and 
willed remain dependent.
But, argues de Man, to focus on this, as Bakhtin tends to, is to miss the 
point of polyphony because the heroes achieve difference, not through being 
existentially independent from the author, but by assuming distinct positions 
in the author’s text.39 De Man gives a wonderful example of this, which he 
deems more dialogic than Dostoevsky’s novels, and which is the post-face to 
Rousseau’s New Héloïse.
Now, this stages a dialogue between the reader and the writer of the 
text, with Rousseau authoring both positions, but what’s significant about 
this exchange is that it puts in play two simultaneous dialogues. There is a 
hermeneutic one, as reader and writer tussle over whether the content of the 
book is fact or fiction. The results are inconclusive; they cannot agree.40 But 
more importantly for our purposes here there is the second dialogue, which 
 405    404
is preoccupied with how the dialogue is staged. De Man writes something 
to the effect that what’s at stake is not whether or not the text is fact or 
fiction. What is instead at stake is the interlocutors’ skill—what I place under 
the banner of utterance literacy—as they fight and seduce each other in the 
throes of arguing their respective points of view.41 Crucially, this points to the 
text’s poetics instead of its hermeneutics—at least, in de Man’s reading and as 
the main source of meaning42—and these poetics hinge on the interlocutors’ 
positionality and the way this finds expression, or form, in the text, through 
their exchange.
Marsha Bradfield: Well, in light of what you’ve said, Shadworth, would you like to weigh in on 
what this might mean in the case of my collating Art Idol 2010 into a dialogic 
artwork?
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, I’m broadly in agreement with Maeve’s point about the author as 
scriptor as well as Brian’s regarding the importance of assuming an authorial 
position, my understanding being that this position is self-aware because, 
following Dostoevsky’s model, it has other aspirations than playing ‘Author-
God’. Let me explain what I mean by this. I would suggest that, as the artist-
author, you might imagine and enact the artist-contenders as what Bakhtin 
describes as ‘heroes’—characters—in your edit. In which case, your challenge 
would be to draw out the ways in which they fought and seduced each other 
over the course of their decision-making in Art Idol 2010. But what strikes me 
as central to this approach is fiction, by which I mean that, for your edit to be 
ethically viable, it must register as some kind of fiction.
Marsha Bradfield: I think I understand what you mean by this but—
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, quite simply, and in light of what you’ve shared with us today, your 
position as an artist-researcher-scriptor-collator could involve fictionalising Art 
Idol 2010 in a way that affords a degree of transparency about the edit being 
yours. It is fiction in the same way that all accounts are fictional because they 
are always partial and incomplete. This returns us to Tina’s point about being 
a responsive subject. As the editor, you have the ability to respond and I am 
suggesting that you make the basis—the reasons—for your response explicit 
in the edit, in some way. But this isn’t only my thinking. It’s right there in your 
working document, Marsha, in vector number six. The final sentence reads, 
‘The practice of dialogic art seeks to innovate representational strategies 
for making [the author’s] response manifest in dialogic artworks.’ And how 
exactly you go about accomplishing this is something that I look forward to 
observing in your forthcoming installation.
Allison Jones: Marsha, it’s now 6:30. There’s still Phil’s contribution to go and the guideline 
session. We’re going to run out of time.
Marsha Bradfield: But we haven’t considered even half of the ethical vectors.
Tina Wiseman: Nor have we looked at the photo-based artworks that we produced through 
and in response to Art Idol 2010.
Fig. 11.9
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Marsha Bradfield: Yes, I’m sorry about that. Perhaps we could close with you and Christian 
offering a few words about this body of work? I should mention that it will 
feature in the installation, which I hope you’ll all come and experience.
Christian Wiseman: Right then, perhaps I’ll just show a detail quickly, as a kind of teaser for the 
exhibition? (Fig. 11.9) What you are looking at in the slide, and this relates 
directly to Shadworth’s comments about fiction, is what Tina and I have come 
to call photo-factions. ‘Faction’ refers to a combination of fact and fiction. 
The form is based on photo-romances, which are romantic stories that come 
together as a sequence of photographs in the style of a comic strip, like the 
kind published in magazines.42 The photo-romance is a genre that has been 
used by other cultural producers to explore collaboration.
The London-based Carrotworkers, for example, use them as a collective 
tool for identifying and coming to terms with the narrative moments in 
which our romantic and utopian desires coalesce.43 In our adaptation of their 
adaptation of this genre, we used stills from the footage of Art Idol 2010, 
which feature in Marsha’s edits, and we animated them with a combination 
of speech and thought bubbles. (Fig. 11.9) The speech bubbles contain 
factual utterances—citations—from the footage, while the thought bubbles 
are fictional speculations about what the artist-contenders may have been 
thinking at that moment in the event.
Marsha Bradfield: And it’s the photo-factions’ speculative approach that intrigues me. It’s 
as though they’re enacting something like intersubjectivity, like they’re 
representing what’s involved in trying to understand the world from the 
perspectives of other subjects without ever actually having access to what 
goes on in their minds.
Tina Wiseman: But the fact that the utterances are speculative—that we don’t actually have 
access to what’s going on in the heads of others—underscores that this very 
impossibility is, well, a fiction.
KK Lin: I’m not always certain myself what I think about something.
Marsha Bradfield: I can identify with that! And yet we manage to communicate with each other. 
I’m intrigued by the photo-factions in their attempt to dramatise this process 
as subjects move between thought and action. I’m interested in how they 
use the combination of vocal and sub-vocal utterances as what Clark would 
surely call a ‘dialogic tactic’, if he were still here, with this interplay being an 
ongoing process of call and response. I don’t, however, think they’re about 
solving a problem—about overcoming our inability to access the interior 
world of others and assimilate their alterity. It occurs to me this isn’t so much 
a limitation as it is constitutive of our human condition. In my view, the photo-
factions are instead about gaining insight into how we manage to interact 
despite this—how we manage to get along with understandings that are 
always partial and biased and how this limited understanding is also a form of 
subjugation, when it shapes us as subjects. Or at least these are some of the 
things the photo-factions explore, in my view.
Allison Jones: Marsha, the time.
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John Johnson: Okay, I understand we’re out of time, Allison. But, look, before we move 
on, I’m sure everyone else is as curious as I am about whose ethics of 
intersubjectivity Marsha has settled on or is leaning towards? Bakhtin’s or 
Lévinas’s?
Marsha Bradfield: Well, I’ve been thinking about the possiblity of following Lévinas’s 
philosophical example—his approach to prioritising the other—but taking 
this approach with the knowledge that it will fail, because, as Tina noted, 
we will fail, owing to our self-centredness. And when we do, we should 
turn to Bakhtin’s more ethico-sociological understanding to grapple with 
how and why we failed—how this failure occurred by accounting for our 
irresponsibility—by which I mean our failure or inability to respond effectively 
in light of circumstances, both within and beyond our control. So it’s about 
moving between Bakhtin’s and Lévinas’s respective positions and using them 
to supplement each other, as neither is sufficient on its own.
David Rooksby: Ding ding.
Marsha Bradfield: Thank you, Tina, Christian and Maeve. I know we haven’t lingered long at the 
intersection of ethics, authorship and subjectivity, but we’ve at least indicated 
some of what’s at stake in taking up the challenge of locating artistic practice 
in the nexus of their respective concerns.
[Barcamp claps.]
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Marsha Bradfield: Phil, you’re last but certainly not least before we go into John’s roundup. Here 
is the remote.
Phil Hind: Thank you. An upshot of having this final slot is that it offers a good vantage 
point for surveying what has been said.
Cassy Appadurai: So tell us, Phil: ‘What is dialogic art?’
Phil Hind: Well, intersubjective exchange has, of course, been a common denominator 
in most of the responses offered today, and we’ve placed primacy on human 
authors.
David Rooksby: You’ve got a different idea.
Phil Hind: Yes, well. That being what as opposed to whom—what authors dialogic art 
in addition to the people involved, the sentient interlocutors? We have made 
moves today towards a more heterogeneous sense of authorship. But the 
truth is, we’ve only just begun the task of ordering and orientating this in 
dialogic art.
John Johnson: Okay—before you go on, remind me in what ways a more heterogeneous 
sense of authorship has begun to coalesce? I mean, I know, but for the benefit 
of the others. I’m sure they’re all tired.
Phil Hind: Yes, yes, of course, very amusing, John. It starts with awareness. You’ll 
remember that, in their discussion, Maeve and Marsha touched on textuality 
with reference to the author’s demise. So textuality as an uthor of the text.  
And—forgive me for mentioning this, Ella—but Ella and Brian’s crashed hard 
drive was an instance of the mediating effects of technology. The result, on 
your account, Ella, was that your contribution was less cohesive than you 
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John Johnson: Okay, you’re not only saying that things like textuality and technology are 
authors. You’re also saying that, for instance, this technological failure 
resulted in a dialogue?
Phil Hind: I am indeed. It was tantamount to a kind of utterance, wasn’t it? It demanded 
a response, didn’t it? And can’t we think about our relation to technology in 
this broader way? Take the Twitter live-feed—in fact, take it away! Apologies 
to Cassy and Anne, but it’s distracting—non-stop call and response, call and 
response, call and response. But we used it as a channel for meta-dialogue to 
supplement our discussion—to go above and beyond what it was possible for 
us to voice. It makes good sense to me, then, that we should nominate this 
feed as one of the barcamp’s interlocutors. And the truth is, we could do the 
same for the slides, the barcamp packs, the chairs, the projector and probably 
more, if we put our heads together. (Fig. 12.0)
Bourdieu would call the barcamp format a structuring structure1—an 
objective structure that both structures and is structured by our subjective 
dispositions, which in turn inform our intersubjective relations.
David Rooksby: Ding ding. More reciprocity.
Phil Hind: Objective structures have recognisable patterns and principles—terms of 
engagement—that structure our subjective and intersubjective interactions. 
The barcamp format mediates our discussion of dialogic art by structuring 
our understandings in common. It also structures our expectations and 
assumptions about how this discursive format will unfold—as well as our 
exchange within it.2 Put another way, the barcamp’s heterogeneous bits and 
pieces have performative effect. Our discursive exchange has drifted from 
topic to topic; as a result, today’s engagement with dialogic art has been 
broader than it has been deep. If the Twitter feed exemplifies the kind of 
technology organising our intersubjective exchange, then the performativity 
of this organisation has also prevented other things from happening—
including the rigorous and reflexive examination of what comes together as 
this thing called a ‘barcamp’. One of the stated rationales for today’s event 
was to shed light on the occurrence of intersubjective dialogue in dialogic art 
through objects, materials and other forms of one kind or another. This is the 
heterogeneity I want to engage. (Fig 12.2)
My question is more than, ‘What is dialogic art?’—more like, ‘What is 
dialogic art if we think about all the heterogeneous bits and pieces that both 
enable and mediate the intersubjective exchange at stake in this practice of 
cultural production?’ We could explore this in numerous ways, but I’m going 
to tackle it sociologically, through Actor Network Theory, also known as ANT.3
First off, a little signposting. So my contribution will move through four 
parts. (Fig. 12.3) First, to lay the groundwork, I hope simply to persuade you 
that this is a useful way to tackle dialogic art.
would have liked. But the truth is, it actually opened up space for discussion 
that may not have otherwise occured. In effect, this failure was generative--
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Second, I’ll apply ANT to an empirical example, (Fig. 12.4) a dialogic 
art project composed of distinct spatiotemporal events. This is PARADE, a 
project that Marsha worked on and I’ll say more about this soon enough.  I’ll 
talk about PARADE to demonstrate both the relevance of ANT as a tool for 
reflexively conceptualising and creating dialogic art, and its importance to 
understanding what dialogic art is and what function it might serve in the 
field of contemporary art and, potentially, beyond it. I hope to show how 
ANT, in particular, might dispel our anthropocentric bias about dialogue—
how it might point out the ways in which there are always more than 
people involved—because I see this bias as an obstacle to a common-sense 
understanding of dialogic art.
Third, I’ll discuss spatiality. I’ll suggest how dialogic artworks move 
through different kinds of space as we iteratively reassemble them, and 
then I’ll talk about the ways these iterations inform each other. The truth is, 
there are various possibilities, but they relate in part to the ‘dialogic bonus’ 
generated through the ongoing production of the artwork. And you will recall 
that according to Clark, this is an excess that accretes when dialogue is in in 
dialogue with itself. This is key if we are to understand the heterogeneity of 
dialogic art as an expression of its dialogic significance—a heterogeneity that 
resides not only in each dialogic work of art, but also through and across its 
iterations. Questions?
David Rooksby: What’s the fourth part?
Phil Hind: Yes, yes, of course. The fourth part will be our discussion, where I’ll try and 
clarify my thinking.
Brian Updike: Brilliant. That being the case and to play devil’s advocate, I’ve already got 
some reservations regarding what you’re saying about ‘iteration’. What about 
the relation between, for instance, a performance and its documentation? 
Would ‘iteration’ result in conflating these things, or making them more 
distinct? These questions carry sizeable baggage in discussions of the non-
availability of relational art, and other types of art. In other words, where 
does the art reside? In the performance? In its documentation? In both? Do 
you follow?
Phil Hind: Yes, quite. I think dialogic art knows all too well that artworks don’t exist 
without recursive re-presentation and discursive production. It also knows 
that artworks change in the course of this re-presentation and production 
process, as they move through time and space. Using ANT methods to 
track this change could advance dialogic art in its quest to understand the 
application of a simple truism that’s come up several times today—how an 
artwork’s whole is greater than the sum of its parts. From an ANT perspective, 
this would include accounting for the ways in which an artwork’s iterations—
as parts of its whole—inform each other. I’ll argue that reassembly, in the 
case of your example, Brian, would resist collapsing the performance and its 
documentation by conceptualising these iterations as distinct but contingent 
events.
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Shadworth Dyson: Or utterances!
John Johnson: Okay, so what you’re saying, Phil, is that iterations are the parts of a dialogic 
artwork’s whole?
Phil Hind: They are one kind of part. This morning, Brian spoke about the discursive 
production of relational art, through its commentary. But agonism in this 
production—agonism as an expression of intersubjectivity, as a name for 
a specific ‘variety of relations between perspectives’4—is only one way of 
reassembling a dialogic artwork. ANT offers another, which I’ll describe in 
good time. But first, a few more words of introduction to ANT.
‘Actor Network Theory’ is a branch of sociology that also goes by a 
host of other names, including ‘sociology of translation’, ‘actant-rhyzomme 
ontology’ and ‘sociology of associations’. Regardless of which name you use, it 
turns on the topology of networks. ANT looks at the world as networks inside 
networks that overlap with other networks.5 But, beyond just being another 
instance of nesting, what does this mean? (Fig 12.5)
Well, it means three things. First, networks mean work.6 Think of an 
artwork as a network. It takes all kinds of labour to organise the actors 
and objects involved—first- and second-order authors, planning, funding, 
galleries, protocols, paperwork, paint and plaster, nails and walls, and plinths 
and all the rest. The aim is to create a network that is durable enough to have 
a sustained presence—an expression that can move through time and space. 
No durable expression, no artwork.
Brian Updike: Absolutely. This is where documentation comes in.
Phil Hind: Correct and I’ll say more about this soon enough.
Second, there is the material matter of composing a network, but 
there is also the matter of ordering all these materials. So networking, then, 
is a particular kind of organisational practice—a practice of fitting pieces 
together.7 (Fig. 12.7) So, here is an ANT understanding of an artwork: it is a 
process of artistic ordering in which aspects of the social, material, technical, 
conceptual and textual are all converted—or ‘translated’, as ANT theorists like 
to say—into cultural artifacts.8
My third point is two-fold. The claim that ANT makes—that is, that 
the world is composed of networks—is radical for two reasons. On the one 
hand, it denaturalises the cohesion of cultural artifacts by insisting on them 
as effects of relations that extend well beyond the artifact itself. Therefore, if 
there is no contemporary context—no art history or tradition, for instance—
there is no art. But the idea of the world-as-networks is also radical because 
it says that networks are composed not only of materials but also people. 
ANT theorists often battle to overcome the fallacy that the social is primarily 
human. The ANT argument is that society would not exist in the absence of 
food, shelter and other forms of material organisation.9 In art, however, the 
inverse view seems to prevail. Maeve argued that artworks as artifacts exist in 
the world independently of their authors. What takes priority is an artwork’s 
materiality, whether it’s textuality or otherwise.
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Given all this, how can we account for the anthropocentric bias in the 
dialogues of dialogic art? It doesn’t seem very art-like to me.
Maeve Cutty: Yes, luv, quite right, but who says that people aren’t integral to art? Not 
Barthes. He called for the romantic author’s death and proposed plural 
author-positions in his wake—more a distribution of authorship across author 
as scriptor and reader as author,10 if you will. You were of course right to 
say that textuality also plays an authorial role, but there are always people 
involved. Obviously.
Allison Jones: You might also be interested, Phil, in Marcel Duchamp’s sense that artworks 
are activated through their encounter. This is theoretically orthodox in the 
discourse of art. As Duchamp puts it, the artist or artists are not the only 
ones performing the creative act. The ‘spectator’ also brings the artwork 
into contact with the world through their interpretation. Now there was 
something else I wanted to say but it’s slipped my mind. Oh yes, Duchamp 
is also attentive to the accidents in an artwork’s production and deems they 
have authorial purchase by rendering them other to the artist’s intentions.11 
However, these effects are only deemed accidental by force of their marking 
a difference between the artist’s intentions and the artwork’s actual 
manifestation. So, to echo Maeve, there are always people involved, even 
when we acknowledge that authorship can also involve non-human effects.
Phil Hind: What you’re saying, Allison, if I may put it another way, is that, when 
contemporary art practice is informed by these authorial theories, it shares 
with ANT the non-reductionist view. Not only do cultural artifacts and their 
authors resist being teased apart but also, and importantly, neither drives the 
other.12
Allison Jones: I wouldn’t go that far. There simply is no art without authors.
Phil Hind: Yes, yes, of course. But by the same token, neither are there authors without 
artworks in the case of art. In practice, though, it’s never a case of ‘either/
or’. And what’s more interesting is how authorship can be ‘and/also’—or to 
put it another way, how human and non-human authors co-author works of 
art. The truth is, tackling dialogic artworks as networks could help us identify 
and distinguish the authors and authorial forces in dialogic art—one from the 
other, but also contingent on one another. In a word, networked.
ANT stems from a post-structuralist sense of semiotics that can be 
defined as an instance of relational materiality. This means that entities 
generate significance in relation to each other; nothing has reality outside of 
some enactment of relations—the network—that organises it into existence.13 
This is as true for language as it is for dialogic art.
David Rooksby: Finally, something that’s not rocket science. But tell me again—what makes 
ANT so useful to dialogic art, in particular?
Phil Hind: Well, David, if we can agree that networking is another name for dialoguing in 
dialogic art, then ANT not only gives us methodological tools to identify 
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 the range of author-interlocutors and utterances that compose this art and 
practice, but also to see them as constitutive. ANT would say that, without 
 dialogues-as-networks, there simply is no dialogic art.
Allison Jones: If I follow your logic, Phil, dialoguing is analogous to networking and dialogues 
to networks. Would this then make the utterances in dialogues akin to the 
nodes in networks?
Phil Hind: Yes, but there is something else. We need to think about all these relations 
against the backdrop of what sociologist John Law has called ‘endless network 
ramification’,14 and the truth is that we don’t, in practice, cope well with it. 
We may acknowledge the artwork as network-contingent in theory but, in 
practice, we often apprehend it as something discrete, set apart from its 
surroundings instead of being part and parcel of them. 
KK Lin:  I, um, remember seeing some photographs by Wolfgang Tillmans in the 
Guggenheim years ago. They were suspended from dog clips. The plaster 
was chipped where the nails had been hammered into the wall and hadn’t 
been repaired. I don’t remember the photographs well, but I remember the 
chipped plaster. It made quite an impression on me, I think because it broke 
up any sense of the artwork’s coherence.
Phil Hind: Good example, KK. ANT would call this break ‘depunctualisation’.15 In my 
understanding, dialogic art thrives on depunctualising itself. It does this by 
drawing attention to the range of actors, objects and other heterogeneous 
materials in dialogue that compose each artwork as a network. Think about 
the examples of dialogic art we’ve considered today: there was the image 
that documented the building process in Chantier Barbès-Rochechouart; the 
before-and-after photographs in The Philosophy of Science and Mutation; 
the 108  responses in Take Care of Yourself; and the chain of questions and 
answers in Interview. All of these artistic methods evidence depunctualisation 
by enacting an array of durable relations that hold all the materials together 
as works of art. 
The truth—or my sense of it, anyway—is that dialogic art can be 
stated very simply. Dialogues and networks are both ways of describing 
heterogeneous materials in affective relation. And given the preoccupation 
with intersubjective exchange in dialogic art, any dialogic artwork informed 
by ANT’s network sensibility would show us how these heterogeneous 
materials mediate intersubjective exchange. Dialogic artworks would then 
help us to appreciate the non-trivial consequences of their materials—their 
performative effects—on the intersubjective exchange they enable and the 
artistic significance to which they give rise.
KK Lin: Um, can we go back to reflexivity? I think what you’re saying is that dialogic 
artworks show us themselves showing us themselves.16*Is that what you 
mean?
Phil Hind: Yes, quite. But how? Dialogic art and ANT are both intrigued by 
intersubjective exchange as a social phenomenon. ANT has good methods 
for grasping the social as something enacted, as opposed to given. So what 
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 art being made explicit in the form of the artwork?
Phil Hind: Yes, yes, there are similarities, but I want to approach this from a different 
angle than you took in your discussion of Take Care of Yourself.
Picture it: you have a photo portrait taken at a studio as a souvenir for 
your degree award. Good clothes, hair, makeup, posture. Nice to look at, 
but what does it tell us about you? This genre of portraiture is selective in a 
particular way—it makes you look like a recent graduate. An ANT approach 
would consider, among other things, why those clothes, that hair, that 
makeup, that lighting, that posture, that photo format. It would likely come 
together in a series of portraits that represent the process of this portraiture 
as a network—a precarious operation, and one that could have been ordered 
differently.
John Johnson: Okay, so that’s sociology. But, look, what about art?
Phil Hind: Well, consider PARADE This dialogic artwork was organised by members of 
Critical Practice Research Cluster, including Marsha. Critical Practice is a group 
of artists, designers, researchers and others tethered to Chelsea College of Art 
and Design. (Fig. 12.8) According to the cluster’s wiki,
Critical Practice seeks to avoid the passive reproduction of art, and 
uncritical cultural production. Our research, projects, exhibitions, 
publications and funding, our very constitution and administration are 
legitimate subjects of critical enquiry. All art is organised, so we are 
trying to be sensitive to issues of governance. Governance emerges 
whenever there is a deliberate organisation of interactions between 
people; we are striving to be an ‘open’ organisation, and to make all 
decisions, processes and production, accessible and transparent.17
An important iteration of PARADE took place on the Rootstein Hopkins 
Parade Ground at Chelsea College in May of 2010. This was a weekend-long 
event that explored the social practice of being ‘in public’ as the culmination 
of two years of research carried out across the UK, Poland and online on the 
Critical Practice wiki. The program unfolded in the form of a large structure 
assembled in public from some 4,320 black plastic milk crates, which were 
held together with approximately 30,000 cable ties. (Fig. 12.9) From an ANT 
perspective, these ties were tools for ‘translation’.
Brian Updike: And ‘translation’? That was something you referenced earlier in connection 
with boundary objects, correct?
I’m suggesting is that dialogic art should use these methods to explore and 
describe the local composition of each artwork—its process of patterning, 
ordering, organisation, intervention, juxtaposition, reciprocity and so on. I 
think ANT could enable dialogic artists to produce effects that they would not 
otherwise be able to realise. I can’t attest to anything above and beyond that; 
I can’t even say how this would qualify as art. But I can say that I envision 
each artwork as a kind of portrait of itself as a process as opposed to a self-
portrait as an outcome. (Fig.12.7)
Ella Stone: Oui, mais, is this not the same idea of the socially produced character of the  
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Phil Hind: Yes, yes, of course. To refresh your memory, ‘translation’ refers to the 
enrolment of actors and objects into the network that holds them together.18 
The ties held the crates together, which in turn held the event together. No 
ties, no architecture—no event like the one that occurred.
Earlier today, Marsha made metaphorical reference to the cable ties as a 
way of cinching together the utterances composing dialogic works of art. This 
was in response to Clark’s ambition that dialogic art might come together as 
something other than a project or an artwork. By now it should be obvious 
that, from an ANT perspective, this ‘something other’ is a network.
Cassy Appadurai: I’m sure it’s just because I’m getting tired; it’s been a long day. But I’m not 
getting the gist of how a parade can be a network—and if I can’t get the gist 
of it, I can’t capture it in tweets!
Phi Hind: Well PARADE wasn’t really a parade. Perhaps it would help for me to talk 
about PARADE’s approach to enacting a portrait of itself as a process, 
with reference to some of ANT’s methodological tools, which included 
reassemblage and framing, as well as accounts that were durable as opposed 
to exhaustive. My contribution will conclude with a few thoughts on spatiality 
in PARADE.
Reassembly proved a crucial tool in PARADE, for the simple reason 
that it was a large-scale and highly distributed project composed of wide-
ranging relations across time and space. These relations were so numerous 
and diverse that they could not be juxtaposed in a single expression, such as 
a flow chart or an image, and certainly not an overarching account. So the 
challenge in the case of ANT-like self-portraiture in PARADE was to find a way 
of alluding to this array of relations. This required an account that was more 
indicative than conclusive. In fact, it was in this publication that I encountered 
PARADE. (Fig. 12.11)
Anne Lang: May I see please?
Phil Hind: Now, the event is over. I’m sorry I missed it. But the publication uses ANT-like 
strategies to reassemble the spatiotemporally diffuse project into a more 
durable form.
Marsha Bradfield: An aside, Phil. I think it’s important to mention the publication’s content was 
produced by Critical Practice and other contributors to PARADE, and edited by 
Neil Cummings.19
Phil Hind: Yes, of course. But let me offer a few general points before we get into 
specifics. To begin with, there’s framing—sociological framing. Does one zoom 
out and consider the macro—the social trends, norms, beliefs and so on? Or 
does one zoom in and focus on the minutiae, such as affect—for example, 
relations between bodies that we feel very strongly, but that we resist naming 
outright? ANT’s approach is to alternate between these frames and other 
ones. The resulting range of perspectives gives distinct but often overlapping 
insights into the relations between the heterogeneous materials that are 
linked together by the network.20
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Anne Lang: You know, it’s really nice the way the PARADE publication includes 
documentary images from different points of view. (Fig. 12.11) There are 
close-ups—I mean, details—as well as views shot from above.
Phil Hind: Apparently, they were taken from a balcony that overhangs the Rootstein 
Hopkins Parade Ground, where the event took place. (Fig. 12.12)
Marsha Bradfield:  Yes, that’s right. 
Phil Hind:  You’ll note the photographs don’t show a fully assembled architectural 
structure ready and waiting to be occupied. These images are not the kinds 
of pristine ones that feature, for example, in architectural magazines. Rather, 
almost all of these images depict people interacting with the structure, and  
many of them show it under construction. What we see, in other words, is 
how it was inhabited—how, for instance, the structure played host to the day 
of barcamps on the Saturday, which explored being ‘in public’ in the past, 
present and future. (Fig 12.15)
Some of the photographs are taken from a bird’s eye view, but none 
of them is a god’s eye view. The truth is, there isn’t a cohesive portrait of 
PARADE. And, from an ANT perspective, there couldn’t be—at least not with 
any fidelity to the complexity of this project. Instead, there are portraits 
that show the slow process of tracking relations among actors, objects and 
networks to build up a picture of the situation being explored.21 This is what 
distinguishes an ANT approach.
John Johnson: Okay, but look—what if I came back with the observation that artists do 
this all the time? They make different kinds of documentation of their work, 
their practice. A few images of the process, an installation view, a detail, 
etcetera. The point is, how is PARADE represented differently? How is this 
account distinct from a run-of-the-mill artist book that documents a project in 
process?
Phil HInd: What if I put it another way and asked, ’What does this run-of-the-mill 
artist book show, and why?’ Most representations of messy processes paint 
a very rosy picture—like the studio portrait I mentioned earlier—with all 
the disconcerting and ambiguous mess purged out of it.22 Perhaps if I offer 
another aspect of the publication, it will make better sense.
The publication includes Critical Practice’s meeting minutes. Like the 
photographs, they offer a schematic narrative of PARADE, but with the 
emphasis placed on planning and development. Many of the minutes read like 
transcripts, as they acknowledge the contributions of individual interlocutors 
over the course of a project’s development. The minutes embody 
intersubjective dialogue as a decision-making process—the ongoing dialogue 
that produced PARADE. As content in the PARADE publication, they account 
for the project’s becoming; and as a dialogic artwork composed of its authors’ 
utterances, the publication is an exemplar. The complexity here exceeds all 
the artworks we’ve considered so far. While Calle’s Take Care of Yourself may 
include a range of responses, the PARADE publication makes explicit the 
project’s planning, development and realisation.
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But the truth is that transcribing this process would not have been as 
simple as it may have seemed. Think again about the convocation portrait—
about what it doesn’t depict. We’re all familiar with project reports that 
are broadly affirmative in their uncritical description, and it’s apparent on 
reading them that they’re too good to be true. Think of this as opposed to the 
minutes, which disclose not only what happened, but also what didn’t—and, 
just as importantly, why.
Here’s a case in point—the minutes of February 22, 2010. (Fig. 12.15) 
The architects have proposed a structure in the shape of a black cloud. The 
minutes note there must be a breakdown in communication. The black cloud 
has problematic associations—ash, terrorism, death. So the proposal doesn’t 
support PARADE’s modes of assembly in the ways Critical Practice envision. 
This isn’t just a glitch in the process. The cluster is concerned enough about 
the architects’ failure to meet their needs that it identifies a ‘plan B’—if the 
existing architects can’t deliver, they will ask another architectural firm to pick 
up the slack. In the end, the original architects come through. But the minutes 
capture this on the move, not after it’s a done deal.
Now, earlier, Tina referenced the ‘responsive subject’ as one who is able 
to respond. The PARADE publication posits an ‘accountable subject’ as a 
complement or extension of this subjectivity. This subject is made literally 
accountable for—made subject to—their obligations to the project and the 
other author-interlocutors through Critical Practice’s practice of minuting.
Brian Updike: Absolutely crucial point! Aren’t minutes so part and parcel of administrative 
process that we tend to take them for granted?
Phil Hind: Isn’t that the truth. But through the publication’s depunctualisation, we begin 
to appreciate the significance of the minutes as the organisational equivalent 
to the cable ties—no minutes, no record of obligations and developments, no 
PARADE as it occurred.
Could the weekend event have happened without the minutes? Maybe. 
But that’s not the point. The point is that the minutes offer insight into how it 
occurred as it did.
Are these minutes exhaustive? Is their scale 1:1? No. If we grant that 
total capture is impossible, we need to ask why some utterances are included 
here and not others. What does this absence tell us about PARADE and 
Critical Practice? What do these omissions reveal? Does the lack of agonism 
here—like the agonism that Brian earlier observed in the commentary on 
relational practices—mean there was no internal strife? Possibly. But there 
are other explanations. One of them concerns the accountability of the 
minutes to those involved. The minutes offer an account of the decision-
making process and this account is also accountable to the decision-makers. 
More reciprocity.
David Rooksby:  Ding ding. 
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Phil Hind: Yes, quite. Actually, there are three areas of accountability and they all 
influence each other with reciprocal effect. First, the decision makers are 
accountable to each other and the project, and this is inscribed in the 
minutes. Second, the minutes are accountable to the decision makers—they 
need to be an accurate representation of the decisions taken. Third, the 
minutes are also publically accountable in keeping with Critical Practice’s ethic 
of transparency—before being aggregated into the publication, they appeared 
on the cluster’s wiki. (Fig. 12.16) So the minutes are boundary objects. 
They are both organisational tools for PARADE and a public account of its 
organisational process. They trace the labour of collaboration—the labour of 
‘the dialogic’. They are traces of the intersubjective utterances as the nodes in 
the network.
[The timer rings.]
Cassy Appadurai: I still don’t get how the minutes are accountable to the decision makers above 
and beyond their being accurate.
Phil Hind: But accuracy isn’t something that can be taken for granted, is it? It’s a process 
of negotiation. Clearly, decisions have been made about what is and isn’t 
represented in the minutes. As I’ve said, there’s not a lot of interpersonal 
dissent represented here. I don’t think it’s because the project was free of 
dissent. More likely it’s because the cluster chose not to represent it. Why?
The truth is, dissent is difficult to document with much nuance. And, 
you’ll reacall, we observed this, for instance, in the written commentary 
on relational art that Brian spoke about earlier. I’m thinking of the 
commentators’ struggle over the artwork’s significance, a struggle that 
sometimes came across as a case of ‘he said, she said’. Other forms of 
dissent are often so complex, so dependent on context—so riven with affect 
in meetings like those depicted in the minutes—that dissent resists being 
rendered in some durable form that does it much justice. This is the messy 
organisational and political stuff that happens ‘off the page’. And it’s very easy 
to misrepresent dissent—as well as those doing the dissenting. And this is a 
second consideration—the minutes are not only making PARADE’s process 
public, but are also presenting a portrait of the cluster as an aggregate of the 
members involved. (Fig 12.17)
For example, the minutes tell us about the contributions of individual 
members, but this telling is performed in relation to their task at hand—that 
is, decision-making to move the project forward. Here’s some quantitative 
data. According to the PARADE publication, Michaela and Kuba each took 
minutes once, Cinzia and Neil four times, Scott five and Marsha seven. Some 
members never took minutes at all. What does this record of contribution 
tell us about Marsha, for instance? She’s a frequent minute taker, which 
makes good sense given that she produced PARADE. It stands to reason that 
she would take a more active role in the project’s administration. Marsha’s 
practice of minute taking also tells us something about her priorities. If 
we compare her minutes to others’, we note that she tends to attribute 
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utterances to individual decision makers more than other minutetakers do. 
Again, this makes sense given her declared interest in reassembling the 
authors’ utterances into a dialogic work of art. As the other minutetaking 
styles clearly indicate, many approaches are possible, but Marsha’s offers 
particular insight into the cluster’s intersubjective exchange through the 
mintues’ attribution. This occurs in a way comparable to what Maeve 
described earlier as ‘citation’, when the minutes tie the utterances back to the 
interlocutors who made them.
But, even in Marsha’s minutes, the author-interlocutors’ individual 
positions are rarely fleshed out. This is an important point. The minutes don’t 
aspire to this kind of representation because that’s not their purpose. PARADE 
did not embrace intersubjective exchange as an end in itself. It explored 
being ‘in public’. In keeping with this, the minutes are an administrative and 
organisational practice that networks the project’s obligations and interests 
into productive relation—the decision-making process through which PARADE 
was performed as an event and is performed as an account in the publication.
John Johnson: Okay—you’re saying the status of the minutes as publically disseminated 
‘process documents’ explains their selectivity. Have I got that right?
Phil Hind: Yes—that is, in part. This goes back to the constitutive role of intersubjective 
exchange in dialogic art. It makes good sense that this is subject to the art’s 
task at hand and mediated by a range of heterogeneous materials. In this 
case, the minutes as a public record of the decision-making process map and 
enact the project’s concern with being ‘in public’.
John Johnson: Ding ding.
David Rooksby: Where’s the reciprocity here?
John Johnson: Okay, correct me if I’m wrong, and maybe it’s not reciprocity but I think its 
reflexivity—at the very least. I think what you’re saying is that the minutes 
are an instance of PARADE—its organisational process and its authors’ 
utterances—being ‘in public’. In other words, the minutes are enacting what 
the project aimed to explore.
Marsha Bradfield: I would agree with this, but I want to add something. I think there’s rough 
consensus in Critical Practice that the minutes represent our meetings, but 
other representations are surely possible. What’s important is that some 
representation gets made. They can always be amended after the fact, 
through our wiki’s editing function. But, in practice, they rarely are—so it was 
only when the publication went to print that the minutes became fixed, if you 
see what I mean, and they’re still theoretically dynamic on the wiki. Anyone 
can change them. 
Phil Hind: Yes, yes, of course. But why is it important that some record gets made?
Marsha Bradfield: Well, for the reasons that you’ve already offered. Our minutes track what the 
cluster has accomplished as well as its immediate interests and obligations, 
with these shifting over the project’s development—as well as the cluster’s 
own development—and in response to changing circumstances.
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Marsha Bradfield: That’s true, Phil. Every once in a while, we sense enthusiasm is waning and 
discuss calling it a day. And then, on cue, something happens and the cluster 
is reconfigured and re-energised. I attribute this, in part, to our practice of 
pooling resources, the longstanding commitment of certain members, the 
cluster’s flexibility—members can come and go—as well as our conscious 
effort to understand what authorship means through exploring our own self-
organisation as cultural production.
Phil Hind: It makes good sense to me. Your reference to reconfiguration brings me 
onto spatiality. As I know we’re running out of time, let me conclude briefly 
by applying Law’s ANT-influenced thinking about spatiality to PARADE and 
considering the publication as a response to the event. It both embodies and 
goes beyond it.
John Johnson: Okay, so we should imagine that the iterative development of PARADE across 
event and publication is a dialogue—is that what you’re saying?
Phil Hind: Right you are. As an event, PARADE was spatiotemporally specific. This 
observation builds on the Wisemans’ discussion of vectors. Law tells us that, 
in this familiar kind of space—called vectored, Cartesian or Euclidean space—
shapes retain their shape if a set of coordinates remains sufficiently stable, 
relative to each other as the shape moves through time and space. He gives 
the example of a ship, which remains a ship as long as the same vessel holds 
together as it moves across the seas.25 But ANT engages with another kind 
of space that is good for understanding networks like PARADE, which are 
spatially dynamic. We can think of this as networked spatiality.
The PARADE of May 2010 no longer exists, but PARADE as a network 
hasn’t ceased. It is performed through reassemblies, including the publication 
and my discursive production of the network here today.
Phil Hind: So this is the ANT argument: a dialogic artwork as a network is an effect 
of relations. An ANT analysis catches the strategies that produce—and are 
produced by—the network that’s performing them. I’ll save you the trouble, 
David, ‘Ding ding’. But the truth is, there’s more to this than reciprocity. The 
accountability inscribed on the pages of the publication intimates us with the 
ethos of PARADE and Critical Practice. These expressions tell us the cluster 
takes seriously its commitment to producing publically accessible accounts. 
Durability is important here. As Law puts it, ‘Thoughts are cheap but they 
don’t last long, and speech lasts very little longer’.23 But when we perform 
intersubjective exchange by embodying it in texts like this publication, it 
has greater staying power. Law concludes that a relatively stable network 
is one that finds concrete expression in a range of durable materials.24 And 
something striking about Critical Practice as a network, at least from an ANT 
perspective, is its resilience. It has consistently reproduced itself for eight 
years 
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Fig. 12.18
Fig. 12.19
Now, Sociologist Bruno Latour argues that the significance of ANT 
as a method of description resides less with its outcomes and more with 
the degree to which it can catch the network in question on the move. He 
describes this kind of text as the ‘functional equivalent of laboratory’.26
Ella Stone:  Ah, so we are back on the subject of laboratories? 
Phil Hind:  That’s right, you mentioned laboratories in your discussion too. 
Ella Stone:  Oui, with reference to John Roberts’s collective collaboration and the Bauhaus 
and—
Phil Hind:  Well, when it comes to ANT, descriptive texts—accounts as they’re called—
are a space in which to experiment with ways of reassembling the network 
through trials, tests, simulations and other forms of analysis as they occur 
through the text—through its construction. When Latour says, ‘follow the 
actors’,27 he means follow them through the text as opposed to merely 
describing them as something that resides beyond it. ‘A good account’, 
writes Latour, ‘will perform the social in the priceless sense that some of the 
participants in the action—through the controversial agency of the author—
will be assembled in such a way that they are collected together’.28 This strikes 
me as a good description of the PARADE publication as a dialogic work of art. 
In addition to the minutes, the documentary photographs and the plans for 
the structure, there is also a section where the contributors to the project 
self-represent through short texts that reflect on their experience of being 
networked into PARADE. (Fig. 12.19)
Allison Jones: Phil, I’m sorry but we’re out of time.
David Rooksby: But this is actually interesting.
Phil Hind: A final few comments. When it comes to the contributors’ section in the 
publication, consider the following example. Bianca Elzenbaumer and Fabio 
Franz of Dep 21 reflect on their contribution to the Market of Ideas, the 
Sunday event composing PARADE. (Fig. 12.19) They describe their ‘plan for 
the day’ followed by ‘the result’. You can read about the specifics of Dep 21’s 
initiative for yourself in the slide. But it’s worth highlighting that it follows the 
same logic as the minutes and the project more generally, as it attempts to 
engage with what it means to be ‘in public’. This includes, of course, making 
the practice of art public in all its success and failure. In so doing, and in 
keeping with ANT descriptions more generally, this means the sociality of this 
project is produced as opposed to merely represented. The actors are, too, 
through their self-representation, as in the case of Dep 21’s utterance within 
the publication.
Allison Jones:  Great, Phil—
Phil Hind:  So, to wrap up, what implications does ANT’s descriptive approach have for 
dialogic art as I envision it—as a portrait of itself in process as opposed to 
a self-portrait as an outcome? First, it means this type of reassembly treats 
itself as an iteration of what it’s reassembling. As I’ve said, many other types 
of art trade on being discrete. But dialogic artworks contest this through 
depunctualising their cohesion and attempt to account for the networking 
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of their heterogeneous bits and pieces. In doing so, I would like to think 
that they aim to demystify how it is they generate a range of effects—
intersubjective and all the rest. The ‘dialogic bonus’ arises through this 
iteration when, for instance, we note that in addition to the event of PARADE 
shaping and constituting the publication, the publication also constitutes the 
event after the fact.
David Rooksby: Ding ding.
Phil Hind: Yes, David, quite. As a process-based account of the project, it is also a co-
authored expression of the cluster’s organisational memory. PARADE resides 
through and across its iterations as event, publication and network.
So I have presented several ideas. First, as a relational and process-based 
sociology, ANT offers tools for producing accounts that enact what they aim 
to explore. Framing, reassemblage, translation and depunctualisation are 
only some of ANT’s tools. Skillfully used, they provide ways of understanding 
dialogic art as an achievement—one that is reached through the co-
authorship of diverse kinds of authors—as opposed to a random and 
otherwise inexplicable occurrence. 
Second, my discussion of the minutes sought to observe their 
significance as plural. They describe PARADE’s material organisation—all the 
milk crates, cable ties, emails, people, decisions—as well as its strategies of 
organisation. This includes a commitment to accountability and transparency 
as the cluster brings these materials into relation. So when the minutes 
explore the character of PARADE, they tackle it as the interaction between 
the project’s material organisation as well as its strategies of organisation—
which by now, it should be evident, are contingent but different. Strategies 
of organisation underpin the cluster’s aspirations for how their projects 
might come together; material organisation refers to how they are actually 
configured into outcomes. ANT provides tools for teasing these things apart, 
and we can use these tools to reach a deeper understanding of dialogic art in 
all its complexity and heterogeneity.
Allison, I know we’re pressed for time, but I have a final thought: Third 
and finally, I have said that ANT asks us to think about the heterogeneous 
materials that compose networks in what Law calls ‘interactional effects 
in contrast to primitive causes’.29 I hope that by now it’s clear that ANT is a 
theory of both agency and complexity. It says the world is complex, but that 
we can better understand it through patient observation and careful analysis. 
ANT is valuable for dialogic art because it explores social effects, regardless 
of their material form, by concentrating on the question of how30—how are 
these artworks structured and organised? How are they authored? How are 
utterances reassembled for artistic and sociological effect? The truth is that 
any approach to dialogic art that does not take technology and other non-
human authors as seriously as it does human ones will never really be able to 
account for the dialogic in all its diversity. If there is one thing you 
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take away from this contribution, it should be that there is no question that
intersubjectivity involves people, but that does not mean it’s reducible to an 
anthropocentric bias. That’s just good sense. 
Cassy Appadurai: For the record, Phil, could you complete the statement, ‘Dialogic art is’.
Phil Hind:  Well,  I would put it this way: Looked at through the lens of ANT, dialogic art 
is a set of social relations mediated by myriad complexities. It is a range of 
disparate dialogues bundled together in an iterative process that attends to 
the reconfiguration of an artwork-as-network through time and space as its 
sociality is reassembled and discursively produced. The tasks of dialogic art, 
as I see it, are three-fold: to explore its own dialogues; to recognise the ways 
in which they reproduce and stabilise themselves; and to observe how they 
could and sometimes should be otherwise—and very well might be in future 
iterations and other dialogic works of art. Thank you very much.
Marsha Bradfield: Thank you, Phil, for proposing ANT as a method for producing dialogic art, and 
using PARADE as an example. I have many questions about ANT’s relevance 
for dialogic art, some of which concern the ways in which it accounts for 
power relations whilst at the same time keeping networks flat. But I’m afraid 
that further exploration of this and other ANT concerns will have to wait 
for our post-barcamp discussion over dinner—or be taken up and explored 
in future research on dialogic art. It’s now time to transition into our final 
session of this barcamp, where John will facilitate our discussion of guidelines 
for the practice of dialogic art, which we have formulated over the course of 
the day. We’ll discuss these in lieu of a plenary. John?
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Fig. 13.0
Fig. 13.1
Marsha Bradfield: John, are you going to project the questions you’ve minuted over the course 
of the barcamp as primers for the guideline session?
John Johnson: Yes, look, I gave up minuting them all and settled on three to five central ones 
from each of the twelve contributions. (Fig. 13. 0)
Okay, it has been a long day for everyone but also a generative one, to 
my mind. Actually, one of the most interesting aspects of this barcamp is how 
it’s left me saturated with dialogue, fully ‘dialogised’, if you will. I suppose this 
is an effect—or an affect—of this way of working, this approach to cultural 
production.
This morning, at the end of Marsha’s and Allison’s opening remarks, I 
anticipated this final session by saying that, informed by everything we’ve 
discussed over the course of the day, we’ll aggregate some guidelines for 
dialogic art. And, in a way, this is something that Maeve’s discussion keyed 
into with reference to authorship qua authorship. Together, we’ll author 
dialogic art as an approach to cultural production as we each author a 
guideline intent on capturing a recommendation that we, each one of us, 
perceives to be indispensible to this way of working. We’ll then sharpen the 
guidelines through very brief discussion.
I know our schedule today has been full to the point of overload, but 
I hope you’ve had some time think about your guideline. Look, I wouldn’t 
normally admit this, but as dialogic art actively draws on popular culture, and 
social media in particular, it is more relevant than usual—and certainly more 
honest—to acknowledge that I did what many would in my position. In search 
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Fig. 13.2
Fig. 13.3
of guidance on writing guidelines, I hit Wikipedia. The entry on ‘guidelines’ 
refers to a source that is as unlikely as it is useful. So, here we go, according to 
the United State’s Department of Veteran Affairs (Fig. 13.2):
A guideline is a statement by which to determine a course of action. [It] 
aims to streamline particular processes according to a set routine or 
sound practice. By definition, following a guideline is never mandatory. 
Guidelines are not binding and are not enforced.1
The idea is that guidelines should provide support for accomplishing the task 
at hand with greater ease and effectiveness, without being prescriptive.
Okay, when it comes to the genre of guidelines, my cursory research 
indicates they’re often composed of two parts, a strap line and a brief 
statement of intent. Consider the ones posted on ‘The Free Encyclopedia 
that Anyone can Edit’. (Fig. 13.4) Rather than discuss Wikipedia’s authorial 
guidelines, I thought I might instead project a few as models for formulating 
yours.
Ella Stone: John, a moment or two to compose our thoughts would be useful, no?
John Johnson: Okay, we’ll pause after my brief introduction. 
David Rooksby: So this guideline session is like a barcamp—a mini barcamp—within a 
barcamp.
John Johnson: Yes, that’s a good way to think about this exercise. Bear in mind that as an 
aggregate of our various points of view and respective interests in dialogic 
art, these guidelines may not necessarily sit next to each other with ease, free 
of contradiction. If earlier today I acknowledged that, to my mind, this is okay, 
what’s come to light through our discussion is that it’s more than okay—it’s 
actually indicative of the ‘dialogic disposition’ embodied in the barcamp’s 
dialogic form. Look, what has crystallised for me is a much more profound 
sense of what it means to inhabit and embody this polyphonic space where 
many voices sound and circulate without any particular one dominating 
or subordinating the others. Of course, in practice dialogic forms, however 
theoretically democratic they may be in their representation, are also messy. 
They fail to cohere into a nice smooth shape composed of positions that are 
equal in authority and significance. 
Okay? The same, to my mind, applies to our guidelines. We may well 
agree on them in principle, but the guidelines themselves may disagree with 
each other, or at least complicate their respective significance through their 
juxtaposition.
Marsha Bradfield: Well no, I don’t expect they’ll be uni-conclusive, any more than I expect the 
position they reflect, namely our shared position in this barcamp, will be 
either. But nor do I anticipate we’ll settle into a non-conclusive understanding 
of dialogic art for that matter, one where no conclusion is reached. More 
likely, we’ll compose something closer to a co-conclusive outcome, as 
something like a juxtaposition—an aggregate, as you say, John—of our 
respective points of view.2
 451    450
John Johnson: Okay, but the critical point is that, as co-conclusive, the guidelines are 
an extension of our exploration over the day—or an embodiment of the 
barcamp’s ‘dialogic disposition’, right? The guidelines will assemble our 
respective views, however partial in their representation, into what we now 
have the language to describe as a ‘boundary object’. The guidelines will 
coordinate our perspectives for the purpose of circumscribing dialogic art as 
a practice that we may each use—and potentially abuse—as we see fit. Okay, 
and finally I want to say that our engagement with and application of this 
approach to cultural production will draw us into a loosely knit community. 
Look, my sense is that here, in this community of practice, the boundaries of 
each dialogic artwork will be determined in part through their contestation. 
And to my mind, this is one of the most crucial outcomes of our discussion 
today. The boundaries of these artworks will be determined as their authors’ 
draw and redraw them as they struggle over the artworks’ significance. And—
David Rooksby: Enough already. Let’s get on with the show.
John Johnson: Right. Allison? Could you set the timer for three minutes, please? I’ll shut up 
now and give you a little peace to collect your thoughts. 
[The timer is set.]
Shadworth Dyson: John, is there a word limit?
John Johnson: I’ll leave that to your discretion, but brevity—and clarity—are both virtues.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, of course.
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[The timer rings.]
[The timer is reset.]
John Johnson: Okay, I hope that’s given everyone enough time to reflect and articulate 
something that they hold to be especially important to dialogic art. I’m going 
to give you a minute or so to state your guideline and then I’ll reset the timer 
to keep us on track. Marsha? Or Allison, would you like to start?
Marsha Bradfield: Well, I can’t actually decide. I have two ideas. So perhaps I’ll raise them in 
relation to each other and we’ll take it from there?
David Rooksby: Very dialogic of you.
Marsha Bradfield: Something that for me came out of the day is a clear sense of dialogic art as 
a ‘dialogue of dialogues’, which I want to distinguish from the ‘dialogueness 
of dialogues’. These are tongue twisters, I know. Allison described the 
‘dialogueness of dialogues’ in our opening remarks as ‘the interplay between 
dialogue’s social and material qualities’. Now, coming into today’s barcamp, 
I understood the material quality of this dialogueness as something like 
textuality, and I think this still applies. However, Phil has challenged me 
to rethink—or at least expand my understanding—with his emphasis on 
‘the social’ aspect of dialogic art as being a constellation of heterogeneous 
materials. And at the same time, I’m fascinated by what Clark termed ‘the 
dialogic disposition’—and Ella’s interest in the ‘socially produced character 
of dialogic art being made explicit in the form of dialogic artworks’. I’m not 
expressing this guideline as coherently as I might. I’m really formulating it on 
the spot. But if we—or at least if I—plump for option number one, the tag line 
would be, perhaps predictably, ‘The Dialogueness of Dialogues’—Dialogic art 
is produced through an interplay of dialogue’s social and material qualities. 
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This art’s ‘dialogic disposition’ constellates these heterogeneous materials 
with the view of making the socially produced character of the art’s practice 
explicit in the form of the dialogic artworks it gives rise to’.
Ella Stone: It’s quite long, and you’ve pre-empted my guideline, but I like it.
Marsha Bradfield: Well, then, would you like to take it as your own?
[Barcamp laughs.]
Ella Stone: Bien sûr, merci beaucoup.
Allison Jones: However, shouldn’t there be a guideline before this one about ‘dialogic 
disposition’—perhaps one that encapsulates all of Clark’s analytic categories. 
As he’s not here, may I suggest something like, ‘Concepts and Strategy’—
‘Dialogic art is distinguished by its “dialogic disposition”, which puts 
interlocutors in dialogue and makes this intersubjective relation conspicuous 
in its representational schemes. “Dialogic tactics”, like juxtaposition and 
nesting, underpin this art’s “dialogic strategy”, with this drawing attention 
to the wide range of dialogues composing dialogic art’. Could this be Clark’s 
guideline in absenstia?
Tommy Low: Well, no. His would be about labour, surely, or at least I think—
[The timer rings.]
[The timer is reset.]
KK Lin: And, um, what about the difference between ‘dialogue’ and ‘the dialogic’?
Allison Jones: I agree; it should top the list. Like Marsha, I have a couple of possible 
guidelines, one being, ‘The Dialogic’—‘Dialogic art takes its name from “the 
dialogic” and not “dialogue” per se. “Dialogue” is an exchange between 
interlocutors, with their utterances issuing across from each other. Originating 
in dialogue but also going beyond it, “the dialogic” manages dialogues as 
well as the relations between them’. Actually, ‘the dialogic’ struck me as a 
very generative concept, especially when we think about it being in dialogue 
with dialogue—or even against dialogue, with ‘the dialogic’ being dialogue’s 
opponent. Clark was right to point out that dialogues are protean and fertile; 
these are only two of many reasons why they need to be managed and— 
John Johnson: Look, I’ll take this guideline, if you have others, Allison. I think it well 
articulates my interest in acknowledging dialogue as occurring within an 
entity—or between its aspects—as well as between more independent 
entities, such as sovereign authors, who produce dialogue as intersubjective 
exchange. But I would prefer to say, ‘”The dialogic” self-organises the 
dialogues composing dialogic art into relation with each other’. I know Clark 
emphasised ‘self-management’, but ‘management’ strikes me as so, well, 
managerial. Earlier Anne, or should I say TheJargonBuster, defined ‘self-
organisation’ as something that occurs when aspects of something work 
together in such a way that no single one dominates. Look, this gets at what 
we were saying about the authorship of dialogic art being ‘distributed and 
contingent’, and in fact we determined that this could be another way to 
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 describe ‘the dialogic’—or perhaps more specifically still, the purpose of 
‘dialogic strategy’. It draws out the aspects of dialogic art as dependent on 
each other through their association and other relations.
Tommy Low: Excuse me but didn’t Clark say something to the effect that as far as he was 
concerned, dialogic art was about recognising all the labour that goes into the 
practice and realisation of contemporary art?
John Johnson: Sooo—
Tommy Low: How about ‘Dialogue at Work’—‘Dialogic artworks seek ways to acknowledge 
and value the range of labours enabling them.’ I hadn’t really thought 
about this before—the idea that artworks are work, or the possibility 
that someone’s art practice might look at the production of art from this 
perspective.
Phil Hind: Yes, yes, of course. This goes back to what I was saying about dialogic 
artworks organising all their heterogeneous materials into a network.
[The timer rings.]
Tommy Low: I don’t mean to go on but, what about the idea of including all the 
dialogues—all the labour—that’s often othered, I mean that’s so often denied 
in the artwork as a cohesive expression—an expression that denies the terms 
and conditions of its own becoming. Or at least I think that dialogic art may, 
could maybe, work harder to acknowledge more of this work, this labour? 
Within reason, of course. 
Allison Jones:  Of course we may run the risk of infinite regress or infinite progress—or both. 
But surely this is something that needs to be worked out on a case-by-case 
basis.
Marsha Bradfield: Well, I sense it’s a risk that dialogic art has to run if it is to engage authorship 
qua authorship as a practice that is, well, that acknowledges cultural 
production as—dispersed. 
Maeve Cutty: Well, then, luv, doesn’t this relate to the theory of the work or a theory of art 
practice? So could we roll this in too? ‘Dialogic art is a theory of art practice 
that seeks to acknowledge and value the diverse and disparate labours that 
compose dialogic artworks’.
Tommy Low: Yeah, I could go along with that. Could that be my guideline?
John Johnson: Certainly, and it seems that for the first time today we’re ahead of schedule, 
with four guidelines down and thirteen to go.
David Rooksby: Well, we’re all too knackered to put up much of a fight. We may not have 
exhausted dialogic art, but it has exhausted us.
[Barcamp laughs.]
John Johnson: Okay, so far we have Ella’s guideline, Clark’s, Tommy’s and mine. Marsha what 
was your second guideline option?
[The timer is reset.]
Marsha Bradfield: Like my thoughts about the ‘dialogueness of dialogue’ in dialogic art, I’m not 
sure I’ve yet fully articulated this second possible guideline to myself either. 
But it concerns the ‘dialogue of dialogues’. I was thinking the strap line might 
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be ‘A Dialogue of Dialogues’ and the statement of intent would go something 
like, ‘By recognising dialogue as a constitutive and heterogeneous practice, 
we can begin to account for the dialogues in dialogic works of art, with these 
occurring between interlocutors and composing registers of exchange, while 
also playing a constitutive role in the art’s overall significance’.
Anne Lang: Well, it’s quite long, that one.
Marsha Bradfield: Yes, I know. But we can boil it down in due course. After all, this is only the 
first iteration.
Phil Hind: Yes, quite. In a way, Marsha, that incorporates my proposed guideline. It 
makes good sense to me to acknowledge that, when it comes to the range of 
dialogues composing dialogic art, they occur between human and non-human 
actors. So I should like to suggest a tweak, if I may, Marsha. Could we place 
‘between human and non-human actors’ after ‘a diverse range of dialogues’?
Anne Lang: It’s already quite, you know, wordy. What about this: ‘A Dialogue of 
Dialogues’—‘Dialogue is a generative and multifarious practice composed of 
dialogues. Here intersubjective exchange often occurs through non-human 
interlocutors. The dialogues in dialogic art play a constitutive role in the 
art’s practice, composition and significance’. And as this is quite a high-level 
proposition, I think it should go near the end of the list.
Phil Hind: On second thought, I think we should separate the idea of non-human actors 
from the ‘dialogue of dialogues’, and give them their own guideline. My 
suggestion for the strap line is, ‘Human and non-human interlocutors’. So—
Maeve Cutty: What about a guideline dedicated to interlocutors more generally as 
authors instead of ‘actors’. This could then trail dialogic art as concerned 
with authorship qua authorship. So it could go something like, ‘Authors and 
Authorship qua Authorship’ [more tongue twisters]—‘By acknowledging the 
various authors of dialogic art, we gain insight into who and what authors this 
art as well as how it comes into being. This is part of dialogic art’s broader 
exploration into authorship qua authorship of cultural production’.
Brian Updike: Absolutely. But I would add ‘over the course of its iterative development’—
‘who and what authors this art as well as how it comes into being over the 
course of its iterative development’.
Phil Hind: Yes, yes, of course, Brian, but don’t you think the development of dialogic 
works of art is something else that warrants its own guideline? A guideline 
that observes dialogic artworks as evolving over time and space in tandem 
with the dialogues they constellate—or, more accurately, through the 
dialogues they constellate?
Marsha Bradfield: Well, for me, this gets at the idea of dialogic art being an ongoing ‘project’ 
that is alive to the ways in which it evolves reflexively, as it bends back on 
itself and informs its own becoming.
[The timer rings.]
[The timer is reset.]
Brian Updike: No doubt. But, in addition to bending back, dialogic art also spreads, as it 
makes what is immanent to itself, namely dialogue, immanent to the terms 
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of its own expansion. I mean, I can absolutely imagine dialogic art evolving 
its own approach to commentary as an extension of its artistic practice, and 
I can see this commentary being composed of a literal dialogue between say, 
Kester, Bishop and Bourriaud—and dialogic artists, including Marsha, as well 
as other interlocutors, second-order authors, for example. The idea would be 
that this commentary would itself bring them all together, on the same page. 
And this genre of commentary would be characterised by its own polyphony, 
its own particular way of organising the relations among its dialogic aspects 
and interlocutors. So what about something as simple as, ‘Expansion and 
Iteration’—‘Dialogic art spreads in time and space’.
Phil Hind. Yes, yes, of course I know what you mean, Brian. At least, I think I know what 
you’re getting at—but I don’t know how I would follow this as a guideline. 
Could we expand and iterate what you’re proposing, in the reflexive spirit 
of the guideline’s recommendation, but saying that, ‘Dialogic artworks 
evolve through iterations, with the practice of dialogic art networking their 
heterogeneous materials (dialogues, histories, interlocutors, etcetera) and 
expressions (practice, artwork, reflective commentary, etcetera) across their 
production, distribution and reception’.
Brian Updike: Absolutely brilliant. Or at least in light of our time constraints, it does the job 
as an initial iteration.
Marsha Bradfield: For sure, all the guidelines will need to be polished and compressed.
KK Lin: May I just say that your mention of dialogic commentary with regards to 
genre reminds me that we never really settled on what the medium of 
dialogic art is? Sorry to bring this up so late in the day.
Marsha Bradfield: If I remember correctly, both Shadworth and David felt this was language, 
with David taking the view that dialogue is the form of dialogic art, 
which accords with my interest in dialogic forms as being predisposed to 
representing a range of authorial relations.
David Rooksby: Well in a way, that comes onto my guideline, which trades on reciprocal 
relations. ‘Reciprocal Relations’ that’s the strap line, and I’m thinking the 
body could go something like this, ‘Reciprocal relations organise dialogic art, 
and bring into relation things that affect each other in ways that are mutual 
without being symmetrical’.
Allison Jones:  ‘Things’? What about ‘entities’. 
[The timer rings.]
[The timer is reset.]
Tina Wiseman: This is quite close to Krista’s guideline. She had to collect our granddaughter 
from a play day and so left it with us to read out on her behalf. ‘Affect’—
‘Being aware of the affect enveloping art practice makes us more sensitive 
to how we mutually influence one another’s experience and understanding 
through the transference of our emotional and bodily states’.
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Phil Hind: Yes, Tina, I think that’s important. But I wanted to say something about 
David’s guideline before moving on. I’m surprised, David, that you didn’t 
choose boundary objects.
David Rooksby: Thought about it. Both should have guidelines, for sure. Does anyone want 
boundary objects?
Cassy Appadurai: Actually, that was my pick. My offer goes something like, ‘Boundary 
Objects’—‘Dialogic art and practice are boundary objects that coordinate 
communities of practice through an ongoing process of commitment and 
negotiation’.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, it strikes me as crucial that we encapsulate the idea of threshold 
somewhere in these guidelines, and you come close to this here, Cassy. It 
occurs to me, however, that ‘negotiation’ may already imply ‘commitment’, 
making the use of the word ‘commitment’ redundant, and if there’s some way 
to lodge contestation in there—or perhaps heteroglossia, which entails the 
struggle of positions, voices and languages—we should try to do so. Perhaps 
something like ‘Dialogic art and practice are boundary objects. They bring 
heteroglot  communities together that thrive on struggle and—
Allison Jones: Struggle? Doesn’t that essentialise dialogic art as, you know, agonistic. I 
mean, haven’t we struggled throughout this barcamp to move beyond an 
essentialist understanding of dialogue—as linguistic exchange or otherwise? 
Though I would sort of agree that agonism is a condition of dialogue—and so 
is cooperation, really.
Ella Stone: Oui, mais, does agonism not imply cooperation? Is it not organised in so far 
as it brings authors, interlocutors and opponents into relation? But actually 
what I was going to say, and this is of course, what’s the expression, my 
‘hobbyhorse’, I was going to say that ‘collaboration’, understood in its most 
basic sense as ‘working together’, seems to catch a sense of engagement that 
could be useful here. So may I suggest, Cassy, that your contribution might 
read, ‘Boundary Objects’—‘Dialogic art and practice are boundary objects 
that engage author-agents through an ongoing process of collaboration that 
seeks to understand the terms of its own possibility’.
Cassy Appadurai: Yes, that’s good. Thank you, Ella. The last bit concerned with possibility seems 
to tap into the important question of what it means to collaborate in dialogic 
art by acknowledging that it’s actively taking shape through this art’s ongoing 
practice. Thank you very much. Or should I say, merci!
[The timer rings.]
[The timer is reset.]
Tina Wiseman: Ella, be to sure I understood you correctly, you said that, ‘Dialogic art 
and practice are boundary objects that engage author-agents through an 
ongoing process of collaboration’, yes? That’s what you said?  Alright then, 
I’m not quite sure about, ‘author-as-agent’? What are the terms of their 
agency? And why not foreground the artist as a coordinator and collator of 
the dialogues composing dialogic art? Christian and I were thinking about 
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this when formulating our guideline. It attempts to acknowledge that, in 
addition to producing artworks, dialogic art also produces subjects. So our 
guideline reads ‘The Responsive Subject’—‘Subjectivity in dialogic art resides 
with intersubjectivity, understood as an ethical relation marked by ongoing 
negotiation. Artist-agents author and are reciprocally authored through their 
artistic practice, in a responsive process. These artist-agents are individual 
rather than independent, with their individuality taking shape through their 
subjectivation in dialogic art—through its myriad dialogues—embedded in 
their broader life experience and practice’.
John Johnson: That’s quite a long guideline.
Tina Wiseman: Well, there is only one between us.
John Johnson: Okay, that means we’ll have sixteen instead of seventeen.
David Rooksby: Sounds good to me. Next.
Marsha Bradfield: I know we’re all eager to bring this barcamp to a close but this point that 
dialogic art produces subjects in addition to artworks strikes me as a central 
pivot—perhaps even the central pivot here.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well complementing the Wisemans’ guideline and your comments, 
Allison, is the idea that both first and second-order authors in dialogic art 
author the art, each other and their understanding through their utterances 
as thresholds across self and other. I expect it will come as no surprise that my 
draft guideline reads: ‘Utterance Literacy’—‘Dialogic Art is authored through 
and composed of its authors’ utterances, who use utterance literacy as a skill 
set for drawing out the utterance’s import as the building block of dialogic art. 
This literacy taps into communication as a threshold between self and other, 
and this is inscribed in their intersubjective exchange’.
[The timer rings.]
David Rooksby: Next.
[The timer is reset.]
Hillary Murphy: I am hoping my guideline indicates the epistemology of dialogic art as an 
approach to co-constructing understanding. Sooo… ‘Dialogic Epistemology’—
‘Anchored in dialogic epistemology, the way of knowing proposed by dialogic 
art is co-constructed. Through intersubjective exchange, subjects call into 
question their understanding, recompose it as knowledge in common and 
share it rather than treating it as coextensive among them’. What do you 
think?
Marsha Bradfield: Yes, that’s quite good. ‘Calling into question’ gets at Stephen Scrivener’s 
sense that a function of art is to raise apprehensions.3 At the same time, your 
emphasis on co-constructing knowing in dialogic art may also acknowledge 
literal dialogue in the form of intersubjective exchange as constitutive of 
dialogic artworks and practice in contrast to being something that they 
prompt on the occasion of their encounter as—
Ella Stone: Why don’t we just say, fait accompli!
KK Lin: Um, this mention of ‘literal dialogues’ and ‘calling something into question’ 
anticipates my guideline. Do you recall that I approached dialogic art from 
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the perspective of spatial relations? I was challenged to rethink this, in light 
of Marsha and Allison holding fast to dialogue as intersubjective exchange 
as a point of departure for their research and hence our broader discussion. 
So, um, speculating how figurative dialogues might serve to re-present the 
literal dialogues that constitute dialogic art became especially interesting—I 
think, in part, because perhaps it’s something that could distinguish this from 
other dialogue-based forms of contemporary art practice. So I’m thinking 
my guideline might be, ‘Literal and Figurative Dialogues’—‘Dialogic works of 
art take as their referent literal instances of intersubjective exchange. People 
interact with objects, networks, information and/or each other to produce 
these works of art. But figurative dialogues may also feature and highlight 
that the artworks produced through this exchange reassemble the authors’ 
utterances into a subsequent dialogue’. I know this isn’t quite right—not fully 
resolved—but what I hope is that it suggests some of the issues we wrestled 
with earlier. Do you think with a bit of editing, it might be able to insist on 
dialogic art’s innovation of mimetic schemes that, you know, acknowledge 
and explore the complexity of what we called ‘the ethics of opacity’ in our 
discussion?
Marsha Bradfield: As a first iteration, KK, that’s excellent.
John Johnson: So who is still outstanding?
Anne Lang: That would be me. What’s missing from our list is a guideline that 
acknowledges the point that John made earlier about bounding dialogic works 
of art—I mean, I think it’s an important point and really shouldn’t be missed. 
So, you know, if John doesn’t mind, I mean if I’m not overstepping here as 
this was really his observation, this guideline would read, ‘Boundaries’—‘The 
boundaries of dialogic works of art are determined by their contestation’.
John Johnson: I can go along with that. 
Brian Updike:  And what’s implicit here is the idea that, through this contestation, one 
becomes part of the community or network of practice—however briefly.
Phil Hind: Yes, well, all right, I suppose I’m up next. Well, mine may be a little opaque to 
those unfamiliar with how I’ve elaborated this idea here today, but I would 
say ‘Portraiture’—‘Each dialogic artwork aspires to be a portrait of itself as 
process, as opposed to a self-portrait of itself as an outcome’.
David Rooksby: Nice one, Phil—short and sweet. Allison, it looks like you’ll have the last word 
here.
Allison Jones: Well, firstly, I’d like to review our research rationales, with these being 
subsumed under our broader conviction that dialogue remains an under-
theorised yet nevertheless vitally constitutive aspect of contemporary art, in 
dialogue-based art practices and beyond. Very briefly—
John Johnson: Okay, but I’m afraid we won’t have time to discuss how we’ve explored them 
throughout the discussion, Allison.
David Rooksby: And nor do we need to because—because we’ve been discussing them for 
close to twelve hours.
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Fig. 13.4
Allison Jones: Well, very briefly and to bookend today’s discussion, our research ratonales 
are as follows (Fig. 13.4): (1.) To develop a more nuanced understanding of 
communicative experience by exploring the ‘dialogueness of dialogue’.
Shadworth Dyson: Yes, well, both Ella’s and guidelines concern this. 
Allison Jones: (2.) To examine about dialogue as art as well as being about art, while at the 
same time exploring dialogic art as a process of communication in contrast to 
a physical object.
David Rooksby: Done and dusted. I can’t think of a better example of dialogic art practice than 
this barcamp—an interactive event rather than an object.
Allison Jones: (3.) To research dialogue from the perspective of a practitioner directly 
involved in the art practice. Actually, this is where my proposed guideline 
comes into it, but I’ll come back to it following all the rationales. (4.) To 
investigate dialogue through diverse forms and materials. The idea here is to 
get beyond dialogue as either verbal exchange or intersubjective exchange—
in order to acknowledge the ways in which intersubjective exchange is always 
mediated.
Phil Hind: Yes, yes, of course.  I believe we made moves towards acknowledging a wider 
range of dialogues composing dialogic art, subject to further expansion and 
complication in good time.
Allison Jones: (5.) There is one final rationale, and it’s to understand dialogic art as a 
constitutive practice, with the methodology motoring this approach and 
bringing into relation sensibilities and resources drawn from disciplines 
beyond fine art.
David Rooksby: If the barcamp’s composition and the range of demos offered today don’t 
point to what a ‘constitutive practice’ might involve, I can’t imagine what 
would.
John Johnson: Okay. Allison, would you like to give us your guideline now?
Allison Jones: Yes. ‘Researching Through Practice’—‘This practice-based approach locates 
the practitioner in relation to their authorship as distributed and contingent. 
The research evolves from this position but it also aims to account for the 
dialogues composing it’.
Anne Lang: You know, I’d just like to request one point of clarification, Allison. Is it the 
‘researcher’ who’s distributed and contingent, their ‘authorship’ or both? I 
mean, it’s a little unclear.
David Rooksby: Where have you been, Anne? Both, of course! If I had a pound for every time I 
heard the phrase ‘and/also’, I’d be able to buy everyone drinks in the pub!
John Johnson: Okay. A round at the pub on David, it is. Speaking of which—
Marsha Bradfield: Right, John. Well I’m sorry this barcamp has come to a close and that it goes 
so rushed at the end. But, on behalf of Allison and myself, of course, I would 
like to thank you all so much for being here today as co-researchers into 
dialogic art. I hope very much that you’ll remain part of this community of 
practice, this network, this ongoing conversation. For sure, your contributions 
have evolved our sense of what this art is and could be, as well as opened up 
important areas for future research. 
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Allison Jones: Thank you all so much for being part of ‘What is dialogic art?’
John Johnson: Marsha, the guidelines?
Marsha Bradfield: Oh yes, when it comes to transcribing the barcamp, I’ll begin with the 
guideline session. I’ll email the list of the guidelines through as soon as 
they’re collated. Feedback is welcome, of course. 
John Johnson: Thank you, Marsha and Allison. Can we have one more round of applause, 
please?
[Barcamp claps.]
Marsha Bradfield: Allison, could you stop the recorder, please? Thank you. Thanks so much. 
________________
1Wikipedia contributors, ‘Guidelines’ Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.
php?title=Plagiarism&oldid=5139350 (accessed March 10, 2012). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guidelines. 
Referenced here is ‘ONE-VA Technical Reference Model, Glossary,’ United States Department of Veterans 
Affairs http://www.va.gov/trm/TRMGlossaryPage.asp, (accessed March 10, 2012).
2Stephen Scrivener, email message to author, April 11, 2012. Herein, Scrivener proposed uni-conclusive, 
co-conclusive and non-conclusive as three forms that understanding generated through dialogic exchange 
might take.
3 Stephen Scrivener, ‘The Art Object Does Not Embody a Form of Stephen Scrivener,’ Working Papers 
in Art and Design 2 (2002) http://sitem.herts.ac.uk/artdes_research/papers/wpades/vol2/scrivener.html 
(accessed May 19, 2011).
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GUIDELINES FOR DIALOGIC ART
John’s Guideline:  ‘The Dialogic’—‘Dialogic art takes its name from “the dialogic” 
and not “dialogue” per se. “Dialogue” is an exchange between 
interlocutors, with their utterances issuing across from each other. 
Originating in dialogue but also going beyond it, “the dialogic” self-
organises dialogues as well as the relations between them’.
Clark’s Guideline:  ‘Concepts and Strategy’—‘Dialogic art is distinguished by its 
“dialogic disposition”. It puts interlocutors in dialogue and makes 
this intersubjective relation conspicuous in its representational 
schemes. “Dialogic tactics”, like juxtaposition and nesting, 
underpin this art’s “dialogic strategy”, with this drawing attention 
to the wide range of dialogues composing dialogic art’.
Brian’s Guideline:  ‘Expansion and Iteration’—‘Dialogic artworks evolve through 
iterations, with the practice of dialogic art networking their 
heterogeneous materials (dialogues, histories, interlocutors, 
etcetera) and expressions (practice, artwork, reflective 
commentary, etcetera) across their production, distribution and 
reception’.
Shadworth’s Guideline:  ‘Utterance Literacy’ — ‘Dialogic Art is authored through and 
composed of its authors’ utterances, who use utterance literacy 
as a skill set for drawing out the utterance’s import as the building 
block of dialogic art. This literacy taps into communication as a 
threshold between self and other, and this is inscribed in their 
intersubjective exchange’.
Cassy’s Guideline:  ‘Boundary Objects’—‘Dialogic art and practice are boundary 
objects that engage author-agents through an ongoing process 
of collaboration that seeks to understand the terms of its own 
possibility’.
 
Anne’s Guideline:  ‘Boundaries’—‘The boundaries of dialogic works of art are 
determined by their contestation’.
KK’s Guideline:  ‘Literal and Figurative Dialogues’—‘Dialogic works of art take as 
their referent literal instances of intersubjective exchange. People 
interact with objects, networks, information and/or each other 
to produce these works of art. But figurative dialogues may also 
feature and highlight the ways in which the artworks produced 
through this exchange reassemble the authors’ utterances into a 
subsequent dialogue’.
Phil’s Guideline:  ‘Portraiture’—‘Each dialogic artwork aspires to be a portrait of 
itself as a process, as opposed to a self-portrait of as an outcome’.
Tommy’s Guideline:  ‘Dialogue at Work’—‘Dialogic art is a theory of art practice that 
seeks to acknowledge and value the diverse and disparate labours 
that compose dialogic artworks’.
Maeve’s Guideline: ‘Authors and Authorship qua Authorship’—‘By acknowledging 
the various authors of dialogic art, we gain insight into who and 
what authors this art as well as how it comes into being. This is 
part of dialogic art’s broader exploration into the authorship qua 
authorship of cultural production’.
Allison’s Guideline:  ‘Researching Through Practice’—‘This practice-based approach 
locates the practitioner in relation to their authorship as 
distributed and contingent. The research evolves from this 
position but it also aims to account for the various dialogues 
composing it’.
The Wisemans’ Guideline:  ‘The Responsive Subject’—‘Subjectivity in dialogic art resides 
with intersubjectivity, understood as an ethical relation marked 
by ongoing negotiation. Artist-agents author and are reciprocally 
authored through their artistic practice, in a responsive process. 
These artist-agents are individual rather than independent, with 
their individuality taking shape through their subjectivation in 
dialogic art—through its myriad dialogues—embedded in the 
artist-agents’ broader life experience and practice’.
Krista’s Guideline:  ‘Affect’—‘Being aware of the affect enveloping art practice makes 
us more sensitive to how we mutually influence one another’s 
experience and understanding through the transference of our 
emotional and bodily states’.
David’s Guideline:  ‘Reciprocal Relations’ — ‘Reciprocal relations organise dialogic art, 
and bring into relation entities that impact each other in ways that 
are mutual without being symmetrical’.
Hillary’s Guideline:  ‘Dialogic Epistemology’ — ‘Anchored in dialogic epistemology, 
the way of knowing proposed by dialogic art is co-constructed. 
Through this intersubjective exchange, subjects call into question 
their understanding, recompose it as knowledge in common and 
share it, rather than treating it as coextensive among them’. 
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Marsha’s Guideline:  ‘A Dialogue of Dialogues’—‘Dialogue is a generative and 
multifarious practice composed of dialogues. Here intersubjective 
exchange often occurs through non-human interlocutors. The 
dialogues in dialogic art play a constitutive role in the art’s 
practice, composition and significance’.
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A 1
TWITTER LIVE-FEED INSTRUCTIONS 
for 
‘What is dialogic art?’ barcamp
There are two ways to contribute to the Twitter live-feed:
 1. Use your own handle, in which case you know what to do.
 2. Tweet anonymously under ‘DialogicArt’ by going to https://twitter.com
       sign in as whatisdialogicart@gmail.com
   password: dialogue123
  start tweeting!
Please use the hashtag #diacamp for all tweets—this is a code that you’ll place at the 
beginning of your tweet to make it easier to search online, in Twitter and beyond. Visit 
hashtag.org for more information.
A few types of tweets:
 1. Status update—observation or comment about what’s going on in your world. 
 2. Ask a question regarding the barcamp’s content.
 3. Respond to a previous tweet.
 4. Make a comment regarding the barcamp’s content.
 5. Include a citation or reference of relevance—links are good.
 
In addition to ‘DialogicArt’, you’ll also notice someone tweeting as ‘Duchamp’s Sister’. This 
is Cassandra Appadurai, one of our two barcamp reporters. While Cassy will ‘narrate’ the 
barcamp, Anne Lang will define terms that strike her as obscure or specialized, under the 
handle ‘TheJargonBuster’.
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THE CONTRIBUTORS  
Anne Lang is a PhD student at Chelsea College of Art & Design. 
Her research concerns the discursive production of art, through 
both written and oral expression.
Anne contributed to the barcamp by tweeting. As 
TheJargonBuster, she defined obscure words raised in the 
barcamp’s discussion.
Allison Jones is a critic, curator and art historian. Currently 
based at Chelsea College of Art & Design (University of the Arts 
London), she is collaborating with artist Marsha Bradfield on a 
practice-based PhD in dialogic art. Through her research, Allison 
is developing a conceptual framework for understanding this 
art. She is also interested in art research as an extra-disciplinary 
knowledge enterprise.
Allison co-organised the barcamp and co-presented the welcome 
address. Here she focused on the event’s research rationales as 
an outgrowth of her and Marsha’s collaborative research.
Cassandra Appadurai is an art journalist and writer based in 
London.
Tweeting under the handle of Duchamp’s Sister, Cassy 
microblogged ‘What is dialogic art?’, sharing the event with 
interlocutors online.
A2
Clark Chris has been blending an eclectic mix of skills and 
sensibilities to create a unique symbolism in his art practice 
since his emergence in the late 1990s. His art explores ‘the self 
in art as a way of life’, concentrating on the personal psychology 
of art making. For Clark, the artist’s media is unimportant. It is 
his capacity to inspire a response that counts. Often using banal 
objects, materials and forms to surprising effect, Clark’s artworks 
eschew conventions of ‘good taste’ to explore the intimacies of 
diverse systems of value.
For this barcamp, Clark gave a PechaKucha on ‘the dialogic’. 
Described as a non-narrative fable, this contribution speculated 
that ‘the dialogic’ stems from, but also goes beyond, dialogue. 
It resides with dialogue but also acts as a counter force with the 
aim of making dialogue more productive. With this in mind, Clark 
proposed a set of analytic categories for understanding dialogic art 
and exploring the conditions of its self-organisation.
Brian Updike is a California-born writer based in London. He 
freelances as a curator and art critic, contributing to wide-ranging 
international publications. Updike also co-edits Assume the 
Position with Ella Stone. This new magazine examines art and/as 
writing.
In their joint contribution, Ella and Brian approached dialogic art 
through the lens of collaboration. Brian focused on the interplay 
between art commentary and art practice, suggesting that in 
the case of relational art, they may be extensions of each other. 
This occurs when what is immanent to the art practice becomes 
immanent to its commentary and vice versa.
David Rooksby was trained as a designer but today works in 
advertising. Describing his current practice as ‘dynamic and 
resourceful’, it ranges across print, new media and social 
networking. David lives in Brighton with Chris Throp and their 
three children.
David approached dialogic art as a resource. He pitched three 
advertising campaigns inspired by the barcamp discussion. This 
opened discussion on dialogic art and practice as ‘boundary 
objects’, shaped through cooperation and contestation among 
their stakeholders.
 497    496
Ella Stone is the lead curator for HiT International’s contemporary 
art collection. Currently based in London, she joined HiT in 2007 
from Tate, where she had worked since 2000. Stone’s interest in 
contemporary art began when she visited the Museum of Modern 
Art whilst studying anthropology at la Sorbonne. Inspired by 
indigenous forms of community art, she read non-western art 
history and criticism, and today works as a curator and writer and 
has a strong interest in emergent art practices characterized by 
social engagement. Stone also co-edits Assume the Position, a new 
magazine that investigates art and/as writing, with her partner in 
work and life, Brian Updike.
For this barcamp, Ella and Brian approached dialogic art through 
the lens of collaboration. Ella focused on ‘collective collaboration’ 
as collectivised practice for making the socially engaged character 
of the artwork’s production manifest in its artwork outcomes. 
Ella’s reference to Sophie Calle’s Take Care of Yourself sparked 
heated discussion about what distinguishes a collaborative 
approach in relation to participation, collectivity and other 
organisational modes.
John Johnson is a London-based artist, curator and educator. 
Describing himself as a ‘generalist’, his art practice spreads across 
diverse media and concerns, which he constellates through his 
long-term interest in self-organisation, self-governance and other 
ways of approaching group or shared practice.
In addition to being the barcamp’s designated agent provocateur, 
John facilitated the final session. Here the contributors 
consolidated their day-long exchange by proposing guidelines for 
the ongoing development of dialogic art.
Krista Wiseman is an artist, educator, curator and activist. 
For ‘What is dialogic art?’ Krista offered reflections on the affective 
registers of intersubjective exchange. Drawing on the barcamp 
as an example, she noted the subtle (and not so subtle ways) 
that emotion and volition spreads through dialogue amongst 
interlocutors.   
KK Lin’s photo-based practice examines our relationship to 
the built environment. In her intricately constructed photo 
installations, she explores art as an immersive experience arising 
from spatial relations. Her current work investigates urban 
construction sites in areas of regeneration.
KK’s contribution concentrated on Pierre Huyghe’s Chantier 
Barbès-Rochechouart, provoking discussion about types of 
dialogue. This helped to flush out a specific concern in dialogic art 
with dialogue as intersubjective exchange, in contrast to figurative 
or metaphorical dialogue.
Hillary Murphy is an art educator currently based in London. She 
studied fine art as an undergraduate at the Accademia di Belle Arti 
di Firenze and completed an MA in education at Essex University. 
Her areas of specialization include process-based practice, 
informal education and peer-to-peer exchange.
Hillary proposed dialogic epistemology for understanding the 
significance produced in dialogic art and practice. This prompted 
discussion on social constructivism as similarly concerned with co-
constructing knowledge.
Marsha Bradfield is presently pursuing a PhD at Chelsea College 
of Art & Design (University of the Arts London) in collaboration 
with Allison Jones. Her recent research explores dialogic art as a 
dialogue-based contemporary art practice that aims to understand 
dialogue in an expanded sense. Previously, Marsha worked in 
Critical + Cultural Studies at Emily Carr University, Vancouver, 
Canada and studied Chinese art and Mandarin in Taipei, Taiwan. 
She has also worked in collaboration with Critical Practice, 
Precarious Workers Brigade, Future Reflections and Contemporary 
Marxism Collective. 
                                                                                                                      
In addition to organising and co-facilitating ‘What is dialogic 
art?’ and collating documentation of the barcamp, Marsha co-
presented the welcome address with  Allison Jones. Marsha 
observed the influence of popular culture on dialogic art, via 
trends including social networking and unconferences like this 
barcamp. 
Maeve Cutty is an educator, writer, artist and researcher. Maeve 
investigates the authorship of new cultural forms, exploring the 
intersection of voice and textuality. She has a PhD in Cultural 
History from the University of Edinburgh through which she 
examined the role played by fonts in written expressions of 
autobiography.
In this barcamp, Maeve proposed authorship qua authorship as 
a central concern for dialogic art. While offering a partial defense 
of the author’s authorial agency, she considered the complex web 
of authorial relations through which ‘the authored’ is realized as 
such.
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Phil Hind is trans-disciplinary in inclination. Part sociologist 
and part methodologist, Phil has worked with artists, writers, 
architects, designers, teachers, engineers, medical practitioners, 
lawmakers and business people. Day-to-day experience is trans-
disciplinary and it demands practices that are sensitive to material 
heterogeneity, spanning ‘natural’, social, cultural, economic, 
human and technological aspects. Phil says he’s ‘fascinated 
and horrified by complexity and think we need flexible but also 
robust ways of studying how things interrelate.’ That’s why he 
works with Actor Network Theory (ANT) and other sociological 
approaches in an attempt to catch social processes and 
understand their contingencies. These approaches come together 
in a growing toolkit, something closer to a heterogeneous bunch 
of methods (definitely not a cohesive theory!) for mapping 
systems and experience. Phil again: ‘I’m also preoccupied with the 
performativity of method, which is to say how methods produce—
via often surprising and conflicted ways—the phenomena they 
are describing’. Phil’s current research project considers the 
performative dynamics of social protest in the UK in response to 
the recent economic downturn. He lectures at UTTQ and TTU and 
runs The Center for Distributed Studies and Services.
In this barcamp, Phil used ANT to explore PARADE, a research 
project concerned with being ‘in public’ that was realised in 2010 
by Critical Practice Research Cluster based at Chelsea College of 
Art and Design. Phil proposed ANT as a methodological toolkit 
for tracking the networks that support dialogic art’s dispersed 
authorship.  
Professor Shadworth Dyson is the author of numerous 
publications on sociolinguistics and pragmatics. His current 
research interest is social dialectology (an approach to language 
change and development) especially within speech communities. 
This includes populist hobby groups, where enthusiasts of 
different backgrounds come together in assemblages cutting 
across age, class, gender and ethnicity. Professor Dyson is 
currently working on his third ESSRC-funded research project on 
the discursive features of artists in London, taking account of this 
cultural context’s massive diversity.
For ‘What is dialogic art?’ Professor Dyson proposed ‘utterance 
literacy’, informed by Mikhail Bakhtin’s meta-linguistics, as a skill 
set for practitioners of dialogic art.
Tina and Christian Wiseman have been working together since 
1972 when they met as students whilst studying photography at 
Kunstakademie, Düsseldorf. Their subjects often emerge from 
living and working with other artists. Supporting and facilitating 
the art practices of others, they say, ‘is central to our own’. 
In the barcamp, Tina and Christian discussed subjectivity and 
authorship with reference to Emmanuel Lévinas’s and Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s ethical perspectives. In response to the question, ‘What, 
in addition to art, is produced through artistic practice?’ the 
Wisemans proposed the ‘responsive subject’. This subject emerges 
through an ongoing process of utterance and response as they 
understand their creative production as composed of diverse 
relations between self and other.  
Tommy Low is currently interning in advertising and enjoys fishing 
and snowboarding in his spare time. 
For the barcamp, Tommy created three advertising campaigns 
aimed at branding dialogic art. They were pitched by David 
Rooksby. 
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